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Appeal from the USDC for WD Texas (3-Judge Court)(Goldberg, USCJ,
Spears & Roberts)(PC)
This is the Texas school property tax equal protection

----------------

case.

Appellees brought this action on behalf of Mexica ..
American children and their parents who reside in the
Edgewood Independent School District near San Antoniog
and on behalf of all other children throughout Texas

-

who live in school districts with low property valuations.
Appellees contended that the method of state financing of
public schools deprived their class of the equal protection
of the laws in violation of the 14th amendment,
agreed.

The USDC

-2State support to public elementary and secondary schools
in Texas is funnelled through the Available School Fund,
which allocated approximately $296 million in 1970-71 on
a per capita basis, and the Minimum Foundation Pro$ram,
which allocated more than $1 billion in 1970-71 in the form
of grants for the costs of salaries, school maintenance,
and transportation.

Eighty per cent of the Minimum

Foundation Program is financed fnn general

s~te

revenues

with the remainder apportioned to local school districts.
lev~y

Local school districts are empowered to

and collect

ad valorem property taxes to provide their share of

he

Minimum Foundation Program (20%), to satisfy bonded
indebtedness for capital expenditures, and to finance all
expenditures above the state minimum.

It is this ad valorem

taxation system that the USDC found unacceptable under the
command of the Equal Protection Clause.
Because of the large part that local ad valorem taxes
play in financing public education in Texas, the USDC con-

-

cluded that this ad valorem taxation system made the guality
of education received in the public schools a function o
t~local

property tax base.

For example, the USDC noted

that a survey of 110 school districts throughout Texas demon•
stnated that while the 10 districts with a market value
of taxable property per pupil above $100,000 enjoyed an
..
equalized tax rate per $100 of only 31¢, the poorest 4
("'· -

districts, with less than $10,000 in taxable property per
pupil, were burdened with a rate of 70¢.

Despite the

fact that the poor districts taxed themselves at a rate
more than double the rich districts, the low rate of the
rich districts yielded $585.00 per pupil, While the high

-3-

rate of the poor districts yielded only $60.00 per pupil.
Moreover, since certain state financial support programs
operated on a matching funds basis, the USDC found that the
taxation system tended to subsidize the rich at the expense
of the poor, rather than the other way around.

For poor

school districts in Texas, the USDC correctly observed that
the taxation and financing system was a "tax more, spend
less system."
Observing that the statutory and constitutional
frarnwork in Texas for providing public education drew
distinctions between groups of citizens depending on the
wealth of the district in which they live (which in turn
is a reflection of their own economic status), the USDC
concluded that Texas would have to demonstrate a compelling

--

state interest furthered by the classifications in order
to withstand constitutional attack.
of

e~al

protection review was

The demanding standard

thou~ necessary

because

a fundamental interest, education, was involved, and
because the distinctions were based on a suspect classifi ..
catio~

--

wealth.

The USDC concluded that far from showing

that compelling state interests justified the classifications, Texas had not even been able to show a reasonable
basis for the classifications. The Supreme Court of
California has reached a similar conclusion, Serrano y. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971), as has the USDC for Minnesota,
Van Dusartz y. Hatfield,

F.Supp.

(Minn. 1971).

The USDC stayed its mandate for two years and retained
jurisdiction, in order to give Texas an opportunity through
its legislature to devise a new financing scheme consistent
with the command fo the Equal Protection Clause.
In addition, the USDC provided that its order in no way

-4-

affected the validity and sources of payment of the debt
obligations of school districts currently outstanding, nor
would it affect the validity of obligations and sources of
revenue adopted to secure them within the two-year stay
period,
The guts of the decision is that appellees' class was
denied the equal protection of the laws because "the system
of financing public education in Texas discriminates on
the basis of wealth by permitting citizens of affluent
districts to provide a higher quality education for their
children, while paying lower taxes."
In No. 71-1332 appellants are the school district and
the State of Texas.

Because of the importance of this

issue, I would NOTE PROBABLE JURISDICIION.

In the

alternative, AFFIRM.
In No. 71-1339 appellants are a group of iKas banks
who underwrite and own school bonds, as well as the Securities
Industry Assn.

They seek to appeal from an order denying

them leave to intervene as a matter of right,

They sought

to intervene after the USDC rendered its decision in the
case, which had been going on for three years.

Tieir

~

con-

cern
is for the integrity of the debt obligatiomof the
..
school districts, and the sources of revenue adopted to
service those obligations.

The USDC provided protection

for these interests to the maximum extent possible.
would AFFIRM in this appeal.

I

They sought to intervene far

too late in the date, and the USDC correctly noted that
their interests had been fully protected by the State of

-

Texas.

....

In No. 71-1332 the AG's of several dozen states have

filed an amicus brief in support of jurisdiction, and the

-5Governors of 5 states (Minnesota, Maine, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, and Michigan) have filed an amicus brief in
support of the motion to affirm.

Leave to file these

briefs should be granted.
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Curiously, however, the Supreme Court cases relied
upon involved "wealth classifications" that operated against
individuals

(!.~.

imprisonment of indigents for failure to

pay fines, providing criminal defendants with counsel and
transcripts, outlawing poll taxes), whereas in Serrano and
and RodriS'!ez the wealth classification was of "school districts".
Professor Goldstein, University of Pennsylvania,
in an article recently published in 120 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev.
504 (1972) questions the validity of the nequal wealth of
school districts" analysis.

Indeed, a hurried reading of

Goldstein's article is rather convincing that the school
district wealth foundation for these opinions is logically and perhaps legally - insupportable.
My own experienee in public education in Virginia -

if my recollection is correct - tends to corroborate Prof.
Goldstein's critical view.

The taxable wealth of a school

district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the citizens
who reside in it.

A classic example is Sussex County, Virginia,

in which Vepco has recently constructed an atomic power plant
costing - as I recall - several hundred million dollars.
This has resulted in the taxable wealth of that previously

. '·

'

J<-·••

3.
poor county "going through the roof' , without affecting ...
except in a few

arginal cases of persona employed • the

actual wealth of resident
resulted in J
plan

t

of the County.

A similar situation

s City County when Anheuser-Busch built its

ere.
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of ealth, the City of

Richmond is on

of Virginia's wealthiest school districts -
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bee~
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these questions.

If you discuss this with me , perhaps

I can indicate sources which may save you some time.

L.F.P., Jr.
lfp/ss
cc:

'

'

Mr. Larry A. BaDIP'l'ld

......

.:

•;'

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Kr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

August 30, 1972

No. 71-1332 San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez
The Court in the above case (following almost
slavishly the California case of Serrano v. Priest, which
in turn adopted almost literally the ''activist scholarship"
theory ofJrofessors Coons and Sugarman in their book, Private
Wealth and Public Education, predicated its opinion on the
proposition:
uThe quality of public education may not be a
function of wealth other than the wealth of the
state as a whole. n
But the Court in both of these cases, again following the
"activist scholars '' , considered the wealth of school districts rather than the wealth of people - as controlling.

The Court

held the Fourteenth Amendment required school districts of
11

equal wealth'' or some equalizing action by the state so that

the wealth available for education in each school district is
approximately the same.

2.
Curiously, however, the Supreme Court cases relied
upon involved "wealth classifications " that operated against
individuals

<!·B·

imprisonment of indigents for failure to

pay fines, providing criminal defendants with counsel and
transcripts, outlawing poll taxes), whereas in Serrano and
and Rodri&uez the wealth classification was of • school districts 11 •
Professor Goldstein, University of Pennsylvania,
in an article recently published in 120 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev.
504 (1972) questions the validity of the "equal wealth of
school districts 11 analysis.

Indeed, a hurried reading of

Goldstein's article is rather convincing that the school
district wealth foundation for these opinions is logically and perhaps legally - insupportable.
My own experienee in public education in Virginia if my recollection is correct - tends to corroborate Prof.
Goldstein's critical view.

The taxable wealth of a school

district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the citizens
who reside in it.

A classic example is Sussex County, Virginia,

in which Vepco bas recentlt constructed an atomic power plant
coating - as I recall - several hundred million dollars.
This has resulted in the taxable wealth of that previously

3.
poor county "going through the roofu. without affecting except in a few marginal cases of persons employed - the
actual wealth of residents of the County.

A similar situation

resulted in James City County when Anheuser-Busch built its
plant there.
My guess is that, in terms of wealth, the City of
Richmond is one of Virginia's wealthiest school districts largely becaa•• of industriQaL and commercial development
within the City.

Yet, the wealth per individual or family

may be relatively low in view of the large black population.
The educational problem in Virginia resulting from
real estate taxes being the principal source of school revenue
at the local level is in the

L~ral

counties - not in the

urban centers inhabited by the blacks and the poor whites.
In Giles County, for example, there is little or no high value
real estate or industrial development.

The county is poor

and the people are poor, but they are not '"6hetto•• residents
and there are very few blacks.
I am writing this memorandum to you in the hope that
you will go by the State Department of Education and assemble
such statistical data as may be available and relevant to

4.
these questions.

If you discuss this with me, perhaps

I can indicate sources whicb may save you some time.

L.F.P., Jr.

lfp/sa
cc:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

MEM>RANDUM

TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

August 31, 1972

No. 71-1322 San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez
This case reminds me, as Brandeis urged, of the
importance of the economic and sociological facts in cases
of great social and constitutional significance.
The Coons and Sugarman thesis (that the quality of
education varies directly with the money spent on it) has been
assumed by many to be true but proved by no one.

BeGGre I

accept it (in view of my own 20 years experience in public
education and my skepticism as to facile new theories), I
would like to see more documentation than I've found so far
in the briefs or the shallow opinions in Serrano or Rodriguez.
There is, of course, a relationship between reeources
devoted to education and its quality.

But it is equally true

that money alone can't buy educational quality.
Charlie Wright's brief for Texas challenges the
Coons and Sugarman assumption, as it does the view that the
Constitution requires "equal" wealth devoted to education in

2.
each school district.

Professor Goldstein's analysis also

questions the assumption.
I wonder, however, whether there may not be studies
by

educators-~.~.,

at the great university schools of educa-

tion (Harvard and Texas), for example) - that would be relevant.
The Coleman report is cited, but I believe this is
now acknowledged to have various flaws.

The re,prt of the

President's Commission on School Finance (1972) may be a
helpful source.
These random thoughts lead me to inquire whether
we can obtain any research assistance in this area from the
Court Library or the Library of Congress?

If this may be

possible, will you try to frame the research questions.
L.F.P., Jr.

' !,.,_

---'~--

---~-----------~'-

________________

__......,,~

,

•.

September 7, 1972

No. 71-1332 Rodriguez v. San Antonio
I should read the case comment by Timothy H. Gailey an applicant for a clerkship - in the March 1972 issue of the
Harvard Law Review, Volume 85, p. 1049.

L.F.P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. .J. Harvie Wilkinson,

FROM:

lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: September 27, 1972

San Antonio v. Rodriguez No. 71-1332
As you did not have an opportunity to obtain the Virginia information

which we discussed, I suggest that you call the state Treasurer, your
friend Walter Craigie, Jr., and ask him to send you a copy of the state
Report -a public document -which contains in various statistical tables
information as to the assessed valuation of real property in each county
and city, and the real property tax rate in each of these subflivisions.
In Virginia, as you lmow, the State Constitution requires property

to be assessed at fair market value. But the practice prevails of
"discounting" the assessed value by a specified percentage, and applying
the tax rate to the discounted value. Thus, in Hanover County (where my
family's farm was located), my recollection is that the assessed value
was discounted 60-70 . before applying whatever rate the Board of
Supervisors determined for a particular year. In view of this syiltem
1n VirglnJa comparisons cannot be made fairly without being adjustedwhich I believe 1s done in one of the offtelal reports.
I believe the same report (containing statistical data an taxation

in Virginia) will show the assessed value (and possibly the adjusted

2.
"real value") of real estate per capita in each city and county.
I m1derstand, of course, that Virginia statistics are net nece•sarUy

relevant to the san Antonio case. I would like to haft a copy of the
Virginia report primarily for my own information and to satiafy my
curiosity.
In speaking to Walter, I would not mention any spec1flc case:

simply say that you would like to have a cq>y of the latest report which
contains th ls data.
I.. F. P ., Jr.

cc: Mr. Larry A. Hammond

BENCH MEMO
No. 71-1332 OT 1972
San Antonio Independent School Dist v. Rodriguez
Appeal from USDC WD Texas (Goldberg, Spears, Roberts~~PC)
I.

INTRODUCTION
In your memorandum to me dated September 21, 1972,

reviewing the cases assigned to me for the first sitting
period, you indicated that this case was of the highest
priority.

You also stated that, based upon your reading

of the principal briefs and selected amicus briefs, it was
your preliminary view that the USDC WD Texas was wrong.
Finallyg you suggested that I might divert from the usual
bench memo format and undertake to draft my memo in a manner
that might serve as a "rough outline" of an opinion, which
might preserve valuable time later.
Pursuant to your suggestions, I have reviewed the briefs

-

.,

with the goal in mind of preparing an outline of the
critical issues in the case.
examine a number of the
not

critical"~in

conclusion-~secondary

the major precedents.)

(I have also undertaken to
terms of importance
to

authorities as well as

A

1

canvas ~

Having only ski~d the surface in
~

terms of the volume of resources touching on the problems
raised in this case, I have arrived at a number of threshhold conclusions.

First, the case is clearly the most

important one I have participated in since you came on the
Court (indeed, it is possibly the most important case in
recent years).

i ~S

Second, there ... a seemingly endless

number of paths that one might pursue to the resolution
of this controversy.

-

There simply are no constants• the

factual premises are as disputable as the legal conclusions.
I, thereforep find it impractical (and possibly impossible)
to draft an outline opinion at this stage.

Thirdp despite

this disappointing response to your request, I do find
that

~ny

intelligent and thorough opinion would grapple

~ith

several issues, and it may prove most helpful if I

attempt to designate those matters and endeavor to collate
the contentions and basic source material on each.
One final caveat.

It is not my anticipation that this

will be the last memo I write in this case.

Rather, it is

my estimation and hope that we will do much exchanging of
views before this case comes to rest.

I look forward to

participation in this case with more enthusiasm than I
can recall possessing heretofore for other cases.

This

case presents a rare combination of socialp legal, and
philosophical considerations.

--3-II.

FACTS
This suit was filed in the USDC WD Texas in 1968 by

the parents of school children residing in Edgewood Ind.
School Dist against the State Bd of Educ, the Att Gen of
the State, and the Bexar Gty (San Antonio) Bd of Trustees.
A three-judge ct was properly convened in light of the
nature of the attack on the state laws governing the financing
of education as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
The major factual findings relate to the manner in which
the State system operates and the manner in which it affects
both the plaintiff school district and other districts
throughout the state.
Texas, much like 49 other States, funds
and secondary schools from two primar
funded foundation grants an

2..

(i) elementary

sources• state-

local property tax contri-

butions that are collected and expended locally.

The

State "Foundation School Program" is itself funded from
two sources.

Eighty percent of the Fund comes from state

revenues, while 20% comes from local district contributions.
The State Fund goes to pay for teacher salaries, building
maintenance, and transportation.

Some confusion in com-

puting the amount of the state aid is caused by the use
in the several briefs of statistics from two different
school years.

The DC found that state aid contributed

$210.00 to Edgewood
and $237 to Alamo Heights, the most
.--._
wealthy district in the Cty (these fgures are per pupil,
per year).

The Serrano amici, apparently relying on figures

for the same year

(1967~68),

arrived at $222 for Edgewood

and $225 for Alamo Heights. (CC & S at 16)

Appelleeso rely-

.. ,...4 ......

ing on statistics from 1970-71, found that state aid accounted
for $350 in Edgewood and $393 in Alamo Heights (the locality's
required share, or Local Fund Assignment, uped the former
to $356 and the latter to $491).

If these figures are

accurate despite the fact that they were not mentioned by
the DC, they would seem to indicate a not insubstantial
increase in state participation over the last three years.
The second major source of school finance--local
property taxes--has not changed much over the same period.
The DC found that in 1967-68 Edgewood had a market value of
real property per student of $5,429 and was able to raise
$21 per pupil.

Alamo Heights possessed a market value per

pupil of over $45,000 and provided $307 per pupil in taxes.
~i

The astonishing trgurep however, was the tax rate.

Edge-

wood taxed itself at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of property
value while Alamo Heights taxed itself at only $.85 per
$100 valuation.

These two districts demonstrate the

prototypical result often found by comparing the districts
with the least property wealth against the one with the
most--the poor districts tax themselves at a higher rate
but yield substantially less in terms of educational
expenditures per pupil.
appellees ~ sh~

(More recent figures provided by

that at the same rates Edgewood

nO\'l

provides

$37 per pupil while Alamo Heights provides $412.)
In addition to the comparison of plaintiff's district
to others in San Antonio, the DC relied on a study om

-

110 of Texas' 1200 school districts showing that in the

wealthiest districts (over $100,000 taxable property per
pupil) expenditures of $585 could be derived from a tax

--5~-

rate of 31¢.

In the poorest districts (under $10,000 per

pupil of taxable property} a 70¢ rate yielded only $60.00
per pupil.

In the bulk of intermediate school districts

the correlations weee not so exagerated.
(The state and local figures outlined above can be
bewildering.

The parties are not presenting the Ct with

identical data, instead they pull statistics from affidavits
f4iled which ~over, with varying degrees of completeness,
several years of this litigation.

Moreover, there is no

reason to expect that the Edgewood-Alamo Heights statistics reflect disparities throughout the state.

The

broader 110 district sample is challengable both because
of the size of the sample and the lack of significant
correlation except at the extremes.

The parties, however,

should concede that this case will not be won or lost on the
basis of the particular statistics in this case.

In

approaching such a massive problem the Ct cannot be so
myopic as to disregard the .:ealities of
on a nationwide basis.

sc~ financi~

That is, it will necessarily pin

its decision on generalities about school financing through
property taxation at the district level.
those generalities must be verified.

And, of course,

I will return shortly

to the question of what generalities must be sustained in
order for plaintiffs to succeed.)
Based on these factual findings, the DC held that the
Texas system of school financing discriminated on the basis
of district wealth.

It found that this case was appropriate

for treatment under the "compelling state interest" umbrella
of the Ct's Equal Protection decisions.

It justified this

--6-·
·t h ato e d ucat~on
·
·
~s
categorization on the dual cone 1 us~ons

a fundamental interest and
are suspect.

tha~eal~h"based

classifications

Based on this foundation, the DC accepted

the principle of "fiscal neutrality" ..... the quality of public

-----------....

education may not be a function of wealth, other than the
wealth of the State as a whole.

Not only was it able to

find a compelling state interest for the state's program,
it found that the state had failed "even to establish a
reasonable basis for these classifications."

Finally, it

emphasized that plaintiffs had not advocated, and the ct
I•

,~ ·

had not approved, a rule that educational expenditures

---=-

~ust be~al.

Any rational scheme of financing ... -apart

from wealth ... based classifications ...... would pass muster.

This

choice was for the State to make and not for the federal
ct.

The DC, thereforep stayed its hand for two years to

allow the state to devise anj

III.

.. ,, .. , +.. lo le.

· g· ,,

plan.

THESIS
The focus of this case from start to finish must be

on the inquiry whether quality education may depend on the
wealth of political subdivisions within any given state.
Even before that question may be asked we must come to
grips with several of the factual premises of that thesis.
But, and this seems to be of paramount importance, the Ct
must avoid the temptation to mislabel the case.

It is not

a case designedp necessarily, to provide some remedy for
the educational ills of .._ racial minorities or of the

-

poor.

Certainly some "poor" children and some minority-group

c hildren will profit but so will many who cannot claim either

~~ 7--

status and whose only injury derives from his place of
residence within a property"poor school district.

It is

not surprising that these factors keep springing up.

Plain"

tiffs made a showing of correlation between individual
po~erty and relative educational deprivation, as well as a

showing that minorities were clustered in property-poor
districts.

In fact, while it did not rely on the findings,

the DC did note that in the San Antonio area the poor and
the minorities were lumped in property-poor districts.
Despite those findings, those who crusade for uplifting the
educational status of the poor and the Black or the MexicanAmerican may be disappointed.

The other "mislabel" that

seems to crop up is that this is somehow an equalization of
expenditure case (see C.A. Wright's Reply brief at 12).

Every-

one who has written about this case has emphasized that
equalization of expenditures is not the theme.
in his article in the

u.

Pa. L. Rev.

several times (pp 512, 513, 518).

9

Goldstein,

makes this point

As I have already pointed

out, the DC was careful to note this fact.

IV.

FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THESIS
(1)

Relationship between money spent on education and
its quality.

You have indicated in your memos on this case a special
concern about this aspect of the thesis.

Certainly if we

could conclude that there is no correlation between money
and educational quality this case would be over.

If money

doesn't buy education then the deprivation of money doesn't
deny the opportunity to enjoy education and 9 ergo, the equal

.... a.....
protection clause has not been violated by the state.

As

you have pointed out, however, "there is a correlation,
of course, between resources devoted to education and
its quality."

(Memo of 8/31/72)

Texas also acknowledges

that "there is some minimum sum of dollars beneath which a
sound education cannot be had."

(C.A. Wright brief at 18)

The President's Comm'n on School Finance comes to largely
the same conclusion:
"The truth is that educational research is only beginning to come to grips with the complexity of the
total teaching process • • • • But, reason would seem to
indicate that there must be fruitful ways to spend
more money to improve schools • • • • We recongnize that
money builds schools, keeps them running, pays the
---:2
teachers, and in crucial if not clearly defined ways, is
essential if children are to learn." (P. xi)
This unwillingness to be more assertive about the
relationship between money and quality is largely a consequence of recent studies finding no or little correlation
between increased expenditures and educational consequences.

--

Most notable are the Coleman Report and the more

recent Jencks Report accounts published in the press.
ry

The

former has been criticized for its method and for its
adopted measure of quality (esse~tially ..-k scores on
tests designed to measure

~~degree

of improvement in

particular subject areas).
The contentions of the parties derived from these
uncertain studies should be briefly set out.

The State

of Texas asserts that at some defined minimum of per pupil
expenditures the State is providing every child with a

-.-9---

"basic" of "fundamental" education.

This is certainly true •

./

:_ ~

There is undoubtedly some level of state expenditure at

~· ~- ~w~ich the parties would agree that an adequate minimum

t! ~.\X

~

~

expenditure above that figure would be simply icing on the

~ ·. ~
/

~

~

~·

~p

7

educational package has been offered and that any local

Texas characterizes its expenditure system in

precisely this fashion.

"The state program • • • does

guarantee an adequate education to every child. • • •
Beyond the state program, each district is left free to
spend more money as its resources and its desires indicate."
(C.A. Wright reply at 17) (see also p. 4 of opening brief)
How do we determine whether $200 is adequate, or whether
$350 is adequate?

Who is to bear the burden?

A number of

answers to those questions have been oYfered in the briefs
and in the underlying literature.
One approach is to ask whether the State can be said to
have genuinely determined that it's share of the financial
burden provides a fundamnetal education when every school
district that has the resources taxes itself to add on to
the state grant.

When the state grant fails to provide for

art courses, a school newspaper, vocational training, a
sports program, libraries (or any of a myriad of other
things) but somehow every school district decides that it
must have them--sometimes at the expense of the things the
state grant labels as minimum (teacher salaries, maintenance)-is it rational to
/

the funding?

J ,Hd,.,...£

the property tax-based side of

The State itself, reasonimg along the same

line, encourages local districts to spend more on teachers
and those schools that do are rewarded with higher state

--10-grants.

Texas will not be able honestly to claim that it

has not heretofore acted on the presumption that money and
the quality of education are related.
On a national level it is almost universally true that
public education is a function of mutual effort between
state funding and local property taxes.
that

Goldstein notes

52% of all state spending on schools comes from

local contributions (p. 507).
percentage breakdown cited

Although we do not have a

in ~ the

briefs a look at the

spending figures indieates that close to half of the money
in any but the poor districts comes from local taxation.

. "'.

In such a system the schools that must rely on the state
aid

aloneAli~ely

to be inferior institutions in a large

number of demonstrable ways.

Teacher salaries will be

~~
, ~~~~· alcowt~vr:t~elassses will be larger, fewer extracurricular

~.

~-

~ ~ ~

will be found, libraries will be smaller, etc.
It
'\"
In sum, as measured by the inputs, it will be clear that
,,
.., .,
these schools are inferior. When the output computations

~ _ ~ .· .. ~
rrfl-':! , rv'

~~

~

(l ~J
~~
~

vv

·

~

---

are so ambiguous it may make good sense to rely on the
objective indicia.

several pre-Brown v. Bd of Educ cases under the separate but
equal doctrine.

"\'"!

~~ ·

Sweatt v. Painter, 339

u.s.

629 (1950) is

probably the best example of comparisons between objective

~~~ indicia
~ ~ ~lfi

This was the approach taken in the

among the schools--facilities, course offerings,

teachers, etc.
The President's Comm'n relies, in part, on the demonstrated fact that when parents have a choice between schools,
other things being held constant, they will send their kids

.. -11--

to the school that spends more.

It is an assumption that

educators have almost universally taken as a given and
so lo"'t -.c
. . . . . the rejection of that principle provides nothing
but uncertainty, it is likely that educators will continue

i-t-.

to rely on .......a-...

This is one area where your own

experience as an educational planner may be of service to
the Court.

~--),

Are gross disparities between per pupil

expenditures fairly indicative of disparities in the
quality of education received?

""'A&e· ~vr---
~·

~.

c::r4t 'f ~

~d ~?~·$~
The question is made somewhat easier here because in~~

every state the discrepencies are still significant and
Texas is no exception.
Appellees also argue that insofar as the future of
conducted on
educational research and experimentation will be/the
i + ,~ fi'J'\
proving ground of state-supported schools
Afair to
deprive property-poor districts of the opportunity to parti•
cipate in that process.

These are the essential touch-

points in the debate over the wealth-quality relationship•
I will save my conclusions for later.

(b)

Is market value of property in a district an adeqQate

....:1,"':7" .. '
e4

measure of weal£h?
To the extent that this inquiry is relevant to the case,
it is a source of much controversy.

It is my judgment that

this case will not rise or fallv however, on the basis of
this factual dispute.

Nevertheless, it has been pushed into
con
the case by the parties and ilsumes considerable space in
the principal briefs• it, therefore, deserves treatment here.

..... 12--

__ ________

The question posed focuses on the relationship between

-

__,
"individual
wealth" and "district wealth."

.

The latter is

measured in terms of the assess Able real property (measured
at fair market value) per pupil.

That is, all the

•

assess l ble property is added up (residential» commercial,
and industrial) and divided by the number of students or
"task units" within the district.

The category of individual

wealth is reflected in as many as three relevant measure~

ments.

One might look to the median family income (what

the income of the family in the dead center of a continuum of
incomes makes), or at the mean family income (the average
income).

Or, in an effort to relate district wealth to

real poverty, one might focus on the number of families
within any district living below the "poverty level."
The DC relied on statistics regarding median family

-

incomes and found a positive correlation 9 i.e.P the more
taxable real groperty in a district the richer the families.
T~s ,

{

relying on the Goldstein article 0 challenges those

findings.
....

4

,..,.,.

Goldstein notes that the statistics relied upon

do not cover all school districts but only a selct portion.
And 0 even within that sample, the correlation exists only at
one
the extremes. Texas also directs the Ct to il6 law review
articlel (Kansas L Rev) and a California study tending to
reject the thesis that any correlation exists.
A very recent study performed by the Yale L. Rev.

(which

has been circulated to counsel and the Ct although still in
page proofs) is the most complete analysis yet available.
The Yale study undertook to examine every school district in
the State of Connecticut (save two).

They compared statis-

--lJ ....
tically . . . district property wealth with (1} the median
family income, (2) mean family income, and (3) the number
of "poverty-level" families within each district.

~
fV

·

-

Its

findings were that district wealth correlated well with
~th

median and mean family incomy but that there was
-

no discernible correlation between poverty families and
district wealth.

On the latter pointp it was shown that in

Connecticut the really poor tend to be spread throughout
the state's school districts.

Some, of course, were resi- 1~~

dents of property-poor districts but others were residents
of districts with very high assessible property.
Yale, Goldstein, and the authors of Private Wealth and
Public Education explain this lack of correlation in the
0.

same m• nner.

The crucial factor in many districts is the

existence of commercial or industrial property which is
generally more valuable than residential property and
often taxed at a higher rate.

..., .....

This finding comports with

,.

your example of the Virginia school district in which a
major power plant was constructed.

It also explains why

oil .. rich West Texas has some of the sturdiest property
tax bases and some of the poorest people.
The architects of this thesis that has been adopted by
the Texas ct and by cts in at least three other states have

______

-

recognized from the very outset that "fiscal equality" or
............_
"fiscal
neutrality" was not a principle geared to uplifting

-

-

the poor individual.

Their thesis has focused instead on

those who are "education poor." It has looked to those
'-ll.lii&AIIIIU~G o-&- ' " • J e , ..#:. lot~ 'It J., '"~I
schools thaSoffer Ln erLor e ucatLonal programs and
has concluded that those children have been deprived of

--14--

education on the basis of a wealth category created by
the state.

They find that individual famil

wealth is

largely irrelavant if it cannot buy education.

The state

___,-

~

has said what "coin" or indicia of wealth will be utilized
to acquire education and those that have relatively
fewer of that "coin" must suffer irrespective what
other assets they may possess.

One gropes for analogies

to make the point that seems to have been lost on the
principal parties.

Maybe the point becomes clearer if

we look to the days in our country's history predating
the existence of a common currency.

If the State of

Virginia had required that a child's education be paid for
in cloth goods or other merchandise, those parents who
had only grain and produce would have been disadvantaged
and we might consider them "poor" in terms of their ability
to purchase education.

Of course, insofar as they were

able to convert from one currency to another-"insofar as
they could exchange grain for cloth goods--their poverty
would be diminished.

But, where convertibility is pro-

hibited as a practical matter, the "cloth poor" remain
"education poor."

~

~.

v..l

This is pretty close to the situation

with public education today.

If a famil

wishes to purchase

a better education from the State of Texas they do it
-/(

largely throu h their property tax payment, an~

At the risk of belaboring an obvious point, one more
non-hypothetical may be of value.

The statistics reprinted

in the Serrano-amicus briefs show that out of 1200 districts
in the State of Texas the Ysleta School Dlstrict was 6th

--15--

from the ..._ bottom in terms of per pupil expenditures for
education.

Its combined state and local contributions

netted an expenditure rate of $296 per pupil.

The Ysleta

district is the one in which my family's home is situated.
When I was in public school the District could not yet afford
a high school and I was fortunate enough to be sent back
Ysleta
into the wealthier El Paso School District (with the/District
paying the tuition to the City). Two of my brothers and
1-1.~ Yc/cf«.;
one sister went through ~ school system, however, and

,. ,._;,'X

their educational offerling was always t · 3 .?

deficient

(in my parents eyes) in comparison with the education offered
in the El Paso Schools.
were few indeed.

But, the options open to my parents

They would gladly have devoted more of their

personal income to education but did not have enough to send

~>the

UJ ~ ~

~
W""" ,..

•

o/-o

kids to private schools.

They could, and

favor of every school bond issue.
increasing the :d valorem tax rate.
~r

did~

vote in

They also promoted
This was the extent of

to effect the quality of public education that

:·_A;~
~~- ~. ---~- vV ~-

not at all that my parents might have been able to pay

~-

a greater share of their income for education.

~

~~~?·
~

their children received

In practical terms it mattered
I

Or, neither

did it matter that they were not "poor" in terms of the
median income in the State.
Momentarily, I will return to this problem of wealth
and the purchase of education in considering the constitutional arguments.
mentioned first.

One final "factual assumption" should be

--16--

(c)

Is a property-tax based ysstem for financing public
education discriminatory on a minority or racial basis?
As I have stated earlier, this issue seems entirely

..

spurious and is a product, primarily, of the case's
advocates1 in the press and the law reviews excessive
zeal for the result.

It has been billed by some proponents

as a means for eradicating racial disccimination i1fhe pro"
vision of education.

Indeed, the DC did find that minority
'r--~~----·~---------~

groups were concentrated in property-poor districts.

Again,

however, the ratio holds true only in the extremely rich or
extremely poor districts.

The property-poverty of a school

district• depends too significantly on the drawing of lines
~

~----------~~--'---------~

and on the existence of high-yield property to be susceptible
to the conclusion that all or any significant percentage
of the poor districts are glutted with minorities.
ly,

Certain-

in Edgewood will profit from the DC

Mexican~Americans

decision but their gain is incidental or even coincidental
to the benefits accruing to all the children in propertypoor districts where the tax effort has been high and the
educational yield low.

I will not waste further time on

this "herring."

V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
The Constitutional argument is styled in the language

of recent precedents of this Ct recognizing a differentiation between levels of justification necessary to support a
state's classifications in terms of the suspect nature
of the classification and/or the fundamentality of the
interests affected.

That approach to the 14th Amendment

--17---

is generally referred to as the "compelling state interest"
analysis byl its proponents, and as to "new equal protection"
by its critics.

Essentially it differentiates between two

types of cases.

Most cases involve differences in treatment

under state law that are entirely permissible so long as
they are supported by some "rational" or "reasonable"
basis.

Cases of economic regulation have long resided

in that area.

E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348

U.S. 483 (1955).
v. Williams, 397

More recently, welfare

u.s.

ca~es

(Dandridge

471 (1970)) and housing (Lindsey v.

Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972»have been placed in the same
category.

Cases involving more "fundamental" interests,

however, have called for a

highe~

of legitimate state interest.

more demandin& showing

In that category the Ct has

-

found (1) the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972), (2) the right to a fair criminal process
(Griffin v. Illinois, 351

u.s.

(,J)

12 (1956), andAthe right to

interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394

u.s.

618 (1969)).

In this category as well are cases involving classifi-

-

cations touching upon First Amendment rights (Police Dept
of City of Chicago v. Mosley, June, 1972).
The higher or more demanding showing is also required
in another group of cases which involve classifications
11

, ._

on the basis of some particularly suspect category of
persons.

Foremost in this arena, of course, are classifi-

cations based on race.

...._.,

A~enage

"

has also been found in

this "suspect" category (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971)).
\

Wealth has heretofore been recognized as the

third member of the suspect category group(Harper v. Virginia,

--18-383

u.s.

663 (1966), Bullock v. Carter, 405

u.s.

134 (1972)).

Historically, a finding that either the state law
~\

tC

impinges upon a fundamental interest Q£ draws into question an
~

\t

invideous or suspect

classification, was sufficient to

support a requirement that the state must meet the higher
justification of "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state
interest."

For instaflce, in race cases the state • s cate-

gorization is always subjected to careful scrutiny no
matter what the interest affected is.

Likewise, when the

right to interstate travel or the right to vote is impinged
upon it makes no difference that the state discrimination
was not drawn along any "suspect" line.

-

In sum the

two doctrines--fundamental interest and suspect category--

I

operated largely independently to invoke closer scrutiny.
Appellees concede that this has never been the case with
respect to wealth-based classifications.

A quick review

of the major wealth cases confirms that conclusion.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351

u.s.

12 (1956), which involved

the right of an indigent to a transcript for use on appeal,
involved both a wealth.,.based classification and a "fundan'ffotal"
interest in a fair criminal process.
~

Douglas v. California,

372 U.S. 353 (1963),concerning the right to court-appointed
counsel on appeal, also inplicated the right to a fair
criminal process in conjunction with a wealth barrier.
Harper v. Virginia Bd of Elections, 383

u.s.

663 (1966),

the case that struck down the Virginia poll tax, was c&:ght
up in the right to vote as well as a wealth-premised discrimination.

Most recently, Bullock v. Carter, 405

u.s.

134 (1972)--the Texas primary filing fee case--also found

.,
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a union of wealth discrimination and a fundamental interest
in the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice.
It is with these precedents in mind that plaintiffs
attacked the Texas system of financing public schools.
They,and the Seranno-amici, have been content to argue
that the state need show a compelling interest for its scheme
~n~

-

if the Court agrees that (1) the present system dis-

c riminates on the basis of wealth, and (2) that it implicates a fundamental right to education.

If either were

found lacking the State would only have to measure up to
the lesser "rational basis,. standard.

You, of course,

need not accept this entire approach to the equal protection
clause,

But, before turning to a consideration of alter-

natives, I will explore the case as presented.
(a)

Classification on the basis of wealth
In my discussion of the factual

assumpt~ons

underlying

the constitutional argument, I endeavored to demonstrate
that there is not a great deal of difficulty encountered
in finding that the Texas educational system is wealthbased,

It may or may not discriminate against the "poor."

However,
PJ~•

~

c:early does discriminate against the propert¥-

i.e., because of a system established by the state,

definable classes of its citizens . . . find that they are

,,

"

without the resources to provide an a:Pequate education to
their children,

In some districts the discrimination

results only in relative deprivation--the taxpayers must
try harder to arrive at the same level of educational
ing of other property-endowed districts.

offer-~

In other districts,

speaking in practical realities, the ·citizens are effect-

ively barred from attaining the same level of educational
offereing as other districts because only an unattainably
high rate of self"taxation would net the same funds as
are available in more wealthy districts.
\

"

-

\

There are, however, two barriers in the wealth portion
of the equal protection formula which any opinion would
have to deal with.

-

First, as the State of Texas emphasizes, all of the

~v

.

former wealth cases have focused on the wealth of individ-

uals.

Now,

for the first time, the Ct is focusing on a

~ ~classification based on the wealth of a collection of

~ ~~

~~ -~

~~

individuals, the wealth of a political
this

~s

a distinction

su~;vision.True,

but in the words of Socratic method,

~ ::i:::e:::st:0 :e~1::::i:::i::i::~:~t3 :)d:::e;e:::~ i:~A.
'

,f

sufficient substance to the distinction to warrant any
devotion of time.
Second, the wealth classification has not received
what I could call unwavering protection from the Court.
One might argue that the wealth classification is not
a..,. J..
itself suspect Ill that each of the wealth cases may be
explained in terms of the fundamental interest impli-

-

cated.

This argument derives from the point I made pre-

viously that wealth has not attained an independent status.
While the nonindepenaence is surely true, it is not accurate
to argue that the "wealth classification" cases do not
emphasize the wealth aspect of the case.

There is ample

language to substantiate the plaintiffs' claim for
preferred treatment.

a

One recent precedent, however, poses

--21-more serious problems for any smooth rationale for
a wealth classification.
In a 5-3 decision, during Justice Black's last Term on
the Court he authored James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
James challenged, on equal protection grounds, the Calif
Const provision requiring that no local housing projects
could be constructed in any county in the State without the
.q,J.,, +urn
prior approval of the local electorate in a referendum ...a .
The lower ct had found the provision unconstitutional
largely on the basis of Humter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 384 (1969).
charter provision
In Hunter the Ct invalidated an Akron, Ohio 61dij4i61
that required that all ordinances dealing with real estate
as it related to Problems of race must be approved by a
majority vote in a City election.

The Ct found that this

provision discriminated on the basis of race--racial
housing ordinances could become law only with the approval of
a majority of the voters while other housing matters did
not require such procedure.

Since race has long been a sus-

pect classification, the Ct applied the "rigid scrutiny"
formula and found the Akron charter lacking in sufficient
basis.

Justice Black found Hunter distinguishable because

James was not a race case and he was unwilling to "extend"
Hunter. He did not say that wealth was not a suspect cate-

..
devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination,
gory.

Instead he emphasized that referendums "demonstrate

--

prejudice."

~

He found that, at the most, the Calif Const

provision migqt be found to "disadvantage" "diverse and
shifting groups" but that this alone was not enough.
While Black did not focus on any wealth classification,

--22-the dissenters (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun) did.

Their

opinion emphasized that "classifications on the basis of
poverty" are "suspect" and "demand exacting judicial
scrutiny."
,., 1

Read broadly, as Texas reads it, James

\

1-otn,l f fJ
signal the

fJ J, -1- J, c

death of the wealth classification's suspect nature.

Such

a devastating conclusion is probably unwarranted since Justice
Black did not dispose of the case explicitly on that ground.
The case may be viewed as relying instead on the peculiar
va1 ue o f th e f ree

+o
1·~t~ca
· 1
·
·
re~n
g~venAth~po

process and

~o

community decisionmaking as an experience in democracy.
Any very broad holding accorded James is undercut by the
Court's subsequent unanimous decision in Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), in which the CJ relied, in
part, on the wealth-based discrimination against voters
and candidates who lacked the funds to place a candidate
on the primary ballot.

Bullock itself is a somewhat

enigmatic decision, however, since it rests on both the
right to vote and the wealth discrimination.

But, at the

least, Bullock is a "strict scrutiny" case which relies, in
part, on the wealth classification and undercuts the notion
that James killed the category.

It is my judgment that

whatever result is reached in the instant case James
will not be the determinative precedent.

(b)

Fundamentality of Education
A great deal of space has been devoted in the briefs to

the question whether education is fundamental, in the
sense that other interests 0 such as fair criminal process,

..

--23-voting, interstate travel, and speech-related interests,
have been found to be.
several fronts.

The argument is made really on

First, plaintiffs cite the long string of

Supreme Court cases in which the Ct has recognized the special
role of public education in this country.
Education, 347

u.s.

Brown v. Bd of

493 (1954) is the first and most often

cited source a
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is the principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values • • • In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of education.
Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on eEJ:ual terms."
Similar, although not quite as powerfully said, is language
from a number of other cases.

Interstate RR Co. v. Mass-

achusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907) (Justice Holmes); Myer v.
Nebraska, 262

u.s.

390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,

268 U.S. 510 (1925); McCollum v. Bd of Education, 333 U.S.
203 (1948) (Justice Frankfurter); Abington School Dist v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

See also each of the more

recent cases we cited in Healy v. James for the importance of
freedom of speech in the marketplace of American schools.

-------

On top of that precedential foundation plaintiffs

--

stack the following assertions.

Education is the necessary

minimum if a citizen is to participate fairly in the free

.... 24-enterprise system.

-

Without it he is hobbled at the gate.

Education is necessary to give meaning to the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment.
~

The right to speak,

~------

the right to petition the government, and the concomitant
right to receive information are largely meaningless for
the uneducated.

By the same token, if voting is necessary

for participation in the foundational political process,
education is essential if that right is to have any real
substantive worth.
On the other side, Texas does not contend that education
is unimportant.

Instead, it argues that it is not "funda ..

mental" in terms of the interests protected under the 14th
To establish this proposition the State looks to

Amendment.

I

recent cases which have dealt with other important human
interests.

r ....

-

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 the Ct

"""

refused to ~classify public welfare assistance as a funda-

"

mental interest entitled to protection under the higher
scrutiny standard.

Rather,

~

lumped welfare in the cateaory

of "economic and social" interests.

The fact that welfare

"involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," was not itself sufficient to justify applying a higher constitutional standard.

That view was under-

lined last Term in Jefferson v. Hackney when the Ct cited
Dandridge favorably and stated that welfare legislation would
pass muster so long as the "judgments are rational and not
invideous."
405

'~
--

u.s.

The same tact was taken in Lindsey v. Normet,

-

56 (1972) with respect to housing.

The Ct rejected

an effort to persuade the Ct that the "need for decent shelter"

.. -25-was a fundamental interest calling for "a more stringent
standard that mere rationality."

While stating that it

would not "denigrate the importance of decent, safe and
sanitary housing," the Ct concluded that t:he "Const does
not provide judicial remedies for every social, and economic
wrong."

From these cases Texas reasons that if subsistence

and housing are not fundamental, education cannot be.
Of course, appellees argue to the contrary.

....

that the Court's interest in education ·

~

They note

.... longer

history thal the more recent concerns for welfare and
housing.

(

Also, education affects more people more directly.~

Most importantly, appellees and amici differentiate those
cases on the ground that the fundamental right to an
acceptable education is rooted in the "Document" itself
~-------------------------because it is inherent in the full exercise of First
Amendment rights and the right to participate in the
political process.
In the case law analysis one other case is found to be
significant by the State of Texas.

They cite Gordon v.

Lance, 4U3 U.S. 1 (1971) involving a West Virginia requirement
that all local bond issues or increases in tax rates be
approved by a 60% majority in a local referendum.

In this

case there was a School Bd bond issue that failed to
get the requisite 60% in a referendum (it received 51.55%
support).

In a short opinion the CJ held that the statute

was neutral, supported by rational state interests, and was
not violative of the equal protection clause.

Texas argues

that since this was a case involving education, if there is
a funda~tal interest in that area, the Ct would have said so.

--26-Briefly, I find this argument unpersausive.

The Ct billed

the case as a voting rights case, not as a threat to any
tt>

fundamental interests in education or any other municipal
A

services.

The statute did not interfere in any signifi-

cant way with education as opposed to other local interests.
And, the attack was not based on a claim of deprivation of
any right to education.

-

"Another argument, h a1.ng
considerably more merit, is
made by the State.

•

The State contends that it will not be

enough for the Ct to conclude that there is a fundamental
right to education.

Instead we will have to determine what

about education makes it "fundamental" and then determine
whether the disparities between districts occasioned by the
1
reliance on local property taxation are so substantial as to

'

constitute a denial of that fundamental interest.

1'~~~'argument

is the legal face placed on the State 0 s argument

~' ·_j~
~._ challenging

~

C. «.l C'.S

the~ factual

assumptions, i.e. that the State's

,,

share of aid to education provides whatever is fundamental

~~
,,

~t an education.

I agree with appellants that there

must be some difference in constitutional terms between

~
(

This

'~t!;~ absolu~iv~ion

~)

/.k ·

of _a fund:;tal r ; t an;-;:

relative deprivation of that right.

~

Certainly, if the re-

lative deprivation was a mere several dollars per student per

~~,...,~

be hard pressed to find a violation of equal
large measure, the resolution depends on the

•

_..~ same factors considered in my discussion of the State's
~
~ ~ .~
~

~~

factual argument (see ~~ .•~11~.

Where the discrepancies are

as large as they appea~ 1.n th1.s case, the issue of relative
deprivation becomes less troublesome.

. • rtJ•
L .......
_A
I ' ''
e.hN~

..,.

:--

•

>•

Alsop where the proof

--27-is that every district that can afford it spends more
per pupil on education than do the property-poor districts,
a strong case may be made that the actions of the citizens
themselves establish. . what they find to be a fundamental
educational opportunity.
Much time will--and ought, to be;-devoted to this question.
One thing that should be kept in mind is the need for the Ct
to stay away from beling placed in the position of designating
some figure as constituting a "minimum" education.

That is

a matter for each state to conclude for itself--not for this

I

Ct.

The Constitution does not provide for a fundamental

education.

It
.....

...

only provides that if a state offers a

fundamental education to some it must not offer less than than
to others simply because of their lack of wealth. You have
already placed your finger on one of the reasons why the
Ct must not lose sight of the limitations of the Equal Protection clause.

In your memo to Jay of 9/28/72 you suggest

that the San Antonio theory, "carried to its ultimate extreme"
would "require nationalization of all public schools."

This

is only a real possibility if the Ct forgets that its focus
is on the state and the state's provison of education.
if the Ct were to declare some fundamental hum

Only

-

right to

____________

.......
education would differences between states become consti-

-------

tutionally relevant.

It is only after the state has under-

~
taken
to prov~de a service--here education--that the Ct
~

requires that it offer it to all on an equal basis.

And,

it is for the State to define the "education" it is offering.

--28--

Texas would have the Ct accept the notion that it has determined what "education" is and has handed it out throughout
the state in terms of the State-funded grant.

The local

taxing which adds on to that amount, Texas says, is merely to
satisfy local needs or desires above and beyond what the
State has found to be an adequate education.

Appellees

attempted to put the lie to that argument in the DC by
proving that the local property tax portion of educational
financing was an integral part of the State's program for
providing its children with an education.
be a legitimate issue before the Ct.

That dispute will

The definition of

"quality education" or "fundamental education" as a concept
in the abstract will not be an issue.

(c)

Compelling State Interest
If appellees get this far--if they convince the Ct of

the fundamentality of education and the invideousness of
wealth classifications--they will have no trouble estab......

lishing that there is no 'Jompelling state interest to
substantiate the State formula for school finance.

-

The

only conceivable justification is local control and the
short answer to that justification is

~hat it simply

does not provide local control in any real sense at the level 1
7tll~~~t4c., tJI C.l't'tl~lf.U#-1,..,.,11'1 ·At.uf'f,hle.)
of the poorer districts, and
nyratternat1ve's' i
.. v ..,, ...,,

Dol-t.
3
,

•

.,...,,,+§

Jl

··

preserve local control.
the contrary.

1

nl•••• ·

7

if

· 4S could

Texas does not argue seriously to

--29-(d)

Rational Basis

le

Mention should be made of the possihl

f

applicability

of the lesser standard of scrutiny--the rational or
reasonable basis test.

The DC found that there was no
...,

.....

-

adequate state basiss
"Not only are defendants unable to demonstrate
compelling state interests for their classifications
based on wealth, they fail even to establish a reason"
able basis for these classifications."
Appellees, of course, rely on that finding and conclude that
even if the Ct fails to demand stricter scrutiny they should
still prevail.

The Seranno"amici do not take that approach.

In their book they concede that the odds against success are
overwhelming under a rational basis test.

Texas takes even

a stronger position, stating that it would be "doctrinaire
in the extreme" to strike down as lacking a rational foundation a system that has been in existence for over 50 years.
Quite apart from the legal analysis of whether the Texas
system is rational, there are strong policy reasons for
avoiding resting the case on the rational basis test.
short, as will become clearer when I review

In

th~remedies

available, a rational basis test would interfere with the
State's choices of alternative systems.

At any rate, it is

-

my judgment that if appellees cannot invoke some higqer
standard of scrutiny their case is doomed.

(e)

An intermediate standard.
So far I have dealt with the language of equal protection

l

as,if there were but two standarqs.

I have treated the

--30-case as if constitutional adjudication were a process of
mathematical deduction.

Those who have given the equal

protection analysis careful consideration have recognized
that, in fact, the process does not operate this way.
Justice Marshall in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
stated it well:
"the constitutional question may sound like a mathematical formula. But legal 'tests• do not have the
precision of mathematical formulas. The key words
emphasize a matter of degree: that a very heavy burden
of justification is on the State, and that the statute
will he closely scrutinized in light of its asserted
purposes."
It is only in an effort to give consistency and predictability to constitutional adjudication under the equal protection clause that the Ct has developed this ·series of
/

labels and classifications.

- -------------.

There is a great deal to be said

for avoiding both the appearance and the fact of ad hoc
~
~~----------------------lawmaking, but labels should not obscure what lies beneath.
~

.

.,..__

Your opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. reflects
a basic sensitivity to the problem.

There you stated,

"Though the latitude given state economic and social
regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory
classifications approach sensitive and funda~tal
personal rights, the Court exercises a stricter
scrutiny. "
That language seems to contemplate a sort of sliding scale
or balance in which the relative importance of the right
affected and the relative"suspectness"of the state's
classification is weighed against the legitimacy of the
State's interests.

In part, I believe that this is the manner

''-...•

l,

,n
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.,luc.4

If you accept the

you will--and should--approach this case.
It

precedents which conclude that wealth is a suspect classification, and at the same time agree with my analysis that a
wealth-based discrimiaation is not alone enough to warrant
closer scrutiny, then the degree to which we will
burden

+-4t.
~

state with a duty to justify its property tax

will depend on the relative

funda~tality

in our society and under our Constitution.

s~stem

of education
On this question

your own experiences, and your own view of what is and what
is not essential to our form of government, will dictate
whare you place education on any sliding scales of values.
The higher you place education, the stiffer the burden
on Texas to justify its system.

-""----------

Having reached that

decision, should you conclude that education is of sufficient importance to merit imposing a significant burden of
,.

explanation on the state, you will probably find the state
system inadequate.

Then, in drafting an opinion, the focus
~

wi; l shift to ~riting in a manner,.. wil~rovide__!_~e_:ibility

4 .,

for the States to choose other alternatives and offer them
a fair prediction of what alternatives will be successful.
In so doigg you or whoever authors the opinion might well
return to the classical language of equal protection to
provide the necessary precedential basis and solidarity of
analysis. This is, I think,how the game will be won or
lost.

Assuming for purposes of completeness that the case

were affirmed 0 I will briefly canvass the remedial alternatives,

--32-VI.

REMEDIES
The USDC did not instruct Texas as to what it was to

do to correct its school financing system.

It merely

struck down the existing scheme and told Texas why it was
unacceptable.

This is as it should be.

federal court to fashion the remedy.

It is not for the

The exact same approach

has been taken by the other courts that have recently struck
down property-tax based financing systems.

-

Professor Wright makes a convincing argumentp

however~

that before this Court affirms the USDC it must determine
~-----------~--------------------

whether Texas does indeed have options available that are
~---------------------------~---------------------

both constitutionally acceptable and politically feasible •
.~

I agree and will, therefore, outline the two main categories
of alternative financing systems that have been suggested.

(a)

State "subvention"
1

S~bven!!o~ is the w~d to mean full sta~e

assumption of financing.

The State would collect all the

revenues for education in the state and then disburse those
resources as it sees fit.

The revenues could come from

any of the usual revenue sources open to the state (in•
come tax, sales tax, etc.).
ta~n

the property tax as

Indeedg the state could main"

~sourc~ducatiOJl reye~es.

Once the revenues were collected the State would then be
free to dole out the funds to the state's local school
districts in any manner that it found proper.

The only

limitation on the state is that it may not distribute

--...__-----GI.

funds on the basis of the wealth of local school I

{

•J tJ-IC.

+s

D.

Those who have attempted to undercut the Coonp Clunep
A

'·.

.. ,..J ......

Sugarman thesis have argued that the State would be placed
in a "strait jacket" with respect to expenditures. _,...--.
They
argue that the State would have to allocate its revenues
among the districts on an equal per pupil expenditure
basis.

As I have stated earlier, this is simply not the

case if the Ct strikes down the existing system under a
strict scrutiny standard.

The factors which render the

present system invalid are (1) the importance of education,
and (2) the distribution of that commodity among the districts
on an impermissible wealth basis.

So long as the state

does not divide up the money on the basis of the wealth (either
district or family) of 't he recipients P any other bas is
would be approved.

This is obviously so because the State

would only have to measure up to a standard of rationality.
Andp in an area of the state's expertise and in an area
~

in which there are many unsettled empirical questions
'~ ~
..... ..
~~
about the relation between expenditures and education,

-

-----------------

federal courts would be hardpressed to find a state's judgw
•

~

.............

ments irrational or unreasonable,

_ _____........

::>

The best example of this

flexibility may be seen if we consider whether the state
would be free to designate several "experimental" districts

p

in which it will send at considerably higher rates in order

"
to test the relationship
between increased money and education.

Certainly, such a program would be rational in a

nonlegal sense.

And, so long as the State does not select

the districts on the basis of the property wealth of the
districts, a federal ct would be compelled to approve it.
Opponents of subvention argue that this alternative
places the schools in a stultifying atmosphere of

far~away

--34 ....

O..ureacratic control.

But there is no reason to find that

____

the localities need to be deprived of the power to control
the manner in which money is expended.

......,._ State wished
___,
If __the

to maintain local control it could surely do so.

~

----------~~--------------------------

The

?

~·

President 0 s Comm'n on School Finance recommends state
funding as the best approach to the resolution of present
inequities created by state reliance on "local district
financing for the bulk of educational revenues."

(P. xii).

The Comm'n also recommends that local districts be permitted
to increase the amount spent in its schools above the
state foundation by as much as 10%. (P. xiii)

~

As a practical matter the latter suggestion by the
Comm'n is an imperative.

Those districts that value

education higher than the state values it should be permitted to contribute more to education.

Local add-ons will

pass muster under the rational basis standard so long as the
bulk of funding is not dependent on local wealth, i.e. once
courts can conclude that the state is providing a fundamental
educational package to every child in the state,local
increments will not be providing a fundamental interest
and the program will, again, only have to survive rational
basis scrutiny.

This result strikes one appropriate balance

between what I regard as the two major competing interests
in education.

Our country has always valued highly the

notion that everyone gets an equal educational opportunity.
~

At the same timeAparents and school districts have always
valued highly the goal of the best education available for
~

their children.

Any system which cannot provide the former

A

without sacrificing the latter is destined to meet public

I

.... 35 .....

opposition •• The problem with the existing system is that
'1--h- f J,, .,~
it provides the localities a ' h money an opportunitydto
provide quality education without granting a similar
opportunity to less welathy districts. State subventionp
coupled with flexibility for local

add~onffi,

meets both

interests.

"District Power Equalizing"

(b)

Power equilization is the product of the thinking of
Coon\ elune & Sugarman ( Private Wealth, pp. 201 .. 42).
II

A

great deal of attention has been focused on this alternative
as possit{lt y the best alternative.

Professor Wright

questions its constitutionality and urges that if the Ct
is to strike down the existing system it has an obligation
to indicate, in advance, whether power equilization would
satisfy equal protection standards.
Wrigh ~

Otherwise , Professor

says that the State that tries power equilization will

be buying a law suit.

"

I agree that soul d jurisprudence would

dictate some, possibly indirect, guarantee that this alter..
native would be acceptable.
Power equilization operates essentially as follows.
The key factor in determining how much money would go to
any district would be the

~

at which that district decides

to tax itself. Dollars per pupil would be a function of
a locality 0 s decision as to how highly it values education
as reflected in the percentage of its taxes it is willing to
commit to education vis a vis other districts.

For example,

in San Antonio Edgewood School District would be rewarded
for taxing itself at a higher rate per $100 of valuation

than does Alamo Heights.

The State could devise a scale of

guaranteed payments to the districts at any given level
of rate.

The following example is one alternative
OFFERING

RATE (EFFORT)
1 %
1~%

$ 400
600
800
1000
1200

2 %
2~%

3 %

The local school district would determine the rate at which
it wished to tax its residents.

Suppose Edgewood chose to

tax itself at the lowest rate (1%).

At that rate lets

assume that,because of the lack of significant property
ue, the district
vall iillitltiilllfiil
collected only $50 per pupil. The
State then would subsidize the district in the amount of
~

•.,.vs

$350 (guaranteed amtJf amt collected).

If Edgewood decided

to try harder, i.e., raise its rate, it would be entitled
to a greater level of support from the state.

Now, suppose

that Alamo Heights also chose to tax its property at
the 1 % rate.

At that rate, because of the relative wealth

of the district, it brings in $500 per pupil.

Since it is

entitled to only $400 at that rate, it would give $100 to the
state to be redistributed to other districts.

(I have posited

a proportional scheme but a state might select any level of
support.

For instance, it might have an incentive program

that would offer relatively higher "offering" at each incremental rise in effort.·

For example, the local decision to

jump from 1% to 2% could be rewarded by granting more than
twice as much per pupil.

Instead of $800 it might be $900).

In such a system the local school districts could mainJ tain complete control of local matters.

...

Indeed the local

.. -37-control would be more meaningful under power equalizing than
it is at present.

The localities on the low end of the

property scale could, for the first time, make a
ly

~.,.

e c,

choice about how highly

+), e'/
~ valuet

All the other aspects of local control--hiring,

relative~

education.

programming, , cJ~

administistering--would remain where they are.
In any specific application, of course, the power
equalization formula would be more complicated.

The state

could take into consideration the other municipal services
that urban residents must pay for, expenses which make it
relatively more difficult to support education in a center
city than in a suburb (this is known as accounting for
"municipal overburden").

The State might choose to impose

equalization on personal family income rather than on property
taxes.

It might also choose to consider only residential

property in the formula and pool all property taxes received

-

from commercial and industrial property.

Furthermore, it

might take into consideration higher cost factors in some
schools, such as added transportation costs, or higher
salary scales imposed by a strong urban Teachers' Union.
It might also account for special remedial courses or courses
for the blind or retarded.

These differences could be easily

worked into the formula by having"weighted task unitse" For
instance, the state might conclude that if the cost of
education was twice as great in the city it would count
each student twice (l urban student

=2

task units).

The

"per pupil" quota could then'te figure~d on that basis.

I

The constitutional argument mounted against power
equalization is that it makes the child 0 s right to an education

depend on the willingness of his parents to support education and might lead to di~ities nearly as great as exist
today.

Professor Wright says he can not see how such

"discrimiaation" differe from a wealth-based classification.
The answer seems simple under classical equal protection
analysis.

Since power equalization does not contemplate

discrimination on the basis of wealth, the ct need only
apply a rational basis test.

And, the State's interest

in the full local control of education is certainly a rational
scheme.
On the practical side attackers of power equalization
say it is unworkable in a real world,
~

'---"

----------~

so for one of two reasons.

This is said to be

If the rate-offering ratio

is set high (for instance the state chooses •a rate that
will allow rich districts to continue to spend as much on
education at the same tax rate) the cost of the program
will be monumental to the state.

There will be little

redistribution of property-tax money between districtsg
rather every district would be provided a way to raise
itself up to the level of the top school district.

In

an age when there are a number of interests of great importance competing for state dollars (water, energy, welfare,
housing, highways) the school financing system will take
money out of the control of the state--it will
education.

over~ emphasize

On the other hand, if the rate-offering ratio p is

set lower the quality of the best schools will be lowered.
This is so, hypothetically, because parents in the rich
districts will be unwilling to subsidize education in other
1,'

districts and will lower their rate to avoid having the
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.,

state take property tax doll,ars away from them.

And,

when the rich schools spend less they will become increasingly unattractive to parents who have the option to send their
kids to private school.
public education.

They may

P

therefore, give up on

What we will be left with is statewide

mediocrity.
The proponents of power equalization disagree.

They

conclude that a proper level can be found that will preserve
the quality of the schools that presently spend more while
providing poorer districts the chance to decide whether they
wish to devote an equal amount of effort to education.
Again, your personal experience may give you a good
basis for estimating whether any such formula can work.
My layman's judgment is that it can work.

It is worth

noting, too, that the arguments against power equalization say something about the relative quality of education
in Texas's schools.

If spending less in the wealthy

schools means that they will become mediocre, how is it
that spending more in the poor schools will not improve
the quality of education?

I wonder whether the State

can genuinely argue, as it does. both sides of the moneyquality question.

The purpose of this section was merely to point out
that under the "strict scrutiny" formula (or something akin

~

to it) constitutional alternatives would certainly be
available, none of which would require equal expenditure
in every

scho~l.

With this behind usp I will turn to the

important question regarding the practical consequences

...... 4Q ......

in terms of what this case could mean as a precedent and
how it will affect the furture role of the federal courts.

VII

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
The Court will undoubtedly be concerned about what this

case portenAs for the future at least in terms of the other
kinds of law suits it will present to the federal courts.
There may be a dual concern for minimizing the "flood of
litigation" and for avoiding a "slippery slope,"

Those

concerns will cause the Justices to focus in their deliberations on two potential problem areas'

(1) other
state or
.. -

municipal service cases, and (2) other public education

-

finance cases,

(a)

Municipal service cases

The argument may be raised that if the Ct strikes down
for
local property"based provisions61 school finance it will
also be compelled to strike down other municipal services
which are financed in the same manner.

Texas, for example,

has local financing of hospitalsp water resources, etc.
----~--~

-------------

Also every city provides a range of municipal services
such as fire, police, low-income housing and local welfare
programs,

While an argument might be made that these

should all be provided to all on an equal basis, the

ground that it is fundamental in a way that other services
~
~
~-------------------------------are not. Dandridge and Lindsey v. Normet already provide the
groundwork for a decision excluding welfare and housing.

'.'
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not
Also, in the cases of programs/funded through property
ta~es,

the claims for equal provision of municipal services

will, in large measure, be demands for equal expenditures.
This was certainly the case in the appeal

116~

decided by

the CAS in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw (an en bane opinion
holding that a municipality could not discriminate against
blacks in providing munici~al services). The Ct, if it were
school
to affirm the instant/case, would carefully hold that this is
~

not
an "equal expenditure case."
,...--... ...._

'

·

Furthermore, in the

-

ordinary case, there will not be a wealth-based discrimination, and in the absence of such discrimination the state
would have to measure up to the lesser rational basis
standard.

Therefore, while it would be unwise to predict

that cases will not come up making these claims, it is
predictable that the Ct will have the jurisprudential tools
available to make intelligent distinctions.

(b)

Public Education Cases
Once the property tax basis of public education is

wiped away, in the event that this case is affirmed, we
can anticipate that other cases will follow in which children

t

from schools that do not receive as great expenditures

··~·

5:---

will complain of denial of a quality education.

I do not

tfuink that there is any way to foreclose those cases being
filed.

However, I am equally sure that the Ct will be un-

wi~ling

to allow itself

manager of the schools.

t in the role of national
Most of the conceivable cases will

present little difficulty because the classification drawn by
the state will not be a wealth or race classification. Ando

,..
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in that event, the state's actions will have only the rational
or reasonable basis standard to meet.

For instance, if the

state decided to put new science equipment in only a few of
the schools, children in the lab-less schools would not have
a persuasive case in the absence of some proof that the
state acted to further some invideous preference.

Other-

wise a mere showing of reasonableness (an experiment with
new training materials, etc) would suffice.
None of this is to say that tough cases will not
arise, for they surely will.

I only refer to these areas

to indicate that the theory pressed in the instant case
may be accepted and a narrow opinion written that could
leave education where it belongs.

The fear of the unfore-

seeable will not, in my opinion, be the telling factor in this
case,

VIII

CONCLUSION
Whew!

Having gone through what I consider to be all of

the major arguments, both factual and legal, that will
arise in this case, I find myself still undecided.

Despite

the basic simplicity of the constitutional argument, and
despite the apparent unfairness of the present system, I
cannot yet be sure that every consideration has been
accurately disposed of,

Therefore, other than to say that

my inclinations cause me to lean toward affirmance, I
will make no recommendation on the merits.

Short of a

merits recommendation, however, I would like to suggest
that we treat this case somewhat differently usual.

.... 43 ....

I would suggest the followings
(1)

So far I have only brought together the arguments

and authorities in a tumbling and disorganized fashion.

On

any single issue in the case a great deal more in the way

of ~Lt

and scholarship remains ahead.

There will un-

doubtedly be a number of problems that you find particularly
crucial.

We should focus on those issues in much more de ..

tail than this memo affords.
seem inevitable.

Further research and discussion

Either before the case is heard or before

conference we should discuss the more troublesome issues
with a view to getting closer to the core of the case.
(2)

If you can find the time in the next month or so,

you might like to read the book, Private Wealth and Public
Education by Professors Cune, Clune, and Sugarman.
referred to them as the "activist scholars."

You have

That they

are, but theirs is a brand of scholarship of the very
highest caliber.

I find myself quite envious of their

sustained hard work and thoroughness.

They began back in

1968 by bringing a case in the USDC ND Illinois attacking
the Illinois financing scheme.
different than it is today.

Their theory then was quite

They focused on expenditures and

argued that money should be distributed in accprd with the
particular student's needs.
shot down.

The DC found the case nonjusticiable and this

Ct aff'd by order.

They then changed course and found the

thesis they now pursue.
in the area.

Not surprisingly, they were

That thesis became the major work

Thereafter they wrote a lQng list of law review

articles dealing with various facets of the case.

At the

same time they undertook the representation of Serrano in

.., .

.li'

..-...

v

•
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California.

They have also filed amicus briefs in virtually

every case litigating this theory throughout the country.
Their approach throughout has been quite unlike the ACLU
or NEA or any number of other organizations that devote
inadequate time to research and to preparing their case
in the clearest fashion.

A reading of their book demon-

strates that their thesis is not hare-brained,nor is it
shallow. You will undoubtedly dispute many of their conclusions but it would still be helpful to see the case
presented in its best light.
(3)

I would also urge that we treat this case differently

within our office.

I have personally profited from dis-

cussing the issues with Bill and Jay.

We ought to encourage

them to familiarize themselves with the issues in the case
so that their judgments may embellish our own.

I can assure

this is not a suggestion that you allow us to "gang up" on
you.

Each of us, at this point 0 has a distinct and different

attitude about the case.

The case is undoubtedly going to be

kicking around here the better part of the year and each of
us may add to the total product.
LAH

Memo to: Larry Hammond
October 26, 1972

From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez

I had occasion today, in another connection, to read Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, holding (63) that a one-year residency requirement for eligibility for welfare payments is unconstitutional as
an impermissible burden on the right to travel.
What attracted my attention is the brief concurring opinion by
Justice Stewart (pps. 642-44), in which he emphasizes that the' compelling interest" test is to be applied because a constitutional right
itself is involved.
I

suggest that you incorporate an appropriate quotation from

Justice Stewart's opinion in your draft of Rodriguez. This wi 11 support our view that the "compelling interest" test has not heretofore
been applied except with respect to rights protected by the Constitution
itself.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls
,,

·'·

...·

MEMORANDUM
TO:

'lldr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: October 9, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent

School District v. Rodriguez
As I continue reviewing some of the briefs, questions and issues
come into focus that prompt me to call them to your attention. I hope
you won't mind my "fiood" of memos - some of which are dictated to
sort out my own thoughts, even more than to invite your assistance.
The subject of this memorandum is what for me is the gut issue
in this case: What is the principled constitutional answer to the question
whether there is a "fundamental interest" in education which requires
the application of the "compelling state interest" test?
I have touched on this in the long memorandum dictated on
Saturday (and not yet typed), but I will now try to focus on it more
sharply.
Archie Cox has written that determinations of the "relative
importance of the subject" in equal protecting cases calls for a "largely
subjective judgment". Cox, Foreward: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 95 (1966).
If this is all there is to it, there is no basis for principled adjudication.

I personally would be inclined, subjectively, to place a higher value

2.
on education than on welfare and housing. Yet, one may doubt that the
millions of Americans on welfare, and the other millions who are
dependent on government subsidy for housing, would agree. Indeed,
if I were making a purely social judgment I might very well agree that

the welfare probi!em is more severe than the secondary education
problem. The truth is that we have been making enormous progress in
the United States in public education (Charlie Wright's brief states that
in the decade ending in 1970, expenditures for public education increased
153% while enrollment increased only 30%- Brief, p. 9), whereas no
discernible progress has been made in solving the welfare problem
which - if it continues to escalate - could indeed destroy our entire
society.
I am also tempted to observe thftt'; now that I live in Washington,
)

D. C. , and am afraid to walk its streets at night, that public safety
seems terribly fundamental
But returning to the law (as distinguished from the prejudices
which add up to our subjective judgments), I invite your attention to

.

the decision of Judge
Harvey, cited in the Wright brief, pp. 28, 29.
_,
He makes the point that the interests "heretofore labeled fundamental

..

-

.

are
few and
....._
.......... are rooted,.. in some provision
___ ......_. of the Constitution. " This
~

~

is certainly true with respect to fairness of criminal trials, all First
Amendment rights, and to racial classifications which violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.

3.
It can be argued that First Amendment rights, including the
right to vote, cannot be exercised effectively without education. I
pause to state parenthetically that the courts have held to the contrary,
in effect, in outlawing literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting. But
I suppose one could argue - by stretching the logic somewhat - that
unless our society provides adequately for the housing, welfare, health,
aafety, transportation, etc. of our citizens, they are less likely to
be able effectively to exercise First Amendment rights.

The question as to which I want us to do some further thinking
is, therefore, whether there is justification in constitutional doctrine

for identifying as "fundamental" any right which is not directly rooted
in the Constitution itself.
L. F. P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FRQ, f:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

October 9, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez
I have been particularly impressed by the brief amteua filed
m behalf of 30 states 1n support of appellants, and apparently written
in the Attorney General's offtee of Maryland (perhaps by Henry Lord,
an exeeptlonally able lawyer).
This amieus brief - as is appropriate m behalf of the states
coneemed - is devoted primarily to the eonsdquenees of a constitutional
deelsion sustaining ROdriguez and Serrano. As eontrasted with Prof.
Wright's brief em behalf of Texas (which addresses, as it shonld, the
fundamental eonstltutional issues), the Maryland amieus brief eonfronts
head on the social and phUosophieal issues, as well as the praetieal
effeet upm the states and espee1ally upcm the urbanized areas.
This amicus brief relies heavtly on seeondary authorities quoting extensively from various studies, books, artteles and Senate
testimcm.y.
I have not had the time -and will not -to investigate independently
these seeoodary authorities. If they have been presented fairly by the
Maryland brtef, they pretty well destroy the alleged benefits of requiring

2.
the states to equalize school expenditures on a statewide basis.
The brief ta partteularly devastating 1n the secMDn entitled
"AdYerse Effects em Interests of Urban Areas and Racial 1\Alnortttes ",
p. 83 et seq.
I must cc:mfess tbat the brief appeals to me because tt supports

and cc:mfirms tentatift judgments based em my own experience with
Virginia education.
The principal purpose of this memorandum ts to suggest, tf you

have not done so, that you:
brief

1. Read the Maryland" carefully.
2. Select several of the seemdary authorities relied oo therein,

and read them to determine whether they have been

~

presented -

on the points involved- by the Maryland brief.
Among the authorities cited, the following may merit examtnatloo:
Prof. Joel

s.

Berke (whose affidavit was reUed upon by

the District Court below)*. Prof. Berke has prepared two
mooographs, publtshed stnee hta affidavit. Apparently these
have been publlsbed by the Select Committee m Equal Educational
Opportunity, U.s. Senate ''nle Financial Aspects of Equality of
Educational Opportunity and Inequities in School Finance."
*Incidentally Prof. Goldstein pretty well demolishes the table set forth
1n the Berke affidavitl See Maryland Brief, 83-84.

3•
.January 1972 (Cited Maryland brief, 85).
Berke and Callahan, Serrano v. Priest : Milestcme or
MUlstooe, 21 Jour. Pub. Law 23 (1972).
study by

u.S.

Office of Educatioo, Finances of Large City

School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (D. HEW Pub. No.

OE72-29 1972). Cited Maryland Brief,. 90.
William L. Taylor, former staff director of Civil Rights

Commission, Mondale Committee Hearings, p. 10472. (Cited
Maryland Brief 91.
New York Times editorial Jan. 29, 1972.
Prof. Charles S. Benson, a supporter of Rodriguez, but
who testified at the Mondale hearings as to the possible adverse
effects. Mondale hearings, p. 7689 (Maryland Brief 97).

**••*
Power Equalizing
The Maryland brief argues -convincingly, I think, tbat'power
equalizing" is impractical if not uncoostitutional Pp. 28-35.
ImplleatiCils of National Control of Schools
I remain uneonvinced (a.lthough you haven't worked on me directly,
Jet) that the ultimate effect of the Rodriguez rule will not be national
all

cootrol of education. I would abhor such cootrol fo( the obvious reasoos,

4.
some of which are stated in the Maryland brief - pp. 36-40. I have in

mind the lrreslstable impulse of politicians to manipulate public
education for their own power and ideology - !· 1- Hitler, Mussollnt
and all Communist dictators.

To a far lesser extent, full state cmtrol - inevitable lf there 18
full state funding - could have unattractive ooosequences. See
Maryland Brief, 37-48.

* •••

*

I realize, of course, that the Maryland Brief ta advocacy, and

not a balanced presentation. Please help me judge it fairly.
L. F. P., Jr.

No. 71-1332 SAN ANTONIO v. RODRIGUEZ

Argued 10/12/72
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

October 9, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez
I have been particularly impressed by the brief amicus filed
oo behalf of 30 states 1n support of appellants, and apparently written
in the Attorney General's office of Maryland (perhaps by Henry Lord,
an exceptionally able lawyer).
This amicus brief - as is appropriate on behalf of the states
concerned - is devoted primarily to the consdquences of a constitutional
decision sustaining Rodriguez and Serrano. As contrasted with Prof.
Wright's brief on behalf of Texas (which addresses, as it should, the
fundamental constitutional issues), the Maryland amicus brief confronts
/A'-~~
~ the social and philosophical

issues, as well as the practical

/\.

effect upon the states and especially upon the urbanized areas.
This amicus brief relies heavily on secondary authorities quoting extensively from various studies, books, articles and Senate
testimony.
I have not had the time - and will not - to investigate independently
these seccmdary authorities. If they have been presented fairly by the
Maryland brief, they pretty well destroy the alleged benefits of requiring

...

2.
the states to equalize school expenditures on a statewide basis.
The brief is particularly devastating in the sedlinn entitled
"Adverse Effects on Interests of Urban Areas and Racial Minorities",
p. 83 et seq.
I must confess that the brief appeals to me because it supports

and confirms tentative judgments based on my own experience with
Virginia education.
The principal purpose of this memorandum is to suggest, if you
have net done so, that you:
brief
1. Read the Marylan<;t' carefully.
2. Select several of the secondary authorities relied on therein,
and read them to determine whether they have been fairly presented on the points involved -by the Maryland brief.
Among the authorities cited, the following may merit examination:
Prof. Joel S. Berke (whose affidavit was relied upon by
the District Court below)*.

Prof. Berke has prepared two

monographs, published since his affidavit. Apparently these
have been published by the Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, U.S. Senate "The Financial Aspects of Equality of
Educational Opportunity and Inequities in School Finance."
*Incidentally Prof. Goldstein pretty well demolishes the table set forth
in the Berke affidavitl See Maryland Brief, 83-84.

3.
January 1972 (Cited Maryland brief, 85).
Berke and Callahan, Serrano v. Priest : Milestme or
MUlstme, 21 Jour. Pub. Law 23 (1972).
Study by U. S. Office of Education, FJnances of Large Ctty

School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (D. HEW Pub. No.
OE72-29 1972). Cited Maryland Brte4 90.

WiWam L. Taylor, former staff direetor of CivU Rights
Commisstoo, Mondale Committee Hearings, p. 10472. (Cited
Maryland Brief 91.
New York Times editorial Jan. 29, 1972.
Prof. Charles

s.

Benson, a supporter of Rodriguez, but

who testified at the Mondale hearings as to the possible adverse
effects. Mondale hearings, p. 7669 ('Maryland Brief 97)•

•••••
Power Equalizing
The Maryland brief argues- eoovineingly, I think, tbat'power
equalizing" is lmpraettealif net unemstituttonal. Pp. 28-35.
Implieatlcns of National Control of Schools
I remain uneonvineed (although you haven't worked on me dtreetly,

,et) that the ultimate effect of the Rodriguez rule wUl net be national
all
emtrol of edueattoo. I would abhor such eootrol fo-( the obvious reasoos,

4.
some of which are stated in the Maryland brief- pp. 36-40. I have in
~

m.1nd the irresistable impulse of politicians to manipulate public
/'\

education for their own power and ideology - !_. ~· Hitler, Mussolini
and all Communist dictators.
To a far lesser extent, full state cmtrol - inevitable if there is
full state funding- could have unattractive consequences. See
Maryland Brief, 37-48.

*****
1 realize, of course, that the Maryland Brief is advocacy, and
not a balanced presentation. Please help me judge it fairly.
L. F. P., Jr.

·-

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

October 9, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez
I have been particularly impressed by the ·brief amicus filed
on behalf of 30 states 1n support of appellants, and apparently written
in the Attorney General's office of Maryland (perhaps by Henry Lord,
an exceptionally able lawyer).
This amicus brief .. as is appropriate on behalf of the states
concerned - is devoted primarily to the consdquences of a constitutional
decision sustaining Rodriguez and Serrano. As contrasted with Prof.
Wrigbt•s brief on behalf of Texas (which addresses, as it should, the
fundamental constitutional issues), the Maryland amicus brief confronts
~

.

J.a.v

HW. . .iiR

dk-1~

the social and philosophical issues, as well as the practical

1\

effect upon the states and especially upon the urbanized areas.
This amicus brief relies heavily on secondary authorities quoting extensively from various studies, books, articles and Senate
testimony.
I have not had the time - and will not - to investigate independently
these secondary authorities. If they have been presented fairly by the
Maryland brief, they pretty well destroy the alleged benefits of requiring

2.
the states to equalize school expenditures on a statewide basis.
The brief is particularly devastating in the sedDDn entitled
"Adverse Effects an Interests of Urban Areas and Racial Minorities"t

p. 83 et seq.
I must c oofess that the brief appeals to me because it supports
and coofirms tentative judgments based oo my own experience with
Virginia education.
The principal purpose of this memorandum is to suggest, if you
have n<:t done so, that you:
1. Read the

brief
ryland/carefully.

2. Select several of the seecndary authorities relied m therein,
and read them to determine whether they have been fairly presented on the points involved -by the Maryland brief.
Among the authorities cited, the following may merit examination:
Prof. Joel S. Berke (whose affidavit was relied upon by
the District Court below)*. Prof. Berke has prepared two
monographs, published since his affidavit. Apparently these
have been published by the Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, U.S. Senate ''The Financial Aspects of Equality of
Educational Opportunity and Inequities in Sehool Finance. "
*Incidentally Prof. Goldstein pretty well demolishes the table set forth
See Maryland Brief, 83-84.

1n the Berke affidavttl

3.
January 1972 (Cited Maryland brief, 85).
Berke and Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or
Millstone, 21 Jour. Pub. Law 23 (1972).
Study by U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City
School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (D. HEW Pub. No.
OE72-29 1972). Cited Maryland Brief,. 90.
William L. Taylor, former staff director of Civil Rights
Commission, Mondale Committee Hearings, p. 10472. (Cited
Maryland Brief 91.
New York Times editorial Jan. 29, 1972.
Prof. Charles S. Benson, a supporter of Rodriguez, but
who testified at the Mondale hearings as to the possible adverse
effects. Mondale hearings, p. 7669 (Maryland Brief 97).

*****
Power Equalizing
The Maryland brief argues - convincingly, I think, that'power
equaliz1ngu is impractical if not unconstitutional.

Pp. 28-35.

Implicaticns of National Control of Schools
I remain unconvinced (although you haven't worked on me directly,

,et) that the ultimate effect of the Rodriguez rule will nc:t be national
all
cootrol of education. I would abhor such control foithe obvious reasons,

·' .

4.
some of which are stated in the Ntaryland brief - pp. 36-40. I have in
~

mind the irresistable impulse of politicians to manipulate public
1\

education for their own power and ideology - !: !· Hitler, Mussolini
and all Communist dictators.
To a far lesser extent, full state cootrol - inevitable if there is
full state funding - could have unattractive oonsequences. See
Maryland Brief, 37-48.

*****
I realize, of course, that the Maryland Brief is advocacy, and
not a balanced presentation. Please help me judge it fairly.
L. F. P., Jr.

' '

MEMORANDUM TO: Larry Hammond
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

October 12, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez

Your bench memo of 10/2/ 72 has absorbed my interest and
thought for most of the day (Saturday, Oct. 7). May I say at the
outset - without reservation - that your memo is thoughtful and
penetrating in its analysis, well organized and exceptionally well
expressed.

However we finally come out in this vastly important

case, your thinking will have made a significant contribution to my
thinking and ultimate judgment.
Mter reading the briefs with some care, my initial tentative
reaction - as you know - was that the factual assumptions and legal
conclusions of the district court were probably erroneous . Your
memorandum has assisted me in a more thoughtful reexamination.
This case is more troublesome for me than it otherwise would
be because of my long association with public education. Next to
the law, education was my primary intellectual interest for many years.
As a member of the Richmond School Board for ll years, as its Chairman for 9, and as a member of the State Board of Education for 8
years, including serving as its President, I lived fairly intimately

-2with the immense problems, frustrations and occasional successes
of public education.
I am in agreement that the traditional system of funding and
control (practiced in varying ways in 49 states, and for a century
or more in some states) is not designed to produce - and does not
produce - identical expenditures among the school districts of a
state or, indeed, within certain districts. I have advocated for years
a larger participation by the state in financial public education, and
the trend - certainly in Virginia - has been in this direction.*
The difficulty with school financing in Virginia (unrelated to
race) was twofold: (i) the property wealth of districts does vary;
and (ii) the willingness of the people to tax themselves for public
schools may vary even more widely. I will cite only one example which
you can visualize. The City of Richmond consistently over the years
has provided more money per pupil for education than any of the
counties in the metropolitan Richmond area. You saw the high quality
residential developments, adjacent to the City, in both Chesterfield
and Henrico Counties. Yet, neither of these counties has ever provided

*

I invite your attention to the new Virginia Constitution which tts-a
unique education article (Article VIII), placing an affirmative duty on
the state to provide "a statewide system of free public elementary and
secondary schools open to all children of school age (which) shall ensure
that an educational program of high quality is established and maintained."

-3a per pupil expenditure for schools as high as that in the City of
Richmond. Until fairly recently (when other factors have contributed
to a marked deterioration in Richmond City schools), the general
quality of Richmond public school education was recognized as the
best in the state, second only to Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria.
Yet , in terms of per capita wealth, Chesterfield and Henrico
Counties are far richer than the City of Richmond if commercial and
industrial property is excluded. But a tax rate on the latter type of
properties must also be paid by individuals, and Richmond traditionally
has simply been willing - due to strong civic leadership - to tax itself
at a higher rate than in the adjoining counties.
On the other hand, as contrasted with a few bright spots (e.g.
Richmond and Northern Virginia) many Virginia counties - especially
in the ...western part of the state (in which the black population is
negligible) placed a low premium on public education; the leadership
was weak; school boards were politically controlled; and the boards
of supervisors were often large property owners not enthusiastic about
taxing themselves. The result, in many of these counties, was a
mediocre effort for public education.
For these reasons, I pressed for years for a larger participation
by the state, and the trend has been that way. But the principal burden

-4-

still falls on the local communities, and the per pupil expenditures
vary from a low of $523 per pupil in Henry County (in the far southwest) to $1,318 in Arlington (operating funding from all sources).*
The answer to the problem is not as simple as having the state
take over all funding of public education. Your memorandum perceptively identifies many of the problems. The tax structure of a
state, involving the interrelationship of federal, state and local
taxes of all kinds, is a complex mix which cannot be restructured
without creating immense problems - political, economic and legal.
Moreover, the genius of our federal system - certainly until recently has rested not merely upon the relationship and balance between
state and federal governments. Local government has played a
fundamental role in making our system work, in preventing the bigness
even of state government from overwhelming the citizen, in keeping
control of local municipal services - including education - largely in
the hands of the localities where the politicians are far more responsive
to the needs of the communities and the will of the people than at any
other level.
The local school board is, I believe, a unique American institution. It has played a vital role in the development of our public school

* As of fiscal 1971

-5system, and especially in helping to generate the community support
necessary to finance it. Critics and cynics attack public education
in the United States; they point to the obvious defects (which I make
no pretense of defending), but they often overlook the merits of a
system which has sustained a quality of democracy not found (I believe)
in any other major country. Few other countries assure 12 years of
free public education for every child who will take :it. Almost no other
country has an educational system with the egalitarian character of ours,
which deliberately attempts to minimize social and economic inequalities, and which affords mobility opportunity for any individual who
has the ability and determination to move upward in the s.ocial and
economic strata of our society.
Reasonable views may differ, but in my judgment the local school
board - with the interest of the parents immediately involved - has been
the most dynamic force behind the overall effectiveness of our public
school system. A local school board does far more than deal with
money. Within broad policies established by the State Board of Education, the local board has significant autonomy - with respect to curriculum,
textbooks, extracurricular programs, supplemental programs, experiments in various educational techniques, employment and in-service
training of teachers, promotions, school building locations, types of
school buildings, etc . , etc .

-6Whenever I feel myself becoming enthusiastic for full state
funding, I check my impulse by recalling that whoever exclusively
controls the purse strings, in the end will control all programs and
policy. Such a total denigrating of local boards would not be in the
best interest of education or our country.
The state thus does have a strong interest - the people of the

-

state have such an interest - in maintaining a high level of Jgc a J.
interest and responsibility for public education. Whether this reaches
the "compelling" level is debatable. But to say, as the district court
did, that it does not meet the test of "rationality," is to cast considerable doubt upon the rationality of the district court judges.
This is especially true when they characterize as irrational a system
approved and in effect in 49 states, some of which have had the essense
of this system for a century.
Thus, as you can see, I approach the San Antonio case with
mixed emotions when I think only as a citizen and a former public
school educator.
As a lawyer and a judge, I have to apply constitutional principles
in the resolution of this case. Yet, they must not be applied in a
vacuum or in a way which may weaken or destroy substantial values
in the existing system. Nor would it make any sense to apply constitutional principles - unless they are unavoidably applicable - in a

-7-

manner which is totally impractical from the political viewpoint.
Against these more or less random thoughts as a backdrop,
I now come to some more specific comments and questions raised
by your thoughtful memorandum:
1. Applicable standard of state interest. I agree with your
view that if only a "rational" state interest nee<Bto be found, the
Texas system must be sustained. For the reasons above stated,
I think it clear that a rational argument can be made for preserving
a vital and influential role for the local school district.
Thus , a critical threshold question is whether the state must
meet the "compelling interest" standard. You point out, correctly
I think, that appellees - to sustain this position - must convince the Court
that the state action either (i) impinges upon a fundamental interest or

......

(ii) draws into question an "invidious or suspect classification" (e.g.

race, right to vote, right to travel).
The "state action" here is the tax structure which, in accord
with long tradition, leaves real estate as a tax source for the locality,
with most other categories of taxation (income, sales, state licenses,
etc.) reserved to the state itself. Property taxes provide the basic
revenue for all of the local services: police and fire protection, streets
and other public utilities (water, sewerage, lighting, etc.), public
health, welfare, recreation, libraries and education. Some of these
services (e.g . police and fire) are funded almost exclusively by the
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locality from the real estate tax. Other services - welfare, health
and education - are jointly funded by states and localities, with the
localities providing the predominant resources.
2. Wealth alone not "suspect." Your analysis (p. 19) is that
the Texas system "does discriminate against the property poor',' and
thus is a system under which "wealth becomes a function of education."*
You point out, however, that wealth alone has not yet been held to be
a "suspect" classification. (In Harper and Bullock v. Carter other
suspect subjects were involved; and in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971), Justice Black avoided saying that wealth was a suspect
category when he had a good opportunity to do so.) I do not think
there is any basis in law - or in policy under a free competitive system for concluding that wealth alone is "suspect."
3. Is education a fundamental interest? The question remains
as to the fundamentality of education. As you put it, is education a
fundamental interest in the same sense that the Court has found certain other interests to be fundamental, namely, fair criminal process,
voting rights, interstate travel, the right to seek public office, and
speech related interests '1
There is language in the school cases (Brown and its progeny)
that could be quoted to support an affirmative answer. In addition, as

* Please enlighten me as to the usage of the word "function."
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you point out in a felicitously phrased sentence:
"On top of that precedential foundation, plaintiffs stack the following assertions."
These "assertions" include the obvious and sound arguments
as to the importance of public education in our democratic system
(pp. 23' 24).
If a layman stopped me on the street and inquired whether I

thought education is fundamental to our democracy, there could be
only one answer. But if the same layman asked whether public housing
and welfare are fundamental where indigents are concerned, I would
unhesitatingly give the same answer. Similarly, many would give
the same answer if the question related to police protection, fire
protection, to the communications network of roads, and to other
services of government which are essential to the social and economic
functioning of our system.
The answers to each of the foregoing questions must be affirmative if "fundamental" is used in the sense that the state or community
could hardly get along without them.
It is possible, of course, that the legal concept of what is "funda-

mental" may differ from the lay concept. Appellees argue, for example,
that education is different because it is rooted in the Constitution itself,
being inherent to the full exercise of First Amendment rights. One

-10remembers, however, that it was not until after the Civ·
that public schools came to be recognized as a state interest of
any significance, fundamental or otherwise. Its roots simply do
not go back to the Bill of Rights.
There may well be degrees of fundamentality and certainly
reasonable minds will differ in applying a standard so inherently
subjective. Starting with my own preconceived notions as to the
importance of public education, it would be fairly easy for me to
conclude that it is a fundamental interest. I am not sure that such
a judgment would be based on legal and constitutional analysis rather
than social and philosophical concepts.
I would appreciate your further thinking as to a principled
basis, rooted in our past decisions, for concluding whether education is a fundamental interest. We do have the repetitive dicta in
the school segregation cases. Apart from these, what are the best
available precedents on the affirmative side? On the negative side,
I believe you have cited the precedents relied upon principally by
Prof. Wright (Dandridge v. Williams, Jefferson v. Hackney, Lindsey
v. Normet, and possibly Gordon v. Lance ).
Before passing to another point, I raise a further question
prompted by your memorandum. You state, correctly, that the
Constitution does not require that a state provide public education;

-llrather, only that it must not discriminate if it undertakes to do so.
(pp. 27 , 28.) If one concedes this, is it consistent to argue that
education is a fundamental interest '1 The areas of fundamental
interests, heretofore identified as such by the Court, have involved
fair criminal process , voting, travel, the electoral process (one man,
one vote) and the like. Each of these that comes to mind (as I dictate
this) involves not merely a major state interest but an individual
right accorded by the Constitution. Can we say, therefore, that
there may be a fundamental interest - in the sense that the state
must have a compelling interest in applying classifications to it in the absence of an enforceable, fundamental personal right?

--~

4. Is there a realistic intermediate standard? Mter
discussing whether the standard must be the "compelling interest
test" or the "rational basis test," you suggest the possibility of an
intermediate standard. This interests me as I am not entirely content with either of the standards mentioned.
Yet the rationale of your intermediate or "sliding scale"
standard is difficult to verbalize or visualize as being a solution.
I agree that any soundly written opinion must avoid the appearance
and the facts of ad hoc law making and that "labels should not obscure
what lies beneath." There is no doubt a "gray area" between the
two conventional standards. But would it not be as difficult to identify
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and define a position within this gray area as it has been for various
members of the Court in the past to define - and distinguish rationally the two standards now customarily invoked?
You state that the higher one places education, the stiffer
the burden on Texas to justify itself. This leaves the judgment in
the realm of subjectivity, and it does not necessarily lead to a legal
conclusion - at least as I presently view it.
I could speak with conviction of the importance of more adequate
state funding for education (as I have for years), but this would not
necessarily lead me to conclude that a tax system, practiced in
virtually all of the states for many decades, is unconstitutional. My
concern comes into sharper focus when I think of possible alternatives,
which you address under the caption of "remedies."
5. What alternative plans could the Court soundly endorse in
principle? Your memorandum suggests two, the first of which is
sometimes called "state subvention." This is defined usually to mean
full state assumption of financing.
I can conceive, without difficulty, of the state taking over full
responsibility for funding public education, and financing it from any
or all available sources of revenue - including the heretofore local
property tax. If the state did this (and assuming it were politically
feasible), the local school board - and its vital role - would go down

-13the drain fairly soon. Some may not share this view, but I am
satisfied from my own experience that the realities of political
life and power are ultimately and conclusively tied to the source
of funding. Moreover, this would raise all sorts of direct and indirect problems, some of which you have mentioned. It would certainly weaken the authority and importance of local government,
which is already suffering from malnutrition and from lost control
of tax resources. But I am not as concerned with this at the moment
as I am with possible educational consequences.
Once the state assumes full funding responsibilities, it is
inevitable that per pupil expenditures will have to be essentially
the same throughout the state. Certain variations would be allowed for differences in cost of living, to accommodate limited special
education programs and the like. But I do not believe substantial
discrepancies in per pupil expenditures would be

tol~e~-:d...t~~~~

or would pass judicial scrutiny. Certainly anthing less than equality
would provoke a flood of litigation.
In 1971 the cost per pupil in Fairfax County was $890 as con-

trasted with $1,318 in neighboring Arlington County. If there were
state funding, neither the politicians nor the courts would allow this
discrepancy to continue - although the quality of schools in both
counties ranks high in the state. Would Arlington be downgraded in

-14order to afford approximately the same level per pupil in Fairfax?
And what about Chesterfield County, in an urbanized area with perhaps
as much '\\ealth as Fairfax and yet a per pupil expenditure of only $647?
Would it be averaged with Arlington? H so - and these examples can
be multiplied by the variations throughout most any state - is it an
answer to the citizens of Arlington to say that, after the state has
taken away all or most of their real estate tax base, somehow they
can add the "icing on the cake" which the state has taken away from
them?
H the State of Virginia had to level its per pupil expenditure to

anything approaching the Arlington level, I hesitate to guess what the
increased tax burden would be on a statewide basis. The median
per pupil cost for all counties and cities in Virginia in 1971 was $649,
and the average was $724. It is simply politically and economically
impossible to increase expenditures on a statewide basis to the standards
of Fairfax or Richmond, much less Arlington. Thus, in Virginia and
no doubt in Texas, statewide funding almost irevitably would result
in "leveling down" the education afforded in the localities which have
had the good fortune both of high incomes and deep interest in schools
for their children.
You suggest something intermediate, and less drastic than full
state funding. But who is to say what constitutes an adequate level of

-15expenditure for education on an equalized basis across the state?
Texas claims that its present plan provides funding adequate to meet
even the compelling state interest test. A three-judge court differs.
I would like to find a reasoned and principled position that
avoided destroying the usefulness of local control of the schools,
and which also minimizes the wide gaps which now exist as a result
of primary reliance on local funding. But I have not yet identified
an intermediate position that is based on objective standards, as
distinguished from subjective judgment as to what is "adequate."
The "power equalization plan," which I confess I do not fully
understand, does not appear to be a feasible alternative. It would
involve a major restructuring of state tax systems with consequences
difficult to foresee or predict - both legal, political and economic. I
would hesitate to plunge into the unknown to that extent, at least
without a firmer grasp of the probable consequences.
6. We are a court - not a legislature. I presently incline to
the view that if the Court were to hold the Texas plan unconstitutional,
the only feasible alternative - that would stand judicial scrutiny would be full state funding. I am deeply reluctant for the judiciary
to plunge 49 states into this sort of a crisis. I remind myself, as you
have often reminded me in other connections, that we are not a superlegislature, that judicial restraint is a cardinal virtue when approaching

-16-

an issue of constitutionality; and this seems especially true in view
of the venerable age of the present system. There is a considerable
public pressure for increased state responsibility of education, as
we have witnessed in Virginia. One wonders whether this complex
problem of how best to finance public education should not be left
to the democratic process.

*******
Note:

I have not addressed many points - such as the validity

of some of the factual assumptions - chiefly because I have run out
of time.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls

10/28/72--LAH
To•

Mr. Justice Powell

Froms LAH
Re1

Attached memo on the Rodriguez outline
Attached is my suggested outline for the Opinion for the

Ct in Rodriguez. As written it has several benefits.

We

can touch upon the several secondary sources in the
educational area without pl ~ng untoward reliance upon
them.

We can avoid the impulse to overwrite the opinion

by focusing our guns primarily on the argument for imposing
a higher level of scrutiny on the State's financing scheme,
defeat it, and then dispose of the subsidiary contention
that the state system falls no matter what level of scrutiny
is utilized.

The meat of the opinion would turn on the

discussion and interpretation of Supreme Ct cases.
Of course, when the dissenters respond we may have to
supplement our opinion with dislcussions

indicating the

contestability of every sociological premise that might
underly the contrary result.

Written in this fashion I think I can flesh out a
rough draft in a week.

Prior to writing I would need only

to explore the Texas financing system a little more thoroughly by reviewing the record and the Texas statutes.
I would also need to reread and organize the equal protection
case law.

As to the bulk of secondary material, it is cited

and cross-examined in the mnultiple briefs.

Since we are

relying on such materials for little more than to demamstrate
the compexity and division of opinion as to the underlying
factual assumptions, we need only to assure ourselves that we

"""

·····
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(1) are citing authorities accurately, and (2) that we are
citing the best sources for any given proposition.

As

the Fall progresses I will then endeavor to find the time
to read over some of the more pertinent social science
material

wi~

more care.

LAH

10/28/72--LAH
Toa

Mr Justice Powell

Froma LAH
Rea

•

~~

Outline for Op Ct in Rodriquez

INTRODUCTION--A !-paragraph statement emphasizing that the

~ ~~~

. Ct is here reviewing a decision whose impact, in the State from

~~~~~~which

~~

~

Its principle would have equal applicability in almost evry

~~~tate
~~~ance
'-~~~

For better or

for worse it would revolutionize public education in Texas.

~ ~ · State

~~~

the case comes, would be staggering.

in the Union.

It also raises grave questions about

provision of other public services.

Of equal import-

is the significance of the questions it poses

for the

future role of thefederal judiciary in implementing the
command of the 14th Amendment.

This Ct 0 s judgment is rendered

~~~ with the fullest awareness of the le~ty of the task.

r

~~~

P\

I.

FACTS.

7

This section would cover three pointss (a)

~f·

the procedural history of the case (parties, ruling of DC, etc) I

~-

(b) explanation pf how challenged Texas system of school
finance operates; and (c) explanation of how that system
effects expenditures in the San Antonio school districts.
In this section we will candidly address the existing
statistical disparities but will also emphasize the extent
to which Texas has increased state participation in recent yrs
and the extent to which state funds assure some of the
basics of public education (books, teachers salaties,
buildings, administrators).

In footnote we would also

point out the similarities between the Texas system and
the systems in the bul ~ of ather states.

.·

...

.......
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THESIS OF DC OPINION & OF RESPS.

II.

We would set out

in brief the 14th A analysis adopted by the DC--suspect classification: discrimination regarding a fundamental rt; cornpelling state interest scrutiny.

Texas system does not

measure up, indeed is not even rational.

In this same

section I propose to expose two of the major flaws with
the thesis• (a) no convincing proof that money= education;
and (b) this wealth classification, i.e., school district
property wealth, is quite unlike the wealth classifications
heretofore dealt with by the Ct.

Here we need do no more,

I believe, than point out these problems and indicate that
the DC did not face them.
III.

.1-.A~~

FUNDAMENTALITY OF EDUCATION.

the purposes of decision here that

Even assuming for

money = education and

that district wealth creates a suspect classification,

··r~~

the case must nonetheless fall unless education is an

~ ~

interest of sufficient magnitude to require strict judicial

-~~
f+Y'

~~~crutiny,
1 ~ ._,L~~ points 1

~~

~

We will then analyse the cases emphasizing several

(a) social importance is not synonymous with funda-

mentality: (b) some clear nexus with a constitutionallly

~~~ ~cognized interest is prerequisite (Dandridge & Shapiro);
~~::~~-~c)
the Ct has already held welfare and housing not to be
1..1· ••
r

~~

fundamental.

~.:A~~
~.....~_,

section we will cite cases emphasizing that the labels are

.

~.......;;--

~~

And, at some pt in either this or the preceding

not ends in themselves but are merely aids for the Ct's
balancing of the invideousness of the discrimination and
its impact against the state's justifications (Dunn v.
Blumstein).

This is, in my view, one-half of the heart of

this case.

,,

,.
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IV.

RATIONALITY.

of this case.

This is the second half of the heart

Having exploded the strict scrutiny require-

ment, we must show why the Texas scheme is rational.

It is

premised on the notion of local control of education.

There

are a number of indicia of rationality which might be brought
to beara (a) local property tax-based public education is
used in at least 49 states; (b) while its historical sources
run deep, educational finance has been a topic of recent
concern in Texas and elsewhere but has been maintained;
(c) a system need not work perfectly to be rational--the
mere fact that some districts struggle does not render
the concept of local control invalid.

Even Edgewood retains

significant local control even though it cannot practically
speaking raise comparable funds.

And, the mere fact that

it is arguable that local control may be achieved in other
ways is not sufficient reason to throw out a system based
on rational considerations.

Also, increasing state partici-

pation to make sure that some minimum provision is guaranteed
proves the state's dedication to finding a proper mix of
local control and state•secured minimum educational standards.
V.

DISCLAIMER.

We should adrees some of the arguments

in favor of the contrary result.

We should make clear that

the DC formula would not have been a universally great
benefit to the poor, to the minorities, or the cities.
We can cite several of the empirical

st4udl~4ies

that show

the lack of correlation between expenditure and the supposed
beneficiaries.

While we should have a section here at the

outset I anticipate that it will grow in response to whatever
"parage of horrible" consequences the dissent relies upon ••
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VI.

CONCLUSION.

are complex.

The problems of educating children

The disagreements between experts and

legislators is profound.

Alternative programs abound.

The trend at the legislative level in recent years has
been greater concern, higher expenditures, and more
innovation.

Disstaisfaction with the pace or the product

of legislative response is insufficient cause for
judicial intervention in an area in which it lacks
expertise and tools.

Experimentation and diversity--

both at the state and district level--should be encouraged
and applauded rather than being terminated by judicial
judgment.

The "nine old friends of the children" can do

little more for the educational opportunity afforded

them

than to reject the chance to interject the federal cts in
the controversy over the course of public education.

MEMORANDUM TO: Larry Hammond
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

October 12, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez
Your bench memo of 10/2/72 has absorbed my interest and
thought for most of the day (saturday, Oct. 7). May I say at the
outset - without reservation - that your memo is thoughtful and
penetrating ln its analysis, well organized and exceptionally well
expressed. However, we finally come out in this vastly important
case, your thinking will have made a

~ignificant

contribution to my

thinking and ultimate judgment.
After reading the briefs with some care, my initial tentative
reaction- as you know- was that the factual assumptions and legal
conclusions of the district court were probably erroneous. Your
memorandum has assisted me in a more thoughtful reexamination.
This case is more troublesome for me than it otherwise would
be because of my long association with public education. Next to

the law, education was my primary intellectual interest for many years.
As a member of the Richmond School Board for 11 years, as Its Chairman for 9, and as a member of the state Board of Education for 8
years, including serving as its President, I lived fairly intimately

.

.

-2with the immense problems, frustrations and occasional successes
of public education.
I am tn agreement that the traditioual system of funding and
control (praetieed in varying ways in 49 states, and for a century
or more in some states) is oot designed to produce - and does not
produce- identical expenditures amoDg the school districts of a
etate or, indeed, within certain districts. I have advocated for years
a larger participation by the state in financial public education, and
the trend - certainly in Virginia - has been in this direction.*
1he difficulty with school financing in Virginia (unrelated to
race) was twofold: (i) the property wealth of districts does vary;
and (li) the willingness of the people to tax themselves for public
schools may vary even more widely. I will cite only one example which
you can visualize. The City of Richmond consistently over the years
has provided more money per pupil for education than any of the

counties in the metropolitan Richmond area. You saw the high quality
residential developments, adjacent to the City, in both Chesterfield
and Henrico Counties. Yet, neither of these counties has ever provided

*I Invite your attention to the new Virginia Constitution which~
as a
unique education article (Article VIU), placing an affirmative duty on
the state to provide "a statewide system of free public elementary and
secondary schools open to all children of school age (which) shall ensure
that an educational program of high quality is established and maintained."

' '

-3a per pupil expenditure for schools as high as that in the City of
Richmond. Until fairly recently (wben other factors have contributed
to a marked deterioration tn Richmond City schools), the general
quality of Richmond public school education was recognized as the
best in the state, second only to Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria.
Yet . in terms of per capita wealth, Chesterfield and Henrico
Counties are far richer than the City of Richmond if commercial and
industrial property is excluded. But a tax rate on the latter type of
properties must also be paid by individuals, and Richmond traditionally
haF- simply been willing - due to Ptrong civic leadership - to tax Itself
at a higher rate than in the adjoining counties.
On the other hand, as contrasted with a few bright spots (e.g.

Richmond and Northern Virginia) many Virginia counties - especially
in the western part of the state (in which the black population is
negligible) placed a low premium on public education; the leadership
wa.f!! weak; F-chool boards were politically controlled; and the boards

of supervisors were often large property owners not enthusiastic about
taxing themselves. The result, in many of these counties, was a

mediocre effort for public education.
For these reasons, I pressed for years for a larger participation
by the state, and the trend bas been that way. Dut the prinelpal burden

-4still falls on the local communities, and the per pupil expenditures
vary from a low of $523 per pupll in Henry County (in the far southwest) to $1,318 in Arlington (operating funding from all sources). •
The answer to the problem i8 not as simple as having the state
take over all funding of public education. Your memorandum perceptively identifies many of the problems. The tax structure of a
state. involving the interrelationship of federal, state and local
taxes of all kinds, is a complex mix which cannot be restructured
without creating immense problems -political, economic and legal.
Moreover, the genius of our federal system - certainly until recently has rested not merely upon the relationship and ba.la.raee between
state and federal governments. Local government bas played a
fundamental role in making our system work, in preventing the bigness
even of state government from overwhelming the citizen, in keepiDg
control of local municipal services - including education - largely ln
the hands of the localities where the politicians are far more responsive
to the needs of the communities and the will of the people than at any
other level.
The local school board 18, I beUeve, a unique American institution. It has played a vital role in the development of our publle school

• As of fiseat 1971

-5system, and especially in helping to generate the community support
necessary to finance it. Critics and cynics attack public education
in the United States; they point to the obvious defects (which I make
no pretense of defending), but they often overlook the merits of a

system which has sustained a quality of democracy not found (I believe)
in any other major country. Few other countries assure 12 years of
free public education for every child who will take I. Almost no other

country has an educational system with the egalitarian character of ours,
which deliberately attempts to minimize social and economic inequalities, and which affords mobility opportunity for any individual who
has the ability and determination to move upward in the social and
economic strata of our society.
Reasonable views may differ, but in my judgment the local school
board - with the interest of the parents immediately involved - has been
the most dynamic force behind the overall effectiveness of our public
school system. A local school board does far more than deal with
money. Within broad policies established by the State Board of Education, the local board has significant autonomy - with respect to curriculum,
textbook.s , extracurricular programs, supplemental programs, experi-

ments in various educational techniques, employment and in-service
training of teachers, promotions, school building locations, types of
school buildings, etc • , etc •

..

...

....

'

-6Whenever I feel myself beeomh~ enthusiastic for full state
funding, I cheek my lmp.llse by recalling that whoever exclusively
controls the purse strings, tn the end will control all programs and
policy. Such a total denigrating of local boards would not be in the

best interest of education or our country.
The sta.te thus does have a strong interest - the people of the

state have such an interest - in maintaining a htgh level of local
interest and responslbitity for publle education. ·whether this r eaches
the ··compe lling" level is rlebatable.

"ut to say , as the district court

did, that it rloes not meet the test of "rationality, ·· is to east considerable doubt upon the :tQtionallty of the district court judges.
This ts especially true when they characterize a r irrational a system
approved and in effect tn 9 states, some of which have had the eesense

or this system for a century.
"Ihus, a you can ee , I approach the San ntonio case with
mixe emotion when I thin c on y as a citizen an a ormer public
F;Chool e ucator.

As a lawyer and a judge, I have to apply constitutional
In the resolution of this case.

pri~lples

Yet, they must not be applied in a

vacuum or in a way which may weaken or destroy substantial values

in the ext sting system. Nor wou d tt make any sense to apply constitutional prtDCiples - unless they are

unavol~ably

applicable - in a

-7manner which is totally impractical from the political viewpoint.
Against these more or less random thoughts as a backdrop,
I DOW come to some more specific comments and questions raised
by your thoughtful memorandum:

1. Applicable standard of state interest. t agree with your
view that if only a "rational" state interest need; to be found . the
Texas system must be sustained. For the reasons above stated.
I think it clear that a rational argument can be made for preserving
a vital and influential ro le for the local school district.
Thus, a critical threshold question is whether the state must
meet the ··compelling interest'' standard. You point out , correctly
I think, that appellees - to sustain this position- must convince the Court

that the state action either (i) impinges upon a fundamental interest or
(U) draws Into question an '"invidious or 8Uspect classification" (e.g.
race, right to vote, right to travel).
The ''state action'' here is the tax structure which, in accord
with long tradition, leaves real estate as a tax source for the ocality,
with most other categories ot taxation (income, sales , state licenses,
etc.) reserved to the state itself. Property taxes provide the basic
reve111e for all of the local services: police and fire protection, streets
and other poblie utilities (water, sewerage, Ughting, etc.), public
health, welfare, recreation, libraries and education. Some of these
services (e.g. police and fire) are funded almost exclusively by the
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locality from the real estte tax. Other services - welfare, health
and education - are jointly funded by states and localities, with the
localities providing the predominant resources.
2. Wealth alone not "suspect." Your analysis (p. 19) is that

the Texas system "does discriminate against the property poor',' and
thus is a Eystem under which "wealth becomes a function of education."*
You point out, however, that wealth alone has not yet been held to be
a "suspect" classification. (In Harper and Bullock v. Carter other
suspect subjects were involved; and in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.s.
137 (1971), ,Justice Black avoided saying that wealth was a suspect

category when he had a good opportunity to do ·,so.) I do not think
there is any basis in law - or in policy under a free competitive systemror concluding that wealth alone ts "suspect."
3. Is education a fundamental interest-? The question remains

as to the fundamentality of education. As you put it, is education a
fundamental interest in the same sense that the Court has found certain other interests to be fundamental, namely, •air c rimtnal process,
voting rights, interstate travel, the right to seek public office. and
speech related interests "J
There is language in the school eases (Drown and its progeny)
that could be quoted to support an affirmative answer. In addition, as

* Please enlighten me as to the usage of the word "function."

__________ _______ __
.__

\"··

.,

J

......_
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you point out in a felicitously phrased sentence:
"On top of that precedential foundation, plaintiffs stack the followiDg assertions. "
These "assertions" ine lude the obvious and sound arguments
as to the importance of public education in our democratic system
{pp. 23, 24).
If a layman stopped me on the street and inquired whether I

thought education is fundamental to our democracy, there could be
only one amrwer.

ut if the same layman asked whether public housing

and welfare are fundamental where indigents are concerned, I would
uDhesitatingly give the same answer. Similarly, many would give
the same IJ18wer if the question related to police protection, fire
protection, to the communications network of roads, and to other
services of government which are essential to the social and ecommic
fUDCtioning of our system.
'Ibe answers to each of the foregoing questions must be affirmatlve if ·•fundamental" is used in the sense that the state or community
could hardly get along without them.
It is possible, of course, that the legal concept of what is ..fundamental" may differ from the lay concept. Appellees argue, for example,
that education is different because it is rooted in the Constitution Itself,
beiug iDherent to the full exercise of First Amendment rights. ODe

-tOremembers, however, that it was not until after the Civil War
that public schools came to be recognized as a state interest of
any significance, fundamental or otherwise. Its roots simply do
not go back to the Bill of Rights.
There may well be degrees of fundamentality and certainly
reasonable minds will differ in applying a standard so inherently
subjective. Starting with my own preconceived notions as to the
importance of public education, it would be fairly easy for me to
conclude that it is a fundamental interest. I am not sure that such
a judgment would be based on legal and constitutional analysis rather
than social and philosophical concepts.
I would appreciate your further thinking as to a principled
basis, rooted in our past decisions, for concluding whether education is a fundamental interest. \Ve do have the repetitive dicta in
the school segregation cases. Apart from these, what are the best
available precedents on the affirmative side? On the negative side,
I believe you have cited the precedents relied upon principally by
Prof. ·w right (Dandridge v. Williams, Jefferson v. Hackney, Lindsey
v. Normet, and possibly Gordon v. Lance ) •
Before passing to another point, I raise a further question
prompted by your memorandum. You state, correctly, that the
Constitution does not require that a state provide public education:

' ~ "'

-11rather, only that it must not discriminate if it undertakes to do so.
(pp. 27, 28.) If one coocedes this, is it consistent to argue that
education is a fundamental interest 'J The areas of fundamental
interests, heretofore identified as such by the Court, have involved
fair crimina.l process, votlDg, travel, the electoral process (one man,
ooe vote) and the like. Each of these that comes to mind (as I dictate
this) involves not merely a major state interest but an individual
right accorded by the Constitution. Can we say, therefore, that
there may be a fundamental interest - in the sense that the state
must have a compelling interest in applying classifications to it in the absence of an enforceable, fundamental personal right?
4 • Is there a realistic intermediate standard? After
discussing whether the standard must be the "compelling interest
test" or the "ratloDal basis test, " you suggest the possibility of an
intermediate standard. 'this interests me as I am not entirely content with either of the standards mentioned.
Yet the rationale of your intermediate or ''sliding scale"
standard is difficult to verbalize or visualize as being a solution.
I agree that any soundly written opinion must avoid the appeanmce
and the facts of ad hoc law makiug and that "labels should not obscure
what lies beneath." There is no doabt a ''gray area" between the

two coaventioDal standards. But would it not be as difficult to identify

-12-

and define a position within this gray area as it has been for various
members of the Court in the past to define - and distinguish rationally the two standards now customarily invoked?
You state that the higher one places education, the stiffer
the burden on Texas to justify itself. This leaves the judgment in
the realm of subjectivity, and it does not necessarily lead to a legal
conclusion- at least as I presently view it.
I could speak with conviction of the importance of more adequate
state funding for education (as I have for years), but this would not
necessarily lead me to conclude that a tax system, practiced in
virtually all of the states for many decades, is unconstitutional. My
concern comes into sharper focus when r think of possible alternatives,
which you address under the caption of "remedies."
5. ·what alternative plans could the Court soundly endorse in
principle? Your memorandum suggests two, the first of which is
sometimes called "state subvention.,. This is defined usually to mean
full state assumption ot financing.
I can conceive, without difficulty, of the state taking over full
responsibility for funding public education, and financing it from any
or all available sources of revenue - including the heretofore local
property tax. If the state did this (and assuming it were politically
feasible), the local school board - and its vital role - would go down

~·

.. "

....

-13-

the drain fairly soon. Some may not share this view, but I am
satisfied from my own experience that the realities of political
life and power are ultimately and conclusively tied to the Eource
of funding. lVToreover, this would raise all sorts of direct and indirect problems, some of which you have mentioned. It would certainly weaken the authority and importance of local government,
which is already suffering from malnutrition and from lost control
of tax resources. But I am not as concerned with this at the moment
as I am with possible enucational consequences.
Onee the state assumes full funding responsibilities, it is
inevitable that per pupil expenditures will have to be essentially
the same throughout the state. Certain variations woul be allowed for difrerences in cost of living, to accommodate imtted special
education programs and the like. But Trlo not believe substantial
discrepancies in per pupil expenditures wou d be to erateri po itically
or would pass judicial 8crutiny. Certainly anthing less than equality
would provoke a noon

0

litigation.

In 1971 the cost per pupil in Fairfax County was

~8

0 as con-

trasted with $1, 318 tn neighboring Arlington County. If there were
state funding, neither the politicians nor the courts would allow this
discrepancy to continue -although the quality of schools in both
counties ranks high in the state. Would Arlington be downgraded in

K

'0

-14order to afford approximately the same level per pupil in Fairfax?
And what about Chesterfield County, in an urbanized area with perhaps
as much "CAealth as Fairfax and yet a per pupil expenditure or only $647?
Would it be averaged with Arlington? If so - and these examples can
be multiplied by the variations throughout most any state - is it an

anBwer to the citizens of Arlington to say that, after the state has
taken away all or most of their real estate tax base, somehow they
can add the "icing on the cake" which the state haF taken away from
them?
If the State of Virginia had to level its per pupil expenditure to
anything approaching the t\rlington level, I hesitate to guess what the
increased tax burden wou d be on a statewide basis. The meriian
per pupil cost for all counties and cities in Virginia in 1971 was $649,
and the average was 724. It is simply politically and economically
impossible to increase expenditures on a statewide basis to the standards
of .Fairfax or Richmond, much less Arlington. Thus, in Virginia and
no doubt in 'J exas, statewide funding almost imvitably would result
in "leveling down" the education afforded in the localities which have
had the good fortune both of high incomes and deep interest in schools
for their children.
You suggest something intermediate, and less drastic than full
state funding. But who is to say what constitutes an adequate level of

. .

-15expenditure for education on an equalized basis across the state?
Texas claims that its present plan provides funding adequate to meet
even the compelling state interest test. A three-judge court differs.
I would like to find a reasoned and principled position that
avoided destroying the usefulness of local control or the schools,
and which also minimizes the wide gaps which now exist as a result
of primary reliance on local funding. But I have not yet identified
an intermediate position that is based on objective standards, as
distinguished from rubjective judgment as to what

i~

''a equate.''

'fhe "power equalization plan,'' which r confess I do not fully
understand, does not appear to be a feasible alternative. It would
involve a major restructuring of state tax rystems with consequences
difficult to foresee or predict - both egal, political and economic. I
would hesitate to plunge into the unknown to that extent, at least
without a firmer grasp of the probable consequences.
6. We are a court - not a legiFlature. I presently incline to
the view that if the Court were to hold the Texas plan unconstitutiona ,
the only feasible alternative - that would stand judicial scrutiny would be full state funding. I am deeply reluctant for the judiciary

to plunge 49 states into this sort of a crisis. I remind myself, as you
have often reminded me in other connections, that we are not a superlegislature, that judicial restraint is a cardinal virtue when approaching

-16an issue of constitutionality; and this seems especially true in view
of the venerable age of the present system. There is a considerable
public pressure for increase state responsibility of education, as
we have 'vitnessed in Virginia. One wonders whether this complex
problem of how best to finance public education shoul not be left
to the emocratic process.

Note:

I have not addressed many points - such as the validity

of some of the factual assumptions- chiefly because I have run out

of time.

L.£'. P., Jr.

LFP, ,fr.:pls

Memo to: Larry Hammond
:&om: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

October 25, l972

Re: Rodriguez
A book which we might take a close look at is Crisis in

the Classroom by Charles E. Silberman. I have no idea whether
it will be enlightening on our Rodriguez issue. It has, however,
been recommended to me several times by old friends in Virginia
who are professional public school educators.
If the library here doesn't have it, we might ask it to

obtain a copy.

L. F. P., .Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls

~aprttnt <!Jo:u:rt ~f

tqt ~ttittlt ,jhttes
'JlUasfttngton. ~. <!}. 2!lgt,..;t
October 25, 1972

CHAMBERS OP'"

JU S TICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Thurgood:
It is fine with me if you
~ndertake

the dissent in No. 61-1332 - Rodriguez,

and No. 71-732 - Bustamante.
W. 0. D.

'-.JoJ
.

Mr. Justice Marshall

I

cc: Conference

I

I.

I

\

'\
1

I' I

MEMORANDUM
TO:

\tfr. I arry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

/

DATE: November 13, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez
This memorandum wUl comment briefly on your first rough draft
of an opinion -which I have read but had no opportunity to study carefully.
I consider it a good start on a difficult case to write. I do not
agree that the draft is "sinkingly disappointing". I agree, however, that
your second draft should deal more deeply with the three areas mentioned
{'
,·

in your covering memorandum, I make the following more or less haphazard
comments:
1.

~damental

right. Your draft is already fairly strong on

this point, but no doubt can be strengthened along the lines you suggest.
One question which puzzles me is whether there is a difference between
a "fundamental right" and a "fundamental interest". The terms seem to
be used interchangeably. Yet, it is easier for me to think of education
as being a fundamental interest than as being any sort of "right" in a
constitutional sense.
Whatever the terminology may be, the compelling state interest
test is applicable only with respect to a right rooted in or derived from
the Constitution. It is here that our opinion should be strong and clear.

' '.

2.
I do not have the briefs with me (I am dictating this at home), but I recall
that Charlie Wright was fairly good on this. Also, Judge Harvey in the
Maryland District Court had a quotable paragraph or two.
In terms of pure analysis, it is difficult to see that education could

possibly be a fundamental constitutional right. It is virtually conceded
that the state has no constitutional obligation to provide free public
education. The state is obligated to protect the other fundamental rights
identified by the Court -notably under the llrst and Fifth Amendments
(and Fourteenth).
2. State tax structure. Your second point relates to the "delicate
and significant state interest in gathering money within its borders". I
consider this a point

major of dimensions. In terms of finding a

"rational basis" for the Texas system, you have properly emphasized
two grounds: (a) the legitimate state interest in local control and
incentive with respect to schools; and (b) the state interest in allocating
sources of tax revenue as between the state itself and the localities.
Both of these can be developed further in the opinion. I believe you can
derive some help from Charlie Wright's brief as well as from the brief
filed on behalf of 29 states.
I also wonder whether there are not some decisions (of this Court
or other courts which emphasize the right of a state to determine the
types of local taxes and the allocation of revenue sources

(~. ~·

property

3.
taxes v. sales taxes) between state and localities. The importance of
this point -as we have discussed - goes in final analysis to the heart
of federalism. If the federal judiciary can order the states to confirm
to taxing systems prescribed by it, we will indeed have rewritten the
Constitution.
In this connection, the draft opinion has not addressed specifically

the almost certain outcome of appelllees position: namely, that equal
spending on education will inevitably require full state funding of education
so that expenditures per pupil will be the same on a statewide basis.
It is hard to see that anything short of this would be constitutional. Texas
is now providing 50% of the school funds and appellees say this is not
to
enough. Would 75% beeenough? Would 95%- of what? -;ineet appellee's
argument against financial discrimination. If the localities are still
allowed to "ice the c*e" there will be disparity regardless of the state's
contribution. In short, full state funding would be inevitable, and this
would surely destroy or severely weaken local government. As you point
out, if the "function of wealth" theory is sound as a matter of constitutional
law with respect to education, why would it not apply to virtually all
municipal services: Health, welfare, safety, public works, roads and
the like?
3. The wealth discrimination issue. I have already anticipated
my thoughts on this in the above discussion.

4.
I suggest that you continue to give this case your first priority
have
attention. We will probably/no equally important case this term. And
the way this opinion is written could have profound influence on
constitutional doctrine.
L. F. P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: November 13, 1972

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez
This memorandum will comment briefly on your first rough draft
of an opinion - which I have read but had no opportunity to study carefully.
I consider it a good start on a difficult case to write. I do not
agree that the draft is "sinkingly disappointing". I agree, however, that
your second draft should deal more deeply with the three areas mentioned
in your covering memorandum, I make the following more or less haphazard
comments:
1.

Fundamental right.

Your draft is already fairly strong on

this point, but no doubt can be strengthened along the lines you suggest.
One question which puzzles me is whether there is a difference between
a "fundamental right" and a "fundamental interest".
be used interchangeably.

The terms seem to

Yet, it is easier for me to think of education

as being a fundamental interest than as being any sort of "right" in a
constitutional sense.
Whatever the terminology may be, the compelling state interest
test is applicable only with respect to a right rooted in or derived from
the Constitution. It is here that our opinion should be strong and clear.

2.
I do not have the briefs with me (I am dictating this at home), but I recall
that Charlie Wright was fairly good on this. Also, Judge Harvey in the
Maryland District Court had a quotable paragraph or two.
In terms of pure analysis, it is difficult to see that education could

possibly be a fundamental constitutional right.

It is virtually conceded

that the state has no constitutional obligation to provide free public
education.

The state is obligated to protect the other fundamental rights

identified by the Court - notably under the First and Fifth Amendments
(and Fourteenth).
2.

State tax structure.

Your second point relates to the "delicate

and significant state interest in gathering money within its borders". I
consider this a point of major

dimensions.

In terms of finding a

"rational basis" for the Texas system, you have properly emphasized
two grounds: (a) the legitimate state interest in local control and
incentive with respect to schools; and (b) the state interest in allocating
sources of tax revenue as between the state itself and the localities.
Both of these can be developed further in the opinion. I believe you can
derive some help from Charlie Wright's brief as well as from the brief
filed on behalf of 29 states.
I also wonder whether there are not some decisions (of this Court
or other courts which emphasize the right of a state to determine the
types of local taxes and the allocation of revenue sources

(~. ~·

property

3.
taxes v. sales taxes) between state and localities. The importance of
this point - as we have discussed - goes in final analysis to the heart
of federalism.

If the federal judiciary can order the states to con:Drm

to taxing systems prescribed by it, we will indeed have rewritten the
Constitution.
In this connection, the draft opinion has not addressed specifically

the almost certain outcome of appellees' position: namely, that equal
spending on education will inevitably require full state funding of education
so that expenditures per pupil will be the same on a statewide basis.
It is hard to see that anything short of this would be constitutional.

Texas

is now providing 50% of the school funds and appellees say this is not
to
enough. Would 75% be ~ enough? Would 95%- of what? -/meet appellee's
argument against financial discrimination. If the localities are still
allowed to "ice the cake" there will be disparity regardless of the state's
contribution. In short, full state funding would be inevitable, and this
would surely destroy or severely weaken local government.

As you point

out, if the "function of wealth" theory is sound as a matter of constitutional
law with respect to education, why would it not apply to virtually all
municipal services: Health, welfare, safety, public works, roads and
the like?
3.

The wealth discrimination issue. I have already anticipated

my thoughts on this in the above discussion.

4.
I suggest that you continue to give this case your first priority
have
attention. We will probably no equally important case this term. And
the way this opinion is written could have profound influence on
constitutional doctrine.
L. F. P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: December 12, 1972

No. 71-1332 Rodriguez
As I work my way through your fine draft more carefully, I may
dictate -as I go along- an occasional memorandum to reflect comments
or questions.
Your Part I (pages 2-12) is excellent and - from my viewpoint ready for the printer. It might facilitate readibility if you could find
two or three appropriate places to indicate subparts by the use of
capital letters, but I do not regard this as essential in any sense.
As to Part II
The introduction (12, 13) also is excellent.
I follow subpart A (beginning bottom p. 13) with clarity and
admiration up to page 18. There, I am partially derailed -perhaps
because I have not sufficiently digested your analysis.
You start, correctly, with the district court's "wealth discrimination".

After noting that it is geographical in a sense (rather than

financial) you distinguish the cases dealing with criminal trials and
appeals, and point out that absolute deprivation - rather than relative

. ·,

2.
ability - was involved.
At p. 17, the draft points out that the c1ass alleged to be
discriminated against is "large and diverse" and unlike blacks, aliens
or indigents.
Commencing at the bottom of page 17, the draft identifies as a
"second significant" distinction the fact that former cases involved an
absolute deprivation of the benefit in question. The first ground of
distinction was, I take it, the amorphous character of the class. Yet,
when I read the phrase "second significant factor" at the bottom of
p. 17, I was momentarily uncertain as to how you had defined the
"first" distinguishing factor. I am not at all sure that any reworking
of these pages is desirable. They are quite strong as presently written,
but I did want to identify this minor break (at least for me) in the smooth
flow of the draft.
The full paragraph beginning on page 19 does raise a question
of possible substance. You ask whether we need answer the question
whether the Texas program is "adequate". I doubt that this is really
what you had in mind - unless the question is rhetorical and you wltsh
to answer in the negative. I do not think it is the business of a court
to determine whether a state service - even education - is'adequate".
Moreover, adequate is relative in relation to time

(~. ~·

science was

3.
far more important following Sputnik than prior thereto), generally in
relation to the demands of a complex civilization, and especially in
relation to available funds and what the public is willing to pay in the
way of texas.

In the section dealing with whether the Texas program

meets the "rational test" standard, you deal with this correctly. The
test is not whether we - or educators are other experts -consider the
Texas program "adequate". It is whether it is a rational approach to
an extremely difficult and complex problem.
Perhaps the answer is to omit - certainly at this point - the
paragraph commencing on page 19.
~

to Subpart B of Part II
This is another beautifully written part of the opinion, with which

I am entirely in accord. My comments are as follows:
P. 24 - see rider A attached to the text, which is self

exp~ory.

P. 29 -the paragraph beginjng on this page raises some questions
in my mind.

You will note a change I suggest in the first sentence. I

wonder, however, whether we need the first two sentences in this
paragraph? The paragraph wruld cmvey its basic message if it commenced
with the third sentence.
Of crurse the Constitution does not require that free public
)ltducation be provided by the states. If we have any authority for this

4.
view, it might be well to cite it. I do not recall when the first public
schools were provided, but I doult that any were mandated in any of the
original states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Did
appellees concede this in their briefs or oral argument? I have in the
back of my mind that it would be conceded by appellees that public schools
are not constitutionally required, but if the state \Dldertakes to provide
them it must do so in conformity with equal protection.
P. 30 - your footnote 60 makes a valid and persuasive point.
I wonder whether it would not be well to move the substance of this note
up to the text just prior to the first full paragraph on p. 30?
P. 31 - I wooder whether you rely too heavily on Katzenbach.
Do you think the portion of Justice Brennan's opinion relied upon would
have been the same if the distinction llad been made by Coogress between
different foreign languages within the jurisdiction of the United States?
~:broad
~¥
~

Although JUstice Brennan's

the fact that the non-American
A

enough, I wonder whether

was not the cootrolling point.

I still think the Brennan quote is pertinent and should be used.
I questioo, however, whether we should tie ourselves to it quite as much
as the present draft does. For example, I am inclined to omit the first
sentence of your text which immediately follows the quote from Katzenbach,
I think you have abundantly sustained our position on the "fundamental
right" point without reliance on the Katzenbach argument. I think that

5.
argument does strengthen our opinion, and yet I conceive of it as a
"moreover" argument rather than one central to our position.

Memorandum to: Larry Hammond
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

December 15, 1972

No. 71-1332 Rodriguez
I return to you herewith your draft of 12/8/72, which I found to
be most excellent.

In view of the unusual importance of the case, I have spent a
considerable amount of time reviewing it and also have reexamined to some extent - the briefs.
It seems to me that the structure of the opinion is good, the
reasoning sound, and your use of the precedents is persuasive. My
suggested changes are indicated either in the text or in riders attached.
You have worked with me enough to know that none of my suggestions
is "written in stone." I naturally want the opinion to reflect something of
my own style, but I am far more concerned with substance and soundness.
Also, matters of taste, relevancy and restraint are also important to me,
and I value your judgment on these.
My suggestion is that you produce, as promptly as you reasonably
can, a second draft with the view to sending it to the printer for a private
printing. To the extent that you make major changes -either in what I
have written or in your draft - I would like to go over them with you.
We will also follow the practice of last term of having another law
clerk review the draft before it is circulated. Indeed, I would be happy

'.

to delay it unduly.

t :. ,' Although I think you have handled the mass of secondary authorities
very well indeed, before we bring down the opinion I hope there will be an
opportunity to review the principal briefs to see whether we have omitted
from our footnotes any references that might fairly be entitled to be cited.
We have such an abundance of material, special care must be exercised
to assure that we have not misquoted or inaccurately summarized anyone's
position.
One random thought: I don't recall that we have mentioned "district
power equalizing," except in a glancing way in one of my footnotes. Perhaps it deserves more specific treatment in a note.
You heard Jay's reference to Professor Grunther' s article.
understand it - without having read the article - he expressed satisfaction
that some of the opinions last term (including a couple of mine) pointed the
way to greater flexibility in equal protection cases, avoiding the extremes
''

of "compelling interest" and "rationality." Jay thinks you and I should
read what Professor Grunther has said, although I am inclined to doubt that
it applies to our case.
· In conclusion, I warmly commend you on

a first-rate piece of work. ~·, '··

F. P., Jr.

•

t;•;.

Judge a

down for a rush printing.

You will want to

I've done with your suggestions and changes.

My

attached notes may help flesh out any areas in which
I have taken an approach different than you suggested.
I am confident that when we see the first printed
draft we each will have a number of things that we will
I feel uncertain that we
wish to alter. At tpresent, id#ijij#liiil#ll#illli
have kept all the loose ends together and that

we

have

not been overly repetitive but that will emerge more
clearly, I tfuink, in a printed draft.

We should probably

anticipate hurriedly scratching through the first draft
with any last minute changes and then having a second
printing for circulation.

(In fact, we might just ask

the printers for 4 copies to expedite matters.)
NOTEs

As of tonight Sally & Peggy still have about

5 pages of footnotes and 10 pages of text to retype.

LAH

\:i'

No. 71 ~1332 san Antcmo Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

""!'

,. Here is the first draft of Rodrigue!! delivered to me this
morning :tJy the printer.
~

~

)~

I am grateful for your willingness to take a took at this before
it is circulated to the Conference.
'"

'. ~ Wt,!tave not yet proofread this draft, nor- indeed- reviewed it "

at alL l'am certain that I will have some changes, although I believe

the basic analysis set forth in the opinion reflects the views of a majority
of the Court as expressed at our Conference.

'

~·

·~

(;

,·~·7 ~' I.·~.

'",,f,!·

Yoar suggestions will be welcome. My thought is that we will
not print a seccmd draft for circulation until next week after everyone ·
,has returned from Christmas.
i
I

Sincerely,

'

"'',•

......

' '

'·

Rea Rodriguez
Judge a
(1) P. 29--You have raised here a question that
has been of considerable concern to me.

That is, does

anything in the constitution require states to provide
public education?

It is true that public education

was not generally required at the time the Constitution
became law.

It is also true that there is dictum in

at least one case stating that while the state might
close its schools altogether, if it provides schools
to some it must comport with standards of equal protection.

Griffin v. Cty School Bd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)/

You are also right--! believe--that the parties may have
made the "throw away" concession that the State could
discontinue education altogether.

However, for two

reasons I decided not to pursue that course.
First, at oral argument Charlie Wright was asked
whether, in his personal view, a case for denial of
constitutional rights could be made out if a state decided
to close its schools and provided absolutely no education
at this point in our country's history.

"I must say
i

I am attracted as a scholar tjo the argument that •t
might be, despite the intimations of your previous
cases, that today the failure of a state to provide an
edmcation altogether would inhibit the First

A~andment

rights,

that a state has an obligation to teach children to
read and to write."
Second, this notion ties in pretty closel' with our
emphasis on the fact that we are dealing with relayive
and not absolute deprivations. I feel that it might
lend an air of disingenmity to our treatment if we were

--2--

to say that no education is required.

In any event,

the issue is not necessary tlo our case and I would
like to maintain the clear impression that your opinion
is sensitive to the value of education.

And, in my

view, any such statement--politically speaking--undercuts that impression.
(2) P. 32.
mine here.

I like your transition better than

I think, however, that we should omit the

sentence I have marked out since it

is almost identical

to my sentence on page 33.
In your reference to Baker v. Carr you raise a
hard question for me.
reapportionment cases.

I have purposely not cited the
You're absolutely correct in

tminking that the cases are pertinent though.

That

area more than any other--except segregation in education-is an iexample of the Court's entry into an area traditionally reserved for the states.

The biggest difference

between voting and education is that in the one the
Ct was able to come up with an easily manageable standard-one man, one vote.

In the educitional area, however,

short of equal expenditures, which no one seems to
want, there really is no fairly controllable standard •
.The problem is that I don't want to say this unless a
dissent compels us to because it makes the

C~urt

asi it is treating this case as nonjusticiahle.

sound
That

is not what we are domng, instead, we are meeting each
argument head on and applying to the case the traditional
teats of equal protection.
With your approval I would rather wait and see
what the dissent tries to do with the reapportionment

--3--

cases.
(3)

I improve entirely of your appended footnote

78, dealing with the relationship between salaries, ratios,
and quality education.

There is scholarly support for

both views and I will endeavor to uncover them in the
next few days but I do not think it necessary to hold up
the first circulation for this purposel.
(4)

In the "rationality" section I think your

summary is an excellent aid in pulling together the
threads that I had been trying to develop.

It occurred

to me that it would work well if I attempted to interlace my rational-basis citations into that conclusion.
Otherwise, it appeared to be overly repetitive.

See

what you think.
(5)

I would like to suggest, concerning your

rider on page 43, that we not get back into the
problems of full state assumption and district power
equalization.
the dissenters.

Your point is surely to be disputed by
They will argue that full state

assumption is not "required."

They will also say that

full state funding does not mean the end of local
participation in education, i.e. the state could supply
the money and the districts could spend it in any way
they see fit.

We have already intimated a contrary

view in the earlier footnote.

I tfuink, for the present,

that that is enough. Let's placeithe burden on them--the

~d~senters--to explain why remedies can be easily
effected.

It will be easier for us to shoot down

their suggestions than to write our own defense in
advance.

7/-133,2

Memo to: Larry Hammond
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

January 2, 1973

Rodriguez
Here is a University of Missouri law review which Justice
stewart commended.
I recall - quite vaguely - that you have seen this. Yet, I

had not read it until this morning. Although it has no basic ally
new ideas, it is well written and some of the points are developed
quite persuasively.
Perhaps it might generate a note or two for our opinion.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls
Attachment

·•

.

January 8, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

/s/ W.H.R.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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MEMORANDUM
Hammond

DATE:

February 2, 1973

P owell, Jr.
Rodriguez
In other connections, I have run across the following cases that

may possibly merit consideration as buttressing points made in our
opinion:
New

Y~

336 U.S. 106, 110 (1948):

"It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils
of the same genus be erradicated or none at all.
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157,

f6-o. "

~!JJ.iamson

v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1954):

"The problem of legislative classification is a perennial
one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the
same field may be of different dimensions and proportions,
requiring different remedies, or so the legislature may
think. ~igner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141. Or the reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind. Semler v. Dental '""'xaminers, 294 U.S. 608. The
legislature may select one phase of one field and apply
a remedy there, neglecting the others. . • . The prohibition
of the equal protection clause goes no further than the
invidious dis~rimination."
On an entirely different point, you might take a look at Justice

.•

Douglas' draft opinion for the Court in 71-685 and 71-691 (Lake Shore

·";'·

.

' '

2.
;!;!

~

''

~.

Auto Parts), and his ireU.ance with respect to the wide latitude of states
as to taxation, on allied Stores of Ohio, 358 U.S. 522, 526-527.

"""···

,,

.j;upumt Q}onrt ttf tltt 'J!l-nittb ~tafts
'JlasJrittgfctt.1[l. (!}. 20.?'-~c?
CHAMBE:RS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

January 9, 1973

No. 71-1332 - San Antonio School v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
In due time I will circulate a dissent
in this case.
Sincerely,:/ '
(!/{~

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Conference

Note re White's opinion in Rodriguez
(1)

He equates "local control" with local fiscal autonomy

and thus fails to grapple with our statement that local
control means more than local financing, it also means
preservation of the traditional barriers against state
interference with local affairs, i.e., it protects against
the prospect that with state money goes state control over
programs, class arrangements, and a number of other concerns
preserved for the schools.

(2)

He relies on the state law which imposes a $1.50

barrier against excess spending.

That law was not before

the ct below and we do not indicate in our opinion whether
tha! barrier is constitutional.

Indeed, one USDC held

that a similar provision in Florida

was impermissible

and we indicate, via a cf citation, that it might present
a different case (see n. 82 p, 34 cite to Hargrave)
(3)

In his

final paragraph he suggests that we have

held that there is no ground for invocation of the e.p. cl
here "because of the difficulty in identifying the class
that is subject to the alleged discrimination."

As I said

this morning, while there is language in our opinion leaning
in that direction that was not the thrust of our section
on wealth.

Instead we were explaining why this class,

however defined, was not suspect.

We added the other

language in an effort to assuage Stewart.

We should probably

retool that section to clarify our points.
SUMMARY
The dissent is thin, as you suggest.

His reasoning

that there is no rational basis is unpersuasive on traditional
e.p. analysis under the rational basis test.

.

I

It also provides

little real guidabce to what system would be constitutional
except to indicate (p. 2) that any such system should
"extend a meaningful option to all local districts to increase
their per pupil expenditures."

Later, p.S, he says what

his view does nQt portend and concludes that all that is
required it is a system which

"provides a rational basis

for the maximatization of local control."

Nowhere does he

suggest how this is to be done short of either some
scheme of "power equalizing" or full state funding.

LAH

,.

~,

;%;npumt Qionrt of tl!t~1ttift~ ~tatct.l
'Jl!aslrittgtatt. p. <;. 2rTbfJ~;.1
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

February 4, 1973

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent in

71-1332, San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez.

' '
William o. Douglas

Mr. Justice White

cc:

Conference
Law Clerks

. :.·

I

LAH 2/4/73
Res

Schedule for Rodriguez

Judge 1
If it meets with your approval I would like to pursue
the following schedule with respect to finafuizing Rodriguez.
(a)

It should come down on March 19 (the first Monday

of the next sitting period).
(b)

I would like to devote next week to the mountainous

task of citechecking and proofing the opinion.

As a major

part of that endeavor, I will respond the Marshall's opinion
in a few spots, I will see what evidence there is of the
nature of "local control" in Texas (statutory or otherSwise),

A significant part of the job will be to read

quickly through numerous sources to obtain any further
valuable info (including the most recent Yale LJ article,
Jencks Report, Mondale Committee Reports and Prints, Civil
Rights Comm'n report on Educ, a recent Texas Research League
report on Rodriguez, etc).
(c)

At the same time I have asked Bill to carefully

edit the opinion before Wednesday of next week.
(d)

it is my goal to have the finally edited and

beefed up draft on your desk by Firday (or no later than
Saturday of next week).

This would provide ample time

for you to make whatever final changes you desire and to
get it printed, circulated, and proofed c l osely one last
time be f ore publication.
(e)

In order to assure the fiastest process, I suggest

that we make available to Marshall's clerk any changes
we make in response to his opinion so that he can be doing
his final tooling up at the same time.

--2--

(f)

You might also want to (1) get a formal note from

the CJ for our records, (2) let PS know that we would like
to come down 3/19 so that he will have his concurrence
around.

LAH

Rodriguez
Judge•
As far as I'm concerned this is ready to go to the
printer.
(1)

Please check the following first.
I tried my hand at redrafting slightly the

introductory paragraph of the wealth section.

~I

In re-

drafting it I tried to come closer to stating exactly
what the "threshold" questions were that should have been
addressed below.

I also changed the sentence structure

to avoid having two sentences in a row with colons.

Finally

I thought it best to tone down the phrase you used in
describing the salient questions--"merely some relative
disadvantage characteristic of a free lfifil.ll.f}:fi#democracy."
I think it might be read as an indication that we are out of
sympathy with the disadvantageds attendant upon attendence
to some Edgewood-type school.
(2)

In the concluding paragraph of the section I

went ahead and added the cite to Kramer and rechecked to
make sure that my Graijam cite was OK.

If you want Kramer

out just run a line through it.
(3)

I added the sentence you like in the rationality

section on page 46 but altered it slightly to make it
fit.

See what you think.
(When you're through you might have Sally put it on

my desk downstairs and 1°11 carry it to the printer
first thing in the morning.)
Thanks

LAH

.iuvrtmt <qourt of tlft ~nittb ~hdtS'

._utrmgtou. ~.

~ 2LlpJ!.~

CHAMBERS O F

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 8, 1973

Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez
Dear Lewis,
Please forgive my delay in responding to your circulation
in this case. The delay was occasioned by my intention to write a
rather thorough memorandum, but that intention has been frustrated by a variety of time-consuming factors, ranging from reading abortion fan mail to preparing to leave for California today.
I shall, therefore, necessarily be brief.
First of all, I think you have done a magnificent job with
this extremely important and factually complex case. I agree with
the result you reach.
Mter much consideration, however, I have decided I cannot subscribe to an opinion that accepts the "doctrine" that there
are two separate alternative tests under the Equal Protection
Clause, and that the necessary first step in any equal protection
case is to decide which test to apply, and therefore first to decide
whether a "fundamental interest" is affected.
I do not for a moment criticize you for embracing this
analysis. It is the analysis adopted by the district court in this
case, the analysis briefed and argued before us, and the analysis
that finds support in several of our recent cases. I have become
convinced, however, that the theory that there is a "compelling
state interest" te.s t and a quite different "rational basis" test under the Equal Protection Clause is wholly spurious and unsound,
in the absence of a "suspect" classification.

- 2The Equal Protection Clause is typically invoked to attack
classifications made by state statutes. I fully agree that some few
classifications are suspect, notably and primarily race, but also
others, including alienage, perhaps sex, perhaps illegitimacy,
and indigency. (I under stand indigency to mean actual or functional indigency, not comparative poverty vis-a-vis comparative
wealth. ) A state law that makes such suspect classifications is, I
think, presumptively invalid.
A state law that impinges upon an individual liberty or
freedom explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution is
also, I think, presumptively invalid. That, however, is not because of a "compelling state interest" test peculiar to the Equal
Protection Clause, but because of the constitutional freedom that
is impinged upon. In other words, a state law that impinges upon
free speech or freedom of interstate travel is presumptively invalid for that reason alone, regardless of whether the state law
makes any classifications.
The so-called "compelling state interest" doctrine stems,
I think, from a passage in the Court's opinion in the Kramer case
less than four years ago. 395 U.S. 621, 625-630. I understood
that passage then, and I understand it now, to mean little or no
more than what is said in the two paragraphs above. It is, incidentally, interesting to compare that passage with what the same
author had to say about the Equal Protection Clause a few years
earlier in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, a case
in which very bona fide First Amendment claims were rejected.
Application of the so-called "compelling state interest"
test automatically results, of course, in striking down the state
statute under attack. That is illustrated by the concession of the
petitioner in the present case. There is hardly a statute on the
books that does not result in treating some people differently from
others. There is hardly a statute on the books, therefore, that an
ingenious lawyer cannot attack under the Equal Protection Clause.
If he can persuade a court that a "fundamental interest" is involved, then the state cannot possibly meet its resulting burden

- 3of proving that there was a compelling state interest in enacting
the statute exactly as it was written. The end result, of course,
is to return this Court, and all federal courts, to the heyday of
the Nine Old Men, who felt that the Constitution enabled them to
invalidate almost any state laws they thought unwise.
I have dictated this letter hurriedly, and I hope it is at
least minimally intelligible. The upshot is that I cannot subscribe to an opinion in this highly important case that will perpetuate a very recent "doctrine" that I think is basically unsound.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
P. S. -- It occurs to me that some of the above thoughts were
better expressed in my concurring opinion in the Shapiro
case, 394 U.S. at 642.

,Snprtmt <!fonrt d tqt ~tb ,jhdts
'~ihtsfti:ngton., ~.

<If.

21lgt~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 8, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1332 - San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
I share much of the concern expressed by Potter in
his note to you of February 8th about the elaboration of
the two separate alternatives test under the Equal
Protection Clause in your opinion in this case. However,
I joined your opinion not only because I thought it was
well done and comprehensive, but because I felt that its
holding was to apply the rational basis test to the facts
before the Court. My lack of complete subscription to
some of what I regard as dicta will not change my earlier
view, and I am "still with you" as the saying goes. If
Potter does write something that I feel one can consistently
join while likewise joining your opinion, I will give some
thought to it at that time.

sincerely' f '

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Mr. Justice Stewart

RODRIGUEZ
Judge•
Following are my random thoughts as I have worked
over your suggested changes and several of my own.
(1) You have suggested citing Gunther's Harv. L.
Rev. article. Especially you have suggested cites
to his statements on pp 9 & 10. I am reluctant to
cite him.
(a) On page 9 he explains the enthusiasm for new
categories of strict scrutiny as, in part, a result
of the fact that the litigators and the commentators
are the same people. Pointedly, as his fn indicates,
he is referring to Coons, Clune & Sugarman. While
he is correct I think he sounds as if he views that
practice as somehow incestuous. If that is his
point, I disagree, Indeed, I stand almost in awe
of their performance. In any event, I see no place to
put the quote.
(b) His comments on page 10 refer to the apparent
"open-endness" of the e.p.cl under the "new" analysis.
But in so doing he is building on the arguments of
people like Archie Cox and the plaintiffs in the school
finance cases. He could not give much credence to the
open-endedness claim if he read carefully Shapiro,
Dandridge, and Lindsey v. Normet. If we want to talk about
the claim that the "new" equal protection analysis is
open-ended we should cite instead Justice Harlan who
has most often made that claim.
(2) I have reread and cited, in two places, the
Vieira--U of Missouri--articl~t I have backed away, however,
from any direct reliance on ~••sarticle because it takes
a siomewhat different view of the fundamental rights
doctrine than we do. He suggests that voting and criminal
process are "fundamental" because they are necessary to
access to the political process. He does not regard
these as fundamental because they have some nexus with
the Constitution.
He makes another argument that you and I have discussed more than once. That is, if the states may not
have disparities ~##ji# betveen districts, why may
the federal government allow difference among states.
I have tentatively decided not to address the argument
in our opinion. It involves at least two subtle constitutional questions• (1) is the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment interchangeable with the equal protection
clause?; (2) are we ready even to suggest in argument
that in the due process clause lies the power for this
Court or the federal Government to deliver the coup de grace
to federalism?
(3) The U. Va. law review article, as I may have
mentioned, deals with intra-district inequalities. While
it has a fair general discussion of the equal
protection cases, I think we should not cite it since
there are, apparently, a number of intradistrict financial
inequality cases presently pending and I would not want
us to appear to have decided that question. (There is,
however, a U. Va. comment on Serrano which I have not
read but which we might check and cite.).

·.

1

(4) I have added a footnote, ~ as per your suggestion,
mentioning that political subdivisions need not be
equal in every respect. I have reread two cases you
cited to me (Bowers & Adickes). I think neither is
apposite here. It is my judgment that we need to be
careful not to say too much about the propriety of
political subdivision lines inview of the fact that
we have two major groups of cases which will involve
precisely this question, i.e. the Richmond school
case and the reapportionment cases. In each case
the question arises whether the integrity of local subdivision
lines should override the application of some constitutional principle under the equal protection clause.
I tmink we are safe by~ saying simply that territorial
uniformity is not a "per se" requirement.
(S) I have gone again over Justice White's dissent.
As my prior memo indicates, two problems bothered me
most. First, his description of our holding with respect
to wealth classifications. That is now corrected by
the redraft I gave you yesterday. (2) His reliance
on the $1.50 maximum rate. I have added a new footnote
to dispose of this contention (see fn 107).
His general thesis of irrationality is already
adequately, in my view, answered in the opinion. But,
when Marshall circulates we will probably want to make
comments relevant to both opinions.
(6) I have reread the Orange Brief filed by the
30 States. Relying on quotations therein I have added
a new footnote 108 which catelogues some of the
commentary on the widely held belief that control of
policies goes with control of the punse strings. I
have asked the Library to get me copies of the sourees
I have cited so that I can check for better quotes and
ascertain that what I have is accurate.
I have also obtained from the Library the Mondale
Committee hearings and prints (cited late in the
Orange brief) and will add whatever helpful material I find
therein for a later draft.
(7) On page 1 I have changed from opinion for the
Court to Memorandum (in hopes that eventualii#ly we
can change it to "Mr Justice Powell announced the judgment
of the Court.").

.hputttt <!}ourl l1f t!r~ ~ttittb ~taUs:
.as:Jri:ttgtou. ~. <!}. 2llgt,.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

February 12, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1332

-

San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
Your preparation of the proposed opinion for this
very difficult case is a monumental and worthwhile effort.
I suspect that you and Potter will be able to resolve
your differences, as expressed by his letter of February 8.
If you are able to do this, I am, of course, with you. If you
are unable to do this, I find myself about where Bill Rehnquist
is, as described in his note of February 8.
Sincerely,

Itt.;..1

Mr.

Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

<!Jcurl.rf tfrt ~nittb _itattg
Jrltllltingtcn. ~. <!J. 2ll~'!.~
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

February 12, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1332

- San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
This note is intended as an addendum to my circulated
letter of this date.
I have two very minor suggestions, neither of which is
very important, but I pass them on to you for what they may be
worth:

1.

I personally would much prefer to omit the last
paragraph of footnote 101 as it appears on page 41. Teachers 1
str1kes are in current vogue across the country. Emotions run
deep. I fear that paragraph may add fuel to the controversy,
and I would dislike to see the Court's footnote quoted by one side
or the other. Teachers undoubtedly have been ~e_r'Q_ai2 in the
past. But so have nurses. Each profession has made great
strides recently. Thus I would be inclined to let their economic
problems be resolved apart from any comment by this Court in
an opinion.
2. I found the next to the last sentence of the £ir11t pa ~
graph of footnote 101 1 also on page 41, to be somewhat confusing.
It would be a little clearer for my benumbed mind if the sentence
read, "The result is that relatively few school systems have merit
plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are increased across the board • . . . "
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

Judge:
Here is the list you asked for.
the major "fundamental rights" cases.

It contains all of
There are at least

13 cases which have struck down state laws under this
stricter stanards of judicial scrutiny (usually called
compelling state interest, but not invariably).

There

are about 7 other cases in which laws have been reviewed
under the traditional approach but the Ct has explained why
it has not applied the fundamental rights test.
Although every Justice has at least joined in opinions
using the two-tier approach, your closest allies are
on the other side in Rodriguez--Brennan, White, Marshall,
Douglas.

(There's nothing wrong with the dog food , ••

we 0 re just selling it to the wrong dogs.)
LAH

2/13/73
Res

PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHING THE TWO-TIER APPROACH TO
EQUAL PROTECTION

I •.

Cases holding that where fundamental rights are
infringed equal protection requires application of
strict scrutiny or a compelling state interest.

(1)

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 1 "strict
scrutiny" where "fundamental" right of "procreation"

(9-0; Douglas, Black, Roberts, Reed,

is involved.

Frankfurter, Murphy, Byrnes; Stone & Jacksone•concurring)

(21

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)• "careful and
meticulous" scrutiny where "fundamental" right to vote
(8~1;

is involved.

Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan,

White, Goldberg; Clark & Stewart--concurring;

Harlan-~

dissenting)

(3)

Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)•

deals with

right of servicemen to vote in the locality in which they
are stationed.

Right referred as as "close to the core

of our constitutional system" and level of scrutiny
not labelled but clearly higher than rational basis.

(7-1; Stewart, Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, Whiteg
Goldberg;

(4)

Harlan-~dissenting)

Harper v. Virginia Bd of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)•
Virginia poll tax struck down ... - "close scrutiny" is
required where "fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted."

(6-3; Douglas, Warren, Clarkp Brennan,

White, Fortas; Black, Harlan, Stewart--dissenting)

(10)

Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Maryland law
which said that residents at NIH (a federal enclave)
were not residents and could not vote in state elections was unconst because it could not survive "close
constitutional scrutiny."

(8-0; Marshall, Burger,

Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White).

(11)

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)s durational
residency for voting requirement infringes fundamental
rights to vote and to interstate travel and must fall
because it lacks a "compelling state interest." (6-1;
Marshall, Stewart, Brennan, Douglas, WhiteJ Blackmun-"
concurring in the result; Burger--dissenting).

(12)

Mosley v. Police Dept of City of Chicago» 408 U,S.

92 (1972)s

anti-picketing ordinance violates equal

protection because its infringement of first amendment rights is not supported by "substantial govern ..
mental interest.f#" and cannot withstand "careful
scrutiny." (9-0; Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
WhiteP . PowellJ Burger--concurring; Blackmun & Rehnquist--concurring in the result).

(13)

Goosby v. Osser, 40

U.S. ___ (1973)s challenge by

pre-trial detainees to incarceration which bars them
from voting raises a substantial federal question
in view of the rule that infringement of the right to
vote requires justification under a "stringent com..
pelling state interest" test.
unanimous Court).

(9-0s Brennan for a

(5)

Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)•

state law

barring minority political party from the ballot;
infringement of rights of association and right to vote
not supported by "compelling state interest."
Black, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall;

(S ... 4a

Douglas~-concurring;

Harlan, White, Stewart & Warren"~dissenting).

(Notes

I think this case, rather than Kramer, may be the source
of the compelling state interest approach).
(6)

Kramer v. Union Free School Dist, 395

u.s.

621 (1969)•

deprivation of right to vote in school board election
violative of equal protection because interfered with
fundamental right without a "compelling state interest."
(5-3a Warren, Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall;
Stewart, Harlan, Black--dissenting)
(7)

Cipriano v. City of Houma 9 395 U.S.701 (1969)a

Limitation

of vote to property owners in revenue bond election
violative of equal protection becaluse not supported
by "compelling state interest."

(8-0s PC• Warreno

Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall; Stewart, Blacki 0
Harlan--concurring in the result).
(8)

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); residency
requirement for welfare benefits violates equal
protection clause because not supported by "compelling
state interest."

(6-.3r Brennan, Douglas 0 White, Fortas,

Marshall; Stewart--concurring; Warren, Black & Harlan-dissenting).
(9)

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)• filing fee for
candidacy in a primary violates equal protection when
subjected to "close" or "strict" scrutiny.

(7-0; Burger,

Douglas, Brennan, Stewart 9 White 0 Mrashall 0 Blackmun).

-.
NOTE: Ineach of these 13 cases strict scrutiny was applied
(in one rubric or another) and a state law was abrogated.
In a number of other cases, the strict scrutiny test was
discussed and the Court explained why it found it unnecessary to apply that more strict case.

The following casesp

then, are not mere dictum but are really necessary to the
disposition.

(14)

McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969):
"Compelling state interest" test, while applicable
where a "fundamental" right is infringed, is not here
applied because the refusal of Cook County to allow
pretrial detainees to vote absentee is not a depri·
vation of the right to vote. (9-0: Warrenp Blackp
Douglas, Brennan, Whitep Fortasp Marshall: Harlan &
Stewart--concur in the result).

(15)

Dandridge v. Williams, 397

u.s.

471 (1970)1 strict

review not applicable to welfare benefit scheme
since no "constitutionally protected freedom involved."
(5-3; Stewart, Burger, Black, White; Harlan--concurring;
Douglas, Marshall, Brennan--dissenting)
(16)

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970): dealt with
Congress's power to enforce the equal protection clause
with respect to voting (extending the right to vote
to 18-year olds).

Douglasp Brennan, White, Marshall

cited "compelling interest test" approvingly in the
area of right to vote.
(17)

Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)1

Illinois bail

system must meet only rational basis test since we are
not dealing with bail in 8th Amendment sense and there

is, therefore, no "fundamental" right requiring

(4-3;

a showing of a "compelling state interest."
Blackmun, Burger, White;

Marshall~concurring;

Douglasp

Stewart, Brennan--dissenting)

(18)

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972): refusal to
apply "compelling governmental interest" test to
housing statutory procedures since no "fundamental
constitutional right" was implicated.

(S-2; White,

Burger, Blackmun, Stewart, Marshall: Douglas, Brennan-dissenting)

(19)

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)•

applied

rational basis to state law prohibiting distribution
of contraceptive information and said that "compelling
state interest" not applicable because no constitution!
(~~L•

right implicated.

Brennan, Marshall, Stewart,

Douglas• White,Blackmun--concurring in the result;
Burger--dissenting)

(20)

United States v. Kras, 40_ U.S. ___ (1973)s

Bankruptcy

is not a "fundamental" right calling for application
of "lofty compelling state interest" test.

(S-4;

Blackmun, Burger, White, Rehnquist, Powells Brennan,
Douglas, Stewart, Marshall--dissenting)

These are the most prominant cases.

I have not explored

all of the reapportionment cases but there may be more
"close scrutiny" language there.

Also, some commentators

regard--correctly I think--the "wealth discrimination" cases
also as "strict scrutiny"-"fundamental rights" cases since
wealth alone cannot be enough to invoke strict scrutiny.
If this is a correct interpretation then Griffin, Douglas,

'

"

.. ·'·

•

Tate , and Williams should be added to the list.

Hammond

<qonrt of tire 'J!Tni:trb .:§htfcs
'Jill'as lyh~1httt, JD. (!f. 20? JI- 2
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN , .JR.

February 13, 1973

RE: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, et al.
Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissenting
opinion in the above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

.•
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

February 13, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1332

-

San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
Your careful and detailed opinion reveals that
you have devoted a vast amount of work and thought to
this case.
I am pleased to join your opinion, for I feel
that it reaches a sound result and is consistent with
past decisions of the Court. I am interested in the suggestions Potter has advanced in his letter to you of
February 8, and I shall also be interested in any writing
along this line he chooses to develop. As he pointed out
in his letter, he, of course, reaches the same result.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

/

February 13, 1973

?/-

1]7

J.-

Dear Harry:

First, my warm thanks for your "join" note in Rodriguez. It
is a great comfort to me to have you aboard.

I thought you might lJe interested in the enclosed memorandum
which lists the cases - perhaps not all of them - which establish the
two-tier approach to equal protection. Whatever I may have thought
of this approach as a de novo proposition, I thought it was taa firmly
rooted in our past decisions for me to attempt a new basis of analysis.

I will, nevertheless, talk to Petter and will, of course, consider

any changes he may suggest short of starting fresh.
I am sending a copy of this letter and the memorandum to the
Chief, with whom I talked this afternoon. He is with us in Rodriguez,
and has suggested a few language changes which I am trying to work
Into the next circulation.

Sincerely,

Mr• •Justice Blackmun

lfp/ss
Enc.
ce: The Chief JustiCe

•

<

.

\

February 14, 1973

Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Ind. School Dist.

v. Rodriguez

Dear Potter:
Thank you for your thoughtful memorandum of February 8, in
which you have outlined your reservations with respect tonmy first
circulated draft in this important case. Unless I misread the essence
of your views, I see little of substance that separates us.

I am in complete accord with your views as to "suspect"
classifications. I do not believe there is anything 1n the opinion as
presently written that is mcoo.ststent with our shared view.
The differences between us are 1n the area of Equal Protectic:m
analysis which has come to be known as the "fundamental" rights
doctrine. You questim whether "strict scrutiny" is called for where
State classifieatic:ms interfere with what the cases have been calling

"fundamental rights". You would prefer, where State laws toueh oo
rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, to say
they are presumptively invalid, not under the Equal Protection Clause
bJt under the particular provision of the Const1tut1m affected.
Your dissatisfaction with applicatioo of the Equal Protectioo
guarantee in such cases appears to be threef<Rd: (1) its historical
origins are questionable; ( 2) the Ttfundamental" rights category is
open-ended and is reminiscent of the standardless dangers of
substantive due process; and (3) the "compelling state Jnterest"
standard sometimes used interchangeably with ether phrases to identify
the test of strict scrutiny, is itself of doul:tful parentage and leads
too inexorably to the rejeetlm of state laws. I wUl address each of
these- briefiy.

·~

. .,
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1 agree that the historic origins of the two-level approo.ch to
equal proteetioo problems are at least dubious. But whatever a close
examination of history might disclose, I ecmeluded that the considerable
volume of precedent in this area leaves little room for a de novo review
unless the Court is willing to start fresh. Numerous eases, dating
at least as far back as Skinner v. Oklahoma 1n 1942, have accepted or
artteulated the idea of closer serutbiy Of liws infringing upon fundamental rights. Most of those decisi004 as yoo have suggested, are
of quite recent vintage.- Yet the sheer number of such eases {nearly
two dozen by my count), • and the firmness with which they express
and apply the two-tier approach, stand as a rather formidabl'
impressive barrier to reconsideration of the doctrine.
Instead, in Rodriguez I have endeavored to rationalize the cases
and explore their limtfs. I am 1n entire agreement that a ''fundamental"
rights test which allows judges to ptek and choose rights which they
desire to accord special prcteetioo because of their mere importance
and to treat them as fundamental would be unacceptable. But (contrary
to Thurgood Marshall's dissenting views) I do not read the cases as
leaving open that possibility. To the contrary, the cases seem to
establish that to be regarded as "fundamental" a right must have tts
roots in the Constitution or, as my draft q>inion states, they must be
fundamental "in a eoostitutional sense." So restricted, I don~ regard
lt as a standardless or unmanageable approach to equal prc:teeticn
And, since I do not regard as "fundamental" any rights that are net
"explicitly or implicttly guaranteed by the Constitutim, " I doul:t that
you and I would arrive at different results in very many cases.
Finally, you suggest that the term "compelling state interest"
bas undesirable c<mnotations and is of questimable origins, a view
shared by Justice Blaekmun as I read his separate ccmeurrence in
Dunn v. Blumstein. To the extent that we have used this language in
our prior drafts Of Rodriguez, it was employed simply as a shorthand
for strict scrutiny. To avoid any possible emfasl<m, I have taken it
out in my most recent draft, which bas not yet been circulated. Our

ease involves the questlcm ooly whether a stricter or more rigorous
review is required. Since I find that educaticm is not fundamental 1n
a coo.stttutional sense, I have no occasion to diseuss what tests are
used once such a right is found. If I were to write on the meaning of
*See attached memo.

,•
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the test, however, I would conclude that there is nothing talismanic
about the word "compelling." As Chief JuStice Warren suggested in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.s. 36'1, 376-77 (1968) it simply is a
shortbiild way of saying that a state's Jaws must be found to be
necessary to the furtherance of an important or substantial governmental
interest if they are to withstand scrutiny. Prqlerly understood, strict

scrutiny focuses more on the means utilized to achieve legltitnate state
ends than it does on the importance of those ends.
In sum, I think we are not far apart. I would greatly appreciate
any changes you might suggest.

Sincerely,

Mr. Just:lee Stewart
lfp/ss

,.,

..

February 14, 1973
Rodriguez - Equal Protection Analysis
Potter stewart's position (His letter of February 8, 1973)
General
In absence of a "suspect" classification, there should be no

two-test analysis under equal protection clause. (The distinction
between "compelling state interest" and "rational basis" is spurious
in absence of suspect classification. )
Suspect Classification
Agrees that some classifications are "suspect" - primarily
race, but also alienage, perhaps sex, perhaps illegitimacy and indigency.
lndigency must be limited to actual or functional indigency, not
"comparative poverty vis-a-vis comparative wealth."
A state law that makes suspect classifications is

pr ~ sumptively

invalid.
Constitutional liberties
A law that impinges on an individual liberty or freedom
implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution is also
presumptively invalid.

'

.

'

2.
Compelling State Interest
There is no such thing. (This, I think is essence of Potter's
position).
The presumptive invalidity of laws that impinge upon individual
liberty derives from the Constitution.

[E. g. some express or implied

protection: free speech, right to travel, right to vote (?) ]. It is
immaterial whether there is a classification or not.
State cannot possibly meet burden of showing "compelling state
interest. "

This test would enable federal courts to invalidate any

law they disliked by finding it required a showing of compelling state
interest to sustain it.
(Query:

Cannot same result be reached by finding "presumptive

invalidity" on ground that the law impinged upon a liberty or
freedom explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by Constitution?
If we make it clear that "fundamental" right or interest is

limited to those explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, do we
not come out same way?)
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I agree that the historic orlgtns of the two-level approach to ·
eqaal proteettcm problems are at 1eut dUblOIII& But whatever a cl
aamlnatlcm of history mlgbt d18cloee, I ccacluded that the considerable
voJmllte". of precedent in thts area ,J.8avesllttle room for a de novo review
less the Court is wWmg to at&:rt fresh. Numeroae cuii,""'diBDg
.at 1eUt as far bact as Skinner v. Oklahoma Jn 1942, have accepted or
artthlated the idea of closer sc~tny ofliwa infringing upon funda"meatal rtpta.:~,&. Most of tba.e decilllcu, u ,.oa 1umt saggested, are
1

of ~te, ~ent ~~P· · Y~ the sheer ,number of such eases (nearly'
o dozen by my count), • and the ftrJmleaa .wU:b which they express
appll',.the :r',two~tler
approach; itand as a rather formlt:ialg
'
'
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barrier to reeonslderaticm' of the doctrine.
'

-sthe teat. however, I woald coaclude tbat there ta aotlatac tallamaale
&bait the word ttcompel.Ung.. " M Chief Juttce Warren auggeeted Ia
t1ldted states Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 36'1, 3'76-'1'1 (1968) lt simply ls a
iliOitbiiid ftJ of sa.JIIlgtbat a state'• lawa mut be foaad to be
uc••I'J to the fartheraDCe ~ aa lmportaDt or aabetutlal pernmeatal
lltereat U they are to withstand acrutlny. Properly anderatood, strict
eentlay foca.a mon Gil tbe m - .w..cl to aehtfte lqltlmate state
eacltl thaD lt does 011 the importance of thOM eada.
In sum, l thb1t we are not far apart. I would
aa.y ehanges you might suggest.

Sincerely,

r. Justice stewart
lip/sa

creatlJ appreelllte

MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:

r. Larry A. Hammond

DATE:

February 20, 1973

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Rodriguez
In Justice Marshall's dissent, it is argued that there is ncTmuch

substance to our point as to the importance of local control by school
boards.
If we add a footnote on this point - as we may very well do, take

'f

a look at Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 623, which
emphasizes the

authori~e

local school boards under New York law.

You might also take a look atth:e-Texas statutes to see whether school

-

boards are authorized by the Constitution or by legislative action, and
the extent to which their powers are specified.

I know, from personal experience, that the local school boards in
Virgbia have far more operational responsibility than the state Board
of Education, although the latter lays down broad policy and does control

certain matters" In Virginia, the local boardT

-

ong other things -

employs, promotes and "fires" all personnel, subject to general teacher

-

qualifications prescribed by the State Board; the local board assigns

-

teachers and supervisory personnel to the various schools, just as it
I

-

assigns pupils; it prepares the school budget, and requests appropriations

2.
from the city council or board of supervisors as the case may be; the

----..

appropriations are in lump sums, with the school board empowered to
determine all budget items within the total sum; it locates school buildings,
'

--.....

purchases property therefor, determines attendance zones; it is
responsible for discipline; although the State Board of Education approves
textbooks and the general courses for the curricula, the local board has
a good deal of flexibility in both respects - and may add textbooks or
courses, subject to the pro forma approval of the state board; athletic
and recreational activities and policies are locally controlled; community
relations are, of course, in the hands of the local board (we would rarely
have a school board meeting without having various groups of parents,
PTA's and the like appear before us . ); the local boards control the
school libraries, use of the school buildings for community purposes,
the transportation of pupils (busing!!!), and a myriad of other things.
L. F. 1?, Jr.

MEMORZNDUM
February 20, 1973

TO: :FROM:

71-1 J ~""V

Rodriguez

In Justice Marshall's dissent, it is argued that there is no much

substance to our point as to the importance of local control by school
boards .
. , , If we add a footnote on this point - as we may very well do, take

a look at Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 623, which
emphasizes the authority of the local school boards under New York law.
You might also take a look at the Texas statutes to see whether school
boards are authorized by the Constitution or by legislative action, and
the extent to which their powers are specified.
~;

" , · , I know, from personal experience, that the local school boards in

Virginia have far more operational responsibility than the state Board
•

of Education, although the latter lays down broad policy and does control

certain matters. In Virginia, the local board - among other things employs, promotes and "fires" all personnel, subject to general teacher
qualifications prescribed

b~

the State Board; the local board assigns

teachers and supervisory personnel to the various schools, just as it
assigns pupils; it prepares the school budget, and requests appropriations

2.
from the city couneti or board of supervisors as the case maybbe; the
appropriations are in lump sums, with the school board empowered to
determine all budget items within the tttal sum; it locates school buildings,
purchases property therefor, determines attendance zones; it is
responsible for discipline; although the state Board of Education approves
textbooks and the general courses for the curricula, the local board has
a good deal of flexibility in both respects - and may add textbooks or
courses, subject to the pro forma approval of the state board; athletic
and recreational activities and policies are locally controlled; community
relations are, of course, in the hands of the local board (we would rarely
have a school board meeting without having various groups of parents,
PTA's and the like appear before us.,); the local boards control the
school libraries, use of the school buildings for community purposes,
the transportation of puPiJls (busing!! I), and a myriad of other things.
L. F. E, Jr.
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P. 13--This is our first characterization of the
questions before the Court and is, therefore, very
imE.ortanj: to me. So, I have done two things s Tfj
I have added what I regard as the essence of our
view of the two-level approach "impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution." (2) Instead of his language about
arbitrary and capricious I have tracked verbatim your
phrasealogy from McGinnis "rationally furthers some
legitimate, articulated state purpose." But, in
deference to PS I have left in the "invideous" phrase.

c.y

~

'f

11

ot<
./""'

-

a1\

~

P. 24--I have changed this only slightly. Again, though,
this is an important point in the opinion because it
r~rase' in direct terms the course we are pursuing,
Therefore, I changed on "guaranteed .. to "protected."
I have a sense that the word guarantee is too explicit/ d
in its mandate, i.e. a right might be accorded consti-> r
tutional protection even though it is not among what )_1~
we usually regard as the constitutional guarantees.
P. 29--I have added the sentence I mentioned to you this
morning that I got from PS last night •
P. 30--I have added his word "liberties.' Additionally,
I have changed the first two sentences to reflect more
clearly that our discussion is focusing on whether,
because of the close nexus between education and speech/
voting, it is a right implicitly protected.

~

01~
/

P. 31.
you $uggested I dropped the word "constitutional"
from the text. V Also I have added PS's phrase to fn 78,
however, I changed eligible to "qualified" because in rereading the voting cases it is repeatedly dsaid that the States
):lave the power to set voter "qualifications."
/ Also note that I have added page citations in fn 74
on page 29 (as well as;.adding cites to Oregom v. Mitchell
and Gray v. Sanders). V These cites buttress my conclsuion
that voting is a constitutionally protected right. As
Justice Douglas said in Oregon, it is a right "rooted
in the Constitution."
-

y

P. 33. I go half way with PS here. In the first sentence
I would leave in fundamental right because we are talking
about how the DC characterized the case. I added, however,
PS's pet "liberty" language. I also made his suggested
second change to "constitutionally protected" since that
is an area in which we are discussing the Ct's jurisprudence.
P. 35 I would accept his first phrase.
But, I would be reluctant to adopt his deletion of
rational basis. He uses the negative form~lation in a
case in which I wanted to illuminate the positive. Note
we say "affirmatively supports." Therefore I have rewritten
the sentence and have used language from your Weber
opinion, 406 U.S., at 172.
P. 39. I have added his 1st & 3d changes but cannot
approve the 2d. What we are trying to say in this
transitional paragraph is that considerations of
federalism, fiscal autonomy, and flexibility with respect
to the resolution of unsettled and complex educational
questions help us conclude that the Texas system is
reasonable and rational. It seems to me to demean our l
point to say that these factors indicate that the schem~
is "not so invideously discriminatory."
____.

}._~-9 ~~~~ . ~~'~
~ -1-o ~~ Pl-<-Jzfr- 13~3s-,
~ ~
~t- ~ .~ ~'/e. ..u'o/ ~ ~~ •

V

/

44 I agree with you that his suggested change is
0{(/' p'
awkward and, therefore, I have tried my hand at a
new sentence or two there. See what you think.

I

~.

P. 45--Have done.
P. 46 I have gone half way again. Here we are reciting,
in almost a shorthand fashion, the usual test, which has
recently included the term "fundamental". I wish not to
depart from it too far so I simply added the word
"constitutional" but kept fundamental as well.
~
I added "liberties" again and aaaed Shelton (with th~
appropriate page citation).
P.48-49. I approve of his change on 48, in exchange for
its repetition on page 49. There I have har~e9 ~~ to
McGinnis. Here I think it not amiss even t~ite your
opinion. (I also approved his word "survives instead
of "meets.")

(

k_~~

/...u f<:t $

I

S

kl-s

s- ~ -s 9

I

Rodriguez
Judges
As per your instructions , I have sent our opinion back to
the printer with the changes.
(1)

You suggest that I cite Weber in the sentence in which

I quote its language.

I hesitate to cite it because,

as I think the scholars will conclude, it is not a
straight rational basis t e st.

As you know, the Marshall

dissent and the brEfs for the appellees relied sgni
significantly on Weber since you intimate a special solicitude for those disadvantaged by the "status of birth"
and because you refer to "sensitive and fundamental personal
rights" and ghe need to weighi the relative fundamentality
of the interest--all indicating (1) a sliding scale
approach, and (2) a lack of a specific requirement that
a "fundamental" right have its roots in the Consti.
(2)

I entirely approve of your change on p 39 to add

consistency of expression .

(r~: r M~~;(/UJ~
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 26, 1973

Re: No. 71-1332, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez
Dear Lewis,
I sincerely appreciate your patient and
generous effort to accommodate my views in this
case, expressed to you orally and in writing. While
you have not found it possible to accept all of my
suggestions, the modifications in the draft recirculated
on February 23 are such that I am able to join your
opinion, and I gladly do so.
It is more than likely that I shall write
a brief separate concurrence, but I shall await
Thurgood's forthcoming recirculation before finally
deciding whether or not to do so.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

Februar y 27, 1973

Re: No. 71-1332 Rodriguez v. san Antonio
Independent School DistriCt

Thank you for your note of February 26, joining my opinion In
~.odrtsu..!!·

Although I have not yet received a formal note from the Chief
Justice, he told me informally that he was with us. This gives us a

•.

Court.
I appreciate a great deal your suggestions and comments - as
you say both " orally and in writing". They cootrtbuted materially to
the improvement of the draft opinioo.
Sincerely,

lfp/ss

cc: The Chief Justice

...
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

February 27, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1332 -

San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis:
Please join ·me in your circulation of February 23.
Sincerely,

/1. v..;.,,
Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

/

No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez

This refers to the discussion at Friday!& Conference as to when
Rodriguez (the Texas school property tax case) wW be ready to come
down. Although I have a "court", including your verbal concurrence,
I stated on Friday that I was not quite ready.
In addition to some further verificaticm and checking of
authorities cited in the nctes, I wanted to see the next circulation of

Thurgood's dissent- which I believe he said was about ready for the
prJnter. Potter also may add a "snapper. "
Since the Conference, I have reviewed the situation and from my
viewpoint -unless Thurgood's recirculation requires substantial
revision- I will be ready by our March 16 Conference.
I certainly imply no need for expedited action by Potter and
Thurgood. The case is important and difficult, and we should - as
always - not rush the decisiooal process. I write merely to report my
personal situation, as it now appears to me.
SJncerely,

The Chief Justice

ee: " The Conference

;.!
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 12, 1973

Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez

Dear Lewis :
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

Judge a
Re:

Rodriguez
(1)

I have incorporated most of your rider on page

7, with one small exception.

You stated that the

comparison reflects the extent to which disparities
exist despite "the impressive progress made in recent years
towards a more equitable balance." I would prefer not to
use the latter clause.

As you know State funding in Texas

has its good and bad aspects.

On the plus side, the State

has poured out a lot of money in recent years.

On the

negative side, more has gone to the "rich" than to the
"poor."

Thus, appellees and Justice Marshall have

heavily emphasized that state aid is in some respects
"anti-equalizing" and at best only "mildly equalizing."
I have countered by emphasizing the overall improvement
in the schools without trying to defend the particular
allocation formula.

Therefore, I would conclude the sentence

with the phrase "despite the State's impressive progress
in recent years."
(2)

You have asked whether it wouldn't be a good idea

to state specifically that no PPE is available for
1970-71.

You have placed your finger on a ticklish

problem.

The record contains two kinds of statistical

information• (1) that

w~ich

is organized in an understand-

able manner for presentation in an affidavit or in some
other proper form, and (2)

three coffin boxes full of

computer print outs of statistical evidence.

Several

months ago I set out to unravel the statistical
mishmash to determine what was actually available but
soon tired of the confusing task.

In short, while I

think that PPE are not available for 1970-71 I can't
be sure.

All I know is that it was not presented as

part of any tabular presentation in affidavit form.
Therefore, I think it siafest to simply state, as we do,
that 1967-68 provides the only "compliete statistical
breakdown.

(3)

You have asked me to explain the last two sentences

in fn 35 on page 10.

This is related to my comments

on the first page of this memo.
part~

This is an effort on may

to take some of the heat off the claim that the

foundation program is "anti-equalizing" because it
givies more money to the richer schools.

Note that

Edgewood raises$26 on its own while Alamo rraises $333,
about a ratio of 13 to 1.

But, after state aid which

gave in 1967-68 a roughly comparable amount of money to
each, the ratio was no longer so shocking, indeed it had
drmgped to about 2 to 1, i.e.,® $558 to $248.
(4)

Your changes in fn 38 (p. 10-11) are good.

You have also asked whether we should include the year of
the study by Berke.

Again, you have touched on one of

the anomalies of this case.

The affidavit submitted

draws on statistics for a number of unconnected years.
The median family income stats are based on 1960 figures;
the race statistics are based on an unrelated Civil Rts
Comm'n study which seems to be based also on 1960
figures but it is unclear.

The remainder of the stats

are for a two-year period preceding 1970.

But, I think

the data was gathered in a two-yr period but I think
it reflects 1967-68 statistics.

In sum, I'm simply not

sure enough to state what the dates are.
(5)

I have, as you suggest, resurrected the intro-

ductory paragraph in
(5)

~~the

wealth section (p. 14-15)

The word deletions on p. 16 were Bill's suggestions,

stemming, I think, from a feeling that the added words
were unnecessary.

I was inclined to accept his change be-

cause it seemed to sacrifice nothing and I was in need of
more short sentences.
(7)

Your addition on page 19 is helpful.

(The State

provides 12 years and local districts may, add on a preschool year, so it is most accurate to say 12 years.)
(8)

Changes on

p~27

are good.

(9)

Your question regarding my citation to Eisenstadt

is a good one and requires some exposition.

I have cited

at the end of this paragraph the remainder ol6f all the
so-called fundamental rights cases in order to show that
our theory is consistent with every expression of the
theory heretofore.

The footnote in Eisenstadt is

helpful because it notes that a higher level of review is
i

required if a Grdswold right had been found.

Griswold

involves an iimplicit constitutional right of privacy.
It is, therefore, a Brennan opinion supportive of our
narrow understanding of the meaning of fundamental right.
Of equal importance, I think, is that we have avoided no
case in this iarea (except Weber) and I think that is one
of the strengths of our position.
{10)

Page 33--lgood change.

(11)

Page 39--Good change.

I have made a slight

word change because you had "as to" in two succeeding
sentences.
(12)

I changed the second one to "regarding."
Page 48--good.

(13)

Yes, I have checked the three sources I cite

in fn 114 and they support the statement in text,

But,

this is not a simple matter and is a subject of considerable
debate.

I have emphasized that higher taxes and lower

PPEs are likely if any alternative designed to achieve
greater equality of expenditures is pursued.

Those who

reject this line of aiijnalysis claim that the short ajnswer
is that the legislatures will have to be sensitive to
the urban problems and itake into consideration their
higher "cost" factors, especially higher teacher salaries
necessary to lure qualified teachers into the urban schools.
This is Simon's thesis.
(14)

Your suggested footnote for the final section

dealing with the abrogation of other

ldi~l#dl#iiiiiid

uses of the property tax raises a problem.

An affirmance of

the DC would not necessarily occasion the unprecedented
upheaval of other financing systems for public services .

.·

.

Only if the Texas system were struck down on a rational
basis test would the other forms of financing be threatened.
I think we have made this point forcefully on page 48
and I would be reluctantly to restate it again.

In the interest of expedition, I have returned this
draft to the printer.

We can discuss further any of

the points made in our respective memos and make any
further changes in the middle of the week.

LAH

No. 71-1332 Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School District
Here is the 5th Draft of my proposed opinion for the Court ill
this case.
Although there have been a number of changes .of verbiage and
the addittoo. of footnotes (as indicated in the usual way) the basic
structure and rationale of the opinion remains unchanged.
Sincerely,

·,

•"
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j;upumt <!)'l1ttrt cf t~t 'Pttitdt ~tatta
JfntdzingLtn. p. <!f. ·2!lgt.l1,;1
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

March 15, 1973

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your dissent in 71-1332,
San Antonio v. Rodriguez.

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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RODRIGUEZ
This case involves the attac f

n the validity of the Texas

bf

system
funding public school education. Under that system,
I -almost half of school revenue yare distributed on a statewide
basis. Each school district/supplements this state aid through a
J

•

J..~

property t~.fvithin,..itsAjurisdiction. In view of variations in the
property tax base, and in tax rates, funds derived locanyf ary
widely among the districts.

These variations, in turn, result in

I

substantial disparities1 in per pupil expenditures.
A three-judge district court invalidated the Texas system 1

of dual state and local funding.

The system was held to discriminate

invidiouslyfg;ainst children who live in districts/ with a low property
tax base.
We disagree with the District Court}tnd reverse its
judgment for the reasons stated in our opinion.
Without attempting any comprehensive summary, I will
~
mention only the contours ~f the rationale of our decision:
1\

2.
We were asked, first, to apply the strictest standard of
judicial scrutiny ecause of the acknowledged importance of
education. Yet, free ublic education is ~t a fundamental righy
guaranteed by the Constitution itself. / We have consistently reached

:s

J!f-similar conclusioi'y<vith respect to social and economic legislation ~·

i

.

_g. , public welfare and

,.

1

housin ~

Nor do we thinkf hat the Texas sytem disadvantages fny

defineabl~us

ect class of citizens -the term suspect clasf aving

been limited by our decisionfrimarily to classifications based on
race and alienage.
The appropriate test is whether the Texas plan has a
reasonable or rational basis. We find that it does. Texas assures

----

a basic education/ for every child in the state. Moreover, its
combined use 1of state and local funding/ encourages significant
local control of schools - long regarded as a vital feature of our
.....____......._

-

'

educational system.
But this case represents far mor fthan a challenge to the
manner in which Texas provides for public education. We have

)

3.
here nothing less/ han a direct attack on the way in which Texas and at-rinlft

~ o~er

states -have chosen to raiso/and disburse

state and local tax revenues. We are asked, in effect, to condemn

the state's judgmen; ';, conferring on political subdivisions/me
power to tax local propert to supply or supplement revenues for
local interests.

Appellee~hus would have the judiciary/intrude

into an area/traditionally reserved under our system f o the legis-

I

cases/ have been hailed as the means

through the judiciary - /

of achieving unprecedented advance r4n public education, especially

2''

I

for childrell{who live in urbanized school districts. 1\ It is by no
I

means clear (from the evidence and studies now available) that
the core city

area~ould benefi

from court

invalidatio~ ~f the

Texas type system. Often, the highest tax values are .found - due
to commercial and industrial properties - in districts largely

populate/ by minoritf and relatively impecunious citizens. There
are many unanswered question in this uncharted area.

Several

4.
studies have concluded that

~financing alternativeftesigned to

achieve greater equality of expenditures,j could lead to higher
taxation,fo.nd lower educational expenditures/ in many

~n centers.

In short, and certainly without endorsing either the status

~or the ~isd~m

-

of any particular funding system/ we conclude that

the vastly important/and complex probleniof how best to fund k nd
.L
I
('.
/, A
- ,control public educatimy must be left to democratic legislative
processes.

*****
Mr. Justice Stewart, who joins the opinion of the Court,
has filed a concurring opinion.

Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a

dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice White also has filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan have joined. Mr.
Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr.
Justice Douglas has joined.

RODRIGUEZ

This case involves the attack on the validity of the Texas
system of funding public school education. Under that system,
almost half of school revenues are distributed on a statewide
basis. Each school district supplements this state aid through a
property tax within its jurisdiction. In view of variations in the
property tax base, and in tax rates, funds derived locally vary
widely among the districts. These variations, in turn, result in
substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures.
A three-judge district court invalidated the Texas system

of dual state and local funding. The system was held to discriminate
invidiously against children who live in districts with a low property
tax base.
We disagree with the District Court and reverse its
judgment, for the reasons stated in our opinion.
Without attempting any comprehensive summary, I will
mention only the contours of the rationale of our decision:

''·"

.

..... ••• .. t

2.
We were asked, first, to apply the strictest standard of
judicial scrutiny because of the acknowledged importanbe of
education. Yet, free public education is not a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution itself. We have consistently reached
a similar conclusion with respect to social and economic legislation -

!· ,g., public welfare and housing.
Nor do we think that the Texas sytem disadvantages any
deftneable suspect class of citizens -the term suspect class having
been limited by our decisions pritn:arily to classifications based on
race and alienage.
The appropriate test is whether the Texas plan has a
reasonable or rational basis. We find that it does. Texas assures
a basic education for every chUd 1n the state. Moreover, its
combined use of state and locai funding encourages significant
local cootrol of schools -long regarded as a vital feature of our
educational system.
But this case represents far more than a challenge to the
manner in which Texas provides for public education. We have

3.
here nothing less than cl direet attack on the way in which Texas ...
and at least 48 ether states ... have chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked, in effect, to condemn
the state's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the
power to tax local property to supply or supplement revenues for
local interests. Appellees thus would have the judiciary intrude
into an area traditionally reserved under our system to the legislative branch.
It may not be inappeoprtate to note that this, and similar
cases, have been hailed as the means - through the judiciary ..
of achieving unprecedented advances in public education, especially
,,r
r'

for children who live in urbanized school districts. D: is by no
means clear (from the evidence and studies now available) that
the core city areas would benefit from court invalidation of the
Texas type system. Often, the highest tax values are found -due
to commercial and industrial properties - in districts largely
populated by minority and relatively impenunious citizens. There

/

are many unanswered questions in this uncharted area. Several

.,it'

4.
studies have concluded that any financing alternative, designed to
achieve greater equality of expenditures, could lead to higiter
taxation and lower educational expenditures in many urban centers.
In short, and certainly without endorsing either the status
~

or the wisdom of any particular funding system, we coo.clude that

the vastly important and complex problem of how best to fund and
control public education must be left to democratic legislative
processes.

*•***
Mr. Justice Stewart, who joins the opinion of the Court,
has filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a
dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice White also bas filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan have joined Mr.
Justice Marshall has fUed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr.
Justice Douglas has j otned.
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RODRIGUEZ

This case involves the attack on the validity of the Texas
system of funding public school education. Under that system,
almost half of school revenues are distributed on a statewide
basis. Each school district supplements this state aid through a
property tax within its jurisdiction. In view of variations in the
property tax base, and in tax rates, funds derived locally vary
widely among the districts. These variations, in turn, result in
substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures.

·-

A three-judge district court invalidated the Texas system

of dual state and local funding. The system was held to discriminate
invidiously against children who live in districts with a low property
tax base.
We disagree with the District Court and reverse its
judgment, for the reasons stated in our opinion.
Without attempting any comprehensive summary, I will
mention only the contours of the rationale of our decision:

2.
I

I
I
I

We were asked, first, to apply the strictest standard of

I

judicial scrutiny because of the acknowledged importante of

edueattoo. Yet, free public education is not a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution itself. We have cmststently reached

a similar conclusioo with respect to social and eccmomic legislation-

!·g.. , public welfare and housing..
- Nor do we think that the Texas sytem disadvantages any
defineable suspect class of citizens - the term suspect class having
been limited by our decisions primarily to classUicattcms based on

race and alienage.

The appropriate test is whether the Texas plan has a
reasonable or rational basts. We find that it does. Texas assures
a baste education for every ehUd in the state. Moreover, its
combined use of state and local funding encourages significant
local emtrol of schools - long regarded as a vital feature of oo.r
educational system.

.~

But this ease represents far more than a challenge to the

manner 1n which Texas provides for public education. We have

I

'

\

\

I

\

3.
here n<thing less than • d.treet attack on the way 1n which Texas and at least 48 <ther states -have chosen to raise and dlslxtrse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked, in effect, to condemn
the state's judgment In conferring on polltlealsubdivteioo.s the
power to tax local property to supply or supplement revenues for
local interests. Appellees thus would have the judiciary intrude
tnto an area traditiooally reserved under our system to the legislative branch.
It may not be tnappeoprtate to n<te that thts, and similar
cases, have been ha.Ued as the means - through the judiciary of achieving unprecedented advances in public education, especially

for children who live 1n urbanized school distriCts. 1t is by no
means clear (from the evidence and studies now avallable) that
the core city areas would benefit from court invalidation of the
Texas type system. Often, the highest tax values are found - due
to commercial and industrial properties -in distrtets largely
populated by minority and relatively impeaunlous citizens. There

are many unanswered questims in this uncharted area. Several

.-

.,

4.
studies have concluded that any financing altemative, designed to
achieve greater equality of expenditures, could lead to higher

taxattoo. and lower edueational expenditures in many urban centers.
In short, and certainly 'Without endorsing either the status
~or

the wisdom of any particular funding system, we ccnclude that

the vastly important and complex problem of how best to fund and
cootrol public education must be left to democratic legislative
processes.

*****
Mr. Justice Stewart, who joins the opinion of the Court,
has filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a

.

dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice White also has filed a dissenting
1,'·.

,,

opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan have joined. Mr.
Justice

~.farshall

bas filed a dissenting opinion, in whJeh Mr.

JUstice Douglas has jotned.

:s-~:

~

-

=>/Z-1/7$

I~ :dko ~d.O~~~
IZ~. y~ ~~ ~) ~,
~ ~kL~,t.

:/ ~ ~ ~ da, PX~-dJ ;f~
#IA.t..t.L ~~~~fA~·

I_..~ ~.tfl /"-.~~~
~ ~ ~ ~ (, ~. t:,.~,~,u...~

~ J-.._J., ~ ~ .J-;1 X ~,.4J_,
IW~~~~~~
A

~

lj

,;6/...r ~ ~ j;C.. ~ ~-;,..l

~~ ~ ~ k·~~~

~~~· IA.t~'f~~

~ ~1~ ~~kr-J,

I~,~~-~(~~

~~-X~J~!:~
~ ~ J,ek.J,

;k ;;liwo-~ ~
1 ~~~~~ ' c.-b. -¥_.t.I.H
~
··..t~ r I .;e,k, e:r ~

,.,

r

h

fc-~~~~~~~

~~ ~~L ~-,w..dJ~

~-'1 6~.

"]:.~~~·~

MN~~~i~~~....,........,
~ ,J,.;_. ~. J-r ..6.- ~ ;e;lw c..--A- ~

Judge:
Here is the printer's final copy of Rodriguez.
Over the last two months I have spent several hours
helping Putzel's people check my cites, especially the
historical material. The changes made in the first 10 or
so pages are all ones I made during that process to
assure complete accuracy.
I think all the changes are OK, but you might take
a special look at the suggested changes on pages 22 and

44.

lr

With your approval (please initial Putzel's letter),
Spencer can return this to them. They have spent, I
would guess, at least 50 hours on this opinion since
there was a great deal of citation work and lots of
things to make consistent with the dissents. You might
write a short note to Mr. Putzel, indicating that you
realize the difficulty of their task (they, like everyone else around here, are apparently woefully understaffed)
and the consistent quality of their work.

LAH

.

,.

~

•.
#

.

•.

Rodriguez a
Judge a
(1}

I would approve both of Justice Blackmun's

suggested changes (see p 42)
(2) P. 18.

I would prefer not to omit that sentence.

He needn't worry about breeding litigation in the school
finance area.

I think any decent

,,,._~l#lli&#li~F
!:1

llil,ilattorney will tell his clients that, after all the
ways in which we foreclose the result, the hall game is
over.

Here the sentence adds symatry. And, without it,

it appears that we are simply disposing of the Texas case
on the basis of the facts found in another State.
(3}

I have incorporated in the master copy every one of

the other suggested changes in the CJ's draft that you
approved.
(4)

I have reviewed the opinion in an effort to drop

any indication that we regard "compelling state interest"
as a li'l talisman.

I have changed the two references

that are of any moment (see pp 35 and 39).

The words

appear in Section I (pp 11, 12, 13) where I explain and quote
from the DC opinion.

Here I think it is merely an accurate

reflection of what the lower ct did.

The only other place

where the word appears is in a quote from Brennan in fn

73.

It is now fair to tell Justices Stewart and Blackmun

that we do not embrace the phrase.

Also the road is now

clear for you in another case (maybe Rosario or Griffiths
to explain that "compelling" is not the critical plhrase.

I would like to reread the master before we send it
back for another printing but here it is for the time
being.
LAH

Judge:
Attached are your riders in Section A of Rodriguez.
I have incorporated the substance of each in the opinion
which is now at the printers.

I have tinkered with the

language a little to avoid redundancy with what we had
said elsewhere and to avoid overstaing our position.
should compare your riders with the printed draft to
t

see whether by fiddling has misstaed or diluted any of
your points.

LAH

•

'

You

Rea Rodriguez
Judge a
On page 11 you questioned by use, first, of "Close"
and "strict" interchangeably in connection with the
higher level of scrutiny test and, second, of "interest"
and "right" interchangeably in reference to the
fundarnentality aspect of the equal protection analysis.
The terms have heretofore been used interchangeably in
the Court's many cases.

I think it is appropriate

to continue that usage.

Moreover, as to the use of

"interest" and "right", I have intentionally used
both terms in an effort to avoid the implication that
our opinion is resurrecting the old, and ill-starred,
right-privilege distinction.

Our point is equally valid

no matter how it is phrased, i.e., "constitutionally
fundamental right"
interest."

=

"constitutionally fuddamental

If any particular usage strikes you as

undesirable in any particular portion of the opinion
we can change it but I see no need in systemativally
adhering to one term or the other.

This draft incorporates each of Justice Stewart's
suggested changes as I presently understand them.

After

we recirculate I will make a special effort to talk again
with his clerk to see if there are ways in which we
can further satisfy him without detracting from what we
have already done.

;

--2--

This draft also incorporates a large number of
changes that you have suggested or that I have made
on my own, usually for obvious reasons.
to tone down your footnote 92.

I have tried

Upon rereading it I

came away with a sense of inevitablility about the
status quo.

If, indeed, no alternative other than what

we have today is politically feasible this is the best
reason for the Court to intervene.

In this sense,

the present case is much like Baker v. Carr.

The majority

is so wedded to the status quo and/or so unwilling to
respond to the present disparities in educational expenditures that nothing other than judicial intervention
can break the log jam.

Our

~mphasis,

in my view, should

be on the positive rather than negative side.

That is

why I have so heavily emphasized Texas' recent gains in
expenditure levels.

It is well to point out that any

alternative is going to meet grave political hurdles, but
I hesitate to do more than that.
As far as I'm concerned, we can send this back to the
printer as soon as I incorporate the rest of your changes
on the draft you marked up.

I never finished incorporat-

ing those items before giving it back to you.

LAH
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· The Schools and Equality

I

l

,

':~

I

·'

The traditional method of paying for this country's
.PUbliC schools, by local taxes on real estate, is clearly
disorderly and unfair. But,lllthe Supreme Court held yE-s·
terday, it is not unconstitutional. The disorder and the
unfairness are deplorable, and require the most active
' I
attention. The force for improvement will have to comE'
. from citizens working at their state capitals.

money from these cities and diverted it into suburbs
where there is no tax base but residential subdivisions
where few of the children are deprived. The Supreme
Court would have been wanton to overlook this consequence of a doctrine of equal d~strlbution and, quite
properly, it drew back from the lower court's far too easy
assumptions .

Neither the Court, nor anyone else, has been able to
devise a single nationwide rule of equality that would
not create new kinds of injustice, and threaten new re·
straints on the improvement of American education.
There is a strong national interest in permitting local
school systems to raise their own standards and their
own budgets. There is a strong public interest in the
kind of experimentation that goes forward only when
local systems control their own budgets. There is much
benefit in the custom of permitting ambitious and prosperous school districts-like Montgomery and Arlin&rton
Counties-to lift their own standards and, indirectly, exert a force on other school districts to keep up. There is
a strong public need for a floor to expenditures and
standards in the schools. But there can be no public interest in reducing, or holding down, the resources that
the leaders are able and willing to devote to their local
IChools.

Justice Powell alluded to these uncertainties when he
wrote, in the Court's decision: "The complexity of these
problems is demonstrated by the lack of consensus with
respect to whether it may be said with any assurance that
the poor, the racial minorities, or the children in overburdened core-city school districts would be benefitted
by abrogation of traditional modes of financing education." The Comt.'s decision may be described as a very
cautious one, in an issue in which caution is essential.

Perhaps the Supreme Court might have ruled other·
wise, if the majority had been persuaded that the most
deprived children live in the poorest districts-or that
they would benefit from any simple rule of equality in
distributing property tax revenues. In fact, as the judges
discovered, neither of those premises is correct. This
case comes from Texas, a state in which the variations
among local tax resources are extreme. The plaintiffs
emphasized the differences between selected districts
with high and low bases. But as this case moved towaril
the Supreme Court, scholars and analysts began a mon·
rigorous examination of the distribution of tax revenur.'It rapidly appeared that, in most states, any rule of eqtw I
expenditure would take funds away from the central
cities. But it is in the central cities that bitterly-deprived
children live in the greatest concentrations. The big citir~
ihave substantial commercial and industrial tax ba&es. In
some states, a rule of equal distribution would have tahen

·~

There will be a tendency, perhaps, to regard this decision as a signal by the Court that it intends to end the
cycle of great cases that, over the past quarter of a century, have vastly strengthened the rights of American
citizens in education. Indeed Justice Marshall, in his ringing dissent., denounced the majority's conclusions as "a
retreat from our historical commitment to equality of
educational opportunity." But in cases of racial discrimination, it was very clear who was ·being burt, how they
we1 e being hurt, ancl what the· remedy would be. In the
present Cilse, none of those crucial questions could be
answered with any degree of precision. It is accurate to
say that, in regard to the relationship between money
aud educational opportunity, the controversy among pro·
fessional Nlncators and scholars is more complicated and
chaotic now than it wa~ five years ago. While the inequalif iP ..; of financing \\'NC apparent enough, no one could
e<'frr a judiri al rc·mccl~· that gave any real promise of
I
working sat isfactMily.

nut t hE>n· r1rc ot ]1('1' kinds of remedies. The Court has
said tli:11 !hl' cli s)'arities in the financing of public schools
~rt• not lllH:on ..,tittt1ional. But that does not make those
di~paritit • ., , in thrir pr('~cnt form am! scale, either neces·
~ar:>· o :· right The Court's decision does not make the
IH ··d for rd0ru1 all)' less urgent. The responsibility now
lies. :~s it rr.ally h~s always lain, with the govemors and
the k g isl ::ttn·r.~ 11r the states.
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While Coons talked about
"rich districts" and "poor
The
principle
whirh
districts," his hook did not
By Willlam Greider
Coons
and
his
associates
asconfront what is a common
Washington Post StnlC Writer .
serted was that the inequali·
happenstance across the na~t was. going to be another
epic socwl reform, inspired ties in local school spending
tion-that sometimes "rich
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Oma.ha, Nebraska
March 22, 1973
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Justice of the SupremE Co urt
·.{as hington ;). c.
Dear Justice Powell:
The recent school property tax decision, f or
which you wro t e the majority opinion, is exceeded in me anness of
spirit only by the Dred Scott decision.
For our highest court to take refuge from the
unfortunate fact that our fundamental document makes no mention about
education at all is exceeding strar1ge, although it's true that the
men in Philadeplphia in 1787 saw fit t6 exclude mention of education
in the Constitution.
But the Ordinance of the same year put the federal
government into the educating of the young field officially, and it ' s
been there ever since, with a shabby performance record.
The full impact of the decision you •t~rote will not
be felt keenly soon , but its cumulative affect will be explosive . A
bright child residing in poor school dis trict that abuts another that
is wealthy will view you in the same light as did bright Blacks view
Roger Taney, whose opinion in the Dred Scott ca se was unnoubtedly an
on b al ance popular one some 121 years ago .
Because of an indifferent,and, in retl'oe;peC' tr
stupid omission on the part of the writers of the Constitution , our
educational system is chaotic, enormously expensive and ridiculously
inefficient. So far as I have been able to determine it, all 50 of
our state Constitutions ~ uarantee the children o~ those states an
equal educational opportunity, and each state constitutes a school
district divided into smaller districts, all arms of the state in its
education function .
So far as the equal opportunity guarantee is
concerned, every state , including Hawaii (although that state has the
only enlightened and fair method for financing education in public
schools), has f a iled to deliver, some miserably.
Your decision will be read in London, Pa ris and
Peking, and in future textbooks. My disappointment is a shriveling
one, for the proper decision was one that should have had our Supreme
Court saying suffer little children to come unto us and you will receive open-handed and fair treatment, each and everyone of you.
The property tax as a basic financial support
system for public schools in the United States , nistrict by district,
cynically disregards the equal opportunity guarantee, and this lliJJDI!H~rt:a
hypocrisy on such a mas s ive scale is a difficult load to carry, but
your decision has given respectability to a complex discriminato~y
e ducational system . I'm sorry now that I felt relief and reassurance
when your name quieted the furor over those of Haynesworth, Carswell
and others. Had any of them written the property tax opini on, it may
not have been so polished ~nd meticulously erudite, and seemingly
rational, but it would have been the same. I had expected that you
were a larger man than you are .
S incere~y ~urs

~ /_·~

\e[m .

/fa...._,_

J. Haney

/

2217 Niskayuna Drive,
Schenectady, N. Y. 12309
March 26, 1973
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, ~r.,
As soeia te Justice, U. S. Supreme Court,
Supreme Court Building,
Washington, D. c.
Deer sir,
I am trained in the law and am now a retired member of the New
York State Bar. While not a Constitutio~al lawyer, I have always
made it a hobby, reading and rereading the more important decisions
of the Supreme Qourt.
The decision in the Rodriguez Case I find completely incomprehensible.
It is as though you had first decided on the outcome you wanted
to produce and then east about in the recesses of the Constitution
for some eruftbof support, however fragile, to lend credence to it.
Your entire reasoning, if the media correctly , reported it, seems
to be predicated upon the undisputed fact that the Constitution
provides no right to education. But the Constitution provides no
right to highways, drinking water, sanitary condition• or 99.9%
ot all the matters which Congress and the State legislature have
decided to be important enough to pass laws about; further the t
the Supreme Court has dealt with many of them even though they
are ~mentioned in the Constitution.
I urge you to look at that Constitutton yet another time. Look
at the XIV Amendment "nor deny to any person within it jurisdiction
the equal protection of the lawso" You admitt~d that the real
estate tax is unfair and that "the need for reform is •:parent,
but the ultimate solution must come from the lawmakers. Fine; I
have no argument with that proposition. BUT '!HE LAWMAKERS HAVE
ALlEADY MADE A SOLUTIONJ IT IS UP 'ro 'IHE SUPREME COURT 'ro DO X'lS
DUTY. That duty is not to legislate 1 but to declare the Texas law
violative of the XIV Amendment as other courts have done with other
laws and tell the Texas Legislature to make the law Constitutional.

TWo centuries ago it was possible to accurately measure a persop's
ability to pay a tax by the value or the land he owned. To-day
I am very certain that even the members or the Supreme Court have
oYer 9~ of their holdings in intangibles. ~al Estate ownership
is not a proper measure for taxation. The lower court had guts
enough to face up to the problem now. Eventually, you know as well
as I that this inequity must be corrected regardless of what
complexities it may generate.
The que tion before the court was properly: shall we do it now in
a legal orderly fashion, or shall we wait for the inevitable
violence to eorree injustice? You nine men have to decide it.

~U%:1~~
EFREM B.
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202 Junipero Serra Boulevard • Stanford, California 94305

SCIENCES

Telephone 1415) 321-2052

March 23, 1973

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
The Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20000
Dear Mr. Justice Powell:
In the New York Times of 22 March 1973 you are quoted as saying in regard
to your majority opinion in the Texas school finance case, "The Justices of this
Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary
to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of
public revenues." If this statement is accurately reported, it is truly incredible.
The implications are obvious: 1) If you do not have "the expertise and familiarity"
then how is it possible for you to render an opinion?; 2) It follows that given the
limitations on your knowledge, your decision is unwise; 3) If your knowledge is
limited and your decision is unwise, then you should have (given that you are a
fair-minded man) disqualified yourself from rendering any decision.
On the other hand, it seems to me that the duty of someone in your august
position is to familiarize yourself with "local problems" so that you might better
render wise opinions: That is your job for whose support we, the citizens of this
country, are taxed.
However, in the climate of these times, ignorance and prejudice in high places
seem to be rewarded. And those who are poor, disadvantaged, Black, Mexican or
Indian are penalized by people like you who fail to acquaint themselves, "acquire
expertise", and familiarize themselves with their problems; by people who are in
positions of power and influence and who have neither charity nor wisdom, nor the
inclination to acquire expertise or familiarity with problems, local or general.
The social consequences of such ignorance will affect many, and may finally affect
us all.
Sincerely yours,

Herbert Weiner, M.D.
Fellow
HW:jc

...

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
SCHOOL OF LAW
2500 Red River
AUSTIN, TEXAS

78705

April 25, 1973

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
United States Supreme Court
Washington, D. C. 20543
Dear Justice Powell:
Thank you very much for your warm letter of April 20th. I am
very pleased to have a copy of your remarks to the Fifth Circuit
for my file on the Freund Committee.
I agree with you about the way the press has treated the report
of that Committee but I am afraid the reasons for that treatment do
not seem opaque to me. It seems to me wholly consistent with the
attempts of the Washington press corp to smear the Chief Justice at
every opportunity. The reasons for their hostility to him are a
mystery to me but the existance of that hostility I regard as absolutely clear.
When the Chief announced his designees to the Commission on the
structure of the appellate courts even the wire services somehow
thought it relevant to point out that Bernie Segal and I had also been
members of the Freund Committee and the readline in the Washington
Star was "Mini-Court Advocates Appointed." Clearly the press has prepared to prejudge the work of that Commission before it is formally
organized because of the taint that Bernie and I bear. No member of
the press thought it relevant to note that Bernie and I are also both
members of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
and were initially appointed tofuat by Chief Justice Warren. Nor does
anyone think it relevant that we are both members of the Council of the
American Law Institute by election of the Institute. Nor has it
occurred to anyone that both of us have devoted a major part of our
careers to improvements in judicial administration with particular reference to federal courts. It is all very disappointing but I have had
too much experience with the press to be surprised by it.
I am delighted to hear that you will be at the Fourth Circuit
Conference and I certainly hope that your Court finishes its term in
time for you to do that. When I consider, however, the difficulty and
importance of some of the cases that were argued last week and this
week I am concerned about when the Court will be able to rise.

·~
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Page Two
Since rehearing was denied on Monday in Rodriguez it is no longer
inappropriate for me to say what a splendid opinion I thought you
wrote in that case. Clearly I am not without bias in the matter, but
I thought that the opinion was an exceptionally clear and forceful
statement for precisely the right reasons for the decision the Court
reached. I am glad to say that the prospect for reform of the Texas
system by the Legislature seems very good.
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RICE UNIVERSITY
HOUSTON, TEXAS
77001

DEPARTMEN T O F MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE
ENGINEERING AN D MATERIA LS SCIENCE

March 26, 1973

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr .
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr . Justice Powell:
I have just read the newspaper article describing your decision
concerning the financing of schools through prope~ty taxation . Although
I do not have the background to understand all the legal reasoning that
went into the decision, I do have one qualification that you clearly
lacked: in my capacity as a recruiter of students for Rice University,
I have visited many schools in both the Edgewood and Alamo Heights
districts . The comparison is so profound that any person of goodwill
would disagree with your decision . Edgewood High School bas offices
and rooms lighted by one bare bulb banging from the ceiling, while
Alamo Heights bas the most commodious of physical plants . The affluent
district bas a large staff of counselors, all specialists at getting
their students into coll ege . This counselling staff bas more receptionists than Edgewood schools have counsellors .
Having this firsthand knowledge of the bones and sinew on which
your facade of legalism was based, I found it very difficult to use the
pro forma title of Justice in my salutation . I am glad that I will not
be held accountable for the future generations of students that will
remain trapped by the continuing reality of unequal opportunity that
was sustained by your decision .
Sincerely,

M. 1 . Rudee
Associate Professor of Materials
Science
MLR : jbd
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LA LOUISIANE EST BILINGUE

FRED M . SMITH

WM . P. RUTLEDGE
TERRY E . THERIOT

WILLIAM H. LAMBERT

April 30, 1973

JACK C. FRUGE. JR .

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
United States Supreme Court
Washington, D.C.
RE:

School District v. Rodriguez

Dear Justice Powell:
I guess this judgment is final and a fit decision for public
discussion.
I sadly read your opinion. The effort is a trevail of
tears. It is long. Its very length is indicative of many
things.
Common sense informs all men alike that the constitution
does not protect education. Education saves the constitution. Wealth is a prerequisite of democracy. Without
wealth, there cannot be education; and without education,
there cannot be democracy; and without democracy, there
cannot be a constitution.
To the children, education is a constitutional fundamental.
It cannot be compared with anything else. To the children,
it is a right of citizenship . Free . And it must be equal
to be constitutional. Physically equal . Spiritually equal.
Equal education is indispensable. Sufficient education is
indispensable. Democracy cannot live without it. The
constitution cannot live without democracy.

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
April 30, 1973
Page
- 2 -

The taxpayers, adults, states, j~stices, are by fate bound
to this whether they like it or not. It is inevitable to
the continuance of democracy as procreation.
I come from the south. We tried to shut down public education. Those before you would not let us because of constitutional guarantee.
I am ashamed of your decision here.

WPR:cf

May 1, 1973

Dear P<tter:
The enclosed is a copy of a paragraph on Rodriguez, contained
in a letter on another subject from Prof. Charles Alan Wright.
As you contributed significantly to the opinion, and especially
to the subtleties of its equal protection analysis, I thought you would
be interested in P rof. Wright's comments.
As he concedes, he is hardly without bias. Yet, I suppose a
scholar is more likely to be detached about the quality of a favorable
decision than the average rough and tumble practitioner.
Again, my warm thanks.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice stewart
lfp/ss

j}u.;rrmtt

(!Jttltrl of t4t ~ta j;bttts

'JilasJri:ttgton.lO. <!f.

2.11~~$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 2, 1973
Dear Lewis,
Many thanks for sharing with
me Charlie Wright's comments about
the Rodriguez opinion. It was a good
opinion, and the credit for it belongs
entirely to you.
Sincerely yours,

0\ <;'

~

Mr. Justice Powell

..

~

COLOATa W . DARDEN, JR .
1111 vtaOIMIA MATIOMAL IAMit IUILDIMO

NOJlPOLJC, VIJlOINIA a1110

May J, 1973.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Supreme Court of the United States,
Wasbin&tdn, D. c. 205~3.
Dear Lewfs:
! have read and re-read with the keenest1 1nterest
your opinion in the Texas school case, which you were good . enou~
to send ~ so..time back.
I find ayself in accord with it.
If
its philosophy ts adhered to I think we shall be able to surmount
the violence that tears at the vitals of our school system today,
, because we shall keep the localities harnessed to the probJ.ems
while at the sa.e time alertin~ them to the need to stru~~le
ceaselessly toward the equalization of opportuaities.

The constitutional provisions wbich ·we were able to
into the Vir~inia Gonstitution will do that for us, and like
provisions elsewhere will brin~ it about in other states as time
~oes on.
In fact public opinion, which is the most powerful
weapon of all, is bringing this about now as you point out in
the Texas case, even without a constitutional mandate.
I liked
very much the way you marshalled your arcwaents and I believe
this will be re~arded as the .ast important opinion written by
you durin~ your stay on the Bench.
~et

The .avin& opinion written by Mr. Justice Marshall
impressed me deeply, and but for the fact I believe action by
the Supreme Court is not the most effective way to bring about
what is thought desirable, I would not be able to escape his
reasonin~.
His opinion brought back a lively discussion which
I heard many years a~o between Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
prominent members of Australia's bench and bar.
In 1958 the
Association of American Universities was invited to attend the
Con&ress of the Universities of the Commonwealth, meetin~ in
Montreal.
I attended representin~ the University of Virginia.
Following the Montreal get-together some of the &roup visited
Washington.
It fell to my lot to accompany the visitors on
a visit to the Supreme Court Building.
We were received by
F. F., the court not bein~ in session.
The Australians of the
~roup were particularly interested in the scope of the 14th
Amendment, and the visit was taken up almost entirely by a far
ran~in~ talk about the authority of the Supreme Court under
this amendment.
The Australians argued with force that the 14th
Amendment created a national state and that no activity is
beyond the reach of the federal &overnment.
Justice Frankfurter a&reed that the wordin& of the amendment was such that
it could support the view put forward by the Australians, but

'.·

be tlaou.pt the exercise of restraint oa the part of tbe Bupreae
Court .ade such an outcoae unlikely.
It is the restraint iD your opinion that so appeal• to
ae.
I think the amendment is subject to the interpretation
of the Australians! but such an interpretation would be, I think,
of very doubtful w sdom.
The Supreae Cou~, with all due respect
to it, is aiaply not wise enou~ to deal with all of the inequities which afflict the American people.
lor fo~ that matter is
the Congress, an9 unless we can manage a reasonable distribution
of power between the several states and the national government
it is difficult to .see how we can continue.
·
I do hope we shall fall in with one another before too
long.
The beautiful spring weather, which has come to Vir~inia,
is about all there is to. gi ye us cause for optimism.

Sincerely,

~e W. Darden, Jr.

'·

/.~
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MEMORANDUM
Mr. Larry A Hammond

DATE: May 4, 1973

l ewis F. Powell, Jr.
Rodriguez
The petition filed by counsel for Rodriguez, on the discussion

Apparently two motions are involved: one to be allowed court
costs, which the Court will clearly deny; and the other a second motion
to be allowed, retroactively, to appear in this Court lon an IFP msis.
I was not prepared to discuss the second motioo..

Some of the

Justices were willing to grant it although others pointed out that this
would entitle counsel for Rodriguez to reimbursement of about $2, 300.
I lmow nothing about this aspect of the matter.

It just does not

seem reasonable to me for such a motion to be given retroactive effect;
nor am I familiar with the applicable ground rules.
Before next Friday's conference, I will need enlightenment from

L. F. P., Jr.

In view of your current family interest in the University of
Virginia and your role in Rodriguez, I thought you might like to see
the enclosed letter from Colgate
Darden, .Jr.

w:

Colgate Darden, to whom I sent a copy of Rodriguez, was
President of the University of Virginia prior to Dr. Shannon; he is
a former Governor; a leader for many years of the "liberal" wing of
the Democratic Party; an advocate of moderation in public education
who served with me during my entire tenure on the State Board of
Education.
Perhaps the wisest Virginia statesman of his time, he is now
in his middle seventies.
Sincerely,

~tlttt

C!Jottrl ttf flrt ~tb $5taftg

~as-fringtMt, l9. C!J. 211gi.ll-~
CHAMB E RS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POW E LL , JR .

March 11, 1976

Dear Jay:
My present law clerks, who have read your Equal Protection
article with admiration, also read it - with amusement - as
criticizing sharply my opinion in Rodriguez. See 61 U.Va.
Law Review at pp. 991-993.
I certainly do not object to your entertaining differing
views about Rodriguez. Almost the essence of being a lawyer
is to be independent minded, to make one's own judgments,
and to respect the differing judgments of other lawyers.
Thus I write not to imply criticism of your present views.
They are certainly arguable, and no doubt entertained by many
others. Rather, I want to record my recollection of "Powell
Chambers history" on this case. So far as it may be relevant
to your comments, my recollection is as follows:
I devoted considerable time during the summer to Rodriguez,
and had made rather extensive notes myself. From the outset
you were with me as to how to decide the case; Larry and Bill
were inclined the other way. It was "Larry's case", and so
he and I worked on it for many weeks. Revisions were made to
accommodate the thinking of another Justice. We had a discussion in my Chambers in which you, Larry and I participated.
I am not sure that Bill was present. The discussion focused
specifically on whether I should adhere to the two-tier
analysis or go to what one of you then called a "sliding
scale" type of analysis. Although I think we had the Gunther
article before we brought the case down, it may not have been
available at the time I was asked to write the opinion.
My recollection is clear that the three (or four) of us
agreed that two-tier analysis, with all of its flaws, was
the established law of the Court at that time. There also
was a general feeling, in which I think you concurred, that

<.' \
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"sliding scale" equal protection analysis enabled a Justice
in every case to apply a wholly subjective test. In any
event, in the fall of 1972 I elected to stay with the twotier analysis for Rodriguez for two reasons: (i) the
precedents seemed to require it, and (ii) the case had
been presented and decided by a majority of the Court within
this framework. I also thought, and still think that you
agreed.
You certainly agreed then on the merits. Although
Larry initially had misgivings, he told me after working
on the case that he also had been "converted".
I consider the case one of the most important I have
written. Had it been decided otherwise, it is difficult to
visualize the ultimate impact on local and state government.
This is no place to reargue Rodriguez. I merely ask you to
contemplate, as you address your classes, how one could have
distinguished education from some of the other governmental
services provided primarily by local governments. As the
opinion states:
"Furthermore, the logical limitations on
appellees' nexus theory are difficult to perceive.
How, for instance, is education to be distinguished
from the significant personal interests in the basics
of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination
might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed,
ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most
ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment. If so appellees'
thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority
of Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v.
Normet, supra."
In addition to welfare services, what about public housing,
public sanitation and health (sewage, water, etc.), public
transr.ortation, and so on. None of these is a "fundamental
right' required to be provided by the Constitution.
State and federal governments now help with all of these
local services. But the argument in Rodriguez was that the
Equal Protection Clause commanded equality on a statewide
basis: i.~., per pupil expenditure on education must be
identical, and only the state could assure this. Presumably
this principle would require equal expenditures per citizen ·
on other public services. And, would the Fifth Amendment

.'

- 3 then require that the federal government equalize education
and other public services among the 50 states?
Even if the principle of equality of public services
were somehow limited to the states, the result would be a
serious denigration of local government. Schools in
particular have been a special interest and concern of the
local community. The quality of education depends upon
adequate fund~ng, but quality certainly does not vary
directly with the amount of funding. The per pupil
expenditure in Washington, D. C., is substantially higher
(more than double, I believe) than in Henrico County, Virginia.
It is much higher in Richmond than in Henrico County. Would
anyone who knows about education suggest that it is of better
quality in Washington than in Henrico?
The meaningful ingredients (as I know from personal
experience) of quality education also include the concern,
interest and participation (through PTA's, etc.) of families,
and the resulting community demands on teachers and the school
board. These ingredients become increasingly attenuated if
the state government (remote to most people) becomes the
primary source of funding, making local effort · immaterial,
and with funding, remote state control becomes inevitable.
Arguably, this may be desirable. But it would represent a
fundamental change, by judicial decision, in the function and
responsibility of the traditional levels of government in
this country.
As Rodriguez is one of my favorite "children", I am not
entirely disinterested when one of the "midwives" casts doubt
upon its legitimacy.
Nevertheless, we all think your article (at least the
rest of it) is splendid.
As ever,

Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson, III
School of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901
lfp/ss
cc: Larry A. Hammond, Esquire
William C. Kelly, Jr., Esquire
P.S. Incidentall(., you say no one has ever adequately defined
a "suspect class.' Take another look at the definition in
Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 28.
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C.
20543
Dear Judge:
I am happy to have the knowledge that you have
to represent me before the court of your distinguished
I am sure Jay and I are in the best of hands, although
recognize that your case may be indeed a difficult one

undertaken
clerks.
I, too,
to defend.

I have been meaning for several weeks now to set aside
an afternoon or an evening to respond at length to your correspondence with Jay regarding Rodriquez.
I have obtained, out here
in the desert, a copy of Jay's Law Review article, but have only
had an opportunity to peruse it hastily.
I am looking forward to
spending some time with that document somewhere in a cabin at the
bottom of the Grand Canyon in a couple of weeks. Let me say though,
at this point, that there is really no question but that you have
faithfully recalled and recorded the history of our office's
deliberations on that case.
Indeed, there is one additional tidbit
with which you may not be as familiar as I am. During my months
of revising the sections that dealt with the "two-tier" approach
to Equal Protection, I found that one of the most difficult
precedents with which we had to deal was your first opinion for
the Court---Aetna v. Weber. Jay, as you will recall, was your aide
on that case, and you may also recall that there is at least one
line in that opinion which is suggestive of a version of the
"sliding scale" approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. Jay and I
discussed that opinion at some length in an effort to determine
whether your opinion in that case had established you as a devotee
of the "sliding scale" analysis. Our ultimate conclusion, as I
recall it, was that the language of Weber did not place you firmly
in one camp or the other, and that in any event it was clear that
you had not intended at that early date to even attempt to resolve
any questions in your own mind with respect to so large and
important a question as Fourteenth Amendment philosophy.
I am sure that Jay will remember our conversations on that
score, but I frankly do not recall whether Jay personally preferred
the two-tier analysis to a less structured approach. There is

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
May 18, 1976
Page 2
absolutely no doubt in my mind that he agreed with the result
in Rodriquez from the very outset. In fact, one substantial
portion of my conclusion that my initial appraisal was in need
of re-examination was the fact that Jay so firmly adhered to the
view that a result striking down Texas' school financing scheme
would be destructive of equal protection principles.
I will write both you and Jay another missive after I have
had the full opportunity to critique his work.
I look forward to
reading it with great relish.
Again, I wish very much that Frances and I could attend
the reunion festivities this year. We will be thinking fondly
of you and Mrs. Powell.
Sincerely,

f~/Jil~
Larry A. Hammond
LAH/cd
cc:

Jay Wilkinson, Esquire
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DRAFT OPINION
No. 71-1332

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

I

This suit, attacking the Texas system of

financ~ng

elementary and secondary public education, was brought by
Mexican-American parents whose children are enrolled in the
Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district
1

in San Antonio, Texas. Their suit is also a class action on behalf of school children throughout the state who are members of
minority groups or who are poor and who live in school districts
in which the property tax base is low. Named as defendants were
the State Board of Education, the Commission of Education, the
State Attorney General, and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. 2
Although the case was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge
district court was empanelled in January of 1969,3 the panel's
decision was not handed down until December of 1971. 4 The trial
was held in abeyance for two years in order to permit extensive
pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending Texas

, r ...

~

..

,

..

>,_:-

-2legislative investigation into the problems of financing public
education. 5 Mter it became clear that the case would not be
a

mooted by legislative action, the district court rendered/per
curiam judgment holding the Texas scheme of financing public
education unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stayed its mandate for
two years to provide Texas with an opportunity to remedy its system
but retained jurisdiction to issue a remedial order of its own if
the state failed to comply with the court's order .6

The State

appealed and this Court noted probable jurisdictionk in order to
give plenary consideration to the difficult and far-reaching
constitutional issues here presented.

U.S.

---

(1972). For the reasons stated in this opinion we now reverse the
decision of the court below.
The Texas system of financing public education, which
is similar in its broad outline to the system in operation throughout

7
this country, combines funds derived from both state and local sources.
A significant portion of the money for every public school in the state
(approximately 50 percent) is provided out of general revenues

- 3 8

under the statewide Minimum Foundation Program.

While the

Program has meny statutory complexities, its general contours
may be simply stated.

The State has established a program which

expends over a billion dollars a year to provide salaries for teachers
and administrative personnel as well as funds for school maintenance
and student transportation.

While approximately 80 percent of this

program is financed directly from the State's general revenues, the
remainder is provided by the local school districts under a Local
9
Fund assignment.

county's
Generally, each

to the Fund reflects that county's

~

XXK

assessed contribution

relative taxpaying ability in

comparison to the other counties in the State.

Likewise any district's

share of the county's assessment is based on that district's portion
9a

of taxable real property in the county.

The poorest districts,

therefore, make the mmt smallest contributions to the program.
Indeed in some districts the State's contribution to the foundation
10
program is in excess of 98% of the cost of the program.

Because

the State Fund is earmarked for specified items in the school's
budgets, the grants are roughly comparable as between schools,

!: ~·,

.... ~C-'&.'·.J u• " ') ,.

the amount of state moeny allocated for each district, computed

-4 on a per pupil basis, is approximately the same for X:!llioc each

11
district.
It is not, however, the state's contribution to school finance

under the foundation program that has created the controversy in
this case.

Rather, this suit challenges Texas's commitment to local,

district level, financing for any funds above the amount provided by
the State since it is this aspect of educational finance that is
responsible for substantial interdistrict disparities found in Texas.
The Texas Constitution transfers to the individual school districts
the power to impose an ad valorem property tax on property within
each district and to spend the revenues, derived from that tax

12
locally.

The amount of money gathered in any particular district

1QmH depends, first, on the amount and value of available taxable
property and, second, on the rate at which local residents decide

13
to tax that property.

Because of wide variations in those factors -

especially the former - the extent to which local funding supplements
the State foundation grant varies markedly from district to
district.

- 5 -

The districts in the San Antonio area provide a fair example
of how the state-local financing scheme operates.

The Edgewood

Independent School District is one of seven districts in the metropolitan
area.

Approximately 22, 000 students

its 25 public schools.

are~

enrolled in

The district is situated in the core city sector

in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial
property.

The residents are predominantly of Mexican-American

8'is9mx descent: approximately 90% of the students are MexicanAmericans and over 6% are Negro.

The assessed property value per

person is $5, 960, the lowest in the area, and the median family

{ft!, CSt.)
income ($., 6&6-) is also the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1. 05
per $100 of property valuation - the highest in the area - the district
contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school
year.

The State foundation program supplied $222 per pupil for a
14

state-local total of $248.
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted
with the Alamo Heights School District, the most affluent district

....

·

.....

- 6 -

in San Antonio.

Its six schools, handling approximately 5, 000 students,

are also situated in a residential community but the community
character is quite dissimilar to Edgewood.

The school EipNiatiE

population is predominantly white, with approximately 18% Mexican Americans and less than one percent Negroes.

The assessed property

value exceeds $49, 000 and the median per family income is $8, 001.
The tax rate ($. 85 per $100 of valuation) yielded $333 per pupil in
1967-68. Coupled with state aid of $225, the district was able to

15
supply $558 per student.
These two districts, respondents contend, reflect a condition
that exists in varying degrees throughout the State of Texas. Respondents
claim that not infrequently the minorities and the poor are clustered
in property-poor school districts that cannot supplement state funding
to the same extent that more wealthy districts may.

Respondents
16

and the court below relied on an affidavit filed by Professor Berke
of Syracuse University in which the results of a study of 110 Texas
school districts were reported.

His study indicated that a direct

correlation exists between the amount of taxable property and the

- 7-

17
level of per pupil expenditures,

and that an inverse xxxx correlation

exists between the level of expenditures and the percentage of

18
minority-group pupils attending public schools in the district.
~

His study also found that the districts which spent the

most on education in the sample had the highest median family
incomes and that the districts which spent less had the lowest family
19

incomes.

While these findings have been subjected to some
20

criticism in the briefs and scholarly journals,

for purposes of

examining the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may
accept the

~"u:..

~ thrust

of each of those demonstrated correlations.

It is to a consideration of that thesis that we now turn.

II
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17
level of per pupil expenditures,

and that an inverse xxxx: correlation

exists between the level of expenditures and the percentage of

18
minority-group pupils attending public schools in the district.
~

His study also found that the districts which spent the

most on education in the sample had the highest median family
incomes and that the districts which spent less had the lowest family

19
incomes.

While these findings have been subjected to some
20

criticism in the briefs and scholarly journals,

for purposes of

examining the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may

'"''

accept the l:Cbl" thrust of each of those demonstrated correlations.
It is to a consideration of that thesis that we now turn.
II

The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"no State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. " Whatever broad or narrow purposes
the proponents of this constitutional prohibition may have hoped it
to achieve, this clause has become central to this Court's jurisprudence.
Its protection has been invoked to eliminate invidious discrimination

- 8 against a broad range of insular minorities and to condemn disparate
treatment affecting the

full~

span of a State's

~contacts

with

its people. The Amendment's potential breadth has become, over
this first century of its life, as much a source of comfort and
optimism for the egalitarian philosopher as it has become a source
of wkepticism and concern for the judicial restraintist and the
federalist.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there is not - at this

time or possibly at any time over the last hundred years - a

tm:CJa'XIXlK

unanimity of viewpoint among the nine Justices on the Court as to
the parameters of the Equal Protection Clause.

Nor it is surprising

that no single test has been developed to meet each of the innumerable
problems presented to the Court under this Clause.

Yet despite the

lack of unanimity of viewpoint, and despite the absence of a single
pervasive formulation, the Court has fashioned a workable and
coherent framework for resolving the many conflicts between the
States and those subject to their jurisdiction.

~Nothing

we decide

today requires a departure from the maturely considered precedents
that have articulated this understanding and have given substance to
the Amendment.

..

- 9 -

The usual or traditional approach to claims of denial of equal
protection calls for a determination whether the State's classification
is reasonably or rationally related to some legitimate state interest.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Oldahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

This test reflects the Court's

traditional respect for the presumptive validity of the judgments
hammered out by the States' lawmaking processes.
_ Boar~of

McDonald v.

Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806, 808-09 (1969).

It

also reflects a recognition of the fact that resolution of a State's
practical problems often calls for a rough - and sometimes imperfect accommodation of competing interests. Of equal importance is the
consideration, which finds expression repeatedly in the decisions
of this Court, that deference to rational state decisionmaking is
mandated lest the majority of Justices impose their personal views
of wise policy on the States.

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,

484-86 (1970).
The "rational basis" test has been invoked primarily in cases
touching upon a state's regulation of business, economic and social

1

- 10 interests.

Not in all cases, however, has the Court found it appropriate

consistent with protection :fX of the constitutional guarantee, to accord
such deference to the

States'~

legislative determination.

When

state action has operated to disadvantage certain specific, definable
minorities within our society, the Court has held that those actions
must meet a higher standard of scrutiny.

Absent a showing of some

compelling state interest. We have not tolerated discrimiatnions,
21

. for instance, on the basis of race,

22

lineage,

22

or alienage.

At

the same time the Court has applied a similarly strict standard in
reexamining state decisions that interfere with or impinge upon the
exercise of rights which are clearly recognized as fundamental in
24

a constitutional sense.
Appellees' constitutional theory in the instant case relies on
a convergence of these two categories of circumstances which have
heretofore

Emxjmagl occasioned

equal protection analysis.

departure from the usual mode of

They contend that education is a "fundamental"

interest and that wealth is a "suspect" classification. Believing that

- 11 -

the State is providing education discriminatively in the basis on
wealth, appellees urge the Court to subject Texas' system to close
scrutiny.

The District Court found this rationale persuasive:

"More than mere rationality is required . . . to maintain
a state classification which affects a 'fundamental interest'
em which is based upon wealth. :XIXmx Here both factors
are involved. "
F. Supp. at

--

Applying the more demanding test whether there was any "compelling
state interest"

to~

support the Texas finance practices, the

District Court found it lacking.

Moreover, the court concluded that

the State had failed "even to establish a reasonable basis for these
classifications. " Id. While the court was willing to

K

leave to the

State the opportunity to remedy its practices, it does require that
whatever financing program the State adopts must meet a standard
of "fiscal neutrality, "

!: ~,

"the quality of public education may not

be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a :xztrocx

23
whole."

Id. at

--

Appellants virtually concede that the degree of judicial scrutiny
applied to Texas' historical dual system of financing public education

- 12 -

is critical to the ultimate resolution

x of this case.

That is, if the

Court places on the State a "heavy burden" to justify its practices,
if the Court requires that the State's plan meet a test of'precision"

if the State must prove that financing is carefully'tailored" to achieve
legitimate objectives, and if it must convince the Gha Court that it
26

has pursued a formula of least "drastic means, "

the Texas

financing system - and its counterparts in nearly every other state will not pass muster.

The State candidly admits that "[n]o one

familiar with the Texas system would contend that it has yet achieved
27
p i perfection. "

Although the State admits that its financing scheme
28

is "far from perfect"

29

and that there "are still defects in it, "

it

forcefully disputes the finding of the court below that there is no
ilK "rational basis" underlying its system.

This, then establishes the framework for our analysis. We
1p.ust decide, first, whether the Texas financing scheme must be
subjected to the rigors of close scrutiny.

If so, the judgment of

the District Court must be affirmed. If not, the Texas' claim to a

- 13 rational basis must then be considered.

The first question turns in

large part on whether we must view education among the small group
of interests that have been rightly deemed fundamental.
undertaking a close consideration of that

XHX

Before

question, however, it

may be wise to address two issues argued here which did not receive
full treatment by the three-judge court.
As outlined above, appelless contend that classifications
29a
on the basis of wealth - like classifications on the basis of race are inherently suspect and will not be sanctioned absent some
persuasive showing of legitimacy. Wisely, however, they do not
seek to prove too much by this argument for no JSIXRRRNR precedent
of this Court can be found which places race and wealth on a parity
for constitutional purposes.

To be sure, the Court has struck down

a substantial number of state laws as invidiously discriminatory
against the poor.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and their property have
invalidated state laws that deny indigents fair and adequate access

- 14 to a criminal appeal. Williarn:; v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1910) and
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) held that indigents convicted of
crimes could be subjected to incarcertaion simply because they lack
resources available to other more affluent defendants.

Harper v.

Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and in Bullock v.
~arter,

40

U.S.

(1972). because the right to vote was implicated,

the Court struck down barriers that fell with "unequal weight" on voters
30
· possessing the least financial resources.
40 U.S.

Lindsey v. Normet,

(1972) overturned Ean Oregon statute requiring a

double appeal bond as a precondition to appealing a landlord's eviction
suit because it discriminated "against the poor" in an "arbitary"
and "irrational" manner.

Id. at

None of these decisions are premised on the view that state
laws that burden the poor more than the rich are inherently
31
impermissible under the 14th Amendment.

In many of our cases

the state laws fell because of its impact on a fundamental constitutional
interest and in others the laws were simply unable to withstand the
basic requirements of statutory reasonableness.

We do not understand

- 15-

appellees to suggest in this ease that a wealth impact is alone sufficient.
Rather it is the presence of the wealth aspect in an area touching upcm

32
education that is critical.
There ta a further problem in this ease, which has received
considerable attention by the parties and the commentators but which
was ignored by the District Court. A major premise underlying the
equal protection thesis of this case is that per pupil expenditures
adequately measure the relative quality of one's education. stated
differently, it is assumed that the -.x quality of the educational
opportunity received by children in districts that spend less per
person is lower than the quality of education in district that spend more.
This thesis raises a peculiarly perplexing problem. Almost
instinctively educators, legislators, and judges assume that, in
the main, money equals quality in education. The entire history
of public education in the country reflects the unquestioned belief
that the quality of our schools is reflected in the amount of money
we expend of them. The supposed answer to every educational

.. 16-

problem has been the itk infusion of economic resources. This
assumption includes virtually every federal and state program in
the field of education. More money buys more qualified teachers
who can teach smaller classes. It •

buys extracurricular programs

and more attractive facilities. All have been thought to contribute
to the quality of education.
Yet in recent years social science studies have questioned
these premises and found them faulty. The hoped-for correlations
between class size or teacher qualifications (measured in terms
of experience and educational achievement) and educational "results"
I

has

r~ot

been found. Infusion of money has not reflected itself in

higber test scores on standarized tests. These findings have been
I

critic,lzed because the testing apparatus is faulty. others have
I

crtUcized the notion that the quality of education can be 'I. effectively
m,easured through any sophisticated testing system. Instead they
I

assert that the value of an education must be measured in terms of
33

other less tangible criteria.

/
I

!

\,

\

\
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~

'

.
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Recognizing that there is no simple and satisfactory way for
this Court to resolve the cost-quality question, the parties have
resorted to more formalistic approaches. We are urged to place
on the state the burden of proof of a lack of correlation since the
state has always heretofore acted as if money were synonymous
with education. Indeed, it is suggested that the state's burden be
made insurmountable; that it be estopped now from disputing a
fact that bt•JD•Iww&::&:i:tM: underlies its entire system. Moreover,
it is even asserted that the issue properly should be disregarded

altogether on the ground that those who raise the claim are engaging
in the worst sort of disingenuity. We u: are told that those who most
fiercely t resist giving up the money they have are the most
34

determined advocates of the inconsequentiality of money.
Because of the ultimate judgment we approve in this case
we need not select one or another of the proffered means of disposing
of this question. It is enough to point out that if we were impelled
to adopt the view that state educational disparities raise issues

- 18-

of fundamental constitutional significance we would have the gravest
difficulty resolving the cost-quality dispute. The problem is complex
and intractable and well beyond the competence of Justices on this
Court to resolve. At the same time none of the formalistic alternatives
suggested above provide a truly satisfactory means of dispatching
35

this problem.

In

·~

....

.,

·•

FOOTNOTES:

(San Antonio, etc. v. Rodriguez)

1. Not all of the children of these complainants
attended public school. One family's children were enrolled in
private school "because of the condition of the schools in the
Edgewood Independent School District.n Third Ammended
Complaint, app. at 14.

2. The complaint also named the seven major
school districts in the San Antonio (Bexar County) area as
defendants. After a pretrial conference, however, the district
court issued an order dismissing the several school districts.
Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District (the
former defendant whose name this case bears) has adopted
plaintiffs' claims and has filed an amicus curiae brief in support
of that position in this Court.

3. A three-judge court was properly convened in this
case and there are no questions regarding the district court's
jurisdiction or the direct appealability of its judgment. 28 U.S. C.
§§

''

2281' 1253.

Footnotes

-24. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist.,

-- F.

Supp.

5 . Id. at

6 . Id., at

(1971).

, n. 11.

--

7. President's Comm'n on School Finance, Schools,
People and Money, Final Report, at

- - - (1972). An amicus

curiae brief filed on behalf of 29 states indicates that each of the
signatory states on the brief has a financing system similar to
Texas'. Other sources indicate that every state, with the possible
exception of Hawaii, utilizes local property taxes as a significant
source of educational funding. Coons, Cline & Sugarman, Private
Wealth and Public Education at _ _ (1970).

8. Texas Educ

Code§~ 16.0l~seq.

9. Texas Educ Code §§ 1671-1673.

Footnotes

-39a. Unlike many states, school district lines in
Texas often do not follow county and city lines. While there
are 254 counties in Texas there are approximately 1200 school
districts. B€xar County alone, which encompasses the metropolitan San Antonio area, has ll school districts.

10. A second state-funded program, the Available
School Fund, calls for uniform per pepil payments to every district
in the state. In 1968 this Fund allotted $98 per pupil. However,
because the contribution of each district's entitlement under the
Minimum Foundation Program is always subtracted from the
amounts paid under the Available Fund Program, it plays no
significant role in state funding of public education.

ll. The major share of the state fund is devoted to
teacher salaries and makes higher payments to schools wlnse
teachers have more years of experience and more advance degrees.
As a consequence of this incentive aspect of the state program,
districts that can afford to hire more experienced teachers often

Footnotes
-4-

benefit more from the state fund than poorer districts.

12. Tex. Const. Art VII, ~ 3; Tex. Educ. Code

f§

20. Ol ~seq.

13. Pursuant to the Texas Constitution, the local
tax rate is set by a majority vote of the "qualified property
taxpaying voters of the district." Tex. Const. Art VII,

§I 3.

14. Federal funds added another $108 per pupil
for a grant total of $356 per pupil. While the federal assistance
has an equalizing effect on total school budgets between wealthy
and poor districts, the district court rejected an argument made
by the state in that court that it should weigh in the federal grant.
F. Supp at _ _ _ . The state has not renewed that contention
here.

15. The dollar figures used in this comparison are
not identical to the figures utilized in the district court opinion

. ... -

r

UOI:ll0tt:o:5

-5but any differences are statistically inconsequential and are
merely a result of relying upon different but comparable
statistical figures.

Berke
16.

Professor~

is the Director of the Education

Finance and Governance Program of the Policy Institute at
Syracuse University. His study of Texas school districts was
part of a broader survey, funded by the Ford Foundation, of
finance systems in several states.

17.

Categorized by Equalized Property Values,
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue
Market Value of
Taxable Property
Per Pupilt

I
1

Median Family
Income From

196a-

Per Cent State & Local
Minority Revenues Per
Pupils'
Pupil\

Above $100,000
(10 Districts)
$100,000-$50,000
(26 Districts)

$5,900

8%

$815

$4,425

32%

$544

$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
( 40 Districts)
Below $10,000
( 4 Districts)

$4,900

23%

$483

$5,050

31%

$462

$3,325

79%

$305

'•.•

Footnotes
-6-

18. Id.

19. Id.

20. See, e.g. , Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities

in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serran v. Priest
and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504,
brief, at
at 83-87.

21-~2;

(1972); appellant's

amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 29 states,

Fn 7

£lL

388

E.g., LovinB v. Virginia,#** U.S. 1 (1967)
22/
E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.

(19 )

23/
E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.

(1970)/

24/
Ef.g., Police Dept of City of Chicago v. Mosley,
40

u.s.

(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 40

u.s.

(1972);

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).

25/
The test of "fiscal neutrality" is the product of
the scholarship of the authors of the book that is widely
acclaimed as the major work

in a campaign to correct

interdistrict disparities in the resources available
for education '.

CUne, Clunes

&

Sugarman, Private Wealth

and Public Education at 303-04 (1970).

26/
Dunn v. Blumstein, 40

U.S.

(1972).

,.

. ·: ..

fn S

27/

·Appellants' brief, at 11.
28/
Appellants' Reply Brief, at 17.

29/
Appellants' Brief, at 11.

~-r-~
30/
See also McDonald v. Bd of Election Comm'rs, 394

u.s.

802
·k)@

(1969).

31/
Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.

(1971); Boddie v.

371
Connecticut, 401 U.S. #&L (1971).

32/

In their seminal text, the authors of Private Wealth

and Public Education#(who have filed a thorough and helpful
amicus cl.ffuriae brief in this Court), concede that "h~ever they may be interpreted, the poverty cases by themselve
are insufficient as a base for our plosition."
375.

..

''I

>,'

..

Id. at

/\
lli/

There is considerable disagreement on the question of

who actually comprises the class discriminated against on
the basis of wealth.

The District Court found a correlation

between personal wealth (measured in terms of
income)

mei~dian

family

within a district and that district's property wealth
it~tA:f!i!:fNJ.fUMPifi.#il/6 iMU#MAdfi.it#.ies:fNI#dledfA#i!ifi.r#A.
F.

(measured in terms of taxable property per pupil).
Supp. at ___ • Since it also found that property-rich
districts expended more for education, it may be reasonable to
conclude that the District Court found a correlation between
personal wealth and educational expenditures.

The thrust of

-the arguments presented in this case, however, focus more
precisely on the poverty of the district in terms of assessable
property than on the poverty of the individual families.

That

focus has caused appellants to argue that this case is unlike

.

any previous "wealth" case because the Court has heretofore
always dealth with questions of individual poverty rather
than district poverty, i.e. it is poor individuals and not
poor political subdivisions that deserve the special protection of the Court.
While we fully comprehend that this case presents
wealth discrimination in a novel context (but see Bullock
v. Carter, 40 U.S. ___ (1972)), we fail to perceive how
this difference operates to require a different form of
analysis under the equal protection clause.

In reality,

the disadvantaged class is composed of children who are

" .. ,
I

~

\

"poor" in the only resourc e that the State has deemed relevant
for providing public education.

Apart from the possibility

that families with high personal income may take their
the level of personal

children out of the public schools,
fzmily income appears immaterial.

ii#l##~l#i~m~ieiiml#i~Mt

We experience no difficulty

in holding that the Texas educational finance program
operates in a manner that disadvantages some of its
school children on a wealth basis and that the claim of
that class--however it is defined--is cognizable under the
Coastitutional.

.4.u.- v~ )J~

"

J./~1

33/
The quality-cost .issue has received considerable
attention.

Among the most notable authorites are the

following.

C. Jencks, Inequality (1972);/Silberman, Crisis

c.

in the Classroom (1970);0ffice of Education, Eq,1lality
of Educational Ooportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report);
On Equality of Educational Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan &
Mosteller eds); J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorker, H. Levin,

& T. Stout,

Schools and Inequality (1971); President's

Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, People & Moneys The Need
For Educational Reform (1972).

34/
It has also been urged upon us that this question should
be decided finally on the record made in the District Court.
The record does show that Edgewood has fewer teachers with
the necessary teaching degrees; that a higher percentage
of its faculties are rated as "substandardY by the State
Education Agency; that the student-counsellor ratio is higher
in Edgewood than in the more affluent districts; the
facilities are relatively more crowded (fewer square feet
per pupil); the library
l~d~i

~j

has fewer books; there

~

a less diverse curriculum than in other area schools;

and there is a higher drop-out ratio\ in the Edgewood schools.
Affidavit by Superintendent of EISD, app at 234-39.

fn 10
These conclusions were nowhere mentioned in the District
Court opinion and, because of the manner in which evidence
was received in this case, were never subjected to crossexamination.

Nevertheless, even if they would justify

a finding of a direct correlation in the subject district,
it is highly questionable whether these findins could
justify statewide relief.

The question becomes even more

difficult when it is understood that the constmtutional
theory pressed here would apply in every State in the Union.

35/
The courts that have, to date, found state financing
schemes improper have not faced this question because the
of the posture in which those cases arose.

Serrano v.

Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (appeal on a
demurer which admits all

al~egations

in the complaint);

Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971)
(motion to dismiss).

But see Goldstein, supra note ___ , at

lah/ss 11/5/72

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal three-judge court opinion we review today is one
striking down under the Equal :protection Clause the state of Texas'
system of financing public education. It is a decision whose impact,

woi

I

I

bett~r
'

cause a revolution In public education In that state. For
or for worse, its principle would have similar applicability

Jevery state In the Union. Moreover, the court's reasoning has
J /
I

·P,. grave implications for the constitutionality of a broad range of

I

' st~te and local expenditures funded out of local ad valorem property
I
ta1~es.

Of equal importance are the questions this case presents with

respect to the proper role of the fedaal courts in implementing the
!

, Equal Protection Clause. We approach our reviewing function with
· the special circumspection that grows out of a full awareness of the
enormity and significance of the task at hand.

'I

·'

.._.,.

..

~.
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"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. " So said a unanimous Supreme Court
eighteen years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.s. 493
(1954) in striking down the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. What
was said there in the context of racial discrimination has lcs t none
of its va:1ltrB vitality over time:

"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonable be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of education. Such an opportunitywhere the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be :III1X made available to all on .:q; equal terms. "
Id.
This theme expressed in Brown has been underscored repeatedly
in the opinions of Justices of this Court. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40_u.s.
(Mr. Chief Justice),

- - ( Mr.

,.

Justice White) (1972);

- 20Abington School Dist. v. Sehempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum
v. Bd. of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 263 U.s. 390 (1923); Interstate
RR Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). The importance of
our system of free public education cannot be overstated. And, nothing
this Court holds today, in anywy departs from our consistent dedication
to that institution.
Yet one might well wonder whether the steadfast belief of nine
Justices in the high value of education is the sole criterion for invocation
of the standards of searching scrutiny reserved for state laws touching
upon "fundamental" interests. If the judgment of this Court on the
relative importance of a particular state activity is the key to
constitutional adjudication under the equal protection clause then
there may be considerable merit to Mr. Justice Harlan's charge
in Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.s. 618, 655, 661 (1969) that the Court
was making itself into a "super-legislature". It -w» uld indeed be
reminiscent of the period in the Court's history when, under the
doctrine of "substantive due process," the Court felt empowered to

....

..

-
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t.'

,
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strike down state laws ''because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Williamson
v. Lee Opitcal Co., 348 U.s. 483 (1955).
The Court has not pursued such an open-ended, policy-oriented
course. Rather, it has always abided by the constraints of the
Constitution itself. Thus, in Shaprio v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 642,
Mr. Justice Stewart effectively responded to Mr.

iii••• Justice

Harlan•s:Btaa stated fear:
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular human
activities, characterizethem as "fundamental," and give
them added protection ..• ' To the B:illdatrN contrary,
the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established
constitutional rights, and gives to that right no less
protection than the Constitution itself demands."
(Emphasis from original).
This statement in Mr. Justice Stewart's separate concurrence merely
served to emphasize what Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
makes unmistakably clear. In refusing to apply the traditional rational
relation test to state welfare eligibility statutes imposing a one-year
durational residency requirement a as a precondition to receipt of
AFDC benefits, the Court stated the salient point:

'· '

- 22"in moving from state to state . . . appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a co~
governmental interest, is unconstitutional. "
Id. at 634 (emphasis from original).
The right to interstate travel had been repeatedly recognized as a
right of constitutional significance,

36
and the Court's judgment required
37

no balance of the importance of that interest in a vacuum.
Last Term, in Lindsey v. Normet, 40 _U.s._ (1972), presented
with an effort to have state legislation invalidated under "a more
stringent standard than mere rationality. " Id. at

That case

involved a challenge to the procedural limitations on tenants in suits
brought under Oregon's Forcible Entry and WIIX Wrongful Detainer
statute. The tenants • argued that those limitations implicated
"fundamental interests which are of particularly importance to the
poor" in the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain
peaceful possession of one's home." Id. The Court's analysis is
instructive:

J. ~

•

'
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''We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does
not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that
document any constitutional guarantee to access to
dwellings of a particular quality of any recognition
of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property
of his landlord beyond the term of the lease, without
the payment of rent • • . . Absent constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the
definition of landlord-tenant relationships is a legis(emphasis
lative not a judicial function. " Id. at
supplied).
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court's
sensitivity for the fact that the "administration of public welfare
assistance . . . a involves the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings, " Id. at 48 5, provided no basis for
departing from the usual mode of constitutional analysis of questions
of

economic and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central

importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate foundation
38

for application of the compelling state interest test.
Eisensta~

40

u.s.

v. Baird, 40_ U.S. _

See also

- 39
(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein,

- 40
(1972); ?olice Department of the City of Chicago v.

Mosley, 40_U. S.

- 41
(1972).

Anticipating that the conceded societal importance of education
would not alone propel the Court to depart from the usual standard of

r

~,.

.,. ;
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of reviewing a state's social and economic decisions, appellees now
argue that education is different than welfare assistance and housing
because it impinges upon the full exercise of other rights accorded
protection under the Constitution. Specifically they assert that
education is essential to the effective utilization of First Amendment
freedoms and to the intelligent use of the ballot. As to the asserted
nexus between

sp•••• speech and education,

appellees urge that

speech is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating
his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of
ideas~ft
,

is an empty forum for those

»aaJwJaag lacking

the basic com42

, I

m,ar.licative tools. Likewise, the right to receive information becomes
I

I

I

I JI

; a ~hollow privilege when the recipient lacks the ability to read,
'/
1{
I

1

1 assimiJate and utilize his knowledge.
I

A similar line of reasoning is

I
I

follo·<ved with respect to the right to vote. Exercise of the franchise
CiMtnot be divorced from the educational background of the voter.
'i

I'

Be The electoral process, it is urged, depends on an informed
I

/

'

I

electorate and a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless he
43

possesses rudimentary reading and writing skills.

'\

\

'.

- 25-

We would dispute neither of these propositions other than to
register the Court's reluctance to find in education a fundamental
Interest upon such attenuated :blat bases. While the Court is surely
capable of protecting the right to speakllr and the right to vote from
unjustifiable governmental interference, we have never presumed
to possess the power or capability to guarantee to the citizenry the
most effective speech :mutbeauax or the most Informed electoral
these
choice. That :tilDe may be the goals of a system of freedom of
expression and of a representative form of government is not the
critical determination. These are goals hopefully to be pursued

b~\
\

a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from

(

JJNMactox'*'Eild:ai

\,
\

·\

governmental Interference. They are not values to be implemented \
I
'

\

by judicjial Interference with otherwise :liJiylalu legitimate state action. \

I Moreover, we might still doubt whether this thesis adequately

I

'

I

I

I

set,s educat ion above the significant personal Interests 1n basically
decent food and shelter. Empirical examination might buttress the
likely estimation that the ill-fed, the ill-clothed, and the ill-housed
are among the most Ineffective participants 1n the political process

'

.
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process :aa:RitHbja that they make the least use of the benefits of the
First Amendment. To the extent that this reasoning is foreclosed
by

Dandridge and Lindsey we think that appellees' educational nexus

theory is also foreclosed.
One final but significant difficulty remains. We are dealing,
in this case and the several others that have been litigated to date,
not with anything approaching the absolute denial of educational oppor- .
tunity by the states. The deprivations have all been relative. In the
instant case, for example, we are cmsumed with the relative inferiority
of an education supported by the expenditure of $248 as opposed to an

44
education costing nearly twice that amount.

Whatever claims might

be made about the relative inequality between the offerings in these
schools, we have heard no charge that any of Texas' schools fail to
provide their students with an opportunity to acquiesce, JMt.•NyD. during
the a course of twelve years of training, the basis communicative
tools. If it were shown in another case that, for instance, particular
schools or school districts were not successfully introducing their
charges to the classic "three R's", we would have a much more

\
\

,,

"
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perplexing case. For it may well be that there are certain features of
' any system of public education that are so inextricably tied to the
\

free enjoyment of constitutional rights as to be fairly invoked as
tundamental.
For the present, however, we hold on the basis of the facts
befo~e us that public education in Texas, allM!it of the greatest social

importance, is not a fundamental interest in a constitutional sense.
Tllerefore, as we indicated at the outset, Texas' system of financing
pUblic ed:acation must be tested under the traditional equal
protec1t1on standards.
'I

I'

/
,;

I

/

I

··~.

'

;
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Appellees attack on the Texas system of financing public
education comes down to the question whether that system has
r~asonable

inte/st.

,1.,
f

I

8.11

or rational basis grounded in some a legitimate state
The District Court founded that it did not. We disagree.

The applicable traditional standard has been characterized
I

and its bounds refined in a large number of eases. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) pulls together the relevant threats of
the test:
"In the area of economies and social welfare, a

state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications mate are
imperfect. If the classification has 'reasonable basis, '
it does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification' is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.'
. • . 'The problems of government are practical ones
and may justify, if they do not require, rough aeeommodations-illogieal, it may be, andx••"••tdr: unscientific.'
• • • " Id. at 485.
liiDII:

The State concedes that its method is "imperfect," that "in practice
it results in some inequality," and that the balances it strikes may
45
be fairly characterized as "rough accommodations."

..

~.

...~

Yet, as

- 29
Dandr!~

makes clear, these blemishes on the state's educational

offering are not alone enough to strike down a system fashioned out
of experience, practicality, and compromise.

Every school district in Texas derives its financial resourses apart from federal assistance 9 from two sources: ( 1( state aid
under the Minimum Foundation Program, and (2) revenues from
taxation of local property. On a statewide average approximately
46

half of the total revenues comes from each source.

The state's

contribution is designed to provide floor or foundation that assures

47
a minJA:num educational offering in every school district.

Allocations

/

I

fror,il this fund are geared to assuring the existence of one teacher
;'

~6r every 25 student~

48

one "special service" teacher for each 20

/

I
I

I

I

- 49
teachers (behavior, nurse, doctor, etc.),

/

principal
and one p:iiducqdle per

50

20 teacpers.

state law also provides for vocational teachers,

51
couns,elors, and specialist teachers,

additional funds are earmarked
52

for operating expenses and student transportation.
I

The state
53

r1rovtdes also for free textbooks for all public school children.
It •*lila•« monitors educational throughout the state, by, among other

..

i

.
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54
means, establishing teacher qualification standards and school
55

accreditation.
The amount of state aid has increased steadily since the
programs inauguaration, and if the increases reflected in the Fund's
allotment for the Edgewood Independent School District are indicative
I

of a statewide trend, the increments have been substantiali:. Figures
in the .rrecord show that the state F\md contributed $222 per pupil for
the I j967-68 school year but that by the 1970-71 year the Fund
C1ontribution

was $3!56 per pupil. In just three years the state aid

I
/ had risen 62%. Indeed, state aid alone in 1970 exactly equalled
/

I

Edgewood's total expenditures from state, local and federal sources
combt/ned in 1967.
I

j

I

In its dual reliance on state and local funding, Texas' system
'

of1
'

schbol finance is comparable with its counterparts 1n virtually
i

56

every other state.
I

I

The "foundation grant" theory upon which the

/

I
/I

TeXas sytem is based is the product of the pioneering reform in
/

/

IJ'ublie education occasioned by the work George D. strayer and

/

1

,,

I

II
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Babetk Robert M. Haig in the 1920's.

Their efforst were aimed at

providing a system Xlfx for financing4JCiljJB:: public education that would
guarantee a minimum education throughout the state W. thout sacrificing
local controlof the institution. The 1t1a;t Strayer-Haig thesis, as
embodied in the present Texas system, may be best understood as
an imperfect attempt to accommodate two competing forces. Professor
Coleman has articulated the tension underlying the dual finance

sche~

in this country:
"The :btalli: history of education since the industrial \
revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: ,
the desire by members of society to have educational
\
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family
to provide the best education it can afford for its own child•• ,58
I~ ocal

control of public education has long been a cherished

1ntere;st of political sul:Miivisions within the states. Appellees do not
I

qur1stion the legitimacy of the state's interest in "subsidiarity," as
I

59

it is labelled.

Quite to the contrary, they applaud the preference

for local decisionmaldng with respect to all aspects of the educational
environment. The intensely personal attachment to government.ic
at the lowest levels: reflects the belief that innovation, experimentation,

•
1

<.

I
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and interdistrict ••'P"MMiraax competition are desirable and are
maximized as local independence increases.
Despite their expressed preference for local control appellees
c hallenge the Texas system. They argue persuasivelyk that for the
districts with the least amount of taxable wealth local option is
meaningless. No matter how much the district's residents value
education their relative property-poverty precludes significantly greater
expenditures. Appellees contend that any number of alternative
'\

systems might be derived that would prese;\ve or even Ilk enhance
local autonomy while
not

de~ide,

\
••'P• improving educ~tional
offerings.

We need

however, whether in factiJebl!X better systems could be

i

I

devts£~d

rejetbt

'

- although we concede that t bey might. Nor do we need to

appellee~

contentions that locaH control is not uniformly and

!

. \

ecvdlally available to teach of Text.ts' t,· 200 school districts. state
1·~~s are not irrational or arbVtra:rcy r,dm:ply

b~cause they only imperfectly

I

I

.

,,

\
f!ffectuate the state's good. .~Atndridg~. .\V. ::&~ WilJMms, supra.
./

A system of compromise7 , loetween state

I

'·'

I

subv,~ntion

'

~·

...~.

\

and subsidiarity
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does not fail to withstand judicial scrutiny under traditional approaches
because it is not narrowly "tailored" to at satisfy the state's interests
or because the state has failed to select the "least drastic means"
60
cl. promoting legitimate goals.

ThM"e are the progeny of the more

searching compelling state interest test, and it is precisely such
differences that lend substance to the

•'"'*'KilliJX ------

Appellees argue that Texas' system 1s irrational and arbitrary
for yet another reason. They point out that the amount of available
taxable property in any geogra.phical subdivision 1s a matter of almost
I

pur~

h'ppenstance. District lines are often products of historical
I

aclciden·~s
I

'

I

which have little or nothing to do with providing a educational

r,Ssoutces. To a significant degree per pupil property values depend
,I

/

on t~e local of commercial and industrial property. It is often this
I

I

I

/

f·~tor,

more than differences in the value of residential property, whlch

I I
;' I

/ alccounts
for the great disparities in assessable wealth. Appellees
,,

'
I

I argue that it is entirely irrational to allow expenditure levels to turn

1

!

on sucJh. coincidences.
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State dedication of local property revenue resources to the
localities to pay for local programs is aa old as the institution of
state governments in this

•••k country and this Court has always

exhib~ed a wise reluctance to impinge upon a State's selection from
among local taxation alternatives. If local taxation and local
expenditure are

cr;

irrational for purposes of funding education this

alternative is equally impermissible as a source of revenues :fa for
local police and fire protection or for local hospitals or any other
programs historically funded out of property taxes.

w~

are unwilling

to take away from the states the prerogative of turning this source
of public funds over to its political subdivisions for their local needs.
In

sum, we are unable to ascertain any serious basis for the

conclusion drawn by the District Court that the Texas educational
finance s¢heme violates the Equal Protection Clause. In so holding
this CrLJu.rt has not at all succumbed to an obfuscating tyranny of
lab',els. OUr analysti!:J d does not nan rest on the mere wooden
application of artificial categories. Rather our adherence to the
now conventtnnallanguage of equal protection ("suspect" category,
•'

'.
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"fundamental" right, "compelling" interest, "rational" basis)
reflects an appreciation of the constitutional philosophy underlying
the 14th Amendment. The crux of that philosopl'fl is that, except
1n the cases where state laws trench upon the rights of insular

minorities or intrude upon the exercise of fundamental rights, state
judgments are entitled to respect and we will decline to replace
state choices withour own views of wise policy absent a finding that
the state has acted in some unsupportably irrational manner. These
teachings of a century of experience with the equal protection cd.ause
demonstrate that restraint is nowhere more appropriate than in
scrutinizing a state's ecooomic and social programs. There can be
no more intractable and complex area of state decisionmaking than
public education and we do well to leave such matters to
political processes.

I

I

f

(

-------
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v
The District Court opinion and its California predecessor,
Serrano v. Priest, 5 CaL 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 ( !971), have been
widely and enthusiastically received as providing, finally, a workable
solution to the seemingly insoluable technical and political problems
that have impeded state legislative reform of the inequities of public

61
school finance.

These decisions have been variously hailed as

the "answer" to removing the intractable roadblocks to educating
62

the poor and the racial minorities.

They have been received as

providblg the ultimate solution, as well, for the urban crisis in · \,

\\

63

education.

\

Indeed, in their enthusiasm for the result, the recent

proponents of "fiscal neutrality" have givenit much more credit than
64

its architects have ever claimed.
The truth is, as inceeasingly more commentators are coming
to recognize, Bib: eradication of the property-tax basis and
implementation of "fiscally neutral" alternatives would have highly

\\

I'
I

'

I

'

I

questionable consequences. Detailed empirical studies have

\
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demonstrated there is no dependable correlation between the location
65

of impoverished families and the presence of inferior schools.
Nor is there any more than a random chance that racial minorities
will be clustered in school districts that are short-changed in terms
66

of assessable property.

Moreover, there is no reason to suspect -

and some reason to fear - that any alternative form of financing is
likely to increase the flow of educationalimputs into our urban case
67

areas.

Under such uncertain circurrs tances, if this Court sat as

a policy tribunal, we might doubt the ultimate efficacy of the attractive
egalitarian concept this case offers.
The clear limitations on this Court's constitutional function
I

rest~in us from embarking upon ahy such political or philosophical

I

\

un~rtaking. That role is preserved for Congress and for the state
legts~~tive

bodies and we do not violence to the values of federalism

I

,

and separation of powers by slaying our hand. So long as this Court's

i/

I

/ action today
is not viewed as placing its judicial impramatur on
I
.
"I

/'
/
I

rl

on thE~ status quo - so long as the lawmarkers and those who select

..
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them do not embrace our holding as an endowment of an educational
68

system in need of reform- we "nine old friends of the children"
can do nothing more for this "constituency" than to turn these important
and difficult issues over to those more suited to the MDa: thorough
and gbaK vigorous undertaking demanded if the American educatioo.al
system is to liiiiD:iw. retain its vitality.
,

I

I

I
,(

I
I

I

\

\

'I
1\

,.

I

Rough Draft

LAH/pls

12/8/72

No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.

This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing public education, was initiated by Mexican-American parents mose children
attend the elementary and secondard schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.

1

They sued on their own behalf and on behalf of school children throughout the state who are members of minority groups or who are poor
and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named
2

as defendants were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San
Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case was filed in the summer of 1968
and a three-judge court was ·impaneled in January, 1969. 3 In December,
1971 4 the panel rendered its judgment in a pexj:uriam opinion holding
the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenthe Amendment. 5 The state appealed

-2and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented.

u.s.

(1972). For the reasons

stated in this opinion we reverse the decision of the District Court.

I

The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry
into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of
free schools. 6 Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach
toward the financing of those schools, relying on mutual participation
by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the State
Constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school
districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of
local taxpayers, for the "erection of school buildings" and for the
"further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds
as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds.

8

9
The Permanent School Fund, established in 1854, was endowed with
millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source
of income for school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which re-

'!",:
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ceived income from the Permanent Fund as well as from State
property taxes, served as the disbursing arm for most state
educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this
Century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in State property taxes
was used to finance a program provkling free textbooks throughout
the State •11
In the early years of Texas statehood this dual finance

structure, not unlike the system employed in most other states,
could serve adequately the State's educational requirements. Until
recent times Texas was a predominantly rural state and its population and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the
state.

12

Sizable differences in the value of assessable property be-

tween local school districts became more evident, however, as the
State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced. 13 The location of commercial and
industrial property began to play a more significant role in determining
a school district's resources for financing education. These growing
disparities in population and taxable property between school districts

-4-

were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in
levels of local expenditure for eduation • 14
At the same time, it was becoming more apparent to those
concerned with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient fully to ameliorate
these disparities •15 Prior to 1939 the Available School Fund contribUed money to every school district at a rate of $17. 50 per schoolage child. 16 Although the amount was increased several times in
the early 1940's, 17 by 1946 the Fund was providing only $46 per student. 18
Recognizing the need to provide increased State funding to help
offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educational needs, the State Legislatiare in the late 1940's undertook a close
evaluation of public education in Texas with an eye toward major reform.
In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators,

was appointed to explore alternative systems in other states and to
propose a State fundilg scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child in the state and that would help
overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's

-5efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer:.. Aiken bills, named for the
Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 19 It is this Program that accounts today for
approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. 20
The Program calls for b

State and local contributions to a

fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses,
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general
revenues, finances approximately 80 per cent of the Program and the
school districts are responsible - as a unit - for providing the remaining 20 per cent. The districts' share -known as the Local Fund
Assignment- is apportioned among the school districts pursuant to
a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability.
The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant
to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative
value of each county's contribution to the state's total income from
manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers
each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and,
to a lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property in

..

,.~

-6the State.

21

Each county's assignment is then divided among its

school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable
property within the county. 22 Each district then finances its share
of the Assignment out of its local property tax assessment.
The design of this cbmplex formulation was two-fold. First,
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have

an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts
by placing the heaviest burdens on those districts most capable of
paying. Second, it was the desire of the Program's architects to
establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children22a but that
would not by itself exhaust any district's resources. 23 Today virtually
every school district does impose a local property tax from which it
derives locally expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary
to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since the Foundation Program went into operation

in 1949, expenditures for education - from State as well as local
sources - have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967 expenditures

-7-

increased by approximately 500 per cent.

24

In the last decade alone

the total public school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion25
and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 26 Minimum teacher salariesby far the largest single item in any school's budget- have increased
from $2, 400 to $6, 000 over the last 20 years.
In order to illustrate the manner in which this dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent to which,
despite Texas• impressive gains, substantial interdistrict disparities
persist, the plaintiff school district may be compared with another
more affluent district in San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent
School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in its 25
elementary and secondary schools. The district is situated in the corecity sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90 per cent of the stuI

de~t population is Mexican-American and over 6 per cent is Negro.

:;,;;~

'

.
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The average assessed property value per pupil is $5,960, the lowest
in the metropolitan area, and the median family income ($4, 686) is also
the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1. 05 per $100 of assessed
property- the highest in the metropblitan area- the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school year
above its Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program.
The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a State- local
total of $248. 27 Federal funds added another $108 for a grand total
of $356 per pupil.

28

Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, the most affluent
school district in san Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately
5, 000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantlt white,
having only 18 per cent Mexican-Americans and less than BBil 1 ~r cent
'

I

'

\

Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49, ~ ooo\
I'
\\ \
I

~

and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-68 the local tax rate
of $. 85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above \\ts

\

\

\
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contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225
provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558
per student. Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal
sources, Alamo Heights was able to spend $594.
Although the 1967-68 school year figures provide the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid,

29

more recent

partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing
State aid has been significant. For the 1970-71 school year the Foundation
School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per pupil. This constituted a 62 per cent increase over the three-year period since 1967-68.
Indeed, State aid alone ••••kbedequaled Edgewood's entire budgetfrom local, State, and federal sources -in 1967-68. While Alamo
Heights received a similar increase to $491 per pupil, these recent
figures indicate that the Local Fund Assignment, at least as to these
two districts, does reflect a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of each. Alamo Heights, because of its relative prop-

ert~ wealth,

was required to contribute out of its local property tax

I

1

Cf~llections
I

I

' I
\

I

~~

approximately $100 per pupil, or about • per cent of its
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Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46
per pupil, which is only about 2.4 per cent of its grant. 30
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail
in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State 31 still
exist. And it was these disparities, largely attributable to differences
in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation,
that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of
public school finance violated the equal protection clause. The
District Court held that the effect of the Texas SJstem was to discriminate on the basis of wealth - a "suspect" classification- in the
manner in which education, a "fundamental" interest, was provided
for its people. F. SUpp. at 2.__. Having found both factors present,
the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only
J

if 1the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling
I

I
I

I

I

'

I

I

Jt~te interest.

_!!!. at

• On this issue the court concluded that

./ '[D)ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state

/

interests ••• they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these

I

I

//,
I

'i
I

'

.

-11classifications." Id. at
Texas virtually concedes that its historically-rooted dual system
of financing public education could not withstand the close judicial
scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative
judgments that interfere with fundamental rights32 or that touch upon
suspect classifications. 33 If, as we have frequently held, close
scrutiny means that the state's system is not entitled to the usual
presumption of validity, that the state rather than the complainants
must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the state must
demonstrate that its educational system has been crafted with'precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives, and
that it has selected the "least drastic means" for effectuating its
objectives, 34 the Texas financing system .. and its counterparts in
virtually every other cte - will not pass muster •

'·

.'

-12The state has candidly admitted that "£tYo one familiar with the Texas
system would contend that it has yet achieved perfection. " 35 Yet in
spite of its concession that educational finance in Texas has "defects" 36
and "imperfections,"

37

the State defends the sy&em's rationality

and vigorously disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a
"reasonable basis. "
This, then, establishetl the framework for our analysis. We
must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education may be subjected to meticulous judie ial scrutiny. If so, the
judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. If not, Texas'
claimed rational basis must be considered. We now turn to the e:xamination of these two questions.

II

The District Court's opinion, which appears to regard each of
the essential elements of its judgment as conclusively established, fails
to reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed
by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. That court

)

..

..

t-.

what it regarded as ample precedential support for its conclusion
that strict judicial scrutiny was required. It relied on this Court's
decisions dealing with the indigent's right to equal treatment in the
criminal trial and appellate processes, 38 and on cases disapproving
wealth barriers imposed on the right to vote. 39 Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the
basis of wtMx wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling.
It then reasoned, based again on decisions of this Court affirming
the undeniable importance of education,

40

that there is a fundamental

right to education and that, absent some compelling state justification,
the Texas system could not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which is in every significant
as~ct

sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the mosiac of constitu-

/

I

tipnal analysis under the equal protection clause. Indeed, for the
I

l

I

/
,;several reasons that follow, we find in this case neither the suspect
I

I

I classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive.

The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court is

-14quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore
reviewed by this Court. Since all children in any given school district
reveive the same public education, irrespective of family wealth, the
District Court found the operative class to be all citizens in "poor
school districts." _ F . Supp. at _ _ • The State's dependence
on local property taxation to pay a portion of the total cost of education was found to impose a de facto discrimination against those school
districts that have, vis a vis other school districts, relatively less
property to tax per pupil to be educated. Because higher rates of
taxation failed to compensate for disparities in property value, the
class was found to be expending relatively less in its schools and,
therefore, providing a lower quality education for its children.
In one sense this discrimination is geographical rather than

financial. But the Court has never questioned the state's power to
draw reasonable distinctions between its political subdivisions.
McGowanv. Maryland, 366

u.s.

420,427 (1961); Balsburgv. Maryland,

346 U.s. 545 (1954). Recognizing the force of those cases, appellees
have focused instead on the individuals who reside in the relatively

~~

'· <
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disadvantaged districts. Yet the status of these individuals is
simply not comparable to the status of the individual complainants
who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws

as ~~

discriminatory against the poor.
In Griffin v. nunois, 351 U.s. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. California, 312

U.s. 353 (1963) and their progeny, the Court invalidated

state laws that denied a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents.
Similarly, Williams v, Ulinois, 399

u.s.

235 (1970) and Tate v. Short,

401 U.s. 395 (1971) struck down criminal penalties that subjected
indigents to

tn.tlgmut ~ :D:a

incarceration simply because they were

unable to pay fines. In each of those cases the Court was not dealing
with relative impecunity but with some level of absolute poverty,

b !.·,

1:

because11 their indigency, each •••aptw~ complainant f s

\

\

Those cases did not deal with the plight of those on whom state laws

\

)
I

impose a weighty but not insurmountable burden. It Bk is clear that
t

the mere fact that it may have been more difficult for one citizen
than another to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal

\

/

y
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~not alone have11 enough to compel judicial invalidation of those
barriers. The Court has never questioned that the nonindigent
citizen must pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have
never held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens created by
a system of absolute fines. In the instant case, appellees have
endeavored to show only that children from relatively poorer

41
biiif~ families
I

tend to reside in relatively poorer districts.

I

I
No ef1ort was made to prove, however, that the financing system

operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more clearly
definable class of indigents. Indeed, there is reason to suspect

,

that tbe poorest families may not be clustered in the poorest
distJtcts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in
fI

I

I

I

Connecticut concluded that "[t]t is clearly incorrect •.. to
c, tend that 'poor' live in 'poor' districts.

. . . Thus,

\
\

the major

I
i

I

fa tual assumption of Serrano--that the educational finance systerp
discriminates against the 'poor' --is simply false in Connecticut. "

42

I

I'

I

\

)
I \

;'t
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Defining "poor" faDiillili families as those below the Bureau of
43
the Census "poverty level, " the Connecticut study found, not
surprisingly, that the poor are clustered around commercial and
industrial areas--those same areas that provide the most lucrative

44
sourees of property tax income for school districts.
Thus, it must be recognized that we are asked in this case
to extend the Court's closest protection to a large and diverse class.
and, unlike our racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it
is not a class saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such

a position of political powerlessness, aa•JaotaoUJ or subjected
to such a history of unequal treatment as to deserve extraordinary
judicial protection from the majoritartan political Jill process. It
has never been the design of this Court to discredit state action
simply because in its effect its budens fall more heavily on those
of lower than--.average income.
Moreover, the nature of the injury sustained by the
disadvantaged class provides a second significant factor

;

'

•1 ~

••

'·

:....

.;
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differentiating the present case from its predecessors. In our
former cases an absolute inability to pay occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the benefit in question. Disparities in school
financing, however, has its impact along a continuum of educational
expenditures,

.!· ~·,

the relatively poorer districts in terms of

assessable property per pupil devote relatively less to education.

=~..vt

In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury waseftt - denial of

a transcript on appeal - and the remedy could be easUy and
effectively secured. What was required was some means of
assuring an "adequate appellate review. " 351 U.S. at 18. The
Court did not hold that lllinois was required to provide a full
stenographic transcript in every case: broad leeway was permitted
for the state to select its own means of meeting its constitutional
obligation. See, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 _U.s. _
Britt v. North Carolina, 40_U.S. _

i (1971)

(1971). Likewise, Douglas

~

v. Califomia, supra, sMle requiring counsel for indigents
perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained from

- 19-

mandating "absolute equality." 372 U.S. at 357. No attempt has
yet been made to guarantee that the poor receive the same high
45

quality of legal representation available to the wealthy.
Efforts to analogize to the remedies afforded in those eases
raise questions of considerable e omplexity where, as here, the
alleged deprivation is not absolute but is relative. Since "absolute
equality" is not required, must the existence of invidious discrimination
and the availability of relief depend on whether 'ixas is presently
providing through its dual financing system an ''adequate" educational
opportunity to children in the poorer districts? The founders of
the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that.
By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds,
the Texas Legislature hoped to "guarantee, for the welfare of the
state as a whole, that all people shall have t at least an adequate
program of:BCDC education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum
46

Foundation Program of Education.'"

Must we decide whether,

in fact, Texas has fulfilled its promise and that, as the state

'~o·"'.·

l.i(!,..
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repeatedly asserts in its briefs in this Court, ''the state has

47
assured every child in every school district an adequate education"?
There are, then, these two demonstrable differences between
the present case and those relied on by the District Court: (1) the
claimed disadvantaged class is significantly larger as well as more
ubiquitous and diverse; (2) the injury sustained is in no sense
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance
system might be hypothesized, however, tn which the analogy to the
wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If
elementary and secondary education were available by the State
only to those who are able to meet tuition assessed against each
pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of ''poor" people definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum who would be u absolutely precluded from receiving an adequate
education. That case presents a good deal more compelling set
of circumstances for

111 judicial

assistance than the case before

us today. Texas a has after all undertaken to do a good deal

...
u
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more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has
endeavored to provide some education for all children and has drawn
no explicit lines designed to separate out the poor for disfavored
treatment.
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding of

wealth discrimination alone has never been held to cmstitute a
sufficient basis for subjecting state legislation to rigorous judicial
48

scrutiny.

Before such close review is required, a state's laws

must be found to interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental"
right. And, it is this question whether education should be counted
among the small circle of rights that have heretofore been found
to be'!undamental" which has so consumed the courts and commentators
49
1n recent years.

(

...
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In ~!'~wn v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) a

unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhpas the most
important function of state and local governments." Id. at 493.
What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has
lost none of its vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic x••r....at responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. " ld.

This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the high 'Vdx: value
of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions
of Justice of this Court writing both before and after Brown was

-

decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40

-

Justice),

I

, - (Mr.
- u.S. - -

Chief

(Mr. Justice White) ( 1972); Abington School Dist.

v. Sehempp, 374
333

U.s.

U.s.

203 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of Education,

203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268

u.s.

510

(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate RR Co.
v. !'4assachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907).
Nothing this Court holds tooay in any way departs from
our historic dedication to public education. We find ourselves
in complete agreement with the coo.elusion of the three-judge panel
below that ''the grave significance of education both to the individual
50
and to our society" cannot be doubted.

But the importance of

a service performed by the state does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under
the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Harlan, long an opponent
of the

Court's~standards for approaching equal prctection

cases, admonished that "[v ]irtually every state statute affects
important rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 665, 661
(1969) (dissenting opinion). In his view, if the degree of scrutiny
of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of

-24-

the importance of the importance of the right affected, we would have
gone "far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Id.
Close examination of the Court's decisions, however, evidences a
consistent respect for the limitations on judicial power and for the
primacy of the legislature's function. Mr. Justice Stewart's
response in Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's charge of judicial legislation effectively exposes the narrow limits of the "fundamental rights"
aspect of the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection •••• '
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes,
as it must, an established constitutional right,
and gives to that right no less protection than
the Constitution itself demands." 394 U.S. at 642
(Emphasis from original.)
Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clur. In subjecting to close
judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a oneyear durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:

/

.-.

J

,.

"in moving from State to State .•• appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634 (Emphasis from original.)

-25-

The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of
constitutional significance, 51 and the Court's decision therefore did
not require an ad hoc balancing of the relative importance of that
right.

52

Lindsey v. Normet, 40

U.s. _(1972), decided only

last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's clear view that social importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving
a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits
brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful
Detainer law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." Id. at
The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests wbich are of particular importance to the poor,"
I

such 1as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peace/

I

ful possession of one's home." Id. The Court's analysis is instructive:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
I

I

I

/I

'

..

''

-

-26any constitutional guarantee to access to dwellings
of a particular quality or any recognition of the
right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his
landlord beyond the term of the lease, without the
payment of rent. • • • Absent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition
of landlord-tenant relationships is a legislative not
a judicial function. 11 Id. a t _ . (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.s. 471 (1970),
the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration
of public welfare assistance . . . involves the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings, "

53

provided no basis for de-

parting from the settled mode of constitutional analyses of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social policy. As
in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to
the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to justify
its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v.
Hackney, 40

U.S. _(1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.

(1971).

The lesson of these cases for the question now before the Court
is plain. 'I'he key to discovering whether education is "fundamental"
is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance

I

1\
'

I

\

\

\

\
i'

'\

.

,

-27of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found
by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, the right to education is fundamental . Eisenstadt v . Baird ,
40

U.S._(l972);

54

Dunn v . Blumstein, 40

of the City of Chicago, 40
316

u.s.

535 (1942).

U. S._(l972);

56

U.S._(l972); 55

Skinner v. Oklahoma ,

57

Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would
not alone cause the Court to depart from the usual standard of reviewing a state's J3ocial and economic legislation, appellees contend that
education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other

I

rights accorded protection;under the Constitution. Specifically, they

I

insist that education is a, fundamental personal right because it is

I

)

essential to effective erercJse of First Amendment freedoms and to

/

/

intelligent utilization of tJae right to vote . In asserting a nexus between
I

'I

speech and education, f:tl>pellees urge that the right to speak is mean-

I

....

'
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ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, the
corollary right to receive information58 becomes little more than
a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read,
assimilate and utili~e available knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the
right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. 'rhe electoral
process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on
an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately
developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has
long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental
interference for the individual's constitutimal rights to speak and to
vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech

-29-

or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable
goals of a system of freedom of expeession and of a representative
form of ·government is not to be doubted.

59

These are indeed goals

to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from
governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented
by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
In any event, to whatever extent a nexus exists between educa-

tion and speech and between education and exercise of the franchise,
it must be entirely clear that the Constitution stops well short of requiring the states to impose standards of uniform equality with respect
to the exercise of those personal rights. Even if it were conceded that
soJe quantum of education is a constitutionally protected peerequisite
(

7the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no Indication that
11

~e ,present

,

levels of educational expenditure in Texas fall short. What-

I

/ eyer merit appellees' argument might have if a state's financing system
I

I

I

occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its

I

I

I

children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference

,!

/

I

I

I,

I

I

,I
I

I

with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending
(

I

!
I
I

I

'

.
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levels are involved and where -as is true in the present case - no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal tools necessary
for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of participation in the
political process.

60

We have carefully surveyed each of the arguments supportive
of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right
and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present conteat.
Even a contrary conclusion, however, would not compel this Court
to subject the Texas public school finance system to searching judicial
scrutiny. For in one most basic sense, the present case is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied
close scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon fundamental
\

rights. Each of our prllor cases Involved legislation which "de~ve9,"
"infringed," or "interferred'' with the free exercise of some func. amental
personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942;

-

'

I

39 1./

(,I!

\

;.,

Shapiro v. Thompson, -9M' U.s. Bill; 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumst~'in, \

&Z-'ca.V
40 --+-U.S. _

1\

, _ _(197 2) • The c iPitieal dis tine tion between th~~se

'

\

\

\

\,,

(\

\

II

\

\

-31cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to
do with respect to education. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court in Katzenback v. Morgan , 384 U.s. 641 (1966), expresses well
the salient point:

61

"This is not a complaint that Congress ••. has unO
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right
to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected[to
others similarly situatedJ ••••
"(The federal law in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied
it by state law. • • . We need decide only whether
the challenged limitation on the relief effected
••• was permissible. In deciding that •estion,
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights
••• is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged
by appellees is presented only as a limitation on
a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing
barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather,
in deciding the constitutional propriety of the
limitations in such a reform measure we are guided
by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not
invalid under the Constitution because it might
have gone farther than it did,' ••• that a legislature
need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' and
that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind •••. '' Id. at
656-57 (Emphasis from original.)

Fairly viewed, the Texas system of finance touches on "fundamental
rights" in much the same manner as the federal legislation in
Katzenbach affedted the right to vote. Every step leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes today - including the decisions

-32permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aid ... was implemented in an effort to
extend public education and to improve its quality.

62

Of course,

every teff)f)m that benefits some more than others may be dondemned
for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and,
therefore, is entitled to be scrutinized under judicial principles
more sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts.

c
It should be abundantly clear, for the several reasons stated

above, that this is an inappropriate case in which to subject state
action to the sort of searching scrutiny reserved for laws that involve
suspect classifications or fundamental interests. To focus exclusively
upon the inappropriateness of the compelling interest test, however,
is to disregard an even more important coosideration in the case

now before us. As Katzenbach suggests, in several significant
respects the present case is a classic one in which to rely on the

.,.}!·.•

- 33traditional rational basis approach. The reasoning underlying
this judgment, which finds deep roots in a century of Supreme
Court adjudication under the equal protection clause, deserves
recitation here.
This case represents more than a challenge of the manner
in which Texas provides for the education of its childrm . In a

fundamental sense, it is a direct k attack on the way in which
Texas has chosen to raise and disburse revenues. It condemns
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the
power to tax local property to supply revenues for loeal interests.
In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area

63

in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsbn v. J. C.

Pen~,

311 U.s. 435 (1940), against overzealous interference with the
state's fiscal policies is worth repeating:
"ft lbe responsibility for devising just and productive
sources of revenue challenges the wits of legislatures.
Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to •..
inject themselves in a merely negative way into the
delicate processes of fiscal policy-making." Id. at
445.

I

/

/

\'

.. 34The Justices a of the Court lack both the technical expertise and
the familiarity with local problems necessary if effective legislation is to be promulgated affecting the acquisition and disposition
of public revenues. Yet we are urged to order the states either
to alter drastically the present system or to tax throw the
property tax out altogether in favor of some other form of taxation.
Are we to counsel the States that an income or sales tax would
prove

~es_!.

discriminatory against the relatively kJqln

impecunious.: elements of society?
Coupled with the inherent complexity of matters involving
state taxation, the present case touches as well on inevitable and
perplexing problems encountered Jilin the effect to provide this
most important social benefit to all people in the State. Education,
even more than public

B

welfare assistance programs, presents

a myriad of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical
problems." DandridS! v. Williams, 397 U.S. 487. The very
complexity of the problems of educational finance suggest that

\
\

\
I

.. -

....

I
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"there will be more than one constituionally permissible method
of solving them," and that, within the limits of rationality, "the
legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled
to respect. .refferson v. !faclmey, 40_ U. S.

I

1972). On even

the most basic questions in this area the researchers and
educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the hottest
sources of controversy concerns whether there is any demonstrable
correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of

64
education - an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this
case. Related to the questioned relationship between the cost and
quality t of education, is the equally unsettled controversy regarding

64a
the proper goals of a system of public education.

Neither question

is amenable to ultimate resolution through the judicial process,

yet any decision that departs from the status quo must inevitably
have a great impact on those problems.
Finally, it must be remembered that every case arising
under the equal protection clause a has implications for the
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relationship between national and state power under our federal
system. Questions of federalism are inherent in and indeed
lie at the basis of the judgment, compelled by the equal protection
clause, whether a state's laws are to be subjected to meticulous
judicial examination. In reaching that judgment we also decide whether
the state's judgment is entitled to deference and whether it oa the
complaining party must bear the burden of justification. While
"[t ]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost
consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
65

which this Court examines state action,

it would be difficult

to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
....a:»d federal system than the one now before us, which threatens

to abrogate the systems of public education presently in existence
in virtually every state.
These considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas'
system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for
close judicial scrutiny. Inevitably, these same considerations

I

~,;•

'.
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must also affect our evaluation of whether such discriminations
as result from that system may be said to be supported by a
reasonable or rational basis. And, it is to that question that
we must now turn our attention.

- 38-

m
The contours of the Texas school finance system have been
traced at the outset of this opinion. Apart from federal assistance,
each school receives its funds from the state and from its local
school district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
66

amount of funds is derived from each source.

The state's

contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed
to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school
in the state. Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one
teacher -compensated at the state-supported minimum salary- for
67

every 25 students.

Each school district's other supportive
68

personnel are provided for: one principal for every 20 teachers;
one "special service" teacher - librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. - for
69

every 20 teachers;

vocational instructors, conselors, and
170

educators for exceptional children are also provided.

Additional

funds are earmarked for current operating expenses and for student

71
transportation.

72
The state t also provides free textbooks.

\
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The program is administered by the Texas Education Agency,
73

which also has responsibility for school accreditation and for

74
monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.

As

reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood
75

School District over the last three years,

the State's financial

contribution to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas'
school districts, however, has been content to rely, alone, on
funds from the Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund Assignment,
every district must pose an

·' 4

• • • • •• •

••

ad valorem tax on property

located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was designed
to remain sufficiently low, however, to assure that each district
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational
76
program.
this manner.

Every district supplements its foundation grant in
For some districts the local property tax contribution

is insubstantial, as, for instance, in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. For other districts the local share
may far exceed JBliJ!Il" even the total Foundation grant. In part
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local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category
1177

of property exceeds its assessed value.

The greatest inter-

district disparities, however, are attributed to differences in the
amount of assessable prq>erty available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, are
more capable of raising money for their schools. In large measure,
these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher teacher
salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing
ailt»:.D attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower

78

pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.
This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance structure.
Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by
disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children
in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious
discrimination. The District Court found that the state had failed
''to establish a reasonable basis for these classification."
F. Supp. at

We disagree.

- 41 The texas system is comparable to the systems employed
79

in virtually every other state in its reliance on state as well as
local resources. The power to tax local property for educational
80

purposes has been recognized in Texas at least since 1883.

It

has long provided the means to assure that education is controlled
I
I

at the local level. When shifts in the distribution of :2ppt population,
ace ompanted by changes in local property wealth occasioned by
the growth of commercial and industrial centers, began to create
disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling
for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas educators
based the Gilmer-Aiken btlls, was a product of the pioneering work
11: of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George

81
D. strayer and Robert M. Haig.

Their efforts were devoted to

establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educat tonal program without sacrificing local coo.trol. The Strayer-Haig
thesis represented an accommodation between these two competing
forces. As articulated by Professor Coleman:

\

i
I

.....
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"The history of education since the industrial
revolution shows a c ootinual struggle between two
forces: the desire by members of society to have
educational opportunity for all children, and the
desire of each family to pr~V'ide the best education
it can affDrd for its child. " 2
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring a basic
education for every child in the state, it permits and encourages
control of each district's school at the local level. In an era that
has witnessed a c ens is tent

D

trend toward centralization of the

functions of government, local control of public education has
survived. The persistence of this attachment to government at the
lowest level where education is concerned reflects the depth of
commitment of its supporters. In part, local control means, as
Professor Coleman suggests, the freedom to dedicate more money
to the education of one's child. Equally important, however, is the
opportunity it offers for participation in the decision-making process
that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism
is likely to encourage experimentation, lnnvocation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-state
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relationship in our federal system seems tmiquely appropriate.
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as ooe of the peculiar strengths
of our form of government each state's freedom to "serve as a
83

laboratory ••. and try novel social and economic experiments."
No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public
84

education.
Appellees do not question the validity of Texas' dedication
to local control of education. Rather, they attack the school
financing system on the ground that it debases the cooeept of
local control because it does not provide tbe same fiscal flexibility
to poor districts as it accords the rich. It is certainly true that
reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides
less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some
Jib districts than for others. Local control, however, connotes

more than the power to make an autonomous decision on how much
to spend. It also contemplates freedom to decide how available

- 44funds will be allocated. Moreover, the Aatles State's sytem may
not be found irrational or baseless because, in practice, it results
in "some inequality. " McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.s. 420, 425·26
(1961). It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the state's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at
485. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to which
Texas' system is entitled, Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to remember that at every
stage of its development it has constituted a "rough accommodation"
of interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.

Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228

u.s.

61, 69-70 (1913).

Appellees urge that, apart from the questions regarding
1ocal control, the Texas system of financing education is unconstitutionally
arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources
to turn on happenstance and fortuity. They contend that no justification
can be offered for a system that allows the quality of education to
fiuctuate on the basis of the historical accidents and coincidences
that often account for the positioning of the :b:xa:iidllpx "'"boundary
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lines of political subdivisions and for the location of valuable
commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of local
taxation -indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental
units - requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that
are inevitably arbitrary. Equally inevitably, it would seems, some
localities are going to be blessed withm more taxable assets. Nor
is local wealth a static quantity.

Are boundary lines to be redrawn

with every shift in population or with every discovery of valuable
minerals or with the completion of every new industrial park?
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional
method of providing for education then it must be Jllll(ik equally
impermissible in providing every other service currently financed
from local:poproperty taxes, including local police and fire
protection, public hospitals and water treatment facilities. We
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of property
taxation as is suggested by appellees' contentions.

'

,

.. ' .....,,

•

.. 46In sum, insofar as the Texas system of school finance may

be said to work a discrimination on any class of children in the

State,. we find ilbat discrimination to be the product of a system that
is reasonably and rationally based. Its shortcomings are well known

and Texas has made no effort to minimize their existence here.
The State has persistently endeavored, however, to compensate
for the failings of its system. And we are unable to say, given the
complexity of this most significant state function, that Texas'
judgments in this area are not entitled to respect.

..
-47IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on the

District Court opinion in this ease and on its California predecessor,
~errano

v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary

postscript seems appropriate. These decisions have been widely
and enthusiastically hailed as providing, finally, a workable
solution to the seemingly insoluble technical and policial problems
that have impeded state legislative reform. These decisions have
been various touted as the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to
augmenting the education offered the poor and the racial minorities.
They have been received as providing the ultimate solution, as well,
for the urban crisis 1n education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for
the result, the recent proponents of "fiscal neutrality" have given
85
it much more credit than its architects have ever claimed.

The truth is, as increasingly more commentators are
coming to recognize, eradication of the property-tax basis and
implementation of "fiscally neutral" alternatives would have highly
questionable consequences. At least one detailed empirical adxlpt

..'
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study has ec demonstrated that thereis no dependable correlation
between the location of impoverished families and the presence

86
of inferior schools.

Nor is there at this time any more than a

random chance that racial minorities will be clustered in school
87

districts that are short-changed in terms of assessable property.
Moreover, there is no reason to suspect -and some reason to fear ..
that any alternative form of financing is likely to increase the now
88
of educational imputs into our urban core areas.

Under such

uncertain circumstances, if this Court sat as a policy tribunal,
we might doubt the ultimate efficacy of the attractive egalitarian
concept this case offers.
The clear limitations on this Court's constitutional :laDt
function restrain us from embarking upon a11J any such political
or philosophical undertaking. That role is reserved for Congress
and for the state legislative bodies and we do no violence to the
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
So long as this Court's action today is net viewed as placing its
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judicial impramatur on the status quo - so long as the lawmakers
and those who select them do not embrace our holding as an
endorsement of an educational system in need of reform- we
89

"none old friends of the children" can do nothing more for this
"constituency" than to defer to those more suited to the thorough
and vigorous undertaking demanded if the American educational
system is to retain its vitality.

Reversed.
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San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.

This suit , attacking the Texas system of financing public education, was initiated by Mexican-American parents mose children
attend the elementary and

secondar~ schools in the

Edgewood Indepen-

dent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.
They

1

~ L:r&-~CU:.~
·.
their own behalf a:c.d on behalf of school children through-

out the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor
and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named
2
as defendants were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San
Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case was filed in the summer of 1968

and a three-judge court was impaneled in Januart
1971

4

the panel rendered its judgment in a

1969.

3

In December

f:_

~-_riam opinion holding

k :
the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenthp Amendment.

5 The State appealed
)

"

.

-2and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented.

1_

U.S. ~{1972). For the reasons

stated in this opinion we reverse the decision of the District Court.

I

The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry
into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of
free schools. 6 Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach
to~

the financing of

i+.s

thos ~

schools, relying on mutual participation

by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the~ate
Constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school
districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of
local

taxpayers~or

the "erection of school buildings" and for the

"further maintenance of public free schools." 7

Such local funds

as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds.
The Permanent School Fund, established in 1854,

9

8

was endowed with

millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source
of income for school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which re-

-3ceived income from the Permanent Fund as well as from State
property taxes, served as the disbursing arm for most State
educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this
Century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in State property taxes
was used to finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State. ll
1iltheearly years of Texas statehood this dual finance

s 7 e, not unlike the system e ployed i
could serve adequately the State's educational requirements. Until
recent times Texas was a predominantly rural state and its population and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the
State.

12

Sizable differences in the value of assessable property be'
I
/~~
tween local school districts became"~ evident;Jk~ as the
State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced. 13 The location of commercial and
industrial property began to play a
~

MS! e

significant role in determining
/J

h~ OhKIN.~'- (~A~ w~ h ~

I •

..J,..;:_J.

~·

;~ o<>hael disl•iol' • resouro"t fep fiRft...,iBg ellaeatief\, These growing

disparities in population and taxable property between ..iGR:e~ districts

.,

-4-

were responsible in part for inc rea singly notable differences in
levels of local expenditure for educaion. 14

1/-

q--

Ld..q ~
~
At the same time, it was "QecQrning moPe apparent to those
A

concerned with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient ~ to ameliorate
these disparities . 15 Prior to 1939 the Available School Fund contribtied money to every school district at a rate of $17. 50 per schoolage child. 16 Although the amount was increased several times in

Recognizing the

need ~creased State funding to help
.1\

offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educa..

~"

tiona~ :Ae6Q.S,

the( tate

evaluation of public

+ho~ov~h

egislature in the late 1940's undertook a .elost

education~ with an eye toward major reform.

In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators,

was appointed to explore alternative systems in other ¥iates and to
propose a State funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child ~ and that would help
overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's

-5efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the
Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 19 It is this Program that accounts today for
approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. 20
The Program calls for :b: dtate and local contributions to a
fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses,
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general
revenues, finances approximately 80 per cent of the Program and the
school districts are responsible - as a unit - for providing the remaining 20 per cent. The districts' share - known as the Local Fund
Assignment - is apportioned among the school districts pursuant to
a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability.
The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant
to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative
value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from
manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers
each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and,
to a lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property in

-6-

the State.

21

Each county's assignment is then divided among its

school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable

Tlu-

property within the county. 22 Eaeh district then finances its share
1-ev~vc. ~

~r(FW\/

·

of the Assignment out of ~local property -tax a&ilessmeath ttL. 'lC d.J h

1M·

The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. First,
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have
an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts

&

by placing the heaviest burdenf on tftese<"\d istricts most capable of
paying. Second , it v;as the desiPe of the Program's

archite~
"

establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
;l3

district to contribute to the education of its children~ but that
l~

would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.~ Today virtually
every school district does impose a

~

property tax from which it

derives locally expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary
to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.

~

In the years since the F'otinda:tion j rogram went into operation

in 1949, expenditures for education - from itate as well as local
sources - have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967 expenditures

-7-

loS
increased by approximately 500 per cent •.2t In the last decade alone

t..'

the total public school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion~
and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
"L1

pupil expenditures throughout the State.~ Minimum teacher salariesby far the largest single item in any school's budget -have increased

.' -;.t.,
from $2, 400 to $6 , 000 over the last 20 years.

To illustrate the

in Of'd:e-r

V

manner in which this dual system of

school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent to which ,.-{
despite Texas' impressive gains substantial interdistrict disparities
persist ,the plaintiff school district may be compared with another
more affluent district in San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent
School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22, 000 students are enrolled in its 25
elementary and secondary schools. The district is situated in the corecity sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90 per cent of the student population is Mexican-American and over 6 per cent is Negro.

-8-

--

The average assessed property value per pupil is $5, 960 ~ the lowest
in the metropolitan areai and the median family income ($4' 686) is also
the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed
property - the highest in the metropolitan area - the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19,6 7-68 school year
above its Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program.
The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a State- loca
~~

I

total of $248. ~ Federal funds added another $108 for a ~total

.

30

of $356 per

pupil.~

Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, the most affluent
school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately
5, 000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike

the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly white,
having only 18 per cent Mexican-Americans and less than mm 1 per cent
Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49,000
and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-68 the local tax rate

I'

of $. 85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above its
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contribution to the Foundation Program.

Coupled with the $225

provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558
per student.

Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal

sources, Alamo Heights was able to spend $594pvt- ~ ..
Although the 1967/)68 school year figures provide the only

I~

~

complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid,

more

recent partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend
of increasing_Jfate aid has been significant.

For the 1970-71 school

year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was

~

$356 per pupil.

This constituted a 62 ~increase over the three-

year period since 1967-68.

Indeed, ,State aid alone in 1970-71

equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-68 school budget -from local,

/

ate and federal sources. Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar
increase under the Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil.
These recent figures also reveal the extent to which 9agb: •

,

'!!'

wt~u
+h l
these two Districtf'fo allot men Wilj funded from · own required

contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.

Alamo Heights,
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the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show
that it was premised upon some compelling state interest.

2g 2. -g'i.

~at

On this issue the court concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants

unable to demonstrate compelling state interests . . . they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.

II

Id. Aat

-----1'

zK~

--

Texas virtually concedes that its historically-rooted dual
system of financing public education could not withstand the close
judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriatex in reviewing
legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental
rights

~

or that involve suspect classifications.

~

If, as we have

frequently held, close scrutiny means that the state's sytem is not
entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the state rather
than the complainants must carry a "heavy burden of justification,"
that the State must demonstrate that its educational system has been
structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least drastic

J

~

means" for effectuating its objectives,

the Texas financing system -

and its counterparts in virtually llltdB every other
not pass muster. -

·,

~tate

,

-will

-12-

The State...Ms candidly admit&. that

"[riJo one familiar with the Texas

J$

system would contend that it has yet achieved

~~

perfection."~ ¥et ~
3

its concession that educational finance in Texas has "defects"

~·

.

and "imperfections, .,3'j the State defends the syltem's

ratio~'(~--

and v-igQFQYSly disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a
"reasonable basis."
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We
must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public edu-

'1--1~
cation .may be subjected to

~
metieul~

judicial scrutiny. If so, the

1\

~

judgment of the District Court "ffittat be affirmed. If not, Texas'
claimed rational basis must be considered.

II

The District Court's opinion r whlefl: appeaFs- to Fegaf'd each ef
the essefttial-e:lements of its--jl:lagmeftt--as ee-BClnsi't'ely

establi~

~~
.t9 reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed
A

by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.

~!:;~-

-J3W'ha:t it -Pcga rd.ed as ample p1 eeeEiential suppGrt fGr its oe-nc-lusion

~~

~~

Athat strict judicial scrutiny was required)

~ relied

on

tl:f=hMi-fii"
B =t0~e'l'l:l1:1t1'r'f!l£'~g

~ I~ hf ~ () .;. 11'1 ,;.
J +~
decisions dealing with theA:i.na:i~eat' s Pig~ to equal treatment in the
I

criminal trial and appellate processes, S and on cases disapproving

'1
wealth barriers imposed on the right to vote. 3fb Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the
basis of 1mX'iifx wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling.
It then reasoned,

based~

on decisions of this Court affirming

the undeniable importance of education, 4i that there is a fundamental
right to education and that, absent some compelling State justification,
the Texas system could not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which

w in euery significant

~~

Q

aspe~ generis, may be so neatly fitted into theAmosiac of constitutional analysis under the equal protection clause. Indeed, for the

-

several reasons that follow, we find Hi this easq_ neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive.

A
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court is

-14quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore
reviewed by this Court. Since all children in any given school district
receive the same public education, irrespective of family wealth, the
District Court found the operative class to be all citizens in "poor
school districts."

Z

] F. Supp. at

?-f2. .

The State's dependence

on local property taxation to pay a portion of the total cost of educa-

(~M,-tr;
tion was found

to~ fftP~

de facto discrimination against those school

districts that have, vis a vis other school districts, relatively less
property to tax per pupil to be edaea:teQ. l Because higher rates of
taxation failed to compensate for disparities in property value, the
class was found to be expending relatively less in its schools and,
therefore, providing a lower quality education for its children.
In one sense this discrimination is geographical rather than

financial. But the Court has never questioned the State's power to

......

~

~
~

~

draw reasonable distinctions between its political subdivisions.

~

.4~ . Q-~~..d-~~~~~) ~

J1 McGowan v. Maryland,

366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland,

346 U.S. 545 (1954). Recognizing the force of those cases, appellees
have focused instead on the individuals who reside in the relatively

-15-

~

iwtJ

'~ /lLA

disadvantaged districts. Ye~~he status of these individuals is

flu,._;fsimply not comparable to the status of the individual complainants
-"1

who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws as

~e

iwlideousl~

discriminatory against the poor.

1. InGriffinv. illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) andDouglasv. California, 372 U.S. 353

(1963~nd

their progeny, the Court invalidated

state laws that denied a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents.
Similarly, Williams v. illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)....and Tate v. Short,
~'

401 U.S. 395

(197l~truck

--

down criminal penalties that subjected

indigents to :indige=nts=t@:ima incarceration simply because they were
unable to pay fines.

In each of those cases the Court was not dealing

with relative impecunity but with some level of absolute poverty,
because;t.eir

indig~ncy,

each

totally unable to pay for the

!: ~·,

KE:qdmbo!so::sXoo~vxx complainant was

~state-proffered

benefit.

Those cases did not deal with the plight of those on whom state laws
impose a weighty but not insurmountable burden. !t Hk is elcaF t:ha.t

fue mere fact that it may have been more difficult for

one citizen

than another to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal

·

... ....

~one have~~gh
barriers.
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to compel judicial invalidation of those

The Court has never questioned that the nonindigent

citizen must pay for those benefits himself.

Likewise we have

never held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens created by
a system of absolute fines:f/:, the instant case, appellees have
endeavored to show only that children from relatively poorer
~families

tend to reside in relatively poorer districts.

~
~

No effort was made to prove, however, that the financing system
operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more clearly
~

definable class of indigents. Indeed, there is reason to -suspeet'

~~~
that the poorest familiesAmay not be clustered in the poorest

districts.

A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in

Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to
contend that 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano- -that the educational finance system
discriminates against the 'poor'- -is simply false in Connecticut. "

'I'

~
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Defining

"poor"~

families as those below the Bureau of

~

the Census "poverty level, "

the Connecticut study found, not

surprisingly, that the poor are clustered around commercial and
industrial areas - those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts.

"

4t,.

Thus, k we are asked in this case to extend for the first
time the Court's most exacting equal protection standard to a
larg)~

diverse

And, unlike racial

minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it is not a class saddled with

.

such disabilities, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness, or subjected to such a history of unequal treatment
as to command extraordinary judicial protection from the majoritarian
political process. It has never

been~ within

the con-

stitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify state action simply
because its burdens fall more heavily on those of lower than average
income.
2.

Moreover, the nature of the injury alleged by the

disadvantaged class provides another significant factor

J

-.l'l

differentiating the present case from those relied upon by the
District Court. The disadvantaged class identified by appellees in

the poorer districts in terms of assessable property per pupil tend
0

to dev4ite relatively less to education.

This difference poses

questions of considerable complexity in termsJ first J of determining

.;. ~~ J,·~ ~
whether equal protection has been denied and, second, of
and~

aseertai:ni~

and imposing an appropriate remedy.

In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury was apparent - denial

of a transcript on appeal - and the remedy could be easily and
effectively secured. What was required was some means of
assuring an "adequate appellate review." 351 U. %at 18.

The Court

did not hold that Illinois was required to provide a full stenographic
~~
transcript in every caseh. 8road leeway if} permitted for the State .S

,

to select

f.~

its own means of meeting~ constitutional obligation.

See, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 _!i u. S.

)J.l (197~Britt v.

North Carolina, 40l{ U. S. ~ __ ( 1971). And, where an "adequate
substitute, " Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969), is

-.-z,D

provided) the Court will approve its use.

_Se_e B_rr_·tt_v. North Carolina,

supra; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v.
Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). Likewise, in
Douglas v. California, supra, the Court, while requiring counsel
for indigents perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions,
refrained from mandating "absolute equality." 372 U. S'f'at 357.
No attempt

~

~quirement

has yet been made to guarantee as a constitutional

that all citizens, regardless of relative wealth,
~ ,.,

receive the same quality of legal representation.
In analogizing from those cases in which the deprivation
was absolute to the present case in which such deprivation as
exists is relative) must the threshold finding of unconstitutional
discrimination depend on whether Texas is presently providing
an "adequate"e education to children in poorer districts? The
,Founders of the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do
.~·

exactly that. By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and
operating funds, the Texas Legislature hoped to "guarantee,
for the welfare of the State as a whole, that all people shall have

,.,
- II> -

at least an adequate program of education.

This is what is meant

by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education' .
decide whether, in fact, Texas has fulfilled its promise and that,
as the State repeatedly asserts in its briefs in this Court, "the
state has assured every child in every school district an adequate
education''?
Even assuming that the Court possessed the tools and expertise
to conclude that the present system is inadequate, how are we to
implement the remedy? Appellees have steadfastly asserted that
they do not demand equal expenditures. Rather, they profess to
endorse almost any system of expenditures that is not limited by
the local district~ lack of relative taxable wealth. Yet any
alternative short of equal expenditures is bound to result, at least
occasionally, in lower expenditures in schools attended by children
of poorer families.

In each such case, our prior wealth discrimina-

tion cases would indicate that the Court must decide whether the
amount spent in the disadvantaged schools is sufficient to guarantee
those children as adequate an education as is afforded other

,.v

-etchildren in the State.

That is a function for which we are quite

obviously ill-equipped.
There are, then, these two demonstrable differences between
the present case and those relied on by the District Court: (1) the
claimed disadvantaged class is significantly larger as well as more
ubiquitous and diverse; and (2) the injury alleged is in no sense
an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance
system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the
wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If
elementary and secondary education were made available by the
State only to those who are able to pay a tuition assessed against
each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people -

to
definable in terms of their

o

inabilit~pay

the prescribed sum -

who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an adequate

education.

That case would present a far more compelling set

of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us
today.

After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good deal

\,.!1

-Itmore than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has
provided what it considers to be an adequate base education for
all children and has drawn no explicit lines designed to separate
out the poor for disfavored treatment.
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding of

wealth discrimination alone has never been held to constitute a
sufficient basis for subjecting state legislation to rigorous judicial

s

~

scrutiny.

:JD::bt Before such close review is required, a state's

laws must be found to interfere with the exercise of some
"fundamental" right. It is this question - whether education should

re counted among the small circle of rights that heretofore have
been found to be "fundamental" -which has so consumed the attention

4iJ S
of courts and commentators in recent years.

B

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483

(1954~

unanimous Court recognized that "education is per~s the most
~at

important function of state and local governments. "

'

493.

What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has
lost none of its vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic ~ responsibilit,ies, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal
terms . " ~
I../} 1/\ 0

vc..W-~

This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the high 'B value

of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions
of Justicf of this Court writing both before and after
1\

-

decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40
1~t-1.1.'1

Justice),

237
\Mr.
- j

~rown was
~~

-

U.S.

(A$ , 2 13 (:~.k. Chief

--

/\

Justice White)( 1972); Abington School Dist.

v. Sehempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

e..

(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate RR Co.
v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 ( 1907).

Jel.,o.c..+.s
Nothing this Court holds today in any way

our historic dedication to public education.

G9paP~

wp

from

.fJUFSe!ve:l}j

in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel
I

below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual
and to our society" cannot be doubted.
a service performed by the

~ate

~~~

But the importance of

does not determine whether it

:::::

must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under
the equal protection clause.

Mr. Justice Harlan

~~~

.lsa~ ill

'?fi'p?nspt

~ ~ ~· ~ef~~i:<J
M-Hte CtJilrt' S

~:idltit!Sfbl RWI ooehiot!j

R'f'O 1

pwtooOi•m

~~~~~~~~
~admonished that "[v ]irtually every state statute affects ..-,

important rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 665, 661

jvJ,·r.,a-1
(1969),~eHel!I8Bii.n~ 8fliRi9..

In his view, if the degree ofJscrutiny

of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of

t
"

t-K...~'-44

the importance

~-~~'*iliiilii~QQ.

of the Figh-t affected, we would have

"
~ (Close examination of the Court's decisions, however, evidences a

~

__fLJj_ \._
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~

We would indeed be assu

ming a legislative role and one for which

"

t
But Mr. Justice
the Court lacks both authority and compe ency.
.

Stewart's response m
c

conern corre

~;ax
~

Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's

·
. ·t f the "fundamental
ctly articulates the narrow hmi s o

"

.
1 f the Court's equal protection decisions:
rights" rahona e o

::nmp1y recognizes,
as it must, an established constitutional right,
and gives to that right no less protection than
the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S ~ at 642
(Emphasis from original . )
___ ___ J ,

..uc

'-'uu.n.

Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to close
judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a oneyear durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634 (Emphasis from original.)

The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of

s
constitutional significance, 5-

and the Court's decision therefore did

not require an ad hoc balancing of the relative importance of that

right. ~ ~
Lindsey v. Normet, 40

~ U.S. S ~ (1972) , decided only

last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's

~view

that social im-

portance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving
a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits
brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful
Detainer law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."

Id ~t

73.

The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are of particular importance to the poor,"
such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home."

~Jbe

Court's analysis is instructive:

(ir
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe ,
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedie$ for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document

any constitutional guarantee to access to dwellings
of a particular quality or any recognition of the
right of a tenant to occupy th~ real property of his
landlord beyond the term of ~ lease, without the
payment of rent. . . . Absent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition
(}A.[J...
of landlord-tenant relationships Ht-ft. legislativ~ not
ft judie ia) func tim.P. '' ~at
(Emphasis supplied. )

.1!t.

Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970),
the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration
of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings, "

'5I

provided no basis for deI

parting from the settled mode of constitutional

analys~s

of legislative

classifications involving questions of economic and social policy. As
in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to
the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to justify
its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v.
Hackney, 40

12._U.S. L

1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.

7~

(1971).

~~
The lesson of these cases fei> the question now before the Court
I\

is plain. The key to discovering whether education is "fundamental"
is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance

-·-""
-v1

of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found
by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, the right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. Baird ,

s~
40

U.S.

(1972);&

Dunn v. Blumstein, 40

of the City of Chicago, 40
316

u.s.

535 (1942).

_u .S.J1.(1972);

Skinner v. Oklahoma,

5

Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would
not alone cause the Court to depart from the usual standard of reviewing a state's social and economic legislation, appellees contend that
education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other
rights accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they
insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is
essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to
intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between
speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-

ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, the

4~
corollary right to receive informationfrfb becomes little more than
a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read,
assimilate and utilize available knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the
right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral
process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on
an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately
developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has
long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental
~

interference~
1\.

the individual's constitutimal rights to speak and to

vote. Yet we have nev.er. presumed to possess either the ability or
~

~

..

p

the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech

-

-~-

~~

or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable
goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative
form of government is not to be

"

doubted.~ These

are indeed goals

to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from
governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented
by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.

[

In any event, to whatever extent a nexus exists between ed

r-

.,.,tion and speech and betweerreducation and exercise of the franchise,

""
*l~
leaF that the Constitution stops well short of re-

it

_/

~

---

.........-.....
~
quiring the statesik *a1,91 st~elS Of ufiitbi1ii%q&&ltt!fwith respect

e exercise of those'personal

right~ conceded that

~-~
some quanturrr of"tHiucatwn is
a constitutionally protected prerequisite
to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that
~,., fl.,,

I c.

~

vc:..

f1Wl

+-h ... t

the present levels of educational expenditure)\in Texas fall,sshort. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a

~tate's

financing system

occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its
children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending

----

levels are involved and where - as is true in the present case - no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. Now, for instance, is education
to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the

rS

basi~

of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might

well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and
ill...housed are among the most ineffective participants in the

,.

political process and that they derive the least enjoyment from

6fb

the benefits of the First Amendment.

If so, under appellees'

thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra and Lindsey v. Normet,
supra, would no longer be good constitutional law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive
of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right

J

-.33

and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context.
In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate

case in which to subject state action to close judicial scrutiny.
For in

OllQ

most l9asie sen~e"fT he present caseJ · s significantly

different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied
close scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon fundamental rights.

Each of our prior cases involved legislation which

"deprived, " "infringed, " or "interferred" with the free exercise
of some fundamental personal right.

See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316

U.S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634

)
(1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 40

U.S. ~~0,

(1972).

The

critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us
lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient point:

''

·,

•.

~.

~

;;.-.

···~

.,.

"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right
to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [ to
others similarly situated] ....
" [The federal law in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied
it by state law. . . . We need decide only whether
the challenged limitation on the relief effected
... was permissible. In deciding that question,
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights
... is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged
by appellees is presented only as a limitation on
a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing
barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather,
in deciding the constitutional propriety of the
limitations in such a reform measure we are guided
by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not
invalid under the Constitution because it might
have gone farther than it did,' ..• that a legislature
need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' and
that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind ..•. " Id. at
656-57 (Emphasis from original.)

\

The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the federal
legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.

Every step

leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes today irxDlH including the decisions permitting localities to tax and

expend locally, and creating and continuously expanding state
aid - was implemented in an effort to extend public education

-.j~

(.

and to improve its quality.

~

Of course, every reform that benefits

some more than others may be condemned for what it fails to
ace omplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, the thrust
of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, therefore,
should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the
nature of the State's efforts.

~
c

It should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated above,

that this is an in appropriate case in which to subject state action
to the sort of searching scrutiny reserved for laws that involve
suspect classifications or fundamental rights.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test.

A century of

Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection clause
affirmatively supports the application here of the traditional
rational basis test.

This case represents far more than a challenge

to the manner in which Texas proviCies for the education of its
children. We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the

way in which Texas has chosen to raise and :s: disburse state and
local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the state's judgment
in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property
to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would

.

have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally
deferred to state legislatures.

~

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's

admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny, 311 U.S. 435 (1940)
against interference with the state's fiscal policies is worth
repeating:
"[t ]he responsibility for devising just and productive
sources of revenue challenges the writs of legislatures.
Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to . . .
inj:§'t themselves in a merely negative way into the
delicate processes of fiscal policy-making. " Id. at
445.
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution, the
Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity
with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions
with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet
we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether in favor

- 37 of some other form of taxation.

Are we, for example, to counsel

the states that an income or sales tax would operate less
discriminatorily against the relatively impecunious elements of
society?

6'f

Nor is this Court - indeed any court - competent to make
informed judgments on the critical issues confronting those who
must determine educational policy at the state and local levels.
Education, perhaps even more than public welfare assistance
programs, presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social
and even philosophical problems. " Dandridge v. Williams, 397

oJr

U.S. 487.

1

The very complexity of the problems

of~

financing and managing a statewide public school system suggest
that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them," and that, within the limits of rationality,
"the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled
to respect.

Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972).

On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and

- 38 -

educational experts are divided.

Indeed, one of the hottest sources

of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable
correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of

1

education

- an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies

virtually ever legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this
case.

Related to the questioned relationship between cost and

quality, is the equally unsettled controversy as to the proper goals
of a system of public education.

And the question of the proper

relationship between state boards of education and local school
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and degree of
control, is now undergoing searching reexamination.

It hardly

need be said that none of these questions is amenable to intelligent
resolution through the judicial process. Indeed, the ultimate wisdom
of these and like problems of education is not likely to be devined
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the
issues.

At the very least, the judiciary should not circumscribe

or handicap - by interposing inflexible constitutional constraints the continued research and experimentation so vital even to partial
solutions and to keeping abreast of changing conditions.

- 39 It must be remembered also that every case arising under

the equal protection clause has implications for the relationship
between national and state power under our federal system.
Questions of federalism are inherent in the process of determining
compelling
whether a State's laws are to be subjected to the
or the rational basis test.

~

interest

While "[t ]he maintenance of the principles

of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the
pertinent provisions under which this Court examines state action,
it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which
we are urged to abrogate the systems of financing public education
presently in existence in virtually every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our

EmiEH

conclusion

that Texas' system of public school finance is an :Xlm: inappropriate
candidate for close judicial scrutiny.

These same considerations

are relevant to the determination whether that system, with its
conceded imperfections, is supported by a reasonable or rational
basis.

It is to this question that we next turn out attention.

7D.

---

III
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!We

.

Will

describe

t
~ sys em and how it operates, as these facts

J

bear directly upon the issue of rationality.

contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed
to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school
in the state.

Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one

teacher- - compensated at the state-supported minimum salary --for

q

every 25 students.

Each school district's other supportive

personnel are provided for: one principal for every 20 teachers;
one "special service" teacher - librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. - for
7

every 20 teachers;

~

~ ~
vocational instructors, conselors,
1\
~

educators for exceptional children are also provided.

Additional

funds are earmarked for current operating expenses and for student
transportation.

1

1\

+htvf

m more detail ~'Pen

~

&

The state

x also provides free textbooks.

L_

-.t.JJ

The program is administe red by the\ Texas Education Agency,
which also

~

R¥

responsibility for school accreditation

and for

monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.

As

reflected by the 62 \ increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood
~
q

School District over the last three years,

the State's financial

contribution to education is steadily increasing.
school districts, however, has been content to

None of Texas'
rely~one ~

funds from the Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund Assignment,
I~P•t~

every district must

A

~ an~

located within its borders.

ad valorem tax on property
-

The Fund Assignment was designed

to remain sufficiently low~ to assure that each district
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational
program.
this manner.

Every district supplements its foundation grant in

<JN'-

~r

some districts the local property tax contribution

is insubstantial, as~ in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967.
may far

~

excee~

'k

Fer other districts the local share

even the total Foundation grant.

In part

local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category
~
v ~~--·, C.J J:. ~0"""
:H , .
of property ~cee ~ its assessed value.
The greatest interdistrict disparities, however, are attributed to differences in the
amount of assessable property available within any district.

Those
~

districts that have more property, or more valuable property,,{ are
~
.
.

1~~~9ft~~==~~ these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher teacher
salaries to more teachers.
xt£riB:

Therefore, the primary distinguishing

attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower

pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary

schedules. ~

This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance structure.
Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by
disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children
in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious
discrimination.

The District Court found that the state had failed

~

,,

~ "to

u

6:..

/.lAf"-'~~ -~k ~

establish a reasonable basis fo1 tnes8

classificatiofl:~

~

F. Supp~ at

_!_.

We disagree.

~c-£-

~~

-~~~ -

The Texas system ·s comparable to the systems employed

i-.6
m its reliance on state as well as

---

( local resources1j The power to tax local property for educational

~

8'8

accompanied by changes in local property wealth occasioned by
the growth of commercial and industrial centers, began to create
disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling
for a considerable investment of state funds.

--

The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas educators
based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product of the pioneering work
lx of two New York educational refo mers in the 1920's, George

D. strayer and Robert M. Haig.

~

Their efforts were devoted to

establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educa-

~v-:_hul.-~~~~
t ional program without sacrificing!\1-eea.l control.

The strayer-Haig

thesis represented an accommodation between these two competing
forces.

As articulated by Professor Coleman:

#

-.t~'f

"The history of education since the industrial
revolution shows a continual struggle between two
forces : the desire by members of society to have
educational opportunity for all children, and the
desire of each family to provide the best education
it can affo rd for its child."~ (j '/
_Herein lies J:he

asserted reaaonablenes s_and .Ar.. a. .,....h...,
· o,...n,..,a..,.,l~
it'-.L
y_______
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(

The ¥ftftte of local control ei=etmea*iqn was recognized

last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright
v. Council of City of Emporia, 40

U.S. _ 1(1972). Mr. Justice

Stewart stated there that "r c!l irect control over decisions vitally
affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly

a:am6Hi~hed

that "[ll ocal control is not only vital to continued

public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance
from an educational standpoint as well."

~t £11~.

and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.

An analogy to the Nation-state

-.~s

relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate.
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths
of our form of government each state's freedom to "serve as a
laboratory . . . and try novel social and economic experiments."

ttJ

~

No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public

~

Appellees do not question the validity of Te
1\
'

~ ~~ ~

t o local control of education.

Ratlu~r, 1he~attack he school

financing system on the ground that it debases the concept of
local control because it does not provide the same fiscal flexibility
to poor districts as it J tords the rich. It is

·~t~ue that

1\

reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides
less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some
Ritx districts than for others.

Local control, however, connotes

more than the power to make an autonomous decision on how much
to spend. It also contemplates freedom to decide how available

in "some inequality. " McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.

(1961). It may not be condemned simp

220 U.S. 61, 78 (191 , it is important to remember hat at every
lopment it has constituted a "rough ace
of intere s in an effort to arrive at practical and workable olutions.
ropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-

(1913).

fu--Hu.--v
Appellees urge that,......apa~ :fpom -the questiens regat dtng -

~

-\

~

the Texas system sf-Hnaneing edtteati8R is unconstitutionally

arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources
II

.._~

II

to turn on happenstance.ana fe

~

''

·'y. They sootQad tQa.t no justification
-1

}~~~~,

.eMrbe off.ered for a system that allows the quality of education to

"
fluctuate on the basis of th~~s

tlutt oft.eR..account- for the positioning of

oad gsifteitleHees

the~boundary

17

--lines of political subdivisions and

jer-

the location of valuable

commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of local
taxation -indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental
units - requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that

91- ~

M-a::t

are inevitably arbitrary. ~ )?qually inevitably~ some
~~

localities are going to be blessed with:m more taxable assets,-\ Nor
is local wealth a static quantity.

.I

Are boundary lines to be redrawn

with every shift in population or with every discovery of valuable
minerals or with the completion of every new industrial park?
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional
method of providing for education then it must be

~

equally

~

impermissible in providing every other service currently financed
1\

from local:::poproperty taxes, including local police and fire

~~

~t4'-'-'~~~~

...

protection, public" hospitals, andf..t.,.,~eat eftt Hteilities. We

~

~

perceive no justification for such a total abrogation ofj property

~~~~ f.wp

,

?Jly~~

taxation~a'S i:8 Sttgg€Sted:::by appellees' contentions~

- 48 In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school finance

results in discriminatory treatment of children who happen to reside
in certain districts, we cannot say that such discrimination is the
product of a system that is without rational basis. Its shortcomings
have been acknowledged by Texas, which has persistently endeavored not without success - to ameliorate the differences in levels of
expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local
participation.

The continued persistence of "some inequality" is

not alone a satisfactory basis upon which to conclude that the
Texas system lacks rationality.
420, 425-426 (1961).

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S.

Nor may it be condemned simply because it

imperfectly effectuates the State's goals.

Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U. S. at 485.

The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, ill conceived legislation. It is certainly not the product of purposeful
discrimination against any group or class. On the contrary, it
is rooted in decades of experience in Texas and elsewhere, and

- 49 in major part is the product of responsible studies by qualified
people. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to
which the Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to remember that
at every stage of its development it has constituted a "rough
accommodation" of interests in an effort to arrive at practical
and workable solutions. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago,
228 U.S. 69-70 (1913). One also must remember, when weighing
the issue of rationality, that the system here challenged is not
peculiar to Texas or to any other

~tate.

In its essential

characteristics the Texas plan for financing public education reflects
what many educators for a half century have thought was an
enlightened approach to a ::piXJbe problem for which there is no
perfect solution. We are unwilling
~

e~fit,...were

tifl:e fl1netion e=

to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to

-

that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 states,
especially where the alternative proposed is only recently conceived
and nowhere yet adopted.

The constitutional test is whether there

is a rational basis for the challenged state action. We hold that
the Texas plan abundantly meets this test.

}

·...

- 50 IV

J.,
In light of the unprecedented attention focus on the District
I

Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor,
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), a
cautionary postscript seems appropriate.

These decisions have

been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major
)f

state legislative reform.

The decision have been variously touted

as the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities.

Some have even

viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban crisis in
education.

Indeed, in their enthusiasm for the result desired by

all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably
more credit than its architects have ever claimed.
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness of
the concept and the absence of a broader base of empirical study,
to make considered judgments as to the :iaJlt intrinsic merit or
the political feasibility of the "fiscal neutrality" doctrine.

Already,

second thoughts have begun to emerge from some commentators.

- 51 It is beginning to be recognized that the abrupt eradication of the

property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally neutral"
alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from
those initially assumed.

9~

There is, in particular, increasing

concern as to whether the Coons plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially as to the lowest

income~

families who tend to reside in urban areas where the assessed value
of commercial and industrial property is high.
whose affidavits as to the relationship between

Professor Berke,
~poverty,

race

and educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the District
~

v

effects of KRXRrl several alternatives to the present system of
$}.

educational finance.
}!''J!!"8'lrtlmc

tj

f

That study indicates that it is entirely

possible that an equal-expenditures alternative to the

present system would lead tohigher taxation and lower educational

'S'3"" 7
expenditures in the Jml2jx major urban areas.

At least one

detailed empirical study also has concluded that there is no

- 52 -

dependable correlation between the location of impoverished
families and the presence of inferior schools.

'

Nor does it

appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial
minorities will be clustered in school districts that have relatively

1
less assessable property.

In view of these uncertainties, if

this Court were sitting as a policy tribunal) we would hesitate to
embrace - at least at this time - the ultimate efficacy of the appealing
egalitarian concept which launched this case.
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional
function restrain us from embarking upon any such political or
philosophical undertaking.

That role is reserved for Congress

and for the l}ate legislative bodies and we do no violence to the
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be
viewed as placing its judicial impramatur on the status quo.
~

O.f'

/

f

The

0

needf \for reform in a tax system which may have relied t~ heavily
on the local property tax, and for reform in public education to

- 53 assure both a higher level of quality and greater

uniformity~
/,\

cfu;f~:;::.~:~ou ~.

They merit the continued attention

of the scholars who already have contributed much by their
challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the
lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.

Rodriguez 71-1332

FOOTNOTES
1.

Not all of the children of these complainants attend

public school.

One family's children are enrolled in private

school "because of the condition of the schools in the Edgewood
Independent School District. " Third Amended Complaint,

!iPP/

~

at 14.
2.

The San Antonio Independent School District, whose

name this case still bears, was one of seven school districts
in the San Antonio metropolitan area which were originally named
as party defendants.

After a pretrial conference, the District

Court issued an order dismissing the school districts from the
case.

Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District

has joined in the plaintiffs' challenge to the State's school finance
system and has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that
position in this Court.
3.

A three-judge court was properly convened and

there are no questions as to the district court's jurisdiction

=

::

2.
or the direct appealability of its judgment.

28 U.S. C. §§ 2281,

1253.
4.

The trial was delayed for two years ~ to permit

extensive pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending
Texas legislative investigation concerning the need for reform of
its public school finance system.
School Dist.,
5.

ill F.

b '3-

Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind.

Supp. 7_~0 ,

F. Supp.

lgS

n. 11 (W. D. Tex. 1971).

. The District Court stayed its

mandate for two years to provide Texas .... an opportunity to
remedy the inequities found in its financing program.

The court,

however, retained jurisdiction to fashion its own remedial order
if the State failed to offer an acceptable plan.

Id. at 2.g

~
6. Tex. Const. , Art. X, Sec. 1:

"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential
to the preservation of the 18fEX rights and liberties
of the people it shall be the duty of the Legislature
of this State to make suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of public schools. "
Id., Art. ::& X, Sec. 2:
"The Legislature shall as early as practicable
establish free schools throughout the State, and
shall furnish means for their support, by taxation
on property. "

3.
7.

Tex. Const. 1876, Art. 7, Sec. 3,

~s ~mended,
""

t

Aug.

'

14, 1883.
8.

Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§3,4,5.

9.

Gammel's Laws of Texas p. 1178.

See Tex. Const.,

Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 (interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor's
Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge and the
Chance 27 (1969) hereinafter Governor's Committee Report
10.

Tex. Const., Art. 7,

5 (see also the interpretive

'§

commentary); V Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12.
11.

Tex. Const., Art. 7,

s

~.
...,'C'

3, as"\ axpepdeQ. l Nov. 5,

1918 (see interpretive commentary).
12.

I Governor's Committee Report, at 35; J. Coons,

W. Clune, S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education
49 (1970); E. Cubberley, School Funds and Their Apportionment

I,
I

21-27 (1905).
13. By 1940 one-half of the state's population was
clustered in its metropolitan centers.
Report, at 3 5.

'

4,,'

I Governor's Committee

4.
14.

Aiken
Gilmer-.Aiduwl Committee, To Have What We Must (1948).

15.

'
R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken B~lls 11-12 (1950);

Texas Bd. of Educ. ,

T~e :re~as

Statewide School Adequacy Survey

(1938).
n~

16.

R. Still, supra

17.

1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1939,

15, at 12.

at 274 ($22. 50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th
Legis/ Reg. Sess. 1943, c~ . 161, at 262 ($25. 00 per student).

~
18.

General Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg.
.11

Sess. 1945, c; . 53, at 75.
19.

For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of

a foundation program, see R. Stills, supra noie 15.

---=-;

See also

V Governor's Committee Report, at 14; Texas Reserach League,
{

School Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972).
20.

For the 1970-71 school year this state aid program

accounted for 48. o% of all public school funds.

Local taxation

contributed 41. 1% and 10. 9% was provided in federal funds.

(
Research League, supra note 19, at 9.
J

Texas

5.
21.

V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48.

22.

At present there are 1, 161 school districts in Texas.
I

I() )

Texas Research League, at 12.
I)

~

~·

In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that

some school districts were not levying any local tax to support
education.

I

f-f-e.-4. J

Gilmer-Aiken Commt\' supra note

, ~,~ ~

'.l 'f

2!·

Gilmer-Aiken

Committe~, Tg

l!f_, at 16.

~a e.t.

, ;

')

f

I J.f.J

(.(

f -16".

V~at We Mast~

Wave

~1948 7{;,

6
2 . I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
"t.

-2f.

Texas Research League, supra note

J1, at 2.

In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average

per pupil expenditure for all current operating expenses increased
from $206 to $493.

In that same period capital expenditures

increased from $44 to $102

per~pupil.

I Governor's Committee

Report, at 53- 54.

':J

.III.. ..xJ o v'f!-, n J.! C..(; m

m 1 ff ec:.

(I

I?~ peJ J.- fj a;l- II :J

-

'It;

2tf"'tit. The Available School Fund, technically, provides a
second source of state money.

1Jo-ke..1 C

That Fund has continued as in

J

7h T.UtA4 .).J~
~

fiA~21:J-~-·-s--- - -.
"J • U0 L, ~. r-;

'-""ll.cJirrl •

r;

~

w w.l~

~ ~'

~-----~ I I

tt

(pe J-t~'J.. (1 97J) .
~

6.
years past (see text accompanying notes ~-~ supra)to
distribute uniform per pupil grants to every district in the State.
In 1968 this Fund allotted $98 per pupil.

However, because the

available School Fundxxtx contribution is always subtracted
from a district's entitlement under the Foundation Program, it
plays no significant role in educational finance today.
~~

~· While ~ federal assistance has an ameliorating effect
on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor
districts, the District Court rejected an argument made by x
the state in that court that it should consider the effect of the
federal grant in assessing the discrimination claim. 3- 1 F. Supp.
at '?. .<is'f . The State has not renewed that contention here.

~·
9j.

The figures quoted above vary slightly from those

utilized in the District Court opinionA. :) 37 F. Supp. at 1g2. . These
trivial differences are apparently a product of that court's reliance
on slightly different statistical data than we kx:ximre have relied upon.

l'l.r
.aft,

Texas Research League, supra note

_lj_, at 13.

£The tEconomic

Index, which determines each county's

•,

share of the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on
a complex formula conceived in 1949 when the Foundation
Program was instituted.

I#t has frequently been suggested

by Texas# researchers that the formula be altered in
several respects to provide a more accurate reflection
of local taxpaying abjility, especially of urban
schools.

V Governor's Committee Report, at 48; Berke,

Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra note 28, at 680-681.

7.

S"t

The District Court relied on the findings presented

in an affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His
sampling of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct
correlation between the amount of a district's taxable property and
its level of per pupil expenditure.

His study also found a direct

correlation between a district's median family income and per
pupil KXJU[RRK expenditures as well as an inverse correltion
between percentage of minorities and expenditures.
Categorized by Equalized Property Values,
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue
Median Family
Income F rom

Market Value of
Taxable Property
Per Pupilt

!

I

1960'

Per Cent State & Local
Minority Revenues Per
Pupils\
Pupil'

Above $100,000
(10 Districts)
$100,000-$50,000
(26 Districts)

$5,900

87o

$815

$4,425

32%

$544

$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
( 40 Districts)
Below $10,000
( 4 Districts)
Although theJiiAA!?"~!

$4,900

23%

$483

$5,050

31%

$462

$3,325

79%

$305

~correlations with respect to family

~---income and race appear only to exist at the extremes,
&'

~affiant's

j

and

methodology has been questioned (see Goldstein,

Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing; a Critial Analysis

- 10 because of its relative property wealth, was required to contribute
out of its local property tax collections approximately $100 per pupil,
or about

~

2~its

Foundation grant.

Edgewood, on the other hand,
32..
)
:itk~

paid only $8. 46 per pupil, which is about 2. 49ft of its grant.
c.----~---~

It does appear then that, at least as to these two

districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect a rough
approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of

eac~

Despite these recent increases, a substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to
!

prevail in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State,
still exist.

-3L

And it was these disparities, largely attributable to

differences in the amounts of money collected through local property
taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual
system of public school finance violated the
clause.

~

equal protection

The District Court held that the ::efiBd: effect of the Texas

system was to discriminate on the basis of wealth in the manner
in which education was provided for its people. ll/ F. Supp-j) at

"1Jf2..

Finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that
.ij::..

education is a "fundamental'tterest, the District Court held that

8.
of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504,

. (,7 (
S.; J - l...S

11)

11'11·{( 1972)), insofar as any of these three correlations is relevant
to the constitutional thesis presented in this

case~

we may

~·g., Police Dept· o~ City of Chicago v. ~
< J.

l

Mosley, 40f u. S.

fJ!'L

(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 400 U.S. ~

(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).

~ ~-g.,

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.

3 (,'Q (197.&;

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ( 1967).

it .§~ Dunn v.

Blumstein,

40~ U.S. 330, 3 4.3(1972) and

:sk the cases collected therein.
\

st. Appellants' brief, at 11.

~-

Vfi

Id.
/

...

. Tr.!<' or. arg. 1 at 3.
/

-Bi·

~·g.,

Griffin v. Illinois, ~ 351 U.S. 12 (1956);

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1964);
McDonald v. :Bd. of Elections, 394 U.S. 80 (1969); Bullock v.
Carter, 40.5 U.S. \ bL\(1972).

30

----

\

--

.,

,

v

~

As indicated inti

note ~

supra, there is reason to

question whether « - even in Texas - there is a direct correlation
between family wealth measured by inc orne and district wealth
measured by assessed IDIX property valuations.
States have found even less correlation.

Studies in other

Ridenour & Ridenour,

Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L.
213, 225 (1972) (:X"it can be argued that there exists in Kansas
almost an inverse correlation: districts with highest income per
pupil have low assessed value per pupil, and districts with high
assessed value per pupil have low income per pupil. "); Davies,
The Challenge of Change in School Finance, in Nat'l Educational
Ass'n, lOth Annual Conf. on School Finance (1967).
Col

4§·

Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance

Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L.
Rev. 1303, 1328-29 (1972).

"'

4J.

\

Id. at 1324mx n. 102.

10.
~

Id.
4-t, Em at 1328.

~!

Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) in

which an indigent's due process right of access to a divorce
a,

tribunal was found not to require more than{ "meaningful opportunity"
to obtain a divorce.

Id. at 379-380.

The Court did not command

that the procedures available for rich and poor be equal: it only
required that they be adequate and effective. Id. at 382.

4fi.

Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra note

lj_, at

13 (emphasis added).

ij.

Appellants' brief, at 3 5; Reply brief, at 1. But

see 5 Governor's Committee Report, at 32.

&

~

For this reason appellees' were able to draw little

precedential sustenance from the Court's cases dealing

x with

wealth classifications touching on the right to vote. Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 'Carter, 40 6 U.

S. J3 i

(196 !_); Bullock v.

(1972); McDonald v. Bd. of

Election~,

Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)(dictum). Each of those cases

11.
involved the right to vote on an equal basis with thex rest of the
electorate - a right repeatedly held to be constitutionally

~3·-~ 7

fundamental.

~

E. g., Dunn v. Blumstein,

40~ U.S. 3~~(1972).

See Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 5 ~'I ,

(1971); Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp.

~ ,'

II $1

i'" _,

W• "'
J. Coons, ~· Cl e and S. Sugarman,

2~

I Z4 I

- (),
'10 (197 .l);

I\L :r, ~(/p~~ •• 2 23)

Robinson v. Ca~ll _xk N.

"''r)

A. 2d

r

1)1,,...,.

Jn (197 2 );
3.37

supra~ote

l'L ,

at_;

5
Goldstein, supra note ~' at _.. _; Note, Educational Financing
& Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich.

L. Rev. 1324, 1335-42 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing
Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14
Ariz. L. Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).
~

~ '3 ~ 1 F. Supp. at
.

tl'J.

E·~·"

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Oregon

/l
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970).
~

a..~+er
~

A

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) there

could be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation
for the Court's holding in Shaprio.

I'

In Dandridge the Court applied

12.
the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family
grant provision under k its AFDC program.

A federal district

court held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter
standard of review. In the course of reversing the lower court,

~d...A~
the Court distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground

that~

"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally
protected freedom of interstate travel. '\ Id. at 484 n. 16.
~
~

The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test

despite its .&:l5llliwa:npc contemporaneous recognition in
1oohistoer~

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) that

"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing,
housing and medical care. "

f> ,

34·

"

In Eisenstadt the Court striCk down a Massachusetts

statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices,
finding that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal
protection standard. " Id. at ~ "\] n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum,
the Court recited the proper form of equal protection analysis:

13.
"if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges

upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (196 S )~ the statutory classification would have to be not merely

..

rationally related to a valid public purpose but ,_...
necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state interest." Id. \ (emphasis in
original).

-

Dunn fully canvasses this Court's equal protection

voting rights cases and explains that

'~his Cou~as made clear that

jYI ele.ci-JV'o1.f
a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate on
A

an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. " Id. at 3

L~,:J~o

~"t~P~.u..J J•

3::

The <X» constitutional BHDXf'ilxi underpinnings of the right to equal
treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted even though,
as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere

expressly mentioned." .See Bullock v. Carter, 40j_ U.S. 13~ (1972);
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

L

14.
\)

In Mosley the u~~ Court strzck down a Chicago

whi

c."'exempted labor picketing from its

anti-picketing

ordinance~

prohibitions.

The ordinance was held invalid under the equal

pxmtet protection clause after subjecting it to careful scrutiny

and finding that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn. The
stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the
ordinance was one "affecting First Amendment interests. "
Id. at I J \ .

..frZ

Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a

state law permitting forced sterlization of ''habitual

criminal~'

Implicit in the Court's opinion is the nm recognition that the right

t!/

~

10A.

procreat1 is among the rights of personal privacy -@r protected

under the Constitution.

See Roe v. Wade,

u.s. - - '

$
(197,).
(,

"51'. See,

~· ~·,

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.

~

FCC,

395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

15.
~

The States have often pursued their entirely legitimate

interest in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise, "
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966), through

~
such Qt;&rgss as literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to
vote.

See id.; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

And,

where those restrictions have been found to promote intelligent
use of the ballot without discriminating against those racial and
ethnic minorities heretofore deprived of an equal educational
opportunity, this Court has upheld their use.

Compare Lassiter

v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), with Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 133 (Mr. Justice Black), 144-47 (Mr. Justice
Douglas), 216-17 (Mr. Justice Harlan), 231-36 (Mr. Justice

-

Brennan), 282-84 (Mr. Justice stewart), and Gaston County v.
United states, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
""

e~.

P'tirM'tel'hiOi'e, the lbgtcal ltmltatt&IS WI

.aeJatEI the ox~ axe diffietdt te

~ereeive,

ft:~Q]lp~'

--...

Rom, for instance, is

education to be distinguished from the :Dgt:Ykw4 significant

16.

6

See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public

Education, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-90 (1971);

Comment,

Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Teilllants'
Association, 47 Texas L. Rev. 1160, 1172-73 n. 61 (1969).

aL

Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered

voters in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English

literacy tests for voting.

The law was suspended as to residents

from Puerto Rico who had completed at least

six~

years

of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even
though the language of instruction was other than English.
Court upheld the questioned provision over the

~

This

claim that

it discriminated against those with a sixth grade education obtained
in x non-English speaking schools other than the ones designated
by the federal legislation.
6.

Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce

v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kick,
313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).

1 7•

•

I

6

See Schflb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971_t McDonald

v. Board of RHmar:tbo Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 ( 1969 ).
6

See,

~· ~·,

Bell's Gap RR v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S.

232 (1890); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 508-509
(1937); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
6

Those who urge that the present system be invalidated

offer little guidance as to what type of school financing should
replace it.
syst~m,

The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing

however, would be statewide financing of all public

education with funds derived from taxation of property or from
the adoption or expansion of sales and income taxes.

The authors

of Private Wealth and Public Education, supra note 12, at 201-242,
suggest an alternative scheme, known as "district power equalizing. "
In simplest terms, the State would guarantee that at any particular

rate of property taxation the district would receive a stated number
of dollars regardless of the district's tax base.

To finance the

subsidies to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from
the "wealthier" districts that collect more than the stated amount

18.
at any given rate.

This is not the place to weigh the arguments

for and against "district power equalizing, " beyond noting that
commentators are in disagreement as to whether it is feasible,
how it would work, and indeed whether it would not violate the
fJ

I

Equal Protection theory .u~ appe lees' case.

President's

Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, People & Money 33 (1972);
Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49
J. Urban L. 701, 706-708 (1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan.
L. Rev. 591, 594-96 (1971); Wise, School Finance Equalization
~Jits:

A Model Legislative Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. "''

Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971); Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities
in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief under the iXplx
Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wise. L. Rev. 7, 29-30.
. The quality···Cost controversykx has received considerable
attention.

Among the notable authorities on both sides are

the following.

C. Jencks, Inequality ( 1972); C. Silberman, Crisis

in the Classroom (1970); Office of Education, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Educational

Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller eds); J. Guthrie, G.
Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. stout, Schools and Inequality (1971);
President's Comm'n on School Finance,
'Flle Nssel FoP EducatiQBal RefuFm 19-7- ; Swanson, The Cost-Quality
Relationship,

in lOth Nat'l Conf. on School Finance, The
... Challenge

of Change in School Finance 151 (1967).

~.

See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's

statewide survey on the goals of education in that state. I.
Governor's Committee Report, at 59-68.
note

?...<l ,

in Note

.tl
1
'6().

See also Goldstein, supra

at 519-22; Schoettle, supra note C,~ authorities cited
supra.
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532
'J'L

(1959) (Mr. Justice Brenna,, 'concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384

u.s.

, 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting).

,i
"'6'tt. In 1C 1970 Texas expended approximately 2. 1 billion
:Um dollars for education and a little over one billion came from

the Minimum Foundation Program.

~

'?Vf/' I,

111

Pablis Schoo] i'iRaaee

~·I

Texas Research League,
•

P1?99lem~ ht 'f'eKI\g (19'i~

h11 Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 13.
1

-6lf

Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 18.
Tex. Educ. Code§ 16.15.
Code §§ 16. 16, 16. 17, 16. 19.

7 . Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 45, 16. 51.
Code § 12. 01.
Code 11. 26( 5).
Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 301 et. seq.

(

J .

.4.

7ft ~~-~llt· ~

d-"'

MZ%?=~ ~tt

i, ,;It

7~.

Gilmer-Aiken Committee, !I:o Have WHat Vi'e

7l

There is no uniform statewide assessment practice

in Texas Commercial property, for example, might

,

Mt'l~t (194~.

be~

taxed at 30% of market value in one county and at 50% in another.
V. Governor's Committee Report, at 25-2~

'

.

IS .

Rider

~,

p. 40
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Add to Footnote i:8, in addition to the present reference:

s

~#
~

o''

oted snpra, p

J

~ the

extent to which the quality of

)

of education varies with expenditure per pupiJI is debated inconclusively
by the most thoughtful students of public education. While all would
agree that there is a correlation up to the point of providing the
recognized essentials, the issues of greatest disagreement include

Jt-~u~
the effect on quality of pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary
t.
schedules.

-

The state funding iniDe!m Texas is designed to assure,

~~~
on the average, one teacher for every 25 students, c-eaeedea to be

"'

a favorable ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary
of $6, 000 per year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers

~~~~
may be more debatable) espesially dependingAupon the location of
the school district.

But there appears to be little :k empirical data
H..P· - ~
dv ntage of any ; : :isfPupil

te~r ratio or

which documents the view that ever higher salariesx result in more
competent teaching.

An intractable problem in dealing with teachers'

salaries is the absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques

;

..

~

t.

2.
crl-"

1\J
~

judging-tnt; ability all performanc ~o£

tgQehei r.

The result is

that relatively few school systems have merit plans

oJ any kind,

with teachers' salaries being increased "by rote" and across the
board in a way whichn rewards the least deserving on the same
basis as the most deserving.

Most systems raise§ alaries

~~~
\ automatically on the basis of predetermined "step~ extending over
10 to 12 year

pe_riods.~In

making these observations, we

ha.v~e

;__,._~~ '
~
tll8\l~kt ef criticiz~xisting practices and certainly we imply no
"

i\

opinion that teachers' salaries generally are adequate. As compared
with others of comparable education there is every reason to believe

that~:es ~~)unduly low base
A

~ st

l

ift fRilSI ]IR"al:ilie!s,

have failed even to keep abreast of inflation. We have included
this commentary on pupil-teacher. ratios and salary levels not to
~a..efL~o/
express any opinion with respect to_Jthose m Texas or elsewhere,

but merely to indicate that the two

~principal

factors distinguishing

the schools in the more affluent districts from those elsewhere do
not - in the opinion of many experts - demonstrably and necessarily

'•

3.
f{..,t_

t

affec\ quality.~Jj flu- ~ .

,.

'• I:'

'H.b Texas Research League, supra note

J!_,

President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra note_,
at

3_.

Until recently Hawaii was the only §tate that maintained

-

a purely _3tate-funded educational program. In 1968, however, that

-

State amended its educational finance statute to permit counties to
ElDbat: collect additional funds locally and spend

amounts on its schools.

those~

The rationale for that recent legislative

choice is instructive on the question before the Court today:
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from
doing anything in this area, even to spend their
own funds if they so desire. This corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties
to go above and beyond the state's standards and
provide educational facilities as good as the people
of the counties want and are willing to pay for.
Allowing local communities to go above and beyond
established minimmms provide for their people
encourages the best features of democratic government. " Hawaii Sess. Laws, Art. 38, § 1
( 1968).
. See text ace ompanying note

f

supra.

_)1.
. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the state
I

of New York (1923).

For a thorough analysis of the contribution

of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of

-

educational finance, see J. Coons, W. Cltle & S. Sugarman, supra
1

Note

ll_, at 39 -9 5.

...J

22.
8'

J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note 12,

Foreward by James S. Coleman, at vii.
New State Ice Co. v. _Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280
311 (1932).
91,

"Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors

Coons, Clune and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of
public education may not be a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the state as a whole. " J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman,
supra n* ' 12, at 2.

Their thoughtful and imaginative work paved

'

the way for the suits, including the present one, attacking the
school finance system.

Indeed, the District Court approved the

authors' thesis verbatim.

337 F.

Supp.~

at 285.

The authors

have often cautioned their supporters, however, against speculating
that "fiscal neutrality" would be a panacea for the poor or for racial
minorities.

Id.~ Coons, Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of

Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971).

'·'

.

~

...

(~,~~~
z.3
q
~·

An initial problem, more obvious to elected officials

than to those of us who write opinions for the courts or essays for the
law reviews, is

~

the~

one of money. Whatever formula may be employed,

---penditure~(even approximately) in every school district: (i) expenditures

"

could be equalized by taking revenues away from some districts and
applying them to the benefit of others, a process of leveling down to -ft. ~
common denominator; or (ii) vast additional tax revenues would have to
be raised to elevate per pupil expenditure to the highest level now obtain-

ing in the districts which provide the greatest supplementation of §late

-

funds. Neither of these alternatives seems realistic. The residents of
a district which, with good fortune and dedication to public education) have
a high level of expenditure ~e not likely to be tolerant of a leveling plan
that reduces funding for their district to increase it elsewhere. Would
teachers' salaries in that district be reduced correspondingly? If pupilteacher ratios were increased, what would happen to the teachers no longer
employed? What, indeed, would happen to school bonds issued pursuant
to a vote of citizens proud of their schools and willing to pay more?
The other alternative, the raising of sufficient additional tax money

statewide, is no more palatable politically. It is

estima:~

that $2.4

billion of additional school funds would be required to bring all Texas

~
districts up to the present

~

"'

. u.J.ro.J

.' 1

~

level of expenditure;\- an amount more

than double that currently being spent in Texas on public education

1 e~~..

+AtJfJella:ntsl btief' 1:3

I

e

~

I

.~

1,;1 1 1 I

tl.

At a time when every !!ate and locality
-::.

is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers already resisting
tax increases, only those who live in a dream world could believe that
a decision of this Court nullifying present state taxing systems would
result in doubling public funds committed to education. Rather, the result in terms of confusion and disruption would be profound, and in the
end the leveling process

~ ould

well mean a lower quality of education

for all.

3.3I ,~AOJ.
:::.: ':--

J

...J__L

~t.\;J

25.

9i.t4 Select Comm.

on Equal Educational fappcrllll

Opportunity, Inequities in School Finance (1972) (Monograph
prepared by Professor Berke). :F
98.

See also U.S. Office of Education, Finances of Large

City School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW
Publication).
94.

See, Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance

Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. Rev.
1303 (1972); see text accompanying note 45 supra.

9~

See Goldstein, supra,

n<llle~,

at 526; J. Coons, W.

Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note 12 at 356-57 n. 47, have noted
that in California, for example, "59% of minority students live in
districts above the median average valuation per pupil. " In Bexar
County by far the largest district - the San Antonio Independent
School District - is above the local average in both the amount of
taxable wealth per pupil and in median family income.

Yet 72 percent

of its students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-68 it spent

26.
only a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and
North Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7

~..cent

0

and 18 pereent Mexican-American :X enrollment respectively. Berke,

'

..

• .v.

" ~.r . • ,

12/ 8/ 72

LAH/ pls

No. 71-133 2

San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court.

This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing public education, was initiated by Mexican-American parents vhose children

secondar~ schools in the

attend the elementary ·and

Edgewood Indepen- ·

dent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas •

1

. ~~'-'-1 LT6- C-L',,:.A--.__, ( .J <::. /r_..t.' ~,....._
They sued on their own behalf and on behalf of school children through-

out the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor
and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named
2
as defendants were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
t·

I

of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San

I

ir,

Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case was filed in the summer of 1968

':.

I

and a three-judge court was impaneled in January, 1969. 3 In December,
1971

4

the panel rendered its judgment in a pe4curiam opinion holding

the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the

.

Fourteenth/~

'

·'

Amendment.

5

The State appealed

•.

I
I

J

-2and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching consti-

u.s.

tutional questions presented.

0

0(1972).

For the reasons

stated in this opinion we reverse the decision of the District Court.

I

The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry
into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of
free schools. 6 Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach
to~

the financing

i+.s

oft~

schools, relying on mutual participation

by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the State
Constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school
districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of
L
fO
I

'

local

taxpayer~~or

the "erection of school buildings" and for the

"further maintenance of public free schools." 7

Such local funds

as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds.
The Permanent School Fund, established in 1854,

9

8

was endowed with

millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source
of income for school support.

10

The Available School Fund, which re-

I
,

0

-3ceived income from the Permanent Fund as well as from State
property taxes, served as the disbursing ar:rh for most State
educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this
Century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in State property taxes
was used to finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
t

I

the State. 11

I
f

. ,.I.-"' :..>::. yvo
, . '" ...r
.· "
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'

,
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~
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6

structure, not unlike the system employed in most other states, i

I

~

·• In the· early years of Texas statehood this dual finance· \ .

I r '"

.

.

I
)

.

c:.:- c auld ~ate ly the ~tate~s-educational l'e~r.:_!ll.~~ts~~Until

t""

l
I

t
~.

f

I

I

r~
'l(>"

recent times Texas was a predominantly rural state and its population and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the
State.

12

f

Sizable differences in the value of assessable property be'

I

d .-'f,<-C,J-<.L- ·'U-<-Lf

~~

tween local school districts became more evident, however, as the
'\

State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced. 13 The location of commercial and
industrial property began tci play a

+he

~

~.vvvt e./;
-~ ,ON~
0,

~..:p ;f.et'

s

regpp~for

·_h

significant role in determining

£A:J, ~ce~ ~ •

financing education.. These growing

disparities in population and taxable property between

~cl:lo ~

districts

. ... .
~·.

I

1.

~·

I
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were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in
levels of local expenditure for eduction·. l4 ·
At the same time, it was becoming more apparent to those
concerned with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient [-f~!fi to ameliorate

.

these disparities . 15 Prior to 1939 the Available School Fund con-

f:

tribtted money to every school district at a rate of $17. 50 per schoolage child. 16 Although the amount was increased several times in
the early 1940's, 17 by 1946 the Fund was providing only $46 per student. 18
Recognizing the need to provide increased State funding to help
offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educa.
+hoYOCJ"fh
tional needs, the State Legislature in the late 1940's undertook a .elosft IJ

evaluation of public education .h\. 't~xa~ with an eye toward major reform •
./

.

In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators,

was appointed to explore alternative systems in other

~ates

-

and to

propose a State funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child in the State and that would help
overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's

!·

I
'

.,. .

... ...

-5efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer-:Aiken bills, named for the
Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 19 It is this Program 1hat accounts today for
approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. 20
The Program calls for idlH State and local contributions to a
fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses,
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general
revenues, finances approximately 80 per cent of the Program and the
school districts are responsible - as a unit - for providing the remaining 20 per cent. The districts' share - known as the Local Fund
Assignment - is apportioned among the school districts pursuant to
a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability.
The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant
to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative
value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from
manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers

.

each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and,

i

I

f

to a lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property in

i
i

f

I

l
~

"'_.

·..

·l·
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the State.

21

Each county's a s signment is then divided among its

school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable
property within the county. 22 . Each district then finances its share

~vvn:J~ ~

+ ~-~./

of the Assignment out of its (local property tax aseessment?; t ()_ '1. CL h

CIYI •

The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. First,
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have
an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts
by placing the heaviest burdenp on those districts most capable of
paying. Second, it was the desire of the Program's architects to
establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children

22

a but that

would not by itself exhaust any district's resources. 23 Today virtually
every school district does impose a loeal property tax from which it
derives locally expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary
to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since the Foundation Program went into operation

in 1949, expenditures for education - from State as well as local
sources - have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967 expenditures ·

....

.

' '

t

-7-

increased by approximately 500 per cent.

24

In the last decade alone

the total public school budget rose ;rom $750 million

t~ $2.1 billion 25

and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 26 Minimum teacher salariesby far the largest single item in any school's budget - have increased
') (p 0...,

from $2 , 400 to $6,000 over the last 20 years.

V

in order-to illustrate the manner in which this dual system of

school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent to which ,.-{

l·

r

f

~~
~ substantial interdistrict disparities
_despite Texas' impressive gains

------

·~/

.--

--

..

persist,!1 ) the plaintiff school district may be compared with another
more affluent district in San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent
School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22, 000 students are enrolled in its 25
elementary and secondary schools. The district is situated in the corecity sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90 per cent of the student population is Mexican-American and over 6 per cent is Negro.

1.'f ..
:/

I
r'
•

'

l
J

I

-8-

l

I

The average assessed property value per pupil is $5, 960t. the lowest
in the metropolitan areat and the median family income ($4' 686) is also
the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed
property - the highest in the metropolitan area - the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school year
I ,

above its Local Furid Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program.
f

The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a State- local

~.
I

total of $248. 27 Federal funds added another $108 for a ~total
of $356 per pupil.

28

Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, the most affluent
school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately

.,: .

5, 000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike

r. .
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly white,

I

~ .

having only 18 per cent Mexican-Americans and less than mm 1 per cent
'.
I

![ .

Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49,000

~·
t

and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-68 the local tax rate

L.. .
~

of $. 85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above its

t..
i

, ..... . . .

..,.,...

''

~-
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'

\, •·

'

'

I .

1
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contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225
provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558
per student. Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal

r
t

sources, Alamo Heights was able to spend $594.

l
i

Although the 1967-68 school year figures provide the only com'
29
plete statistical breakdown for each category of aid,
more recent
partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing
State aid has been significant. For the 1970-71 school year the Foundation
School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per pupil. This constituted a 62 per cent increase over the three-year period since 1967-68.

~ 7-;_;-~-1) ----·
1 f {.. 1- (_.S
Indeed ,\State-ai& alone'~UJmds:lEd equaled Edgewood's entire budget
,
'.1f
\
\

/.1.-c

k<.' r -X.

-

from local, State, and federal sources ,. ~dP. ;1967 ~ 6&. While Alamo
t~

Heights received a-similar increase to $491 per pupil, these recent
·I

figures indicate that the Local Fund Assignment, at least as to these
.,--'"
/

I

I

two districts, does reflect a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of each. Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth, was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20 per cent of its

~
[
t
t

~-·-

,

.

-..

'

-lQ -

Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46
per pupil, which is only about 2.4

~er cent of its grant. 30

Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail
I
I.

in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State} 1 still
exist. And it was these disparities, largely attributable to differences
in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation,
that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of
public school finance violated the equal protection clause. The
District Court held that the effect of the Texas system was to discriminate on the basis of wealth

~

manner in which education

c.,_

'

,

~L...<-<-;

1\

.

~

"

was provided

J-(,.,. .-f' l.C-< .c·-l ..i/._
( dr.:. -~ -t-<-f-<-<<-- 1' ,_._.. ',_.__..._ #--/t.,t. t....

for its people. F. Supp. at
I(
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' :·. Having-found-both-factors present,_

- - I'
iJ

lA-<-J--<CT'C-£: 1 )

. the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only

;\

if the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling
state interest . Id. at
',~nj ot

On this issue the court concluded that

only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state

interests ..• they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these

,·

.

-11clas sifications." Id. at

..

Texas virtually concedes that its historically-rooted dual system
of financing public education could not withstand the close judicial
scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative

c cr K-.J-L(_ /-~.. '- !c. l U<'- ( LuI
..
/
v;..t-t.. ~ u '--'
32
judgments that interfere with fundamental rights or that touch-upon
1../ '

r\

suspec t c 1ass1'f'1cat'Ions. 33

If, as we have frequently held, close

scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual
presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants
must carry a "heavy burden of justification, " that the State must
<1..

h'-t-1.-C.. kL-+Li.Y....

demonstrate that its educational system has been crafted with'pre._
cision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives, and

f

r
).

, .•

I

that it has selected the "least drastic means" for effectuating its

I

f

I

objectives, 34 the Texas financing system - and its counterparts in

i

virtually every other ~e - will not pass muster.

t

'-L

I. '

-~/1.APV1..::;....;;;
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The State.·has candidly admitt~ that " [rij o one familiar with the Texas
system would contend that it has

~~ its concession that
and "imperfections, "

37

y~t achieve,d perfecti~n. " 35

Yet

~

educational finance in .Texas has "defects" 36
'•·

~

the State defends the syS:em' s rationality

~·

I

and vigorously disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a

t' '

r'

"reasonable basis.,;

i

i

l
~

This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We

'

f

I·

r

must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public edu·h tA.<-J.-f

cation may be subjected to meticulous judicial scrutiny. If so, the
'\

4/c..t~(

judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. If not, Texas'
claimed rational basis must be considered. We now turn to the exami-

L·

nation of these two questions.

[...

r .

r. ..

II

f. ;

The District Court's opinionr\vfiich appears -to rega-rtl-eae-h-ef--::>
I

t.:~~
~reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed
A

by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. That

fo CJi1 J
CO'lFt

r ·"'

'r.

.

.

f

•'

''

' .
·,.
~

"I

'

r .

t

r·

·'
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It'-"-- r- <! c u ....... (L·
that strict judicial scrutiny was required) ·It relied on this--Cou-rtLs

"::7

I--1-<----'" .

'

c. c 2 l-<..~

e.' ......_,__,/

A

/\

~~~

·

,

ht. ~ oJ.

decisions dealing with the indigent's

n-,~l · vrnd·.s
rig~

to equal treatment in the

criminal trial and appellate processes, 38 and on cases disapproving
wealth barriers imposed on the right to vote.

39

Those cases, the

District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the
basis of lBliiitx wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling.
It then reasoned, based again on decisions of this Court affirming

.

the undeniable importance of education,

40

that there is a fundamental

right to education and that, absent some compelling State justification,
the Texas system could not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which

~

in every significant

~'rt::f..-4Yr~.)~
aspect sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the mosiac of constitu~-

~
I

I

tiona! analysis under the equal protection clause. Indeed, for the

I
I

.

l

[

several reasons that follow, we find~n
this -ca-~
'.- neither the suspect

I
I

!

classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive.

t

A

~.
r..

The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court is

'·

...

~·

'

.,..,.,.

..

1,

,. .
. '

-14quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore
reviewed by this Court. Since all children in any given school district
receive the same public education, irrespective of family wealth, the
District Court found the operative class to be all citizens in "poor
school districts." _ _ F. Supp. at ___ . The State's dependence
on local property taxation to pay a portion of the total cost of education was found to impose a de facto discrimination against those school
districts that have, vis a vis other school districts, relatively less
7

property to tax per pupilrtO be educated~ Because higher rates of
1.-.

-·-'

taxation failed to compensate for disparities in property value, the
class was found to be expending relatively less in its schools and,
therefore, providing a lower quality education for its children.
In one sense this discrimination is geographical rather than

financial. But the Court has never questioned the State's power to
draw reasonable distinctions between its political subdivisions.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg .v. Maryland,
346 U.S. 545 (1954). Recognizing the force of those cases, appellees
have focused instead on the individuals who reside in the relatively

r-

...

'

I.
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disadvantaged districts. Yet the status of these individuals is
simply not comparable to the status of the individual complainants
who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws as

(~;ict~~~~i;::tJI

discriminatory against the poor.
In Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. Califor-

'10~

nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and their progeny '!the Court invalidated
state laws that denied a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents.
Similarly, Williams v. illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971) struck down criminal penalties that subjected

indigents to indigents.:to::Dmx incarceration simply because they were
unable to pay fines.

In each of those cases the Court was not dealing

with relative impecunity but with some level of absolute poverty, :!:: ~·,

""''Silill:IXbiDim~!OOctxi:Jlyxx comp1aman
.
t was

. m
. d.1gency,
.
b ecause,;(ft,h e1r
eac h ......

totally unable to pay for

the~

state-proffered benefit.
;,.;

Those cases did not deal with the plight of those on whom state laws
impose a weighty but not insurmountable burden.

It :sX is clear that

the mere fact that it may have been more difficult for one citizen

..

r

than another to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal

.,. ....... ,;.........,...

..

.,

..

-~-

l

~

vu
.c·'<)"
LL.
not
/J

)

1• '
alone have,,, ~~ough to compel

barriers.

[
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I

I

judicial invalidation of those

The Court has never questioned that the nonindigent

citizen must pay for those benefits himself.

Likewise we have

never held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens created by

<f(

a system of absolute fines. . In the instant case, appellees have
endeavored to show only that children from relatively poorer

41
tend to reside in relatively poorer districts.

~families

No effort was made to prove, however, that the financing system
operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more clearly
io_(._~

definable class of indigents. Indeed, there is reason to suspeetc.;: ~,... c..- ~ t.~..::r- (..-t,..(A,. 'r./...,-~d~tPy

that the poorest families
districts.

may- no~be

clustered in the poorest

A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in

Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to

I
contend tJ?.at 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major

t.
[·.

factual assumption of Serrano- -that the educational finance system

f
!

I
i

42

discriminates against the 'poor'- -is simply false in Connecticut. "

. ..

'.'• '

• ..

1 ';.

~

.,.

-.
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Defining "poor" :Faam:ldt families as those below the Bureau of

I
r

\

43

the Census "poverty level, "

t

~·

the Connecticut study found, not

surprisingly, that the poor are clustered around commercial and
industrial areas--those same areas that provide the most lucrative

I
I.

.

(

I

44

sources of property tax income for school

districts~

~

-.

~

Thus, it--=must-bs reeognized that we are asked in this case . . 0 f:
.
.•l-:/c K.. !.~ ~ '- :
J ,
J
·- I , ...
,..- '1-~ .. ..,_t ~'- )4 <::t C: ~--~-.._;..,/ .:.:t ., -.c.. I.. / 1- >
'-..'- / ._ <.:'_ ·~;. ~-'
I
r -.-"- 1~ -,-....~ t ·H- ~ _.....1
'\
to exten\ the Court's,{c~o~st-pr-ete~tion to a large and diverse lclass.
,

t: .
'

!1,.

h::·'

,h!nd, unlike our racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it
is not a class saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such
a position of political powerlessness,

~or

subjected

C~l'"t........._.'-4...._~ (

to such a history of unequal treatment as to deserve extraordinary
·I

judicial protection from the majoritarian political Jm process. It

~c.,J.~
has never
1

WIt--h ,'

n t-h G

bee~~

C. V>'l

~ f- I #'-1.1 i- I e-ll If..

\r; ~ ~ ;.
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CJ..

h
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of this Court to, discredit state action

.·

.•

~·

'

r- -.

t_
·;.;·'

simply because in-its-ef.feGt its budens fall more heavily on those

l : :·..
f)•: .·.

of lower than :.IIXIJe'll. average inc om e.

f..:.: ..

Moreover, the nature of the injury sustained by the

~-'

I

I.

disadvantaged class provides a second significant factor

I
I

~ .
'

~·
t

•

.

"
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'
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I~ t. , _

differentiating the present case from its predecessors_.
•

t\

.

1
L-\..
(

J•A'-'vv'

.

}-r-·--

1-lJ-. p

I U''V-~L.

In our

former cases an absolute inability to pay occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the benefit in question.

Disparities in school

h~v~

financing, however, has it& impact along a continuum of educational

(

the relatively poorer districts in terms of

+-~ct +0

assessable pro:rerty per pupil \devote relatively less to education.
'

Y~'<-;'

A•

·'_f.

.

In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury was a:pprent - denial of

a transcript on appeal - and the remedy could be easily and
\;~·~
'

effectively secured.

What was required was some means of

assuring an "adequate appellate review. " 351 U. S. at 18.

The

Court did not hold that Illinois was required to provide a full
stenographic transcript in every case: broad leeway was permitted
~-.

for the State to select its own means of meeting its constitutional
obligation.

See, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 _U.S.

Britt v. North CaJ:.:Qlina, 40 U.S.

(1971).

9 (1971)

Likewise, Douglas

, ,.~·--

v. California, supra, shile requiring counsel for indigents
perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained from

.

.'

..,
1

~I

.

~·
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I

e

mandating "absolute equality. " 372 U.S. at 357. No attempt has
.. ;
tv<:,()..;

_LL....-}..

~U\t.~

.,'--i.

'£;_"1'=..--................... ..,...(

nut~

yet been made to guaranteelthat the poor receive the same high-z,-

A

.1\.j

.

.:; . ;,-

?

45

quality of legal representation .available-to-tlla wealthy.
Efforts to analogize to the remedies afforded in those cases
raise questions· of considerable complexity where, as here, the
alleged deprivation is not absolute but is relative.

Since "absolute
~-

equality" is not required, must the existence of invidious discrimination
and the availability of relief depend on whether ':€xas is presently
providing through iti ®~fu:m.Ileing syste\¥ an "adequate" educatiomil
opportunity to children in the poorer districts? The founders of
the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that.
By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds,
the Texas Legislature hoped to "guarantee, for the welfare of the
State as a whole, that all people shall have kat least an adequate
program .of :ECtK education.

This is what is meant by 1 A Minimum
46

Foundation Program of Education.

111

Must we decide whether,

in fact, Texas has fulfilled its promise and that, as the State

.· .

tI

t

!
I

- 20 -

~.

repeatedly asserts in its briefs 'in this Court, "the ·s tate has

47

I

assured every child in every school district an adequate education"?
There are, then, these two demonstrable differences between
tile present case and those relied on by the District Court: (1) the
claimed disadvantaged class is significantly larger as well as more

. . . .
,:_£&,_.,:, •U.:!__
ubiquitous and diverse; (2) the injury susta~ed is in no sense ~
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance
system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the
wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If
~~~t{L

elementary and secondary education were ,available by the State
'\

/ )~a_
,4,.,

r
only to those who are able to "\imeet ituition assessed against each

pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum who would be xx absolutely precluded from receiving an adequate
education.

1..<.-~-Lo....
1
That case presentd a good-deal more compelling set
A\
'f

of circumstances for m judicial assistance than the case before
us today.

Texas x has.)after all undertaken to do a good deal
1

r

I
f
t
I
. . .......
,..

-

- 21:U..,

I .

more than provide an education to those who can afford it.
~_;/- t-1"" C.~ u.-J-<A.~·~•-c._, f/ ~ c:....cG'-~ - L<.~ l t ;

It has
- 6-ro..<L..r<__

endeavored to provide',A s-<m1e education for all children and has drawn
no explicit lines designed to separate out the poor for disfavored
treatment.
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding of
r

(.:

wealth discrimination alone has never been held to constitute a
sufficient basis for subjecting state legislation to rigorous judicial

48
scrutiny.

Anq,

~
!lt is this question:;;ether
education should be counted
/\

among the small circle of rights that~~ heretofore}..,b een found
to

f

Ir .... :.··
r··

Before such close review is required, a state's laws

must be found to interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental"
right.

~'

y which has . so consumed theA
~=;T.:u.~ of J:"~,_
courts and commentators

be'fundamental' ~
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in recent years.
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[
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) a

w1animous Court recognized that "education is perhpas the most
important function of state and local governments. " Id. at 493.

r
I

~
~\
i

What '\Vas said there in the context of racial discrimination has
f

~.

lost none of its vitality with the passage of time:

f..
I'

''Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic ~ responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. " Id.
V(..ftJ._}-- -~
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the high-vdK-value

of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions

>

.

of Justice of this Court .writing both before and after Brown was
1\

tWL-,

~

decided.
Justice),

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40_ U.S.

__, - - (Mr-./\ Chief

(Mr. Justice White) ( 1972); Abington School Dist.

i
r.

~·
.

•

1..:3
- 21 v. Sehempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 ·
~

(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate RR Co.

v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 ( 1907).

J t!. t . , o.c..+.s

Nothing this Court holds today in any
.

way'\dQpaP~

from

I

c.t...,~

our historic dedication to public education. We ' f.ind-ourselve-~
--1
in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel
below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual
50

and to our .society" cannot be doubted.
a service performed by the

~ate

-

But the importance of

does not determine whether it

must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under
.

..-- .~

-

the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Harlan{long an opponent
f'4

;-.-~ /, --~

of the Court's ·ppev-iling standards for approaching equal protection
caseJadmonished that ,;·[v ]irtually every state statute affects
.A

impo.rtant rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 665, 661
(1969) (dissenting opinion).

In his view, if the degree of scrutiny

of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of

.....

-24-

~t 1<1-/'<-t t
the importance o.f lhe-impoJ>haollQ.{i}. of the right affected, we would have
~

'

gone "far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
... _....- --·-

p. 24 Rodriguez (12/13/72)

~
We would indeed be assuming a legislative role and one for which
1\

the Court lacks both authority and competency.

But Mr. Justice

Stewart's response in :ikXflxXrx Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's
L'

conern correctly articulates the narrow limits of the "fundamental
·\
righ~"

rationale of thedCourt'.s ,eaual Protection decisions:
The court toda oes not ptck aut parbcu1ar
- - ---.::;-;
activities, c ar:trnrrzethe~un.d.a:
mental,'' and ii~@: tll&m a~<i:QAQt_~G.t:ion .... '
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes,
as it must, an established constitutional right ,
and gives to that right no less protection than
the Constitution itself demands." 394 U.S. at 642
(Emphasis from original.)
Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to close
judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a oneyear durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634 (Emphasis from original.)

..

-25The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of
constitutional significance, 51 and the Court's

decisi~n therefore

did

not require an ad hoc balancing of the relative importance of that
. ht . 52
rig
U.S. _ _(1972), decided only

Lindsey v. Normet, 40

last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's c-lea-r view that social im-

~·
il

portance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislaI·

tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving
a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits
brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful
Detainer law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." Id. at

.•

The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "funda-

i'

t.

i'
f

mental interests which are of particular importance to the poor,"
such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peace-

•,.

ful possession of one's home." Id. The Court's analysis is instructive:

I

l

"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document

'' .

I

~
I

•t

••
'

:".

,.

-26any constitutional guarantee to access to dwellings
of a particular quality or any recognition of the
right of a tena.nt to occupy the real property of his
landlord beyond the term of the lease, without the
payment of rent.... Absent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition
of landlord-tenant relationships is a legislative not
. (Emphasis supplied.)
a judicial function." Id. at

-

-- ·

Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams , 397 U.S. 471 (1970),
the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration
of public welfare assistance

involves the most basic economic

needs of impoverished human beings,"

53

provided no basis for deI

parting from the settled mode of constitutional analyses of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and s ocial policy . As
in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to
the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to justify
... .

its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v .
Hackney, 40

U.S. _(1972); Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S.

(1971).
-v

.

~ ..::;l.,~.~~-J-,!.~v-<(

The lesson of these cases for the question now before the Court
1\

is plain. The key to discovering whether education is "fundamental"
is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance

-

,•

'

~' ( ,'f

•

-27of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found
by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, the right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. Baird ,
40

U. S._(l972);

54

Dunn v. Blumstein, 40

PoHc-e-Depa-:Pt-nleRt-~-t-he-~4t-y-ef-G.k~

of the City of Chicago , 40
316 u.s. 535 (1942).

u. s._(l972);

55

Mosley v. Police Department

U .S._(l972);

56 .

Skinner v. Oklahoma,

57

Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would
not alone cause the Court to depart from the usual standard of reviewing a state's social and economic legislation, appellees contend that
education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other
rights accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they
insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is
essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to

I

.'

intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between

t

speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-

f

,.,

•

t....

-28-

ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, the
corollary right to receive information

58

becomes little more than

a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read,
assimilate and utilize available knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the
right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral
process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on
an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately
developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has
long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental
IAJ~~t..

interference 1\,fer the individual's constitutim al rights to speak and to
vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech

[
l
E
I

f
•

.~ .

'

I

.·

.

"

'•

'

.
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or the mos t informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable
goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative
form of government is not to be doubted.

59

· These are indeed goals

to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from
governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented
by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
In any event, to whatever extent a nexus exists between education and speech and between education and exercise of the franchise,
- ~

i~rmtSt

.

be-.. 8-ftti:t>el~P-that the Constitution stops well short of re .

,;(~

'
'

1:.'7....-j/j.LC•P<.(3',..
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~.(...</".#l''!..i.~

I

~

f

_.•'l, ';'-~A-\.< -4.,.i \ ~~(. 1.,;

quiring the states tdlimpose-standards--of-uniform equality' with respect

k

/

-j

to the exercise of those personal rights. Even if it were conceded that

~

;

I
some quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite

t.

to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that
~ "Cl . , I j ·t.. ~ e. j

(..1 .;;.. .'\.

f I WI +-h {1.. T

the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas fal ls short. What;\

ever merit appellees' argument might have if a state's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its
children, that a1'gument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending

---.-----··
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levels are involved and where - as is true in the present case - no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each

.:z,k .,_i_t_,j-)
child with an· opportunity to acquire the basic minimal teal-s necessary
~

for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of participation in the
A

political process.

I· ..

60
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We
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of the District Court's finding ·that education is a fundamental right

--

'

".

carefully surveyed each of the arguments supportive
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and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context •
Even a contrary conclusion, however, would not compel this Court
to subject the · Texas public school finance system to searching judicial
scrutiny. For in one most basic sense, the present case is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied
close scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon fundamental
rights. Each of our pri::>r cases involved legislation which "depriver!,"
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of some fundamental
personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942);
Shapiro v. Thompson, ])4 U.S. 618·, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein,
40

L'~,];-~

u.s.

. ·· ....

_._. t.

(1972). The ciFitical distinction between those

---

~

i

....

-

.....

-31cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to
do with respect to education. Mr. Justice Brennan, ·writing for the
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well
the salient point:

61

"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right
to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected{to
others similarly situateq] •.••
" [The federal law in· question;} does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied
it by state law.... We need decide only whether
the challenged limitation on the relief effected
... was permissible. In deciding that question ,
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights
... is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged
by appellees is presented only as a limitation on
a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing
barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather,
in deciding the constitutional propriety of the
limitations in such a reform measure we are guided
by the familiar principles that a 1 statute is not
invalid under the Constitution because it might
have gone farther than it did, 1 • • • that a legislature
need not 1 strike at all evils at the same time, 1 and
that 1 reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind ..•. " Id. at
656-57 (Emphasis from original.)
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J!airly viewe}!J the Texas system o~!finance touches on "fundamental

i
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rights" in much the same manner as the federal legislation in

~

Katzenbach affected the right to vote. Every step leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes today - including the decisions

[
'

I
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-32permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aid - was implemented in an effort to
extenq public education and to improve its quality.

62

Of course,

every reform that benefits some more than others may be condemned
for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance,
.'

the thrust of the . Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and,
therefore' is entitled to be scrutinized under judicial principles

~<!~~
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It

We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the inbov

appropriateness of the compelling interest test. A century of Supreme

a

]

t

Court adjudication under the Equal Protection clause affirmatively supu ,t:

"

ports the application here of the traditional rational basis test . This

?1'-f!'
I

up

' il

case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas
I'

t

i

provides for the education of its children. In terms of the ultimate
n

consequences, appellees are asking the federal judiciary to intervene
'

decisively in areas long reserved for state democratic processes . We

bave here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas
has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues . We are
/ asked to condemn
I

:

\,
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L.--tr..aditiooal rational basis approa:ch.
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The reasoning·underlying
I

this judgment, which finds. deep roots in a century of Supreme
Court adjudication under the equal protection clause, deserves
I .

aj /-<--> ,.._ ~--r
r ·e citation here.

+o

.

I

This case represents more than a challenge ..og. the manne

.

in which Texas provides for the education of its childrm. In a
fundamental sense, it is a direct k attack on the way in which
Texas has chosen to raise and disburse revenues. It condemns
-----------~-------------------------

the state's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the
power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests.
In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area

63

in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.

..

I!

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny,
311.

u.s.

~

.J
435 (1940), againstc:verzealou~interference
with the

_ ( [r_
~

state's fiscal policies is worth repeating:

;

1\.

. .....c...~

_,__ {.. '

'

'
~

''
- · ··

"[t }he responsibility for devising just and productive
sources of revenue challenges the wits of legislatures.
Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to . . .
inject themselves in a merely negative way into the
delicate processes of fiscal policy-making. " Id. at
445.
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the familiarity with local problems.\ necessary, \ if-effective legis-
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lation-is -to be promulgated affecting the acquisition and disposition
cL-,.'-"-Gt

of public revenues. Yet we are urged to order the states either
to alter drastically the present system or to idm: throw the
property tax out altogether in favor of some other form of taxation.

I-' v

J
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Are we to counsel the States that an income or sales tax would
1\

0'-P~~~less

discriminatory against the relatively
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impecunious ooc elements of society?
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relationship between national and state power under our federal
'1

system.

!--(;._.._ ?,.(.,;...,;(..~-<-<-c.'--(.

I J-J.-.e -<-«"- I/~ . ~

z~

Questions of federalism--are inherent in and-indeed
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--clause,· whether a State's laws are to be subjected to ·meticulous
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judiciaL.examination~-In -reachjng:_that_judgmenLwe._also
.

~

decide_whether

the-State-ts -judgmenLis entitled .to. deference-and whether it or-the
complaining- party-must-bear-t-he-burden-of-justification. While
"[t ]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost
consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under

~·

f.
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which this Court examines state action,'' it would be difficult
to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
~ - t<.· - i-~.-<.Jt._ U.'-~

~federal system than the one now before us, ·which-threatens
.~

~~ t~v-·'~

-~~J/

to abrogate the systems of 'public education presently in existence
A

in virtually every State.

ft -~-</ th4<-<f'_

Thes.e considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas'
·'\

I.
·..

system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for
~

·, .

~~..L
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close judicial scrutiny.
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as-result from that system may-be-saiG-t-9-be supported by a
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reasonable or rational basis.
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~

~
f-iu ·-L...

Anc;l, -1t is to that question that

now turn our attention.
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-At thfH' is:ki of...Ynduly pPolooging- this -<>phrion, ~~ will describe
·\

in more detail the Texas system and how it operates, as these facts
bear directly upon the issue of rationality .

..

~

.. - - I

contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed
to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school
in the State.

Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one

teacher-- compensated at the state-supported minimum salary --for
·67

every 2 5 students.

Each school district's other supportive

68
personnel are pro:vided for: one principal for every 20 teachers;
one "special service" teacher - librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. - for

69
every 20 teachers;

!.. '--

1!.

vocational instructors, conselors,
and
A
I,

8 70

educators for exceptional children are also provided.

Additional

funds are earmarked for current operating expenses and for student

71
transportation.

The State

x also provides

72
free textbooks.

I
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The program is administered by the Texas Education Agency,
73

which also has responsibility for school accreditation

and for

74
monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.

As

reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood
75
School District over the last three years,

the State's financial

contribution to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas'
school districts, however, has been content to rely, alone\ on
)--;~
funds from the Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund Assignment,
I ....,. fHI ' (..

every district must

~ an~

1\

located within its borders.

ad valorem tax on property
-

The Fund Assignment was designed

to remain sufficiently low,. 1fow~ver\ to assure that each district
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational
76
program.

Every district supplements its foundation grant in

9-v---

this manner. .Fe,r some districts the local property tax contribution
is insubstantial, asjfur"fhstanc~ in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967.
~

k.

may far exceed Jemel' even the total Foundation grant. In part
4ii'

.

FBr other districts the local share

- 40local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category
v ~ ··:t ~ J

of property

;.t:,.owt.

e-xcee~

i& 77

its assessed value.

The greatest inter-

district disparities, however, are attributed to differences in the
amount of assessable property available within any district.

Those
/~.- er <-' - ' -

districts that have more property, or more valuable property, •\ are

';;:-;,.u~<---k--1~ cc- f>-G:.L·~l.J-L(l of ·~Lf-t.f1--l~u..;._.~'1· .<J2,c._c;:_ F"~.L--c..-

~ m·ore-capabie-of- raising--money-for-their-school~ In large measure,

'

these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher teacher
salaries to more teachers.

Therefore, the primary distinguishing

xibtXH attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower

~

\
\

pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.
This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance structure.

disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children
in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious

discrimination.

The District Court found that the State had failed

~

r "to establish a

A

,, .

6:... .
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reasonable basis for these-classification-.-' ..

F. Supp. at

~

We disagree.
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A
The Texas system ·s comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State

--.

79
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m- 1fsreliance on state as well

====------- ' .
/.'.

aS)

~ ~__.....

~ <rhe-power to tax local property for

educational
80 /

-·-

:u~~~~~as been r .e cognized in -~~~a~-~~~-~~ ~It~ ~'1a_~
:?~ ~l ~~~(%--v~~';_:;.tyv.._. _;:,~
ha-s-longzrc.ov}ded--th~e~to.ilssur~hat::ed. ucatiort:lS.. ,ConkoHed

~~ ~~l_o~
_:._~~_;:L ~7.~-f_~--· -----

-{
.j

at-:t-hs:l'ooal leve[ Wlien shifts in the distribution of ::ppc population,

.

accompanied by changes in local property wealth occasioned by
the growth of commercial and industrial centers, began to create
disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling
for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas educators
based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product of the pioneering work
lx of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George

81
D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig.

Their efforts were devoted to

establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educa-

~ ~,,_;_1-z-Jz._ _d.z..--~~r~t/ .t~ ~~~*..._
t ional program without sacrificing loca.l-eootr.ol.
1\

The Strayer-Haig

thesis represented an accommodation between these two competing
forces.

.

'

As articulated by Professor Coleman:

'

.'
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,;there will be more

than one constituionally permissible method
.

of solving them," and that,

within the limits of rationality' "the
t .·

blems" should be entitled
legislature's efforts to tackle the pro

to respect.
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And the question of the proper relationship between state boards of
education and local school boa.xls 1 in terms of their respective responY

sibility and degree of control, is now undergoing searching reexamination.
ls

It hardly need be said that none of these questions is amenable to intellir

gent resolution through the judicial process. Indeed, the ultimate wisdom
on these and like problems of education is not likely to be devined for all
time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. At
the very least, the judiciary should not circumscribe or handicapp- by
c

l

interposing inflexible constitutional constraints - the continued research

t
l,r

..
~

and experimentation so vital even to partial solutions and to keeping
abreast of changing conditions.

• •."i ..

..

- 43 relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate . .
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths
of our form of government each state's freedom to "serve as a
83
laboratory .

and try novel social and economic experiments. "
HOdti{:i;ltCZ

Rider A, Page 43

~

rJ
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The relief sought by appellees - certainly if all fiscal
"inequities" are to be obliterated - would require full state funding
of public schools. Only in this way can a state guarantee equality
in per pupil cost in each school throughout the state. Yet, despite
the virtual end of local participation which appellees' rationa:ewould

~><fl._ 4~~.J.
compel, they nevertheless acknowledge some merit in the <:-en'\lentional
dedication to local control of education.

*

*

\·

Larry: Here add a note generally to the effect that appellees - or at
least Professor Coons (whose theory they have adopted) - would preserve
a measure of local control through an untried technique called "district
power equalizing." Then, you might identify what this means and pick up
the substance of the draft of Rider A, Page 34. This may be a better place
for that type of commentary than back on page 34.

not be found irrational or baseless because, in practice, it results
in "some inequality. " McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961).

It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at

effectuates the State's goals.
485.

(

\

In giving substance to the presumption of validity to which

)

Texas' system is entitled, Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to remember

th~t

·I

at every

\
I·

stage of its development it has constituted a "rough accommodation"
of interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
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Appellees urge that,._. apart-..frem-the-questions--regardi.ng-\

.JGcal-control, the Texas system· s:f.-Hnanc.ing:....edueatiOR is unconstitutionally
arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources
II

..,,

II

''

to turn on happenstance. and fet !aity.

~

They G-Glltentl-that no justification
"\

1-tu·""t ~ 'l-L. .;...;..... 1...4 ~ J
ean-be-ef.fe-red for a system that allows the quality of education to
)

a-t,_

"

"
. f-cy--~·'l.L-1.---'
fluctuate on the basis of the' ~istor-icai-aoe-idents.a.n!.L:G-oineidenc-es
A

that-often....a.ccount for -the positioning of

; .. •!

the~

boundary

..
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lines of political subdivisions and f6r the location of valuable
commercial and industrial property.

But any scheme of local

taxation -indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental
units - requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that

9-1- ~

/~

are inevitably arbitrary. ~ ,E'qually inevitably,"' :it ~u4!.fiaem.a~ some

1-tt.e...-.;

c~-.'-"'-'

localities are going to be blessed withm more taxable assets,;\ Nor
is local wealth a static quantity.

J

.

Are boundary lines to be redrawn

with every shift in population or with every discovery of valuable
minerals or with the completion of every new industrial park?
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional
method of providing for education then it must be

~

equally

-~

impermissible in providing every other service currently financed
1\

from local::poproperty taxes, including local police and fire
~i--t- ~-t..<..l-~
ju..£~ ~ l-<-1-.J...:t<-{ ~-J.A.- Fu -1.-- c:-~
protection, public hospitals) and :'at-er-tr-eat-menHae1lit-ies. We e~-o---c.-" uz...
1\

~·2.

1\

J!..c-G<.._..J.?_,

perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of 'property
...
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is reasonably and .'raHonally-based. Its shortcomings are-well-known
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-and-T-exas-ha-s--made-no-effort-to-min-imize-their-existene-e-here.

~~<~-o-<AJL - ·?~cc..rc..t.~-M:t ~~-~-t...--t.--'

- fo

~~~·+~

I ~ ~e-Stat~-has_pers-i-stently-endea.V-or..ed,-llOweve·r;-to-C\Jmp-en-sare

I

~ cl.<---j--f_.:_.r..e~-""1-- ~ _e£-<~~ c:~ ~7"--ft..x..~~ ~

or--the--fa·ilings-ef-.its-system-;--And-we--are-unable-to-say,-given·t~e

t

1 ~ ~~---2-~-t-~ ~ r-tu._ CL~.t..--(. .<.4- ~~-~_L__.}/,.._, ..--~-z-<:"'';/f11r
-omplex,itY-Of-'-this-Jn()st-signifieant-stat~unetion;-that-Texas'
•

..R..~ - /J-d~~~~-V'-'

..

udg-rrrents-m-tlrtscrreaarennrenTifled-to-respect.

--

."

. -~--·-

.
· ---

I

I

-.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school finance

results in discriminati>ry treatment of children who happen to reside
in certain districts, we cannot say that such discrimination is the
product of a

syste~

that is

~-Efflftbl€-8.1*f

without rational basis.
u.~~'---L

Its shortcomings have been acknowledged by Texas, and-it has

:rmx persistently endeavored

- not without success - to ameliorate

the differences in levels of expenditure without destroying the
lhnu~ed

acknowledged benefits of local participation.
~

that the Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, ill conceived
~--~~

legislation.

It is certainly not the product of intended discrimination
·\

against any group or class. On the contrary, it is rooted in decades
t-4.)

of experience in Texas and elsewhere,

and{~

in major part the
A

)4---1~£cu:-T
.
nmk-reS\tit of responsible studies ffiafte by qualified people. One
r\

also must remember, when weighing the issue of rationality,
~ c~.£4>~;7-J!)..._ ( TP~~
that the T-e:HQS system' is not peculiar to -that. or to any other state.
A

~

Yfo<-
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As-conceded-by-appellees,~

the Texas plan for financing public

~ - ~ ;:6;

education reflects what leadin-g educators for a half century have·

'.

'

<.

.

.

..
2.
thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there
is no perfect solution. We are unwilling, even if it were the function
of a court, to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to
that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 states,
especially where the alternative proposed is only recently conceived
and nowhere yet adopted.

The constitutional test is whether there

is a rational basis for the challenged state action. We hold that
the Texas plan abundantly meets this test.
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IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on the
District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor,
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary
postscript seems appropriate.

These decisions have been wJ..Qe:ly-
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that-have-impeded state legislative reform. The~ decisions have

U-

A

been various touted as the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to

k

fer the urban crisis in education.

Indeed, in their enthusiasm for

~...,w2.A-

-f.-.i a...i!12~; ~·~ d..-:e...-.<·-G.<-- f<;--L _
the result{ the--rec-ent--pFoponents of "fiscal neutrality" have given
c.t 'J-t.A .........a!~~
85
it mu<!h more credit than its architects have ever claimed.
"\

iW

~tr:.Yetrufh- is,

~
~

as il:.crffisingl;;;:.ore

ca"m;;e~t~;o~~--~r~!

coming to recognize, eradication of the property-tax basis and
implementation of "fiscally neutral" alternatives would have highly
questionable consequences.

-----:-

. . .___,___.,-----

...

At least one detailed

empirical~

v

.

Rider Az Page 47, Rodriguez 12/15/72

The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness of the concept and the absence of a broader base of empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of
the "fiscal neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have begun
to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be recognized
that the abrupt eradication of the property tax basis and the implementation
of "fiscally neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly
different from those initially assumed.

85a

There is, in particular,

increasing concern as to whether the Coons plan would not in fact be
counter-productive especiallym; to the lowest income families who tend
to r~ide in urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
in~ustrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to
I

I

, ihe relationship between poverty, race and educational expenditure t n
I

Texas were relied on by the District Court, see note

\

-

, supra, has\
\
\

J

/

'

since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to \
the P,t esent system of educational finance. Berke, Inequalities in School
~e,

33-84, 66-69 (1972). That study indicates that it is entirely

l

I

po ssiblle that an equal-expenditures alternative to the present system
1

would lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the
major urban areas. 85b At least one detailed empirical study also has
concluded that there is no dependable correlation between the location
of impoverished families and the presence of inferior schools. 86
In view of these uncertainties, if this Court were sitting as a

policy tribunal we would hesitate to embrace - at least at this time the ultimate efficacy of the appealing egalitarian concept which launched
this case.

I

o,

\:.

- 48 -

----- --- ------·~ . ---. .,*-·-·---· ·-----·

---\

study has e:: demonstrated that thereis no dependable correlation
.
~

I

between the location of impoverished families and the presence

(

86
of inferior schools.

Nor is there at this time any more than a

random chance that racial minorities will be clustered in school
districts that are short-changed in terms of assessable property.

(
Moreover, there is no reason to suspect -and some reason to fear -

)

vn

that any alternative form of financing is likely to increase the flow
.

I

88

A

of educational imputs into our urban core areas.

I

Under such

uncertain circumstances, if this Court sat as a policy tribunal,

_____ __

we might doubt the ultimate efficacy of the attractive egalitarian
,

.:._

\1

_____ _[

hta~~~-1::'--'
The GJ.OO:i" limitations on this Court's constitutional ili:mt

"
function restrain us from embarking upon xkJ any such political
or philosophical undertaking.

That role is reserved for Congress

and for the state legislative bodies and we do n·o violence to the
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
~6.1 .~4t .:-o..et2~.~- l-1~
k
S<H.ong-as this Court's action today is not viewed as placing its

WL
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·udicial impramatur on the status quo - so long as the lawmakers
nd those who select them do not embrace our holding as an

d

endorsement of an educational system in need of reform -we
-n,' e.

I

89

\'~ old friends of the children" can do nothing more for this

)

\

'!'constituency" than to defer to those more suited to the thorough

syst~~~~~~-y!t~~:_-----~--

_ _ -·-------

Reversed.

~

Rider A, p. 34 Rodriguez

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not
a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected
to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws which involve suspect classifications or fundamental constitutional rights •

..

Rider A, Page 42, Rodriguez 12/14/72

The value of local control of education was recognized
last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright
v. Council of City of llinporia, 40 _U.s. _(1972). Mr. Justice
Stewart stated there that "Ld/irect control over decisions vitally
affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly
felt in our society." Id. a t _ . Likewise, the Chief Justice
admonished that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued
public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance
from an educational standpoint as well." Id. at _ _

\I

\.
I
I'

\

\

•._ •'•Y :: •

nour1guez

Rider A, Page 43 liD·~

12/14/72

The relief sought by appellees - certainly if all fiscal
"inequities" are to be allliterated- would require full state funding
of public schools. Only in this way can a state guarantee equality
in per pupil cost in each school throughout the state. Yet, despite
the virtual end of local participation which appellees' rationa.Bwould
compel, they nevertheless acknowledge some merit in the conventional
dedication to local control of education.

Larry: Here add a note generally to the effect that appellees- or at
least Professor Coons (whose theory they have adopted) - would preserve
a measure of local control through an untried technique called "district
power equalizing." Then, you might identify what this means and pick up
the substance of the draft of Rider A, Page 34. This may be a better place
for that type of commentary than back on page 34.
i

J

*

IV.
In light of the considerable attention that has focused
on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California
precedessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241
(1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot
be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the

District Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval
in public education. And many commentators have concluded
that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs
that might be devised and approved, the result could simply not
avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is utlaoc nothing
I

simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases,
there is nothing simple about predicting the consequences

of .
I

I
'

massive change in educational finance. Those who have devoted
the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of
these cases have found no simple, dependable a''**'' answers an, d
their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the
desirability of change.

I

,> ~~·

;

...

The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by
the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be aaid
with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or the
children in overburdened core-city school districts will be
benefitted by abrogation of traditional modes of financial education.
Unless there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures
on education across the board .. an event the likelihood of which
is open to considerable question

111

- these groups stand to

realize gains in terms of increased per pupil expenditures
only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively
low levels, i.e., in those districts that would benefit from the
redistribution of existing resources. Yet recent studies have
indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered
in the most impecunious school districts.ll2 • Nor does it now
appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial
minorities are co!X!entrated in property-poor districts. 1131 Additionally, several research projects have concluded that an}r
fina!X!ing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality Gf
I

expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower
tional expenditures in the major urban centers,

•

""-!

....

114

edUt~a,

a result

that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing conditions in those areas.
These practical considerations, of course, play no
role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented
here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional
limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes
of the various states, and we do no violence to the values of
I
I

I

federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. we

'
I

hardly need add that this Court's action today is not b> be vieW\ed
\

as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need
is apparent for reform in tax systems which tnay well have relied \
\

too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly
innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods and its
funding, is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and
greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much

''

by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come

from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of
those who elect them.

·•

.

Rider A, p. 1 (Rodriguez) 2/11/73

Rather than focus on the unique features of the alleged
discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed
their answers by a two step process of analysis: since some poorer
~

people receive less expensive education than other more affluent people
/\

'

under the traditional systems of financing public schools, these
systems discriminate on the basis of wealth.

In this simplistic

approach, the hard threshold questions have been largely ignored:
what precisely is

the~

asserted discrimination, how is the

class of disadvantaged "poor" to be defined or identified, and has
the discrimination resulted in an absolute deprivation or merely
some relative disadvantage characteristic of a free democracy?
Before a State's laws and its justification of the challenged classification
bl are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold
questions must be examined.xiXJr far more analytically than they
were in the court below.

J

Rodriguez Rider A, p. 14 (12/26/72)

(i) the class claimed to be disadvantaged (all citizens in the poor
school districts) is diverse and amorphous; and (ii) the injury alleged
is in no sense an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit.

1. The cases reliel.upon by appellees have involved
indigents - a specific and identifiable class. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
44
and their progeny, the state laws invalidated were found to deny a
fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents.

Similarly, in

Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971), we struck down criminal penalties that subjected
indigents to incarceration simply because they were unable to pay
fines.

In each of those cases, the Court was not dealing with some

undefined class characterized as "the poor", but with a level of
absolute poverty (indigency) which rendered each complainant
totally unable to pay for the state-proffered benefit.
The first difficulty with appellees argument is that the
class simply cannot be ascertained if it is defined as "the poor"
rather than all persons who live in the particular school district.

2.
Once we depart from the accepted standard of indigency, the word
"poor" describes no identifiable class of persons except in a
relative sense.

This Court has never tested the validity of legislation

under the 14th Amendment by asking whether it discriminates against
the relatively poor in favor of the relatively rich. Or, putting it
differently, in a society as diverse as ours - and in which there is
no stratification of citizens into social or economic classes - it would
be impossible to draw constitutional lines on the basis of who is

relatively rich as compared with who is relatively poor.
The difficulty with such a formulation is well illustrated
by this case.

Appellees have endeavored to show generally that

to reside in relatively poorer districts.

Perhaps this is true as

a generalization with respect to some districts. It is certainly
not acceptable as an invariable premise. Indeed, as studies in
other states have indicated, there is reason to believe that the
poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest
45

districts.

' '

Rider A, p. 17 Rodriguez 12/26/72

The mere asking of this question suggests the difficulty if not impossibility - of answering it in the courts. Whether any
particular form, level or extent of education is "adequate" depends
upon so many variables, and inherently is such a subjective
inquiry, that the experts disagree widely.* But even if there were
some formula which enabled the Court to KERifilx conclude that
inadequate education is being provided, the problem of devising
and implementing an appropriate remedy would remain.
*Larry: Either make some cross reference to other notes or
supply some general reference - if you have one.

Rider A, p. 18 Rodriguez (12/26/72)

Yet any alternative system which falls short of providing
equal expenditures per pupil (or at least per district) will inevitably
result in continued disparities. Perhaps it could be argued, under
some such system, that the disparities of expenditures wire

"

~

less than under the present system. Again, in

an area in which there are no absolutes and few objective standards,
who is to say what level of disparity is discriminatory or results
in an x inadequate education?* If, as the logic of appellees' position
would require, the remedy were to be equal expenditures on a
per pupil or per district basis, the result would not necessarily
benefit the children of

relatively~

poorer :JiaaDtldtHxx families.

As noted elsewhere in this opinion, in view of the tendency of low

-1--ftv~~~

income families to live in districts witli) comme rcial and industrial
properties,

th&-r~1.dt

of an equal expenditure remedy would beaefit

.

~~

tj-t~~a~t;:=~ in others.

We have

not been confronted with any such episodic and unpredictable
result in prior cases involving elements of wealth discrimination.
*Larry: If we use this rider, there should be~ cross
references here to one or two of the footnotes which discuss the
practical and political problems of adopting some different system
as being constitutionally mandated: e. g. notes 85 and 92.
~ j:-

Larry: Here, we could cross reference to the text pp. 15 and
43.

Comment to Larry:
I am not at all satisfied with this Rider.

Perhaps the

difficulty results from our discussing the "remedy" as well as
whether equal protection has been denied.

As the main thrust

of the opinion at this point is focused on the equal protection
analysis (no absolute deprivation or denial), perhaps a discussion
in the text of the "remedy" problem is a distraction. We might
drop it into a note or omit entirely.

Rider B, p. 18 Rodriguez 12/26/72

There are, then, two significant differences between the
present case and those relied on by theJlistrict e ourt as supporting
its finding of wealth discrimination: The class, being diverse and
amorphous, cannot be identified with sufficient exactitude; and
there is no absolute deprivation of the right or benefit in question.
These differences would be sufficient to cast serious :DecxK doubt
as to the correctness of thej hstrict cimrt's holding.

There is,

however, a further ground for questioning the soundness of that
court's constitutional analysis.

A finding of wealth discrimination

alone has never been held to constitute a sufficient basis for

52
subjecting state legislation to the compelling interest test.

l•

. •...

ry

.HJ

ron Hlaer A, p. o

Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed
seriously the fact that there is no absolute deprivation of the asserted
right as there was in each of the foregoing cases. The argument
here is not that the children in Edgewood District were receiving
no public education; rather, it is that they were probably receiving
a poorer quality of education than the children of Alamo District
because expenditures per pupil in that richer district were
substantially greater.

~for subsequent comment whether
Cill!fi!i /JJie/ tnk'·"*J

!c-Y.£> ~/

there is ReeessarHy 1 correlation between the quality of education
and the cost thereof, a sufficient answer to appellees argument is

~~~
that the equal protection clause does not fD1X require absolute /f

~~ {Jr2- ~

·e~

'Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables and the

nature of the education process, can any system assure equal quality

1~~~
1\ except in the most relative sense.
Texas does assert that the Maximum Foundation Program
provides an "adequate" education for all children in the state. By
assuring teachers, books transportation and operating funds, the
*Can we cite a case or two for this.?

, ... '

:

'·

2.
Texas legislature intended to "guarantee, for the welfare of the
state as a whole, that all people shall have at least an adequate
program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum
49

Foundation Program of Education. '"

The state's repeated

assertion in this case that Texas has fulfilled this intention and
that it now assures "every child in every school district an
50

adequate education" has not been refuted by any evidence offered
at the trial. Even had such evidence been offered, the prior
decisioss of this Court would not have required a judicial evalution
of relative differences in the quality of BD a service

made

ru-e;..,~~~~
availablejto all 11J1X1D persons within a particular political subdivision."'

But appellees press their claim on a somewhat different

\
and novel basis. They argued, and the Xlri.staldcUa District Court's
opinion in effect holds, that invidious wealth discrimination

\
~~

\

nonetheless inheres in the Texas system on the ground that
I

expeJJ.ditures for education (and hence its quality) are directly
i

cottrelated to the wealth of school districts. As a predicate for this
I

I

-·-1~-----

*lparry - Is this a good place to put the eases you cite on p. 9?
/

3.
holding, the District Court found that those districts most rich in
property .•. have the highest median family income •.. while the
poor districts are poorer in income • . • . " 337 F. Supp. at 282.
This finding is based on an affidavit provided by Prof. Joele S.
Berke of Syracuse University, who submitted an exhibit :zatx
reflecting a statistical examination of approximately one tenth of
Texas' school districts. Prof. Berke's exhibit, and an analysis of
the correlations deduced tila»idutherefrom, are set forth in the
margin below. The District Court further concluded on the basts of
the Bwckaix Berke statistics that relatively wealthy districts spend
:ma: relatively more on education while relatively poorer families

reside in poorer districts that devote relatively less to education
(Larry: should we not cite the page in the District Court's opinion).
Although the relevancy of this conclusion may be doubted even if
it were supported by the evidence, the fact is that the principal
thrust of the Berke exhibit is precisely to the contrary of what the
lower court found. As shown in the margin below (note_) only
14 of thexwt 110 districts examined, or 12. 7% of the sample,
'I
I

I
I

\

i",

1

I

'

'·

4.
reflect the correlation which would lead to the District Court's
finding, while the other districts point toward a contrary conclusion.
It is evident, therefore, that the relationship relied upon below -

between educational expenditures and median income and between
expenditures and the quality of education - is attenuated at best.
Note 55.
We thus look in vain for a theory or

an~

analysis

that identifies a disadvantaged class with the exactitude required
by the equal protection clause. Certainly there is no "suspect"
class comparable to racial minorities, aliens or indigents. The
asserted discrimination is one based on wealth -not of a definable
group but of a geographical area embraced within a school district.
The class alleged to be disadvantaged within the district is ioxswabyx
loosely characterized as the "poor". But once we depart from
the accepted category of indigency the word "poor" describes no

\

\

\

identifiable class of persons except in the most relative sense.
'\

This Court has never illllx tested the validity of legislation under
II '

the 14th Amendment by asking whether it discriminates against the
relatively poor in favor of the r elatively rich.

... 1.1!; ,.,

:"' ,.....

5.
But accepting arguenda that there may be a class disadvantaged
on account of its relative lack of wealth, we next consider appellees
contention that education must be included among the small circle
of rights that heretofore have been found to be "fundamental",
requiring a compelling state interest to justify any classification
57

which interferes with the exercise thereof.

Rider A, p. 9 Rodriguez (12/30/72)

theory is founded on an unproved assumption,

n~ely,

that

the quality of education varies directly w·
funds expended on · .

Appellees~

argue, and sought to prove,
l

~

that there is a correlation between"personal wealth of citizens ~

~
-i district and the expenditures therein for education.

They then

submit that the poorer a person is the less adequate is the quality
of education he receives from the ~ate.
Ld.
~
~.e<-tt.<J... ~

(~1,,_,{1

...; 1

..

'4::>

The principal evidence

~

Aetll:nRitteel ~support~- the comparative discrimination theory is
!'~
the affidavit of ..Pre£; Xfle Joele S. Berke of

University.

~

Syracuse

Relying in major part upon this affidavit, the District

Court accepted the substance of appellees' theory.

First, it noted

a direct correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured
in terms of assessable property per

•

wi'H11"1

pup~) and

their levels of per

pupil expenditures. Second, the Court found a direct correlation
between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,
measured in terms of median family income.

337 F. Supp. at 282.

).

2.
If, in fact, these two correlations could be sustained,

appellees' theory would still face grave and unanswered question,s,
including: what degree of correlation would constitute a sufficient
basis for concluding that the financing system is designed to

I§

operate

58

to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor,

and

whether a class of this size, diversity and amorphous character
could ever claim the special protection

acc ~ed

•

Neither of these questions need be addressed

H

*

"suspect" classifications?
in this case, however,

since appellees' proof falls far short of supporting their

~

allegations / or the conclusions of the District Court.
The correlation conclusions of that court are based on a survey
made by Prof. Berke of approximately 10% of the Texas school districts.

*The classification based on comparisons between districts is essentially
one based on property and geography rather than people. Moreover,
as shown, supra p.
of this opinion, there is no reason to believe and certainly no proof in this case - that the relatively poor (however
defined) are concentrated in the districts with the least property
values. Nor is there reason to believe that there are not significant
variations in "wealth" among the citizens of any particular district.

B1derA, p. 3 Rodriguez(12/30/72)

Each of these descriptions of the class may well be too vague
and imprecise to identify a classification for equal protection purposes.
It

:itx

is clear, in any event, that the class as designated under each

of these forumlations is markedly dissimilar to the types of classes
involved in the precedents relied upon by appellees and the court
below and lacks the traditional indicia that have rendered other
classifications suspect.

Rider A, p. 9 Rodriguez (12/30/72)

This theory is founded on an unproved assumption, namely, that
the quality of education varies directly with the amount of public
funds expended on it. Appellees then argue, and sought to prove,
that there is a correlation between personal wealth of citizens of
a district and the expenditures therein for education. They then
submit that the poorer a person is the less adequate is the quality
of education he receives from the state. The principal evidence
submitted in support of the comparative discrimination theory is
the affidavit of Prof. :De Joele S. Berke of

~afh

Syracuse

University. Relying in major part upon this affidavit, the District
Court accepted the substance of appellees• theory. First, it noted
a direct correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured
in terms of assessable property per pupil and their levels of per

pupil expenditures.
between district
measured

Secon~-~.,

wealf~;.l

in-~erms

the Court

t~d 9-

direct correlation

and the personal wealth of its residents,

of median family income. 337 F. Supp. at 282.

~ A • ,.'0. .t

,.

2.
If, in fact, these two correlations could be sustained,

appellees' theory would still face grave and unanswered question,s,
including: what degree of correlation would constitute a sufficient
basis for concluding that the financing system is desi.gned top operate
58

to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor,

and

whether a class of this size, diversity and amorphous character

*

could ever claim the special protection accoded "suspect" classifications?
Neither of these questions need be addressed 11 in this case, however,
since appellees' proof falls far short of supporting their~
allegations for the conclusions of the District Court.
The correlation conclusions of that court are based on a survey
made by Prof. Berke of approximately 10% of the Texas school districts.

*The classification based on comparisons between districts is essentially
one pased on property and geography rather than people. Moreover,
as shown, supra p.
of this opinion, there is no reason to believe and certainly no proof in this case - that the relatively poor (however
defined) are concentrated in the districts with the least property
values. Nor is there reason to believe that there are not significant
variations in "wealth" among the citizens of any particular district.

Rodriguez Rider A, p. 44 (12/29/72)

The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional
function restrain us from undertaking through the judiciary the
initiation of fundamental reforms in state taxation and education subjects of great complexity and vital concern to the states and
localities. That role is reserved for the legislative processes of
the various states, and we do no violence to the Dll: values of
federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed
as placing its judicial kR:p:u: imprimatur on the status quo. The
need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And
certainly innovative new thinking as to public education is necessary
to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity.

..
,,

...... ..
~

Rider A, P. 1

Rodriguez

The District Court vaguely identified the class as all citizens
in "poor school districts," obviously too imprecise a definition
to merit serious consideration. Viewing the appellees' case in
the most favorable light, we find no identifiable class or group
of individuals that bears any similarity to the class involved in
any of the precedents relied on by appellees or the court below.
Indeed, whether the class here involved be deemed citizens of
poor districts, children in such districts, or the poor in such
districts, the result is a diverse and amorphous class not susceptible of rational identification. Our inquiry might well end
at this point. In view, however, of the importance of this case
and fact that other courts apparently have accepted the asserted 1
basis for equal protection relief, we will now test in detail appellees'
\

claims against the precedents relied upon.

\

Rodriguez Rider

Az

p. 14 (12/26/72)

(i) the class claimed to be disadvantaged (all citizens in the poor

school districts) is divers and amorphous; and (ii) the injury alleged
is in no sense an absolute deprivation of the desired beaefit.
1. The cases relieLupon by appellees have involved
indigents - a specific and identifiable class.. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v.

Californ~

372 U.S. 353 (1963),

44
and their progeny, the state laws invalidated were found to deny a
tair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. Similarly, in
~illia~~

v. Illinois, 399 U.s. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short2 401

U.S. 395 (1971), we struck down criminal penalties that subjected
indigents to incarceration simply because they were unable to pay
fines. In each of those eases, the Court was not dealing with some
undef4ned class characterized as "the poor", but with a level of
absolute poverty (indigeney) which rendered each complainant
totally unable to pay for the state-proffered benefit.
The first difficulty with appellees argument is that the
class simply cannot be ascertained if it is defined as "the poor"
rather than all persons who live in the particular school district.

2.
Once we depart from the accepted standard of :lndigency, the word
"poor" describes no identifiable class of persons except in a
relative sense. This Court has never tested the validity of legislation

I

under the 14th Amendment by asking whether it discriminates against

/

the relatively poor in favor of the relatively rich. Or, putting it
differently, in a society as diverse as ours - and in which there is
no stratification of citizens into social or economic classes - it would
be impossible to draw constitutional lines on the basis of who is

relatively rich as compared with who is relatively poor.
The difficulty with such a formulation is well illustrated
by this case. Appellees have endeavored to show generally that
children from relatively poorer faBtblkfe!ia.Wwaidnecl families tend
to reside in relatively poorer districts. Perhaps this is true as
a generalization with respect to some districts. It is certainly
not acceptable as an invariable premise. Indeed, as studies in
other states have indicated, there is reason to believe that the
poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest
45

districts.

I

.:.··

'\

Comment to Larry:
I am not at all satisfied with this Rider. Perhaps the
difficulty results from our discussing, at this point, the "remedy"
as well as whether equal protection has been denied. As the main
thrust of the opinion at this point is focused on the equal protection
analysis, perhaps a discussion in the text of the "remedy" problem
is a distraction. We might drop it into a note or omit entirely•

...

~der

A, p. 16 Rodr_iguez 12/26/72

There is no absolute deprivation of education and no showing that
the quality of education provided is not reasonably adequate. The
application of c onventtonal equal protection analysis to this situation
presents

:aJb(itB:

unique problems, first, in identifying the alleged

invidious discrimination and, second, if such is found to exist,
in devising an appropriate constitutional remedy.

Rider A, p. 17 Rodriguez 12/26/72

The mere asking of this question suggests the difficulty if not impossibility - of answering it in the courts.

Whether any

particular form, level or extent of education is "adequate" depends
upon so many variables, and inherently is such a subjective
inquiry, that the experts disagree widely.* But even if there were
some formula which enabled the Court to B:BII.Itiu conclude that
inadequate education is being provided, the problem of devising
and implementing an appropriate remedy would remain.
*Larry: Either make some cross reference to other notes or
supply some general reference - if you have one.

Rider A, p. 18 Rodr1S\!ez (12/26/72)

Yet any alternative system which falls short of providing
equal expenditures per pupil (or at least per district) will inevitably
result in continued disparities. Perhaps it could be argued, under
some such system, that the disparities of expenditures ware
uiadtx: relatively less than under the present system. Again, in

an area in which there are no absolutes and few objective standards,
who is to say what level of disparity is discriminatory or results
in an a inadequate education?* If, as the logic of appellees' position
would require, the remedy were to be equal expenditures on a
per pupil or per district basis, the result would not nec-Jssarily
benefit the children of relatively JPClCI&' poorer b'*tOM••x families.
As noted elsewhere in this opinion, in view of the tendency of low

income families to live in districts with commercial and industrial
properties, the result of an equal expenditure remedy would benefit
the poor in some instances and penalize them in others. We have

\
not been confronted with any such episodic and unpredictable
result in prior cases involving elements of wealth discrimination.
*Larry: If we use this rider, there should be it11WXCMCBB CrOSS
references here to one or two of the footnotes which discuss tine
practical and political problems of adopting some different sy·s tem
as being constitutionally mandated: e. g. notes 85 and 92.
'
Larry: Here, we could cross reference to the text pp. 15 and
43.

. ..

Rider B, p. 18 Rodriguez 12/26/72

There are, then, two significant differences between the
present ease and those relied oo by the district court as supporting
its findin of wealth discrimination: The class, being diverse and
amorphous, cannot be identified with sufficient exactitude; and
there is no absolute deprivation of the right or benefit in question.
These differences would be sufficient to east serious rclll!iiaoc: doult
as to the correctness of the district court's holding. There is,
however, a further ground for questioning the soundness of that
court's constitutional analysis. A finding of wealth discrimination
alone has never been held to constitute a sufficient basis for
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subjecting state legislation to the compelling interest test.

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT

v. RODRIGUEZ

RDRAFT SYLLABUS

(Based on draft
No. 4 of the opinion)
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
v. RODRIGUEZ et aL

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas
No. 71-1332. Argued October 12, 1972 ... Decided

, 1973

The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in
Texas ia a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the
revenues •re derived from a largely state-funded program designed to
provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each
district supplements state aid through an ad valoeem tax on property
within its jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class action on behalf of
school children said to be members of poor families who reside in school
districts having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas
system's reliance on local property taxatioo favors the more affluent
and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from
differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The
District Court, finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that
education is a "fundamental" right, concluded that the system could be
upheld only upon a showing, whibh appellants failed to make, that there
was a compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded

- 2-

that appellants failed even to demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis
for the state's system. Held: The Texas school-financing system does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pp. 14-49.

( 1) This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws
under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is reserved
for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect
classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. P. 14-40.
(a) Thelexas system does not disadvantage any suspect class.
It has not been shown to discriminate against ay definable class of
. -~ ~ ..,
.

''poor" people or to occasion relative discriminations depending on the
relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as the
flnancing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their individual
income characteristics, reside in relatively poor school district., the
resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. Pp. 14-24.
(b) Nor does the Texas school-financing system impermissibly
interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right or liberty. Though
education is one of the most important services performed by the State
it is not within the limited category of rights and liberties recognized
~this

Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if some identifiable

' ..

- 3quantum of education is arguably entitled to constitutional protection to
make meaningful the exercise of other constitutional rights, here there
is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal
skills necessary for that purpose. Pp. 25-35.
(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke
strict scrutiny since it involves the most delicate and difficult questions
of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism,

considerations counseling am.re restrained form of review. Pp. 35-40.
(2) The Texas sytem, though concededly imperfect, bears a
r ational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. While assuring
basic education for every child in the Sttlte, it permits and encourages
participation in and significant cootrol of each district's schools at the
local level. Pp. 40-49.
337 F. Supp. 280, reversed.

:rmangucz
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FOOTNOTES
1. Not all of the children of these complainants attend
public school.

One family's children are enrolled in private

school "because of the condition of the schools in the Edgewood
Independent School District. " Third Amended Complaint,

~

app. at 14.
2.

The San Antonio Independent School District, whose

name this case still bears, was one of seven school districts
in the San Antonio metropolitan area which were originally named
as party defendants.

After a pretrial conference, the District

Court issued an order dismissing the school districts from the
case.

Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District

has joined in the plaintiffs' challenge to the State's school finance
system and has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that
position in this Court.
3.

A three-judge court was properly convened and

there are no questions as to the <;!istrict

.

-;:

~ourt' s

=

jurisdiction

2.
or the direct appealability of its judgment.

28 U. S.C.

§§

2281,
"

1253.
4.

The trial was delayed for two years )'it;o6ct~·~ to permit

extensive pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending
Texas legislative investigation concerning the need for reform of
its public school finance system.
School Dist.,

5.

- - F. Supp.

--

F. Supp.

Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind.

__, - - n.

11 (W. D. Tex. 1971).

The District Court stayed its

mandate for two years to provide Texas with an opportunity to
remedy the inequities found in its financing program.

The court,

however; retained jurisdiction to fashion its own remedial order
if the State failed to offer an acceptable plan.
6.

Id. at _ _

Tex. Const., Art. X, Sec. 1:

A general diffusion of knowledge being essential
to the preservation of the ~ rights and liberties
of the people it shall be the duty of the Legislature
of this State to make suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of public schools. "
11

Id. , Art. fk X, Sec. 2:
"The Legislature shall as early as practicable
establish free schools throughout the State, and
shall furnish means for their support, by taxation
on property. "

3.
· 7.

Tex. Canst. 1876, Art. 7, Sec. 3, as amended, Aug.

14, 1883.
8.

Tex. Canst. , Art. 7, § § 3, 4, 5.

9.

Gammel's Laws of Texas p. 1178. See Tex. Canst. ,

Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 (interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor's
Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge and the

-Chance
- 27 (1969)
10.

Tex. Canst., Art. 7,

~ommentary);

11.

[hereinafter Governor's Committee Report].
§

5 (see also the interpretive

V Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12.

Tex. Canst., Art. 7, Sec. 3, as amended Nov. 5,

1918 (see interpretive commentary).
12. I Governor's Committee Report, at 35; J. Coons,
W. Clune, S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education
49 (1970); E. Cubberley, School Funds and Their Apportionment
21-27 (1905).
13. By 1940 one-half of the state's population was
clustered in its metropolitan centers.
Report, at 3 5.

I Governor's Committee

4.
14.

Aiken
Gilmer-kKkfax Committee, To Have What We Must (1948).

15.

R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken B~lls 11-12 (1950);

'

Texas Bd. of Educ. , The Texas Statewide School Adequacy Survey
(1938).
16.

R. Still, supra note 15, at 12.

17.

1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1939,

at 274 ($22. 50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th
Legis/ Reg. Sess. 1943, ch. 161, at 262 ($25. 00 per student).

r_

18.

General Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg.

Sess. 1945, ch. 53, at 75.
19.

For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of

a foundation program, see R. Stills, supra note 15. See also

?
/

V Governor's Committee Report, at 14; Texas Reserach League,
~

Public School Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972).
20.

For the 1970-71 school year this state aid program

accounted for 48. o% of all public school funds.

Local taxation

contributed 41. 1% and 10. 9% was provided in federal funds.
Research League, supra note 19, at 9.

<'

Texas

5.
21.

V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48 .

22.

At present there are 1, 161 school districts in Texas.

Texas Research League, at 12.
22a. In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that
some school districts were not levying any local tax to support
I f-f-G-4..

education.

J

Gilmer-Aiken Comml\' supra note

11._, at 16.

, v e ~o
r:J f ~ I J..f,J t~~ f JG".
23. Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Have \1/ftat \tie M~s~
(J..

) ;

24. I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
25.

Texas Research League, supra note_, at 2.

26.

In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average

per pupil expenditure for all current operating expenses increased
·from $206 to $493. In that same period capital expenditures
increased from $44 to $102 per:::pppupil. I Governor's Committee
Report, at 53:-54.

'(;Ct.. .:r::ri.
27.

.xJo v ·O· I1t~J.f C., t;-;nm ' ff~~ l?epoJ· ij ~ 1/3 -'it. ~

The Available School Fund, technically, provides a

second source of State money.

,·

'I11at Fund has continued as in

6.
years past (see text accompanying notes _ _ _ supra)to
distribute uniform per pupil grants to every district in the state.
In 1968 this Fund allotted $98 per pupil.

However, because the

available School Fund xxtx contribution is always subtracted
from a district's entitlement under the Foundation Program, it
plays no significant role in educational finance today.
28.

While the federal

ass~stance

has an ameliorating effect

on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor
districts, the District Court rejected an argument made by x
the State in that court that it should consider the effect of the
federal grant in assessing the discrimination claim.
at

F. Supp.

. The state has not renewed that contention here.
29.

The figures quoted above vary slightly from those

utilized in the District Court opinion/\ _

.

F. Supp. at __. These

trivial differences are apparently a product of that court's reliance
on slightly different statistical data than we kxwmoo have relied upon.
30.

Texas Research League, supra note __, at 13.

_.

7.
31.

The District Court relied on the firidings presented

in an affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His
sampling of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct
correlation between the amount of a district's taxable property and
its level of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct
correlation between a district's median family inc.ome and per
pupil RXJmlUlK expenditures as well as an inverse correltion
between percentage of minorities and expenditures.
Categorized by Equalized Property Values,
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue
Market Value of
Taxable Property
Per Pupilt

J

,
I

Above $100,000
(10 Districts)
$100,000-$50,000
(26 Districts)
$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
( 40 Districts)
Below $10,000
( 4 Districts)

Median Family
Income From
196~

Per Cent State & Local
Minority Revenues Per
Pupils'
Pupil\

$5,900

8%

$815

$4,425

32%

$544

$4,900

23%

$483

$5,050

31%

$462

$3,325

79%

$305

Alth~u~- the ! acc~racy~h~ correlations with respect to family
income and race appear only to exist at the extremes, and
d - -although the affiant's methodology has been questioned (see Goldstein,
Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing; a Critial Analysis

J

8.
of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504,
(1972)), insofar as any of these three correlations is relevant
to the constitutional thesis presented in this

case~

we may

accept its basic thrust.
32.

~· ~·

, Police Dep. of City of Chicago v.

Mosley, 40_ U. S.

- - (1972);

~

Dunn v. Blumstein, 40

U.S.

(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
33.

~· ~·

, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.

(1970);

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
34.

§~

Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.

_,

(1972) and

:sk the cases collected therein.

35.

Appellants' brief, at 11.

36. Id.
37.

Tr. or. arg. 1 at 3.

38.

~· ~·,

Griffin v. Illinois,

~

351 U.S. 12 (1956);

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
39. Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1964);
McDonald v. Bd. of Elections, 394 U.S. 803 (1969); Bullock v.
Cart.er, 40

U.S. _

(1972).

,.(

•.'

\

9.
40.

See cases cited in text at

infra.
--~~[ _OA ~ ~;)

41.

As indicated in

question whether

EX -

~

note

supra, there is reason to

even in Texas - there is a direct correlation

between family wealth measured by inc orne and district wealth
measured by assessed

~

property valuations.

Studies in other

States have found even less correlation. Ridenour & Ridenour,
Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L.
213, 225 (1972)

~"it

can be argued that there exists in Kansas

:almost an inverse correlation: districts with highest income per
.pupil have low assessed value per pupil, and districts with high
. assessed value per pupil have low income per pupil. "); Davies,
The Challenge of Change in School Finance, in Nat'l Educational
Ass'n, lOth Annual Conf. on School Finance (1967).
42. Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance

Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L.
Rev. 1303, 1328-29 ( 1972).
43.

-Id. at 1324:m:x n. 102.

4'..;;

,.

I'

.1

10.
44.

Id.
iXk at 1328.

45.

Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, · 401 U.S. 371 (1971) in

which an indigent's due process right of access to a divorce
tribunal was found not to require more than "meaningful opportunity"
to obtain a divorce.

Id. at 379-380.

The Court did not command

that the procedures available for rich and poor be equal: it only
required that they be adequate and effective.
46.

Id. at 382.

Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra note _ , at

13 (emphasis added).
47.

Appellants' brief, at 35; Reply -brief, at 1.

But

see 5 Governor's Committee Report, at 32.
48.

For this reason appellees' were able to draw little

precedential sustenance from the Court's cases dealing :k with
wealth classifications touching on the right to vote.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
Carter, 40_ U.S.

(196_); Bullock v.

(1972); McDonald v. Bd. of

Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)(_dictum).

Harper v.

Election~,

Each of those cases

11.
involved the right to vote on an equal basis with thex rest of the
electorate - a right repeatedly held to be constitutionally
fundamental.

E. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 40_ U.S.
See Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d __,

49.

(1971); Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp.
Robinson v.
J. Coons,

~.·

Ca~ll

W•

~·

_xk N. J.

_,

A. 2d

(1972).
pd
(197_);
(197_);

.,

Clp1e and S. Sugarman, supra, note_, at_;

Goldstein, supra note _ _, at __; Note, Educational Financing

.

.

& Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich.
L. Rev. 1324, 1335-42 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing

Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14
Ariz. L. Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).
50.

F. Supp. at
F-·~·)

51.

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Oregon
1\

v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970).

a..£-+ct52.

II

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970) there

could be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation
for the Court's holding in Shaprio.

In Dandridge the Court applied

12.
the rational basis test in reviewirig Maryland's maximum family

·

grant provision under kits AFDC program.

A federal district

court held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter
standard of review. In the course of reversing the lower court,
the Court distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that there
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally
protected freedom of interstate travel.'\ Id. at 484 n. 16.
53.
despite

The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test

its~

~

contemporaneous recognition in

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) that

"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing,
housing and medical care. "
54.

\J

In Eisenstadt the Court str!Ck down a Massachusetts

statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices,
finding that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal
protection standard. " Id. at

n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum,

the Court recited the proper form of equal protection analysis:

13.
"if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impin ges
upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (196_)J the statutory classification would have to be not merely
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state interest. " Id. , (emphasis in
original).
55.

Dunn fully canvasses this Court's equal protection

voting rights cases and explains that "this

Cou~as made clear that
iYI

e le. c. r t(/11.!
a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate on
A

an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Id. at

_:-r,

Ct--l'Y'vtJJ'\1...;..~ A,.(._,J.~t.J. ) ·
The CXE constitutional :mniRXJ!IW underpinnings of the right to equal
treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted even though,
as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere
expressly mentioned." See Bullock v. Carter, 40_ U.S.

(1972);

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

..~· ··..

,,

14.
-

.

~

.

56. In Mosley the~ Court. str!'Ck down a Chicago

wh~ c.~

anti-picketing

ordinance . ~

prohibitions.

The ordinance was held invalid under the equal

exempted labor picketing from its

pxE!iatprotection clause after subjecting it to careful scrutiny
and finding that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn.

The

stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the
ordinance was one "affecting First Amendment interests. "
Id. at

57.

Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a

state law permitting forced sterlization of ''habitual criminal1,\'
Implicit in the Court's opinion is the

XRE

recognition that the right

to procreate is among the rights of personal privacy now protected
under the Constitution . . See Roe v. Wade,

U.S.

__,

(1972).
58.

See,

~· ~·

, Red Lion Broadc;:tsting Co. v. :tiD:: FCC,

395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

.. ..

~

.. '

15.
59.

The States have often ·pursued their entirely legitimate

interest in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise, "
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966), through
such
vote.

~
Gl~rsss as literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to
See id.; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

And,

where those restrictions have been found to promote intelligent
use of the ballot without discriminating against those racial and
ethnic minorities heretofore deprived of an equal educational
opportunity, this Court has upheld their use.

Compare Lassiter

v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), with Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U. S. at 133 (Mr. Justice Black), 144-47 (Mr. Justice
Douglas), 216-17 (Mr. Justice Harlan), 231-36 (Mr. Justice

-

Brennan), 282-84 (Mr. Justice Stewart), and Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
·60.

Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees'

nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the

~

significant

16.
personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that
the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most
ineffective participants in the political process and that they
derive the least enjoyment from the benefits
Amendment.

o~

the First

See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in

Public Education, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-90 (1971).
If so, under appellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.

(1972)

(196_) and Lindsey v. Normet, 40_ U.S.
would no

longer~

61.

be good constitutional law.

Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by

registered voters in New York City to a provision of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 that prohibited enforcement of a state law
calling for English literacy tests for voting.

The

law~

was

Rico
suspended as to residents from

Puerto~

who had completed at

u-6 f~d..)At.dl_~, V
least six years \at an "American-flag" school in that country even
though the language of instruction was other than English.

'· .

~

This

.

·.

17.
Court upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it
discriminated against those with a sixth · grade education obtained
in a non-English speaking schools other than the ones designated
1\

by the federal legislation.
62.

Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Sisters

Pierce v. Society

of~

268 U.S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v.

Kick, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M. D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S.
476 (1971}.
63.

See,

~· ~·,

Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134

U.S. 232 (1890); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495,

Jt 508-09 (1937); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522
(1959).

----'l
64.
attention.

The quality-cost controversy has received considerable
Among the jXJ.ost notable authorites on both sides are

the following.

C. j Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisis

-------

in the Classroom ( 1970); Office of Education, Equality of Educational

Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Educational

\

Rider A, Page 34, Rodriguez 12/14/72

Add as a footnote something along the following lines:

Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace it.
The authors ofji\"ivate Wealth, supra. p. _ _ , suggest a scheme
called "district power equalizing." In simplieS: terms, the state would
take funds from the "richer" districts and allocate them to the "poorer"
districts, guaranteeing that a particular tax rate would provide a
stated number of dollars per pupil regardless of the tax base of the par·
ticular district. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and
against "district power equalizing," beyong noting that the commentators
are in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and
indeed whether it would violate the Equal ProGlction clause. (Larry:
here cite the Presidential Commission and perhaps others.) The almost
inevitable result of invalidating the present system would be statewide
financing of all public education, assuring - to meet the equal protection
standards invoked by respondents - substantially identical per pupil expenditures in every school district. There are only two ways to accomplish
this massive restructuring: (i) expenditures could be equalized by taking

••

'

••

'I

~ . /7~
-2money away from some districts and applying them in others, a process
of leveling down to a common denominator; or (ii) additional tax money
would have to be raised to elevate per pupil expenditure to the highest
level now obtaining in prosperous districts. It has been estimated that
it would require $2. 4 billion of additional school funds to bring all

Texas districts up to the present top level- an amount more than double
that currently being spent in Texas on public education. The other alternative, of leveling down districts presently enjoying higher than average
per pupil expenditure, is hardly more promising in terms of its political
reality or disruptive consequences.

I

I

,I
'

,.,!,

18.
Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller eds); J. Guthrie, G.
Kleindorker, H. Levin,

& T. Stout, Schools and Inequality (1971);

President's Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, People & Money:
The Need For Educational Reform (1972); Swanson, , The Cost-Quality
Relationship,

in lOth Nat'l Conf. on School Finance, The Challenge

of Change in School Finance 151 (1967).
64a.

See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's

. statewide survey on the goals of education in that State. I.
Governor's Committee Report, at 59-68.

See also Goldstein, supra

.note __, at 519-22; Schoettle, supra note _ ; authorities cited
in Note 64 supra.
65.

Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532
"Jil.

(1959) (Mr. Justice Brenna, concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
·I

384

u.s.

__, 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting).

19.
66.

In 'R 1970 Texas expended approximately

2~

1 billion

Ibm dollars for education and a little over one billion came from

the Minimum Foundation Program.

~~A~ ~v-,
.Public School E.inanee

Texas Research League,

d .- '

P~s in 'fe~ ( l9-~

67.

Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 13.

68.

Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 18.

69.

Tex. Educ. Code§ 16.15.

70.

Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 16, 16. 17, 16. 19.

71.

Tex. Educ . Code §§ 16. 45, 16. 51.

72.

Tex. Educ. Code § 12. 01.

73.

Tex. Educ . Code 11. 26( 5).

74.

Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 301 et. seq.

75.

See note

l

I

!

l

i

supra.

~~ ~w ·--~d . - ~o

Have l3laat We Mnst ( 194~.

76.

Gilmer-Aiken Committee,

77.

There is no uniform statewide assessment practice

in Texa/,\Commercial property, for example, might be ~

taxed at 30% of market value in one county and at 50% in another.
V. Governor's Committee Report, at 25-26.

"

.

'
:...

' '~

.
.
'

J.fO~~ ·

(ji)/~;~·

_;?!

at

p ,;;t:;.-'fy

I

.

20.

~·

78.

Texas Research LeagU.e, supra note_, at 18.

79.

President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra note_,

Until recently Hawaii was the only state that maintained

a purely state-funded educational program.

In 1968, however, that

State amended its educational finance statute to permit counties to
KEilbet collect additional funds locally and spend those xmimDdxlm

amounts on its schools.

The rationale for that recent legislative

choice is instructive on the question before the Court today:
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from
doing anything in this area, even to spend their
own funds if they so desire. This corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties
to go above and beyond the State's standards and
provide educational facilities as good as the people
of the counties want and are willing to pay for.
Allowing local communities to go above and beyond
established minimunns provide for their people
encourages the best features of democratic government. " Hawaii Sess. Laws, Art. 38, § 1
(1968).

80.

See text ace ompanying note

supra.

81. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State
.

of New York (1923).

For a thorough analysis of the contribution

of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of
educational finance, see J. Coons, W. Cltie & S. Sugarman, supra
1

Note_, at 39-95.

.
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'
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.

K,

Add to Footnote 78, in addition to the present reference:

As noted supra, p.

_,

the extent to which the quality of

of education varies with expenditure per pupil# is debated inconclusively
by the most thoughtful students of public education. While all would
agree that there is a correlation up to the point of providing the
recognized essentials, the issues of greatest disagreement include
the effect on quality of pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary
schedules.

The state

funding~

Texas is designed to assure,
t-v/~"'--

:..,.,u

~-u..~-# ,{

on the average, one teacher for every 25 students, c-on(}edsa to be
1'\

a favorable ratio by most standards.

Whether the minimum salary

of $6, 000 per year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers
~ -n~<~j't'V j~Lf
.may be more debatable) espeG-ially depending.!\upon the location of

the school district.
~;- I..{ .·=·

But there appears to be little :k empirical data
~

/

~(

'

.

.,

+ .

.J

- , ·•

~ - jr]AP·.,/(-<~-o.->--4....._;

whicl; ~uppdrts an adv nta ge of any pree:ts-e pupil teacher ratio or
/w

A

which doc).lments the view that ever higher salaries:x result in more
competent teaching.

An intractable problem in dealing with teachers'

salaries is the absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques

2:
th'-'"

of judging the ability ot performance of teachers.

The result is

that relatively few school systems have merit plans

a{ any kind,

with teachers' salaries being increased ''by rote" and a cross the
board in a way whichXR rewards the least deserving on the same
basis as the most deserving. M.Qst-s-ystems- raise.:§alaries
~

(A..4.-<. ....

,_e.t2y ._,.....c~~Q.

~automatically

10 to 12 year

on the basis of predetermined "steps", extending over

periods.~ In

making these observations, we

h~

~k~L /V<-Q . . (.,._v
thoy.gflt-ef criticiztrH(existing practices and certainly we imply no
1\

1\

opinion that teachers' salaries generally are adequate.

As compared

with others of comparable education there is every reason to believe

teC--<"~fu:.A-1-.J i

~ p~ ~..-l-df2y)

.

that sueh salaries starting from an unduly low base
A

I

in-m~eaiities,
l

have failed even to keep abreast of inflation. We have included
this commentary on pupil teachers ratios and salary levels not to
H..t_ e:L£•·~~.Af u(/
express any opinion with respect to_/hose m Texas or elsewhere,

but merely to indicate that the two

~principal

factors distinguishing

the schools in the more affluent districts from those elsewhere do
not - in the opinion of many experts - demonstrably and necessa:dly

'

,.

3.
f'0__

I

affect·\ quality.c-j /1c...:.- ~L-- ~ --h

----,

(Note to Larry: I think it is desirable to add the
substance of the foregoing to your footnote 78. It is
a delicate area and yet I know from my own personal
experience that the substance of what I have said is
probably correct and certainly is widely debated.
I say this in spite of the fact that I fought with the
City Council in Richmond, and later with the legislature,
over a period of many years for annual increases in
teachers' salaries. If you have some citations of
scholarly discussions of these issues, you might add
them to the note. )

21.

82.

J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note _ ,

Foreward by James. S. Coleman, at vii.
83. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280,
311 (1932).
84.
(

The value of local control of education was recognized

last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright

\\\ v. Council of City of Emporia, 40_ U.S.

(1972).

Mr. Justice

~ Stewart stated there that "[d]irect control over decisions vitally
j

affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly

I

I

/

(

felt in our society. " Id. at _ .

Likewise, the Chief Justice

admonished that 11 [1 ]ocal control is not only vital to continued

I

\
l

.\

\

.~

public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance

~from an educational standpoint as well.
85.

11

Id. at

"Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors

Coons, Clu~ and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of
1

.

public education may not be a function of wealth other than the
total wealth of the state.

11

J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman,

('lrr

~

lv..
I

/

/

u+
,.v,

i

i

,..

.
22.
supra note _ _ , at _ _. Their· thoughtful and imaginative work
paved the way for the suits, including the present one, attacking
school finance system.

-the..

Indeed, the District Court approved the

authors' thesis verbatim.

---

F. Supp. at

---

The authors

J j '-t"#..MAJ
have often cautioned their supporterAagainst speculating that

"fiscal neutrality " would be a panacea for the poor or for racial

I

minorities. ]Jd. at _ _ ; Coons, Clune & Sugarman, xxRx A First
~Appraisal

of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of L. Soc. Action 111,

'114-15 (1971).

I

1

Footnote 85b:

p

nv

0

See also u.s. Office of Education, Finances of Large City
School Systems: a Comparative Analysis (1972)(HEW Publication).
0

,.

l

., .. ,.

"

Rider A, page, 22 of Footnotes Rodriguez

85a. An initial problem, more obvious to elected officials
than to those of us who write opinions for the courts or essays for the
law reviews, is the gut one of money. Whatever formula may be employed,
there are essentially only two ways to accomplish equal per pupil expenditure (even approximately) in every school district: (1) expenditures
could be equalized by taking revenues away from some districts and
applying them to the benefit of others, a process of leveling down to a
common denominator; or (ii) vast additional tax revenues would have to
be raised to elevate per pupil expenditure to the highest level now obtain-

ing in the districts which provide the greatest supplementation of state
funds. Neither of these alternatives seems realistic • The residents \of
\

a district which, with good fortune and dedication to public education ha've
\

a high level of expenditure, are not likely to be tolerant of a leveling plan \
\

\

that reduces funding for their district to increase it elsewhere. Would
teachers'
salaries in that district be reduced correspondingly? If pupil,
I

)

teat~her

ratios were increased, what would happen to the teachers no longer

e1L7fl.ployed? What, indeed, would happen to school bonds issued p\suant

tp a vote of citizens proud of their schools and willing to pay more ''A
1

!

The other alternative, the raising of sufficient additional

'

i\\

\

I

I.

t;U~ '~oney
I

\

-2statewide, is no more palatable politically o It is estimated that $2 4
0

billion of additional school funds would be required to bring all Texas
districts up to the present top level of expenditure- an amount more
than double that currently being spent in Texas on public education
(Appellants' brief, Po 40). At a time when every state and locality
is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for services of all

kin~s burgeoning

and with weary taxpayers already resisting

tax increases, only those who live in a dream world could believe tht
a decision of this Court nullifying present state taxing systems would
result in doubling public funds committed to education. Rather, theresult in terms of confusion and disruption would be profound, and in the
end the leveling process would well mean a lower quality of education
for all.

I
\

\

\
I

I

\

. '

\

\

23.
88.

Professor Berke, whose affidavits regarding the

relationship between povei·ty, race, and educational expenditure
~ "n CI f C. -

/.lA.N~ )

in Texas were relied on by the District Court,;\has since published
a study of the possible effects of several lad alternatives to the
present system of educational finance.

Berke, Inequalities in

School Finance, 33-34, 66-69 (1972).

That study indicates that

it is entirely possible that an equal expenditures alternative would
~ead

to higher taxation and lower expenditures in the major urban

~reas.

See also U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City

School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW publication).
89.
~t

J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note __,

vi (dedication).
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SUPREME COURT OF 'l'HE UNITED STATES
No. 71- 1332
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the
District et al., Appellants
United States District Court for the
v.
Western District of
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al.
Texas.
[January -, 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the
Court.
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.'
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who arc members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low properLy tax base. Named as defendants~
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
Not afl of the children of thrse romplain:lllt ::; attend public ~c hool.
One f:unil~ ·'::; children are enrolled in priyate ,.:chool "hec:lu,.;e of the
rondit ion of t hr ~rhool,.; in t hr Edgrwood Indeprndeni School Di::;trict.'' Thii'([ Amrndecl Complaint, App., at 14.
~ Thr San Antonio IndrpE'nd<'nt School Di~trict , whose name thi::;
case ~ till be:1r,.;, was one of ;;even ,.;chool dist ril't~ in the San Antonio
metro]1olitan area which were originally nnmed :1~ part~ · defendant~.
After a prrtrial confNenre, the Di:;trict Court is,.;urd nn ordc•r cliHmi~,.;ing the ,.;chool di ~t rirt,.; from the rase.
Rubsrqurntl~·. thr San
Antonio IndepC'ndent Sc·hool Dist riet has .ioinrd in the plaint iff::;'
challenge to t IIC' St nt e's ,.;chool finance ~~·~t rm and ha:-; filrd nn
amicus curiae brirl' in support ol' that po,.;it ion in this Court.
1
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of Education, the ~tatr Attorney GC'nC'ral, ancl th0 Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in the summer of Hl68 and a three-judge court
was impaneled in .January 1060." ln Decelllber 1971"
the panel rcnclercd its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas f'chool finance system unconstitutional
uncler the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'' The State appealed and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far~reaching constitutional questions presented, 406 U. S. 966 ( 1\)72). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court.

I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union 'in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools.n Early in its history,
:<A three-j11(lgr court was proprrly convrnrd and thrrc arc no
quest ionl:l as to the Dist riet Court's .i urisdict ion or i hr direct ~ppeal
ability ol' its judgment. 28 U. 8. C. §§ 22R1, 1253.
'The trial was drla.Yed for two year::; to prrrnit extrnsin• pretrial
cli:::rovery and to allow completion of :t pending Texns ](•gislativc
investigation ronc·erning the nc•ecl for rel'orm of it~> public school
finance s~·stcm. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337
F. Supp. 2f,O, 285 11. 11 CWD Tex. 1971).
"3:37 F. Rupp. 280. The Distriet Court stn~·(•d its mand:1te for
two ~·ears io pro1·ide Texas ~n opportunit.1· to rcmed)· the inequitie:;
found in ii~ finanC'ing program. The court, howe1·er, rPtainecl juri~
diction io fa:-;hion it~ own n•mcdial order if the State failed to offer
an ncceptablc plan. I d., at 286.
G Tex. Const., Art. X, § 1:
"A general diffusion of knowledge hPing; C'>'~Pnti:ll io thr preservation
of tlw right,.; nnd libertip,; of the people it ~hall be ihe duty of ihe
Legi~latme of thi~ State• to make suitable provi~ion for the ~>UpporL
nnd lll:lintenance of public );Choo]:;."
!d., Ari. X, §2:
"The Lcgi~l:li me :,;hall a~ early a:,; pract icahlr estnhlish frer schools
throughout the Stair, and :::hall fumi~h mean~ for their ~upport, by
taxation on property."
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Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
schools. relying on mutual participation by the local
school diRt.rids and tlw Rtntr. As early as lF\8~ the state
constitution "·as amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empo\\"erecl to levy ad valorem
taxes vvith the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school builcliJJgs" ancl for the "further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds.' The Prrmanent School Fund, established in
1854," was endowed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued Rource of income for
school support."' The Availablr School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent Fund as well as
from state property taxes, served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this ce11tury. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State.' t
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property v\·ealth were spread
r.e latively evenly across the State.•t Sizable differences
Tex. ConHt. 1876, Art. 7, § 8, as amrndrd, Aug. 14, 1883.
TPx. Con~t., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4, 5.
9 Gammd's Lam; of Trxas, p. 1178. Srr Trx. Canst., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2
(intrrprrt il'(' ('OllllTIC'lltarirs); I RP[)Ol't or Go,·ernor's Committrr on
Public Sehool Education , Tlw Clwllrngr nnd the Clwnee 27 (196!))
(hereinal'lc•r Govrrnor':-; Committrr Rrport).
10 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § ,) (~rc abo lhr intrrpretive eomnwntary);
· V Govrrnor's Committrr Rrport, at 11-12.
11 Trx. Const. , Art. 7, § 3, as amendrd, Nov. 5, 1918 (;;re interJHPtivr eomnwntar~' ).
12 I Governor's Committ<'c Rrport, ai 35; .T. Coons, W. Clunr,
S. Sugarmun , Pri\'ate Wraith and l'ublir Education 40 (1970);
E. Cubbcrley, School Funds and Thrir Apportionmrnt 21-27 (1905).
7

8
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in tho value of assessable propor·ty between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronou need.' " The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. Those growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
wore responsible in part for increasingly notable diff<3rences in levels of local expenditure for education. 14
In clue time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund wore not sufficient to ameliOI·ate those disparities.' " Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per schoolage child.'n Although the
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,' 7
the Fund \\'as providing only $46 per student by 1946.' 8
Recognizing tho need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in tho late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
bf educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
n By 1!)40 one-half of the Stntr'H populntion wn ~ elu~terrd in it s
inet ropolitan renter~. 1 Go\'ernor'H Commit tee Rrport, at 35.
14
Gilmer-,\iken Commit tre, To IIa 1'0 What vVr l\J IIHt (19~8).
' " R. Still, Tho GilmN-Aikrn Bill:; 11- 12 (1950) ; Trxas Bd. of
Eclur., Thr Texas Statewiclr School Adc•qunt'y Smvcy (1938).
1(; R . Still, sup1'a. n . 15, at 12.
17
1 General Law,.; of TrxaH, 46th Lc~i R., Rrg. se~;,:. 1939, :II 274
($22.50 prr HI mlrnt) ; Genrrnl & Sprc. Law~ of Trxns, -18 th Lrg iH.,
Reg. s{'~S . 194:3, (', 161 , at 262 (825 .00 prr ;;t uclrnt) .
1 R GrnN:tl & Spec. Law:; of Tcxa;;, 49th Legis., Rrg. Srs:;. 1945,
c. 53, a t 75.

.
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alternative systems in other States and to propose a
state funding scheine that would guarantee a minimum
or basic educational offering to each child anrl that would
help overcome .lnterdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 1 " It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas. ~
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80 ~ of the Program and the school districts
are responsible- as a unit- for providing the remaining
:20 7r . The districts' share- known as the Local Fund
Assign men t- is apportioned alnong the school districts
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a complicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and , to a
lesser extent, con siders each county's share of all property
0

°For a complete hi ~ tory of the adoption in T r xas of a found ation program , ::;ee R . Still ~, supra, n . 15. Ser abo V Governor's
Commit ter Report , at 14; Trxa:-; Hr~carrh Lragur, Public School
.Finance Problrm ~ in Trxas 9 (Interim Rrport 1972) .
~ ° F or thc l9i0- 1971 school yrnr thi ~ ,;tatr aiel program accountcd
for -1 8.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation rontributrd
41.1 % and 10.9% wa ,; provided in federal funds. Texa~ Rr~rar c h
League, supra, n. 19, at 9.
1
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in the State."' Each county's as~iglimcnt is then clividec.l
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county."" The
district then financ<:>s its shar<' of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The dC'sign of this compkx formulation was t,,·o-folcl.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying'.
Second, the Program's an·hitects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children "a
but that would 110t b itself exhaust any district's resources."1 Today virtuall. every sc wol c istnct ~
.--- - -I-Jl-1.!-)0- s....~ a property tax rom which it derives locally
expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary to
satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation
Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for education-from state as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
and 1967 expenditures increased by approxin1ately
500;1< ."" In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion "n and these
increases have been reflected in consistently nsmg per
V Governor'::; Committrr Rrport, nt 44-..J-8.
At prc~c nt there arc 1,161 school cli~trict ~ in Texn ~. Tcxa ~ Research Lcn~uc , sup1'a, n. 19, at 12.
2 :1 In 19-1-8 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that some school
clitilriets werr not Jev~·in~ nn~· local tax to ~upporl education.
Gilmcr-Aikrn Commit tee, supra, n. 14, at 16.
2 '1 Gilmer-Aiken Committer, supra. n. l..J-, :tt 15.
2
" I Go\'Crnor'::; Committee Report , :tl 51-53.
~a Texas Rcl:icarch League, supra, n. 19, at 2.
n

22
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pupil expenditures throughout the State. 27 Minimum
·teacher salat;ies-by far the largest single item in any
.school's burlget-'have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years. 2 q
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with a11other more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood I nclependent School District is one of seven public school districts in thr mrtropolitan area. Approximately 22.000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elcmrntary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. rrhe residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 907r of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6o/c
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5.960- the lo\Yest. in the metropolitan area- and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area- the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19671968 school yrar above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
~ 7 In thr year;,; between 1949 and 19G7 1he a\·erap;r JlC'r pupil
expend it me for all rmrrnt opera I ing cxpcnHr~ inrrcaH('(I from S206
to S-HJ.'3. In that ~ame period rapital exprnditures inrrca~Pd from
$4-l to 8102 pC'r pupil. I Govrrnor'H Committrc RPport, at 53-54.
28
III Gon•mor'~ Commillrr HPport , :11 113-146; Brrkr, Carnavalr, Morgan & White, Thr Texa" Srhool Finance CnHr: A Wrong
i"n Scnrrh of a Hrmcdy, 1 .T. of L. & Edur. G59, 681- 6 2 (1972).
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total of $248."" Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil." 0
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six C'hools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgrwood District. The school population is predominantly white. having only 18% Mexican-Americans
and less than 1% Negroes. The asses!"ecl property value
per pupil exceeds $40.00cMnd the median family income
is $8.001. ltt H)G7- 10()8 thr local tax rate of $.8.3 per
$100 of valuation yielded $:333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $22.5 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $3G per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $504 per pupil.
Although the 1967--1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aiel,"' more recent partial statistics indicate that
~"

Tlw Al-:lilablr School Fund, trchnic:dl~-, pro1·idr:-: n ~rrond
or ~I :1 t r 111011('~-. That Fund ha~ COil t illltf'd :1;-: in ~·ra r;-: paRt
(~rr trxt :lf'f'Oillp:tnying nn. lfi-J , , 811/)ra) to di;-:trihutr unil'orm
rwr pupil grants to r1·rr~· di;-:trirt in thr Rtatr. Tn lOilS thi:-; Fund
rdlottrd !':OR prr pupil. HmYr1·rr, hr<-au~r thr Antil:lhie 8C'hool
Fund contribution i~ alw:1~·s ~uhtr:H't<'d !'rom n cli"trict':-; rntitlcmont undrr tht' Foundation Progrnm, it play:-; no ~ignifir:111t role
in rcluea t ional fin:1 ncr t oclnr.
:~o Whilr i'Pd<'l':tl ~~s~i~t:111cr h:1s nn amrlioratin!J; rfTrrt on the difTrrrnrr in school bucl!J;rt s bet wrrn m•:tl tit~· and poor d i~t rirt s, t hr
Di~trirt Comt rr_irctrd an argurnrnt maclr b~- thr Stntr in that
romt that it "hould ron~idt'l' t hr rffpet of t hr frdrrnl gm nt in
n~srssing thr di~niminntion dnim. 3a7 F. Supp., at 284. The Stair
has not rrnrwrd th:1t rontrntion hrrr.
:n Thr figurr:-; quotrd ahovr l':tr~· "light)~- from thosr utilizrd in
tho Dist rirt Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., ni 782. Thr:-;e trivial
~()\II'('('
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the pr~viously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. This con stituted a 62 lJ increase over
the three-year period since 1967- 1968. Indeed , state·
aiel alone in 1970- 1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budget-- from local, state. and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program. netting $491 per pupil. These
recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, becausE' of its relative property wealth,
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil. or about 20 %
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $R.46 per pupil. which is about 2.4 '/i- of its
grant. ' ~ It docs appear then that. at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment docs reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potentiai
of each.'"1
, Despite these recent increases. substantial interclistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
1

differencrs are nppnrrntl~· n product of that rourt'H reli:tnrr on
din·rrent stntiHtiral data than we hn1·e relied upon.
' 1 ~ Tex:tH Rrsearrh Le:tgur, supra, n. 19, at 13.
11
' ' Tlw Eronomir Index, which detrnninr~ rarh eount~ · 's sh:tr(' of
the total Local Fund Assignmrnt , i~ ba~rd on a complex formula
ronrriYrd in 19-1-9 whrn thr Founclat ion Prop; nun was inst ii uted.
It has frequrntl\' hE'rn suggrsted bY Texas rC' ~enrchers thnt the
formula br nltrr~d in seYNnl rrspeet~ to pro1·ide a morr ;H'curate
rdlert ion of lora! t nxpa~·ing ahil it~- . rsprri:dl~· of urban schools.
V Ciowrnor's C'ommittrr Rr]Jort , nt 4R; Brrke, Cnrnavnlc , l\Iorg;an &
White>, supra, n. 28, at 680-681.

slip;lttl~·

LM...,-:-

-1..4 J. ......

l'\ool
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degree throughout the State, 1 ' still exist. And it was·
these disparities. largely attributable to difkrences in the·
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas,.
dual sy<c;tem of public school finance violated the Equal
Protect\on Clause.
The District Court held that the·
.
·)

:l l The Di~trict
Comt rclicd on thc fi11din!!::-:: pres~'ntcd in an
affidn vit submit t cd by Profc~~or Dc•rkP of S~Tartt~c. Hi ~ ~nmpl'ing
of , llO Tcxa~ ~chool di~t ril'ts dcl)lon:;t ratcd' a dircct correlation
bet wccn t hc a mount of a clist riel'::;'. taxa blc propC'l't y and it:s IP\' C'l
of prr pupil c•xpc11dit mc. Hi~ ~~ u(J'~· afso found a direct eonrlat ion
bd wccn a district'::; mcdian family i1H•ome and per pupil cxpcnditurc:; n~ wcll as an invcr~c eorrclatwn bctwcen p~rccntagc of minoritic::;' and cxpendit urcs.
'

Catcgorir.ed b~ · Equnlizcd Propert~· Valuc~,
l\1cdi:Ul Family Inromc, nnd State-Lora\ Rcvcnuc

Market Value
of 'I'a.rablc
Prop<'riy
PN Pupil
AboYc ::;100,000
(10 Di,.:t rirt,.;)
S100, 0()( 1-S.'>O;000
(2(i District:;)
S5fJ ,ooo-s:m ,oi)o
(:30 Di,.;triris)
S30,000-SIO,OOO
(40 Distrit'!s)
Brlow SlO,OOO
(4 District<:>)

Median
Family
Income
From 1DGO

Per Cent
Minorit.11
Pupils

Stale &
Lora!
Reveuues
Per Pupil

85,900

8%

S815

S-±,425

32%

$544

S-±,900

23 %

S483

$5,050

31 %

S..J62

s:3,325

79 %

8305

Although thr l'Orrelations with rr~pc•ct to farnil~ · inromr and racr
appear on!~· to rxist at thr rxtrrmr,.;, and :tit hough thr :\friant 'H
mrt hodolng~· h:\s brrn qnrstionrd (~<·r Gold~tr·in, TlltNclist rict
Inrqualit ie~ 111 :;;chool Fin:t nr·ing: a Crit ir:tl /l.nnl.n;i~ of 8t•n·mw v.
Priesi and its Pro(JI'11!f, 120 0. J>a. L. Tie\'. 50-l ..'):2:~ -525 nn. G7 and
71 (197:2)) , tn~of:\1' as any of thrsc thrcc• rorrclatio11~ i~ rdrvnnt
to thC' ron~titutional tlw~i~ prrscntrd in this rn~c \YC' may ar•crpt
it~ bnsif' thru~t.
]<'or a drfrn~r of thr rdiahilit.\· of the• aflid:tYit, sec
Bed::c, Carnantlr, l\Jorgan & White•, suwa. n. 28.
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effect of the Texas system was to discriminate on the·
basis of wealth in the manner in which education was·
provided for its people. 337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding
that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that cduca·
tion is a "fu nclamental" interest, the District Court held
that the Texas system coulcibe sustained only if the State
could shO\\' that it \\'aS premised upon some compelling
state interest. I d. , at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that
n lot only arc defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for those classifications. 11
Id., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand
the close judicial ~crutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter·
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights'"; or that
involve suspect classifications."" If, as ~c have frequently held, close scrutiny means that the State's system
is not entitlecl to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its eel ucational system has been struc.
turod \\'ith "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,"' the Texas
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every
other Stato--\Yill not paRs muster. The State candidly
admits that "I n]o one familiar with the Texas system

"r

""E. (!., Police Drpt. of the City of C'hicaao v. Mosle!f. 408 U. S.
92 (Hl7:2): Dunn v. B/umstPin, -l05 U. S. :3:30 (1972) ; Shapi1'o v.
Thompson. ;:;94 U.S. ()J!) (1969).
:wE. (f., Uraham v. Ric hard~on, 40:3 U. S. 365 (1971); Lovin(! v.
Virainia, :3RS F. S. 1 (1967).
:n Rce Dunn \'. Blumstein, 405 U. S. :3:30, :3-1:3 (1972), and the
ra:;c::; rolleeted therein.

7

7

71-1332-0PIXION

RAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DTSTJHCT v. HODTUG UEZ

12

would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." '18
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" "" and "imperfections," 40 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
tlle Di~?trict Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable·
basis."
.·This, then, establi~hes the framework for our analysis.
We must' decide, first, · whether the Texas system of
fiuancing ·public ed~(mtion must be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. If so, the juclgmelit of the District
Court ~houlcl be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational .
basis must be considered.

II
The Dif"trict Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty ·
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and'
appellate processes/ 1 and on ca~es disapproving wealth
barriers impof:ed on the right to vote.<" Those cases,
the Di trict Court concluded, established wealth as a
suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undelliable importance of education/' that there is a
Apprllnnt::;' 13ricf, at 11.
Ibid.
10 Tr. of Ornl Arg., at 3.
11
E. (!. , Griffin v. 1/linois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douolas v. California, 372 U. 8. 35:3 (1963).
1
"llarper '· Bd. of Elections, 3, !3 U.S. 663 (196..J.); McDonald v.
Bd. of Elections, 3D..J. U.S. 802 (1DG9); Bullock v. Carier, 405 U.S.
:1R

~D

134 (1972).
1 1
'

Scr ca,;rs citrcl in text, at -,infra.
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fundamental right to education and that. absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We arc unabl<> to agr<><> that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed. for the
several reasons that follow. we find neitlwr the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuasive.

A
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court is quit<> unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this C'ourt. Since
all childrrn in any given Rchool district receive the same
public education. irrespective of family wealth. the District Court found the operative class to be all citizens
in "poor school rlif'tricts." 337 F. Aupp .. at 282. The
Stat<>'s dependrnc<> on local property taxation to pay a
portion of thr total cost of education \vas found to constitute de facto discrimination against those school districts that hav<>. vis
vis othrr school districts,
relatively lef's propNty to tax p<>r pupil. Because higher
rates of taxation failrcl to compensate for disparities in
property value. the class \Yas found to be exprnding
relatively less in its schools and. therefore, providing a
lower quality education for its children.
In one sense this di!'crimination is geographical rather
than financial. But thr C'ourt has never questioned the
State's power to draw rrasonable distinctions between
its political subdivisions. G1iffin v. County School Board
of Prince Edward County, 377 U. A. 218, 230-231 (1964);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420. 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 ( 1954). Recognizing
the force of those eases. appellees have focused instead
on the individuals who reside in the relatively disad-

a

\
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vantaged districts. Yet, for two related reasons,
/7 n
status of these individuals is simply not comparable to
(l~
~
that of the individual complainants who have hereto~
fore successfully challenged state laws as invidiously~
discriminatory against the poor.
·1. In
riffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. _ 12 (1956), and
Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), and their
prog'eny,"'1 the Court invalidated state laws that denied
a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. Sim·
ilarly, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down crimin::tl
penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply
because they were unable to pay fines. In each of those
:cases the Court was not deaLing with relative impecunity
but with some level of absolute poverty, i.e., because of '
their indigency. each complainant was totally unable to (
pay for the state-proffered benefit. Those cases did not ~~
deal with the plight of those on whom state laws impose
a weighty but not insurmountable burden. The mere
(
fact that it may 'h ave been more difficult for one citizen
--+--.--.
than other to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal would not alone have been enough to 1
compel judicial invalidation of those barriers. The Court I
has never questioned that the nonindigent citizen must I
pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have never
held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens
created by a system of absolute fines.
In the instant case, appel lees have endeavored to show
only that children from relatively poorer families tend

f

\

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Vi'illiams v. Oklahoma City, 395
U. S. 458 (19(\9); Gardner v. Calijon1ia. 390 U. S. ;~()7 (1969);
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court of
jowa, 385 U. S, 192 (1966); Dmper v. Washington. 372 U. R. 487
(Hl63); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, ;357 U.S. 214 (1958).
'
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to reside in relatively poorer districts.
Jo effort wa~
made to prove, however, that the financ· 1g system operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more·
clearly definable class of imlig('nts. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the )OOrest familiC's are ~~~M"!oMoJtr-0!
c ustcq;~cl in the jJOorest distric ?!]A recent and exhaustive study of school diStricts in Connecticut co11cluded
that "r i H is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 'poor 1
l!ve in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major factual
assumption of Serrano-that the educational finance system eli criminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in
·connecticut." w Defining "poor" families as those below the BurC'aU of the Census "poverty level," 17 the
Connecticut study found. not surprisingly, that the poor
arc clustered arou ncl commercial and incl ustrial areasthose same areas that provide the most n,ttractive sources
of property tax income for school districts: "
Thus, we are asked in this case to extend for the first
time the Court's most exacting equal protection standard
to a large, cliYerse and amorphous class. And, unlike
racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it is not a class
4
n. 33, supra, there is rr:tson to (]Ur:stion
" A:s inctiratrd in
whrt hrr-rvrn in Trxa~-therr i:s a dirrrt roiTPlat ion brt wrrn family
wraith mr:t~urrd by in('omr and di~trirt wealth mrasurrcl h~· n~,.;r:;,.;rcl
proprrt~· nduation;;. Studie~ in othN Rtatr:-; havr found rvcn le,.;:;
corrrlat ion. H idt•nour & Hidrnonr, Serrano v. Priest: Wralt h and
Kan,.;a,.; 8rhool Finanrr, 20 Kan. L. 21:3, 22,') (1972) ("it ran be
argurcl that thrrr rxist;; in Knn~as :tlmo:st an itn-rr:-;r rorrrlntion:
distrirt,.; with highrst incomr prr pupil ha,·r low m:~r,.,~rd ,·nlur per
pupil, and di,.;trirt,.; with high as,.;r",.;rd ndur prr pupil hnvr low
inromr prr pupil"): D;wic:>, Thr Challrngr of Change in School
Finanrr, in Xnt'l Edu<·atiomtl Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School
Finnnrr {1967).
40
Notr, A Stati,.;tiral Analy~iH of tbr School Fimmrr DrciHionH: On
\Yinning Bat tlr~ and Losing \Yar:s, 81 Yale L. Tirv. 1:30:3, 1:32R-1329
( 1972)
17
!d., at 1:32-+, n. 102.
48
I d., at 1328.
0

Rider A, p. 16 Rodriguez 12/26/72

There is no absolute deprivation of education and no showing that
the quality of education provided is not reasonably adequate.

The

application of conventional equal protection analysis to this situation
presents

~

unique problems, first, in identifying the alleged

invidious discrimination and, second, if such is found to exist,
in devising an appropriate constitutional remedy.
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saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such l:t
position of political powerlessness, or subjected to such
a history of unequal treatment as to command extraor~
dinary judicial protection from the majoritarian political
process. It has never been within the constitutional
prerogative of this Court to nullify state action simply
because its burdens fall more heavily on those of lower
than average income.
2. ~,"lhe nature of the injury alleged ·e ¥"""11lfte"""""~-,
provides another significant
_.....o- diffePentiatillg the present case from those relied upon
by the District Court. The disadvantaged class identified by appdlees if+ -this ease has sustained only a relative deprivation, i. e., the poorer districts in terms of
assessable property per pupil tend to devote relatively
- - - - - - - . . ;le..:.:s.:s. :. to education T us CTiffercncepose~udtions of con]
Sl era e complexity in terms, first, of determining
whethe.r equal ~)rotc~tion has been .c.lenied and, second, .
o t h1w and 1m )Osmg an a :>pro )ria~
In Gri.f!in v':-r([i?IO~s, supra, t 1e inJury was app~denial of a transcript on appeal- and the remedy could
be easily and effectively secured. What v,:as required
was some means of assuring an "adequate appellate
review." 351 U. S., at 18. The Court did not hold that
Illinois was required to provide a full stenographic transcript in every case . . Broad leeway has been permitted
for the States to select their own means of meeting their
constitutional obligation. See Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971), Brilt v. No1·th Carolina, 404 U.S.
226 (1971). And, where an "adequate substitute,"
Gardner v. Cal?:fornia, 393 U. S. 367, 370 (1969), is provided, the Court will approve its use. Sec Britt v.
North Carolina, supm; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (19,63); Erskine v. Washington J>n:son Board, 357
U. S. 214 (1058). Likevvise, in Douglas v. California,
supra, the Court, while requiring counsel for indigents

-
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perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained
from mandating "absolute equality." 372 U. S., at 357.
No attempt has yet been made to guarantee as a constitutional requirement that all citizens, regardless of
relative wealth , receive the same quality of legal
representation.~ 9

In analogizing from those cases in which tho deprivation was absolute to the present case in which such
deprivation as exists is relative, must the thre~
ing of unconstitutional discrimination depend on whether
Texas is presently providing an "adequate" education to
children in poorer districts? The founders of the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that.
By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and o )Crating
funds, the Texas Legislature hope o 'guarantee, for 1e
welfare of the Rtatc as a whole, that all people shall have
at least an adequate program of education. This is
what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of
Education. '" r.o Must we decide \vhether, in fact, Texas
has fulfilled its promise and that, as tho State repeatedly
asserts in its briefs in this Court, "the state has assured
every child in every school district an adequate
education?" 51
1-Even assuming that the Court possessed the tools an
~expertise to conclude that the present system is inade
S£~tc l ow ar \ye to imp.lcment. the rcmedz__?j Appellees
have steadfastly asscr~hat they do not demand equal

d

"'n Cf. Boddie v. Connrcticut, 401 U. R. :371 (1971) , in which an
indigent';,; dur procr,;,; right of acce;,;~ to a di,·orcr tribunal wa~
found not to rrquirr morr than a " meaningful opportunity" to
obtain a divorcr. !d., nt :379- :380. Thr Court did not command
that the procedur e~ availablr for rich and poor hr rqual: it only
required that the~· br :ld<•quatr and rfTectivc. !d .. at :382.
r.o C:ilmCJ'-Aikrn Commit tee, supra , n. 14, at 13 (rmpha:;iH added).
'" Appellant~ · Bri<•f, nt :35; Rep]~ · Brirf, nt 1. But Her V Governor'~ Committee Report, at 32.

~.
~~
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expenditures. Rather, they pr fess to endorse almost
l ahy system of ~xpenclitures t at is not limited by the
local district's lack of relativ taxable wealth. Yet any
alternative sl1ort of equal ex enditures is
to result,
~w--~~JM;;ca"3ttl'tltll"l"t¥ , in
wer expenditures in schools
3:ttenclcd by children of )OOrer families. In each such
case, our prior wealth discrimination cases would indicate that the Court must decide whether the amount
spent in the disadvantaged schools is sufficient to guarantee those children as adequate an education as is
afforded other ch ildr·en in the State. That is a function
for which we are quite obviously ill equipped.
here arc, then, these two demonstrable difference's
between the present case am! those relied on by the
District Court: (1) the claimed disadvantaged class is
significantly larger as well as more ubiquitous and diverse;
and (2) the injury alleged is in no sense a_n absolute
deprivatio~1 of t~e clesirccl benefit An edu~ation .finance ~
system 1mght 6c Jiypothes1zec, however, 1n whwh the )
analogy tb the wealth discrimination cases would be
considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State only to those who
are able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil,
there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" peopledefinable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed
sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving
an adequate education. 'rhat case would present a far
more compclliug set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us today. After all, Texas
has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide an
education to those who can afford it. It has provided
what it considers to be an adequate base education for all
children and has drawn no explicit lines designed to
. separate out the poor for disfavored treatment.
In any evctYt, as appellees virtually concede, a finding
of wealth discrimination alone has never been held to
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constitute a sufficient basis for subjecting state legisla. tion to rigorous judicial scrutiny."" Before such clu~loi.4e~_,7J....~
review is required, a State's laws must be found to
interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" right.
It is this question-whether education should be counted
among the small circle of rights that heretofore have
been found to be "funclamental"-which has so consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent
years. 5 3

B
In Br-own v. Boar-d of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." !d., at 493. What was said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
52
For this reason appellee~ were nble to drnw little precrdentinl
:>ustenmwe from the Court's caseR dealinp; with wealth cln~~iflca
tiom; touchinp; on the right to Yote. Jlm·per v. Virainia Bd. of
Elations, 383 U. S. 66:3 (196G); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 1:34
(1972); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, :l94 U.S. 802 (1969)
(dictum). Enrh of tho~r ra;;e;.; ill\·olvrd the rip;ht to vote on nn
equal bn~is with thr rr~t of thr elcrtoratc-n right rrpeatrdly held
to be ron~titutionnlly fundamcntnl. E. (!.,Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. :330, :3:3G-:337 (1972).
5 :1 Sec Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cnl. 3d. 5R4, 4.S7 P. 2d 12-1-1 (1971);
Van Dusactz v. Ilat/irld, 3-1-4 F. Supp. F.70 (l\Iinn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N . .J. Suprr. 223, 2F.7 A. 2d 1F:7 (1972); J. Coons,
W. Clune, and S. Sup;armnn, supra, n. 12, nt :339-394; GoldHtrin, supra, n. :3:3, nt 534-5-11; Note, Edurnt ional Finanrinp; & Equal
Protrction of thr Laws, and thr Rupreme Court, 70 l\rirh. L. Rev.
1:32-.t, Ja:35-1:3..J2 (1972); Xot<', Thr Public S<'hool Financing CaHes:
lnterdistri<'t Inequnlitir~ and Wealth Di~erimination, 14 Ariz. L.
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).
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democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, ·even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of'
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably bC" expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opgortunity of education. Such an
opportunity where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right '"hich must be made available to
all on equal terms." Ibid.
rrhis theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this C'ourt writing
both before and after Broton was clcciclecl. ·wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JuSTICE), 237,
238-239 (MR. Jt'S'l'lCE WHI'l'IB) (1072); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 37.4 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v.
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 ( Hl25); Meyer v. A'ebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1023); lnlerstale R. Co. v.
M assachuseLLs, 207 F. S. 79 ( 1907).
Nothing this Comt holds today in any 'vay detracts
from our historic dcclication to public education. We
arc in complete agreement with the conclnsion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave sig11ificance
of education both to the individual and to our society"
cannot be doubted ....., But the importance of a service
performed by the State docs not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a la'" illlpinging upon the right of interstate
"'' 337 F. Supp., at 283.
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travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. S. 618, GG3, 661 (1960). in his view, if the degree·
'of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de.p ending on a majority's view of the importance of the·
interest affected, we would have gone "far to"·ard
"m aking this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
WfJ
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
one for which the Court lacks both authority and competency. But lVIR. JusTICE STEWAHT's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the narrow limits of the "fundamental rights"
rationale of the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today docs not 'pick out particular
human activities, character1ze them as "fundamental," and give them added protection .... ' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and give
to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Emphasis from original.)
lVIR. JusTLCE STEWAHT's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to clos~ judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year clurational
t··esiclency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification vvhich serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental i11terest, is unconstitutional." ld., at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
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as a right of cottstitutional l'!ignificance,"" and the Court's
decision therefore clicl not rrquire an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importancC' of that right."u
L1'ndsey v. J\"ormC'L, 405 U. S. 56 (1072), decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's view that social
importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting
state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants
in that case, involving a challenge to the procedural
limitations imposed on tenants in suits brollght by land~
lords under Oregon's Forcible Entry ancl Wrongful Detainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation
of the statute unc!C'r "a more stringent standard than
mere rationality." !d., at 73. The tenants argued that
the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which arc of particular importance to the poor,"
such as the "ncC'd for decent shelter" and the "right to
retain peaceful poflscs:-ion of one's home." Ibid. The
Court's analysis is instructi vc:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
docs not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. vVe arc unable to perceive in
that document any constitutiotial guarantee to access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
""E. (!. , ['nited Stales \'. Gursl, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oreoon v.
Mitchell, -WO F. 8. lU , 2:lR (1970).
r.u AftC'l' Dnndriduc \'. William~. :397 U. R. 471 (1970), there could
be no linp:C'rinp; quC'~tion about the constitutional foundation for
the Comt',; holrlin,g in 0hnpiro. In Da11dridoe the Court applied
the rat ionaJ ba;;i"' te;;t in re\·irll'ing ::\Iaryland ',.; maximum family
grnnt provision under ih AFDC progrnm. A fedt'r:d diHtriri court
held the pro\·ision IIIH'OHstitutional, applying a ;;tricter standard
of rel'iew. fn I he rom,.;e of re1·C'rsinp; the lower court I hE' Court
di~tingui"'hed Shapiro proper!~ · on the ground that in thni rao;e
"the Comt found state inl<'rferencE' with the <·on,.;litutionaJJ.I' protected frredom of inter::;tatc tra1·el." Id., at 484 n. 16.

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

23'

property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and tho definition of landlord-tenant relationships arc logislativo. not judicial, functions.' 1
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridr;e v. ·w illiams, 307 U. S. 471
(1970), the C'ourt 1s oxplicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," ;; 7 providocl no basis for departing from
the settled modo of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the ca::e of houf'ing, the central importance
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its la'v by
showing some compelling state interest. Sec also Jef]erson v. llackncy, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question
now before the Court is plain. The key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found
iil comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is
it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as
· travel. Rather, the answer lies
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself,
the right to oducation is fundamental. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 5 ' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
The Comt rcfusrd to apply the ~t rirt s rrutin~· tr:;t clrspitr it::;
rrcog;nition in Goldberg v. K ellu , 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970) , that ·'wrlfarc pro,·ides thr mean:> to obtain rs::;ential
food, clothing, houl:'ing and mrdiral rare."
58 In Eisenstadt thr Conrt ~truck dmm n :\1nssnchusrtt;: "tntute
J!fOhibit inf?; t hr distribution of cant rarrpt ive drvicrs, finding that
the law failed "to ~atisf\ rvrn thr morr Jrnient equal proter1ion
standard." !d., at 4-!7 n. 7. Nrvcrthde~s, in dirtwn , the Court
57

rontrmpor::mrou~
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U. S. 330 (1972); "" Mosley v. Police Department o/
the City of Chicngo, 408 lT. S. 02 ( 1972); nn Skinne1· v.·
Oklalwmn, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). n•
Anticipating that the unclisputecl importance of eclu-=
cation would not alone callse the C'ourt to depart from
the usual standard' of reviewing a State's social and.
~conomic legislation. appellees contend that education
is distinguishable from
. other services ancl benefits provided by the Stat~· Mcallse it bears , a prculiarly clo1s~
relationship to oth6'r rights accorded protection under
\

rl'rited the pmper form of rqual protrrtion annl~ · ::;i ,..;: ·'if \\'<' wNr
to roncluclr thnt thr ~Lt~~nrbu~rtt~ statutP imping:es upon fundamrntnl frrrdom~ undrr Gri8wold fv. Counecticu't, :381 U. S. +79
(J965),J thr stntutor~· ehs~ification would ha1·e to br not nl('rrly
rctlionally related to a Y:llid public purpo::;r hut 1Jecc8.'' 0I'.lJ to thr
nehir1·rmrnt of a compelling state interest.". Ibid. (rmpha,.;i~ in
original).
'•!I Dunn fully rall\'l\Hs'r., thi.H Court's equ:d' prot ret ion voting: rig:ht::;
CaHP~ and (";plninH that "this Court ha:-< m:tdr elear that a ri.tizen
has a ('oiiRtilutiona/ly ]irolectNi rir;ht to p:trtieipatr in PIN·ti.onH on
an Pqttnl ba~i,.; with other citizrns in thP .iuri~clif'tiPtt." !d .. at :~86
(emph:t~i~ sttppliPd). ThP ron~tittttional undNpinning:-< of tlw right
to rqual treutment in the· 1·oting proer~s ran no Iong:rr he dnuhtrci
r,·en though, :1~ the Court notrd in llarper v. Virginia !3d. of Electi'ons, :~R:~ U. R. !36:~. (l(l.J (19GG), " the rip;ht to ,·otr in stair Plrrtions
is nowlwrr rxpre~~~~- ment iom•cl." Rer Bullock v. Cnrter, 405 U. S.
i:~4 (1972): Krmner v. Union Free Srhoo/ District , :395 U. S. G21
(1969); Reynolris v. S!ms, 877 U.S. 583 (1964).
nnrn Mosleu thr Court stnu•k down a Chic·ago antipirketing
ordinanrr whic·h rxemptrd labor ]1ickrtin!); from it:-; 11rohihitiomt
The onlinnnrr wns hrld inntlid unclPr thr Equal Protrrtion Clau~r
nftrr ~ubjPcting it to l'arcful srntlin~· and finding that thr ordinanre
was not 11a rro\1·]~· drawn. Thr st rieter ;,;t :md:nd of re\'irw wns nppropriatel~· applird sinc·r t lw ordinance wa~ one "nffrrt ing: Fir:-;t Anwnclment intrre:-;ts." Id .. at 101.
n• Skinner applic·d thr standard of rlo~r srrutin~· to n st·nte law
permitting forl'rd stcrilizntion of "habit unl criminals." Implicit in
tlw Comt':-; opinion is thr rero!);nition that thr right of proc•rc•:ttion
is among thr right,.; of JWrsonal priYac-~· protectrd under thr Constitution. See Roe v. TVade,- U. S. - , - (1973).
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the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees
·urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas"
·is an empty forum for tho~e lacking basic communicative
tobls . . 'Likewise, the corollary right to receive information n~. becomes little more than a hollow privilege when
the ;.ecipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and
utilize available 'knowledge.
A siniila:r line oi reafloning is pursued with respect
to tlw right to vote. Exercisr of the franchise. it is contended, can not · be di vorccd from the eel ucational foun·dation of the voter. ' The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the clemocratic ideal' depends on an informed electorate: a voter can not cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not clispu te any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the inclivid·ual's constitutional rights to speak and to vote. Yet
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or
· the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.
That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be cloubted.n" These are indeed goals
"~ Rrr, 1'. g .. Red Lion Broadrasting Co. v. FCC, 3\1,1 U. S. 367,
:390 (1!)()9); Stanley v. Georoia. :394 U. R. 557, 564 (1960); Lamont
v. Postmaster General. :181 U.S. 301 (190.5).

r;"Thr Stntr~ hn,·r oftrn purRuNI thrir
in as;;uring " intrlligent exNei~r of the

rntirrl~·

lrgitimatr intrre,.;t
Katzenbarh v.

franchi~r , "

71-1332-0PINION
'26

SAN AXTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODHICUEZ

to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs
are freed from governmental interference. But they are
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
otherwise legitimate state activities.
Even if it were conceded that some quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditure provide
an education that in Texas falls f'hort. Whatever merit
·a ppellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational op'"
portunities to any of its children, that argument provides
n'o basis for finding an in tcrferenc~ with fundamental
rights where only relative differences in spending levels
arc involved ai1cl where-as is true in the present casen'O charge fairly could be -\nade that the system fails to
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of sp'eech and of full participation in the
political process:
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory arc difficult to perceive. ~ow, for 'in stance, is
'education to be distinguished from the significant per"
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-feel, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (IOGG), through ~uch drl'ier::; as
litoraey tr~t~ and :1gr rr~trictionH on thr right to vote. Rrr ibid.;
Oregon v. llfitche/1, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). And , \Yhrrc tho~r rc~tric
tion~ han~ bern found to promotE' intrliigc·nt u~r of the b·dlot without
di~c·riminating again,;( tho~r racial and rthnic minoritirH hrrrtoforc
drpri\'C'd of an equal rducH I ional opport unit~·. I hi~ Comt hn;.; upheld
their UHC. Comprtrl' Las8itr1' \'.Northampton JiJlecLim1 /3d., :~GO U.S.
45 (1950) , with Oreoon v. Mitchell, -WO U. R., nt 1:~:3 (:\fr ..1uHtier
Blark) , 14+-1-1-7 (MH. .TUH1'ICJ, Douc;I.~H), 216-217 (:\ fr. .Tu~t icc
Ila rl:tn), 2:31-2:)6 (:\In. J u:;TTCE BnEN N 1 ' ), 2R2-2~+ (\ fn . .f u~'I'ICE
S'l'BWAn'I'), and Gaston Countu v. United States, 395 U.S. 2.S5 (lOGO).

H
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the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment.';.( If so, under appellees' thesis. Dandridge Y. Williams, supra, and T..~indsey
v. N ormet, supra, would no longer be good constitutional ·law.
We have carefully considrred each of the argum.ents
supportivP of the District Court's finding that education· is a fundamental r1~ht and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context. In one
further respect WC' find this a particularly inappropriate
ca"e in which to subject state action to close judicial
scrutiny. The present case, in one most b;;c sense, is
significantly different from any of the cases in which
the Court has applied close scrutiny to state or federal
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of
our prior cases !nvolved legislation which "deprived,"
"infringed," or "in"terferred" with the free exercise of
_some fundamental personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535. 536 (1042); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618. G34 (1060); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S.
330, 338-343 (1972). The critical distinction between
those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR.
JusTICE BRENN AN, writing for the Court in Katzen bach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient
point: ar.
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
11
; Srr Srhorttlr, Thr Equal Protrrtion Clnu::;(' in Public Edmation, 71 Col. L. Hrv. 1:31)5, 1389-1390 (1971); Comment, Trnant
Intrrr:st Hrprr;;rntation: Propo:-:nl for a National Trnant:;' AHsociation, 47 Trx. L. Hrv. 1160, 1172-1173 n. 61 (1969).
Hr. Katzenbarh v. II! orr;an im·ohwl a challrngr b~· rrgi"trrrd Yotrrs
in Nrw York Cit.1· to a provi~ion of thr Votinf(" Rif("h1H Act of 1965
t hnt prohibitrd enforcement of a statr law c:1lling for Engli~h

7
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti..:
tution by 110t extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] ....
"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by.
state law. . . . We need decide oniy whether the
challenged limitati.on on the relief effected ... was
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-·
Ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc._.
tions in laws denying fundament?-] rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap..:
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding·
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a refor~1l measl.1re we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all
evils at the same time.' and that 'reforms may take
one step at a ti~ne 1 addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind ... .'" Id., at 656- 65V. (Emphasis from
original.)

The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation illvolvecl in Kalzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
literacy tr:;tH for voting. The lnw was su~pcndc•d as io residents
from Puerto Riro who had cornpleted at lenst ~ix ~·cnr~ of ed11cation at an "American-flag" Hchool in 1hn 1 cotm1 ry evrn thongh
tho lan!l;uagc of in::;t rudion wn:,; other than Engli;.;h. Thi:-> Court
upheld the quedtioned provi:;ion over the claim that it discrimin:~ted
ngainst those with a sixth gmclc ocluea1 ion obtained in non-English
speaking Hchools other than the ones de:;igna1 eel by 1he federal
log isla tion.

i

.;

-~
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Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding statr aid-"·as implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its
quality.Gn Of course, every reform that benefits some
lTiorc than others may be condemned for what its fails
to accomplish. But \Ve think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative aud reformatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles stmsitive to the nature of the State's
efforts. 67

c

It should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated
above, that this is an inappropriate case in ·which to
subject state action to the sort of searching scrutiny
reserved for laws that involve suspect classifications or
fundamental rights.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the
way in which '"texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We arc asked to condemn
the· State's judgment in conferring on political sub"'
divisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi"'
G(; cr. Meyer\', Nebraska. 262 U.S. :mo (1923); Pierce V, Society
of Sisters, 26R U. S. 510 (192.1 ); Hargrave v. Kick, ;31;~ F. Supp.

94-1- (l\fD Fla. 1970), \'arntrd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971).
c; Srr Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971); McDonald v.
Board of Election Commissioners, :394 U. S. 802 (19()9).
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tionally deferred to state logislaturos.ns Mr. Justice'
Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney,
311 U. S. 435 (1040), against interference with the
State's fisral policies is worth repeating:
"[t Ihe responsibility for devising just and productive sources of revenue challenges tho w its o C'gisfatures. Nothing cm1 be less helpful than for courts
to ... inject themselves in a rn:eroly negative way
i1Jto the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making."
Id., at 445.
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution,
tho J usticos of this Court lack both the expertise and
the familiarity with local p1·oblems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions 'A1th respect to tho raising
and disposition of public revenues. Yet wo are urged
to direct the States either to alter drastically the present
system or to throw tho property tax out altogether in
favor of some other form of taxation. Are wo, for
example, to counsel tho f-ltatos that an income or sales
tax would operate· less cliscriminatorily against the relatively impecunious clements of society'?
G!)

nH Srr, e. g .. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pe11nsylva11ia, 1:~ f U.S. 232 (1R90);
Ca.nnichal'l \'. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. R. 49.5, .'iOR-.509 (19:37);
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Rou•(·rs, 3SR U.S. 522 (19.59).
no Tho~r who urge that thr pn•spnt systc•1n br invalidated of'frr
littlr· guida!H'C' a~ to what t.1·pr of ~rhool financing ,.;houlcl rrplaer
it. The altllo,.;t inrvit:1hlr rr~ult of rr,ieetion of thr rxisting "·'·strm,
howrvrr; \\'Oulcl br st :I trwidr flnaming of all pu bl i(' rcluea t ion with
funds clrri1·('([' from t nxat ion of property or from t hr adopt ion or
C'xpnnsion or Hairs :tnd inc·omC' taxC's. Thr l\\Jthor~ of Pri\·:ltr Vi'ralth
and Public Education, supra. n. 12, at 201 - 2-1-2, ~uggrst an altrmatii'C' srlwmr, known as ''dist riet ]JO\\'C'I' rquali;~,inp;." In simplest
trrlnH, the Stutt' \\'Ollld guamnter that at an~' pnrticul:tr rate of
property taxation thr district would l'C'C'C'i\'C' a statrd numbrr ol'
dollar,.; rrgnrdlr~s of thr distric·t's tax ba~r. To fin:mcr thr ,.;uh~idir,;
to "poorrr" district~, l'unds would br tnkrn awa~' from thr "wralthiC'I'"
di:;trict,; that collect more than the :;tatrd nmount at any given
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Nor is this Court-indeed any court-competent to'
make informed judgments on the cr1t1cal issues con"'
fronting those who must determine educational policy·
at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even
l'nOre· than public welfare assistance programs, presents
a myriad of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.,
at 487. Tho very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggest that "there will be more than one constitutionally
permissible method of solving them," and that, within
the limits of rationality, "tho legislature's efforts to
tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. R. 53t5, 546- 547 (1972). On
even the most basic quest.ions in this area the scholars
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of
the hottest sources of controversy conoerns tho extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenclitures and the quality of education 70rate. Thi~ is not the place to weigh the RrgumcntR for and ngain~t
" cli>'t rict power cqualir.ing," bc:-·ond noting that comnwntator~ are
. in di~ngrccment a~ to whet her it i" fC'asiblc , how it would work, and
indeed whPt her it would not violate tlw equal prot crt ion theory
undcrl:-·ing nppcllccH' c:1"c. Prc,ic!Pnt's Comm'n on School Finance,
School~, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown , Rome
Reflection::; on SNrano v. Priest, 49 T. Urban L. 701, 700- 708
(1972); Brc"t , Book TIP\'icw, 23 Stan. L. nc\'. 591 , .594--.590 (1971);
Wi~r. School Finance Equnlizahon Lnw~uits: A l\Jodf'l Lc·gi,lntivc
nc"pon~r, 2 Yale HPv. of L. & Soc. Action 123 , 12.5 (1971);
Silflrcl & White, lntra~tatc Tncqualitics in Public Education: The
Cnsc for .Judicial HcliPf Under the Equal Protection Clau~c , 1970
Wis. L. He,·. 7, 29-30.
70
The qu:tlit ~·-co~t cont rovcr~y hnR received con~idcmblc nt tent ion. Among t hr notu blc aut horit ic~ on both side's nrc the following C . .Tcnck~ . Tnequnlit:-· (1972); C. Silbcnmn, Cri~is in the
' Classroom (1970); Office of Education , Equalit~· of Educational
Opportunit~· (1906) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of EcluC'ational Opport unit~· (1972) (l\foynihan & l\To::;tcllcr eel~.); .T. Gut hric,

____

...._
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an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies
virtually every legal COllclu8ion drawn by the District
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationship between cost and quality. is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
cducation. 71 And the questio11 of the proper relationship between f'tate boards of education and local school
boards. in terms of their respective responsibility and
degree of control. is now unc!C'rgoing searching re-examination. It hardly need be said that none of these questions is amenable to intelligent resolution through the
judicial JWOce8s. Tndeed. the ultimate wisdom c1f these
and like problems of education is not likely to be devined
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly
debate the issues. At the very least, the judiciary should
not rircmm:cribe or handicap-by interposing inflexible
constitutional constraints-the continued research and
experimentation so vital even to partial solutions and
to keeping abreast of changing conditions.
It must be rem0n1bered also that every rase arising
under the Rqual Protection Clause hns implications for
the relationship hebYC'en national and ~tate power under
our f0deral system. Questions of federalism arc inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws arC' to be subjected to the rompelling interest or
the rational basis test. While "rt lhe maintenanre of
the principlC's of federalism is a foremost ronsideration
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions u11der
G. T<lrindorkn, H. Lr,·in, & T. Slonl, Schoo]:-; :~n d Tnrcpmlity
(1071); Prr~idl•nl':-; Conun'n on School Fin:1nrr, wpra. n. 69; Swanson, Thr C'o:-;1-Qnalil~· Tirlation:-<hip, in lOih Nnt'l Co nf. on Srhool
Finnncr, lhr Ch:1 llrngr of C'hnngr in School Fin:ltH'r 151 (1!)67).
7
' Srr thr rr:-<ult s of lhr Trxns Govrrnor':-< C'onlmillr<''" "1:1trwidr
~ un ·ry on lhr ~oalH of rducalion in lhal Stal<'.
I C:o,·cmor'~;
Commillrc Ticporl, nt 50-68. Srr nlso C:olcbtrin, supm. n. 2R,
rtl 519-522; Srhoctllr, ~uwa, n. 6:3; aulhorilir~ ritrd inn. 69, suwa.
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which this Court examines state action/ ~ it would be
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our ferkrnl sy:-:t('m thnn the one now b('fore
us, in which we are urged to abrogate the systems of
financing public education presently in existence in
virtually ev('ry State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' Pyskm of public school finance is an inap- ---()'
propriak candidate for ~udiciai scrutii1y. Tfiese
same considerations arC' relevant to the determination
whethN that system, with its conceded imperfections, is
supportC'd by a reasonable or rational basis. It is to this
question that we next turn our attention.

III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the issue of
rationality.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from ('ach source.7:l The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program , was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstatrcl at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 7 '' Each school district's other
7

~

Allied Storrs of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 532 (1959)
Kat zeubach v. Morgan , 384

(l\1'H . .TusTrc8 BHBNNAN, ronc•utTing);

U .. S. G-n, 661 (19G5) (1\rr . Justice Harlan , di:-;~ellting).
7 a In H)70 Texas expended approximate]~ · 2.1 billion dollars for
education and a little o\·er one billion came from the l\rinimum
Fonndation Program. Texas Re,.;earrh League, supra, n. 19, at 2.
7 1 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13.
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supportive personnel arc provirlcd for: one principal for
every 20 teachers; 70 one "special service" teacherlibrarian , nurse, doctor, etc.- for every 20 teachers; 76
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided." Additional funds
are earmarked· for current operating expenses and for
student transportation."' The State also provides free·
textbooks. 79
The program is admi nil'ltcrccl by the State Board of'
Education ancl by the Texas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation"' and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.' ' As rcfiectccl by the 62'/c increase in funds allotted
to tho Edgewood School District over the last three
years/ " the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of' ·T exas' school district$, however, has been content to rely :alone on funds from the
Foundation ·Pi·ogram.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on pror>erty 'located within its bordeTs. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
:assure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program.'a Every
'district supplements its fotl!lclation grant in this manner.
In some districts tho local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in HJ67. In other districts the
7

Tex. Edur.. Code § 16.18.
Tex. Eclur. Code § 16.15.
77
Tex. Eclur. Code §§ 1G.l6, 16.17, 16.W.
78
Tex. Edur. Code §§ Hi.45, 16.51.
7
" Tex. Edur. Code § 12.01.
RQTex. Eclur. Code§ 11.26 (5).
Rl Tex. ] ~clue. Code § 16.301 !'i . seq.
82 Sec autr , nt - .
83 Gilmer-Aiken Commit tee, supra . n. 14·, at. 15.
"

70
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local share may far exceed even ti1e total Fou ndati01i
grant. In part local differences arc attributable to dif..:
fcrences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
the markrt value for any category of property varies from
its assessed value.''' The greatest intcrclistrict disparities,
however, are attributed to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
, districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability of supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher teachet' salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri..
butes of schools i11 more affluent districts arc lower pupil..
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.s"
There i~ no uniform sfafe\\'ide a~:<e:<i"ment practice in Tex:1s.
Commercial pr·oprrf~·, for examplr, might be faxed at ;{Q% ol'
market value in onr rount~r and at 50% in anothrr. V Oovrrnor's
Commiftrr Tirport, at 25-26; Berke, Cnrna,·ale, ]\forgan & White,
SUJn·a, n. 2R, at 666-667 n. 16.
hr. Texas nrsearch Lrngue, Sltp1'a, ll. 19, at 18.
As previou~ly
notrd, text aceom]xm~·ing n. 69, supra, the extent to which the
(]llalif~· of rdueation \'aries with expenditure per pupil is debated
inconrlu"i'·el~· by f he mo~t t houghtl'ul "t udents of public edueat ion.
While all would n!);rre t hnt then' is a rorrelat ion up to the point
of providing the recognized es~o;cntials, the i~sueR of grcafl'H! disagreemrnt includr the dfrct on qunlity of pupil-trarhrr ratios and
·of
hhJ;liP'i2snlary sehrclulcs. Thr stntr funding in Texa,;
iR clrsignrd to asRurr, on the average, onr te:1rhN for rvC'l'y 25
Ht uclrnt~o;, which is ronsic!C'l'rd to be a 1':1 ,·ornblr ratio by most .~t:md
nrds. Whcthrr thr minimum Halnry of S6,000 prr yr:1r is sufllccnt
in Texn~ to f1 t t n1ct qu:1lified trarhN~ may br more dcbatablr, clepcncling in major part upon thr !oration of the school di~trirf. But
jherc apprar,.; to be little rmpirieal data which supports the advantage> of an~· partiC'nl:u· pupil-traehcr ratio or which doeumcnts the
yirw that rvN highrr salarir8 rrsulf in
An intractablr problem in dealing with trnrhrn;' s:1lnrirs i::; the
ab~cncc, up to this time, of ::;ati,;factory tcchniqur;:; for judf!;ing
their ability or performance. Tlw rrsult i:-; that rrlntiwly few
Hehool ,;y:;tems have merit plan;-; ol' any kind, with teacher~' salarics
bci11g increa::;cd "by rotc" and acros~ the board in a wny which
4
R

(fri!3

..
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This. then, is the basic outli11c of the Texas finance'
structure. Bccauf'c of differences in expenditure levels'
occasioned by dispari tics in property tax income, ap-·
pellces claim that children in lesf: affluent di!"tricts have'
.
been made the f:ub.iC'ct of invidious discrimination. The'
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
e.stablish a rcMonablC' basis'' for a syE"tC'm which results
in cliffC'rent lcvC'ls of J1C'r pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,.
at 284. \Vc clisa~?/CC'.
The 'texas syEtem. ii1 its reliance on statC' as wC'll as
local resource's, is comparable to the systems employed'
in · virtually every other Rtate."n The power to tax local

-

reward~ the lrn~t de:.:ei'I'ing 011 the sn me basis n~ the mo~t dr~erv
ing. Snlnries are u~u:dl~· l'ili~<·d automaticnll~· on the basis of
predetermined "step~." extPncli11p; ovrr 10-to-12 ~·e:1r pNiod~.
In making these observn t ions, we int<·nd no rrit ieism of existing
]1mctires r~nd crrtainl~· we imp!~· no opi11ion th:il tenchrrs' snl:uies
grnrrall~· are :Hlrqunte.
AR romp:11wl with othe1·s of rompnrahle
edurat ion there is r\·er~· rea~on to helie\·r that tenchrrs' Aal:uie8
grnerali~·, starting from an undul~· low hnse, hnvr failrd rwn to
kel'p nbrrast of inflation. Wr hnvr included this commrntnr~· on
pupil-tenchN rnt ios and ~: dar~· le\·elR not to exprrss nn~· opinion
with r<'sprct to the ndequ:H'\' of thm'r in Trxns or rbr\\'hNr, but
mrrrl~· to indi<':ttr that thr two pri11r·ipnl far·tors di~tinguishi11g the
school s in thr morr nfTinrnt di ~ trirt ~ from thos<' rb<'whrr<' do notin thr opinion of man\· rxperts-demon~t mhl~· :1nd necr~sarily nffrri
the qualit~· of the tr•:1c hing.
>-G President':.: Cmmn'n 011 Srhool Finnnrr, SU]H'a , 11. oR, :1 t 9.
Until
rercntl~· ITnwnii w:1~ thr onl\' Rtntr thnt m:1intainrd a purr]~· ~tatr
fundrd rdmational progr:nn. Tn J!)flR. ho\Yr\·er, thnt Stntr nmrndrcl
it~ rdu('ationnl flnnncr Ntatntr to prrmit rountirs to rollrct :ldclitionnl fund~ lorniiY and :.:pend tho~r amounts on it s srhook The
rationale for th nt rrr·c•nt legisl:iliw' choice i~ inRtl'll('tiw on the
quest ion before t hr Comt t ocln~·:
·'UndN rxisting law, rountirK nrr prr('ludrd from doing nn.\'thing
in this :nrn, <:'\'011 to ~pr ncl their own funds if they so drsire. This
ronwti\·r lrgi~lation i:-: urgrntl~· ncedl'd in order to allo\\' <'Ollnties
to go aho\·r and he.\·o nd the Rtate's stn ndnrd:.: :md pro\·idr rducationnl facilities as good rrs the rwoplr of thr countirs wnnt :mel
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property for educational purposes has been recognized
ir'l Texas at least since 1883." 7 When shifts in the clist~ibution of population, accompanied by changes in local
property wealth oeeasioned by the growth of eommercial
and industr.i~l centers, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investmel1t of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
edueators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
of the pioneering ,,·ork of t"·o New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. ~' Their efforts were devoted to establishing a
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital clement of local
participation. The Stra.ycr-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these t\vo competing forces. As
articulated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual trugglc between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children , and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for
its child." su
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring
are willin~ to pn)' for. Allowin~ local rommunitie:; to ~o above
and be)·oncl e~tabli~hed minimums proYiclrcl for their prople encourages thr br:;t frat me:; of drmoC"ratic government." Iln~r . Se:;:;, Laws,
Art. 38, § 1 (19()8).
8 7 Scr tPxt acromp:myin~ n. 7, $Upra.
'R G. Str,l)·rr & H. Hnil!;, l<'inancing of Education in the State of
New York (1923) . For a thorough nnal)·~i:-; of 1he con1ribution
of the:;e reformrrs and of t hr prior and sub:-;rqucnt hi::;tor)· of cclucat ionnl finn ncr, :;ee J. Coon:;, ViT. Clune & S. Sugarman, ~upra, n. 12,
at' :30-95.
' 0 .T. Coons , W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 12, Forcwnrd by
.Tamr;; S. Colrm::m, at vii.
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a basic eel ucation for every child in the State, it permits
and encouragrs a largo meaF>ure of participation and
control of each district's schools at the local level. In
an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward
centrali11ation of the functions of government, local sharIng' of responsibility for public education has survived.
The merit of local control was rcrogni11ed last Term in
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v.
Counc·il of Cily o/ Emporia, 407 U. 8. 451 ( 1972). MR. :
JusTICE 8'l' I~WART stated there that "[cllirect control ,
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's
children is a neecl that is strongly felt in our society. 1' .
!d., at 469. THE. C'Hm·F JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed
that "[ljocal control is not only vital to continued public
support of tlw schools, but it is of overriding importance
from an educational standpoint as well. " /d., at 478.
The·· persistence of this attachment to government at
the lowest level where education is concemecl reflects
the depth of commitment of its supportC'rs. In part,
local control means. as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the clC'cisio1Jnaki ng process that cletorm incs how those local tax ~ollm·s will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
iocal need s. Pluralism alf'b afford s some opportunity
for experimentation, invocation , and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in ow· federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments. " uo No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi00

N ew State I ce Co . v. Leibmann, 2 5 U. S. 262, 280, .'311 (1932).
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i~~icity of vicwpoi,1ts and from a diversity of approaches

than docs public education.
'" Appellees do not seriously question the validity of
Texas' dedication to local control of erlucation. They
focus their attack on the school financing system on the
ground that it debases the concept of local control because it docs not provide the same fiscal flexibility to
poor districts as it affords the rich. It is no doubt true
that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to
l')Xpenditures for some districts than for others. Local
control, however, connotes more than the power to make
an autonomous decision on how rn uch to spend. It also
contemplates freedom to decide how available fu nels will
be allocated and is an essential clement in local participation in the operation of the schools.
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable rcf"ourccs to turn on "happenstance."
They sec no justification for a system that allows, as
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
·local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable
·local governmental units- requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.
It is equally inevitable that some localities arc going
.to be blesf"ccl ''"ith more taxable af"Rcts than others. Nor
is local wealth a ~tatic quantity. Arc boundary lines to
be redrawn with every shift in population or with every
discovery of valuable minerals or with the completion
of every new industrial park? :Moreover, if local taxa'tion for local expenditure is an unconstitutional method
·of providing for education then it must be equally im-
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permissible in providing
. other necessary servic~,..----currently financed from locnl property taxrs, inclnding
local police and firr protection. public health and hospitals. and public utility facilities of various kinds. We
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of
'
local property taxation
and control as would follow from
appellees' contentions.
In sum. to the extent that the Texas system of sch,ool
finance results ill discriminatory treatment of children
who happen to reside in certain districts. we cannot say
that such discrimination is the product of a system that
is without rational bash<. Its shortcomings have been
acknowledged by Texas, which has persistently endeavored-not without success-to ameliorate the differences
in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowl- .
edged benefits of local participation. The continued
persistence of "some inequality" is not alone a satisfactory
basis upon which to conclude that the Texas system
lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. 8. 420,
425-426 (Hl61). Nor may it be condemned simp_Iy
because it imperfectly c.ffectua,tes the State's goals.
Dandridge v. W·ill£ams, 897 U. 8., at 485.
The Texas plani is not the result of some hurried,
ill-conceived legislation. It is certainly not the 11roduct
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class.
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and rlsewherc. and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
.substance to the presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. 8. 61, 78 (Hl11), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. 8.
69- 70 (1913). One also must remember, when weigh~
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ing the issue of rationality, that the system here challengecl is not pcculinr to TcxaR or to any other State.
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for financing public education rcficcts what many educators for
a half century have thought was an enlightened approarh to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We arc unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legi slators, scholars and educational authorities in 40 States, especially where the
alternative proposed is only rcecntly conceived and nowhere yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether
there is a rational basis for the challenged state action.
We hold that the Texas plan abun'dantly meets this test.

IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on
the District Court opinion"' in this case and on its California prcclcccssor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P. 2d 1241 (1071). a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. These decisions have been widely hailed as providing a constitutional rnandatc for major state legislative
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have over claimod.n
Vt "Fisralneutr::tlity" is tho nnme p;iven by Profe~sors Coons, Clune,
nne! Sugarman to their thesis thnt. " the quality of p11blir edur:tl'ion
mny not ben funetion of wcnlth other than the wonlth of the ,;tale
as a whole." .J. Coon.-;, vV. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 12, at 2.
Their thoup;htful and imnp;inative work paved the wn~· for the
suit;;, imluding the present one, attn eking the school finnnre "~·s tem.
Indeed, the Di ~ lrirt Court approved the author~' the~i;; yerbatim.
337 F. Supp., aL 285. The :1uthor~ have often cautioned their sup-

'·
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The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
i1eutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to emerge from some commentators. Tt is beginning to be recogni7.ecl tha~ the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and th~ implementation of "fisca.lly
neutral" alternatives .could have consequences ~Esquiet
ingly different from those initially assumed. 02 There iii,
port e r~ , however, ngainst sprruhting that "fiscal nrut rnl it y" would
J;c · n JXmncra for t.he poor or for rncial minorit ie~. lb'id. ; Coons,
Clune & Sugarmnn, A First Apprni::Jal of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (197-1):
n~ An initinl problrm, morr obvious to rlrcted officials than to
those of ~~~ who write opinions fur t.he comt s or essay~ for the law
reviewH, is the critirnl one or money. Whatever rormuh mny be
omplo~·ed , there are esse ntially only two wnys to assure equal per
p11pil expenditmc•s (even a pproximate!~' ) in rvrry school district:
(i) expenditmeH could .be e(]unlizcd by taking: rcvrnues away from
some cl i ~t riet s a ncl a]lpl~·ing; t hrm to t hr benrfit or others, a process
of lewling down to some common denominator; or (ii) vast additional l'l1x revenurs would .have to be raisrd ' to rle\·atr per pupil
expendih1re to 1hr high est levrl now obt ainiug in thr di Ht ri~t s which
providr the grent rst snpplrment:1 tion of .::;tate: fu11ds. Nri\hrr of
1hese :1lt ern at ives seems rrnl ist ir.' The re~iclrnt s of a di ~t ri ct which ,
with good fortune nnd dedirnt.ion t.o public education, h:wr a high
lcvrl of expencliturr nre not Jikrl.\' to be 1olernn.t or a levelinp; plan
ihnt rcclurr ~ funding for ihrir di ~ triet to incrrn se it rbrwhrre. Wonld
trar·hrr:-;' snhrie.-; in that district br reduced eorrrspondingly? If
pnpil-t.r·nclJcr rr1tios wcrr ineren .~ecl , whnt wonlcl happen to the
tearhrrs no longrr em plo~ ' rd? vVhnt , imlrrd , would h:tpprn t o school bond>: issurd pur~unnt t 0 [I vote or citizen1fii-oud of thmr
school s nncl willing to pRy more?
The oihrr nlternntivr, the raising of sulllcirn t aclllitional tax money
statewide, is no more palntflblc politi ca iJ~· . It has been ralc·ulatrd
that $2.4 billion ol' additional school funds would be required to
bring all Trxct~ dist rirt s np io the preHont level of expenditure in all
but tho weal1 biesl di~t rict s-a n amount more than double thai,

... ··~
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the Coons
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
·ftS to the lowest income families who tend to reside in
·urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the
District Court.n" has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance. 0 '' That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
·.to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.u"
lt~ 1@8:1"1U,Il4' r;lctajled cmpiri,Qiil!J iitUQY lillilQ QQ,.'3 concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the location of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools."u Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
·clustered in school districts that have relatively less
curTently bcinp; spent in Texas on public education (Texns Resea rcl1
.League, supm, n. 19, ::tt 16-18. At a time when ever~· State and
locality is sufFering from fi sca l nndernnurishmrnt, and with demands
for services of nil kinds burgeoning and with wear~r taxpa~·rrs already
resisting t::lx increa ses, only those who live in a dream world could
believe that n derision of this Court nullif~· ing present stnte taxing
systems would result in doubling public funds committed to education. "Rather, thr result in terms of confusion and disruption would
be profound, nne! in the rnd the leveling process could well mean a
lowrr quality of education for all.
ua Sec n. 33, supm..
u-1 Select Cornm. on Eqnnl Eclucntionnl Opportunity , Inrquitics
in School Finnncr (1972) (l\Innograph prepared by ProfeHsor Berke).
uu Sec abo U. S. Office of Educntion, Finance::; of Lnrgr City School
Systems: A Comparntive Annl~·~ is (1972) (HEW Publicntion).
'w See Note, A Stah~tic:1l Analysis of the Srhool Finn nee Deci;;ions: On Winning Battles nne! Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. Rev. 1303
( 1972); see text. nccompnnying n. 45, supra.
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assessable property." 7 In view of these uncertainties, if
this Court were sitting as a policy tribunal, we would
hesitate to embrace-at least at this time-the ultimate
efficacy of the appealing egalitarian concept which
launched this case.
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu~
tional function restrain us from embarking upon any
such political or philosophical undertaking. That role
is reserved for Congress and for the state legislative
do no violence to the .values of feder;li~~~ ~
bodies and
and separatwn of pmYers by staymg our hand. ~·
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to
be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status
quo. The need is apparent for reform in a tax system
which may have relied too heavily on the local property
tax. and for reform in public education to assure both a
higher level of quality and greater uniformity. They
merit the con tin uecl attention of the scholars \vho already
have contributed much by their challenges. But the
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.

':·0

n7 Sre Gold~trin, SU]Jra. n. 33, at 526; J. CoonH, W. Clune &
S. Sugarman, supra. n. 12, at :356-:357 n. 47, km? notrd that in
California, for example, "59 % of minority ::;tudrnt;; !il'r in district s
abovr t hr mrd inn a 1·cragr vnl un t ion JWr pupil." In H('xar County
by far thr large::;! di;;trirt-thc San Antonio Indrpcnclcnt School
Di;;trict-i;; abo1·r thr local ~wcragr in both the amount of taxable
wraith per pupil and in mrdian fatnil)· income. Yrt 72 % of its
;;tudent::< arc ::\[('Xican-AmNican". And, in 1967- 1968 it sprnt only
a vrry f('W doll ars l"ss per pupil l han the 1\ orl h Ea;;t nnd 1\ ort h
Side Jndrprndrnt School District ;;, which ha1·c onl~· 7% and 18%
Mexicnn-Antcrican en rollmrnt rcsprct j,·rly.
Berke, CarnaYale,
l\1organ & White, supra., n. 28, ai 673.
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assessable property.!); In view of these uncertainties, if
this Court were sitting as a policy tribunal, we would
hesitate to embrace-at least at this time-the ultimate
efficacy of the appealing egalitarian concept which
launched thi:s case.
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu.:.
tional functio1i restrain us from embarking upon any
such political or philosophical undertaking. That role
is reserved for . Congress and for the state legislative'
bodies and we Clo no violence to the values of federalism
and separation of powers by staying our hand. We
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to
be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status
quo. The need is. apparent for reform in a tax system
which 111ay have relied too heavily on the local property
tax, and for reform in public education to assure both a
higher level of quality and greater uniformity. They
merit the continued .a ttention of the scholars who already
have contributed much by their challenges. But the
ultimate solutioi{~ must come from the lawmakers and
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them;

n; Ser Gold~trin, supta, n. 33, at 526 ; .T. Coom;, W. Clunr .&
S. Suf!;arman , supra, n. 12, nt :35G-:357 n. 47, h:wc notre! that in
California , for rxnmple, "59 % of minorit~· studrnts Ji,·r in di~trirt s
abovr thr mrclian a1·rragr ,·aluation prr pupil. " In Brxar County
by far thr lnrgr~t cli~trkt-the San Antonio Indrprmknt School
Di~trirt -iH aboYr thr local :wrrag;r in both thr amount of tnxnble
wrnlth per pupil and in mrdian famil.1· incomr. Yrt 72 % of ils
~tudent:; arc l\frxican-Amerir·ans. And, in 1967-19GR it spqnt only
a \' Cr~r frw dollars I"~" prr pupil than tlw North East and North
Side Tnd<-p<-ndrnt School Districts, which havr onlx 7% and 18%
frxican-.\mNiran , rnrollmrnt rrsprcl ivrlv.
Berke, Carnavalr
J\Iorgan & Wl;itc, supra, n. 28, al 673 . .
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Western District of
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al.
Texas.
[January -, 1973]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the
Court.
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents "·hose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood I ndepenclent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who arc members of minority
groups or who arc poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax ba~e. Named as defendants"
were the State Board of Eel ucation, the Commissioner
Not all of thr rhildrrn of thrsr romplninants attrnd publir school.
Onr family'~ childrrn arr rnroll<'d in print<' ~rhool "brcnu~r of the
condition of th<' schoob in t hr Eclp;<'wood Indrprndrnt School Di~
trict." Third Am<'uclrd Complaint, App., at H.
~ Thr San Antonio Tnclrp<'ndrnt School District, \Yho~r namr thi~
ca:-;e still l)('ars, wa~ onr of ~r1• rn :-;chool cli:-;trict~ in thr San Antonio
metropolitan arra which wrrr originally n:unecl ns part)· ddrnclnnt:-;.
Aftrr a prrt rial confNrn<·<', the Di~t rict C()\11'( i:-;sued an ord<'l' dismis:-;ing; thr school di~tricts from the ra~r. Rub~rqurnt l )·, the San
Antonio Tnclrprnclrnt School Di~trict hn:-; joinrd in thr plaintiffi:i'
challrngr to thr Stair'~ school finanrr sy:-;trm and hn:-; filrcl an
amicus curiae brirf in i:illj)port of that po~it ion in I hi~ Court.
1
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of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in Lhe summer of 1068 and a three-judge court
was impaneled i11 January HJIJO." In December 1071 ·I
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas Pchool finance system unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presentee!, 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court.
I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools}' Early in its hist6ry,
3

A three-judgr com1 was proprrly convrnrd and thrre arc no
qur:stiom; as to the Di:striet Court'H juri~diction or thr direct appralabilit.y of its judgment. 28 U. S. C. §§ 22Sl, 1253.
1
The trial w:tH delayrd for two yr:tr;; to ])E'rmit rxtrnsive prrtrial
discover~· and to allow c-ompletion of a IJl't1CI in~~; Texas legisln t ive
investigation concerning the nerd for reform of its public ;;chool
financ-e systrm. Rodriouez v. San Antonio f11d. School Dist., :337
F. Supp. 2SO, 2S5 n. 11 (WD Trx. 1971).
";3:37 F. 8upp. 2SO. The Distric-t Court sta~·rd its mandatr for
two ~·cars to pro1·iclc Trxas nn opportunit~· to rrnwd.1· thr inequitie::;
found in its financing program. The court, howrvrr, retainrd juric;dietion to fa~hio11 ils own n'ml•dinl order if the Statr failed to offc'r
an aeerptablr plan. ld., at 286.
G'fcx. Const., Art. X,§ 1:
''A grll('l'al diffusion of knowledgr he inn; r~~rnl i:ll to t hr presen'at ion
of thr right~ and libl'rtirs of the proplr it :-;hall be thr dutr of ihe
LrgiHlalure of thi~ State• lo mnkr :-;uilable provision for the :;upport
and nwintc'natH'C' of publir srbool~."
!d., Art. X,§ 2:
"The Lrgi~laturc> shall as rarly as prarticahlr rstahli:-;h frer schools
throughout lhc Slate, and »hall furnish means for iheir ;;upporl, by
iaxat ion on property."
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Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
schools. relying on mutual participation by the locai
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amencled to proviclc for the creation or
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school builclit1gs" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funcls. 8 The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854,n was endowed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support.1(' The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent':Funa as well as
ll~lc p1 opel'tiy-tax~~served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State. 11
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State.' 2 Sizable differences

)

Tex. Con~!. 1R76, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug. 14, 1883.
Tex. Con~t ., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4, 5.
n Garnmd'H Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2
(interpretive commentari0:-:); T Hcport of GoYcrnor'~ Committcc on
Public School Education, The Clwllenge and the Chance 27 (1969)
(hereinaft0r Govcrnor'g Committee Report).
10
Tex. Const., Art. 7, §5 (~00 al~o tlw interpretive commentary);
V Governor'~ Committce Hcport, at 11-12.
~~ Tex. Const. , Art. 7, § 3, a;,; amended, Nov. 5, 1918 (sre inter_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __..1 ~
prctive commrnt"r~·).
12
I Govrrnor'::; Com mitt rr Report, at .'35
CoonH, W. Clune,
~
S. Sugarman, Privat0 Wcalth !lnd Public Education 49 (1970);
"""
E. Cubberley, School Fund~ and Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905) .
7

8
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced.n The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education. 1 ·J
In due time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities.' " Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per schoo];ge child.'n Although the
amount \vas increased severaf'times in the early 1940's, 17
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.' 8
Recognizing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
'" B~· 1940 one-half of the State';; popnlation \\'::Iii rln~trrrd in its
metropolitnn crnters. I GO\·ernor's Committer RPport , at 35.
11
' Gilmcr-.'\ikrn Committee, To Ha,·e What We l\Ju~t (19-J.R).
'" R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950) ; Texn;; Bel. of
Educ., '.IJJ.c,. 1:€-:-m -Sif\t{)widc cll
dPqutwy Surve~· (W38
tu R. Still, supra, n. 15, Gt 12.
17
1 General Lnws of Trxn s, 46th Leg;is., Rrg. Sr~"'· 1939, nt 274
(S22.50 per studrnt); Grneral & Sprc. Lnm; of Trxa~ , 48th Lrgis.,
Rrg. SP~s. 1943 , ('. 161, at 262 (S25.00 per student).
l R Geneml & Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Lcgi~., Reg. Sess. 1945,
c. 53, at 75.
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alternative systems in other S~ates and to propose a
state funding scheme that would . gu~rantee . a minimum
or basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen. establishing the .Texas Minimum Foundation School Program.'u It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas.~
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80/i- of the Program and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment- is apportioned among the school districts
pursuant to n. formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a complicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. Jt also considers each county's relative
'share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property
0

1
u For a complrtr history of the adopt ion in Trxas of a foundation program , ~re H. Still~, supra, n. 15. See also V C:o,·C'l'nor's
Commit ter Hrport, at 14; Texas Hr~<rarrh Lrag;ur, Public School
Finance Problems in Tcxa::; 9 (Interim Report 1972).
"° For thr 1970-19il school ~·e:1r this ~tatr aid prog;rnm arcountrd
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Loc·al taxation rontributrci
41.1% and 10.9% waH provided itt federal funds. Texn~ Rr~rarrii
League, supra, n. 19, at 9.
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in the State. 21 Each county's assignment is theu divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county."" The
district then finances itf' share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to asRure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing inflU<mce 011 expenditure levels bet\\'cCn school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that \\'ould force every school
district t0 contribute to the education of its children 23
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources."·' Today virtually every school district does
impose a property tax from which it derives locally
expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary to
satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation
Program..
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1040, expenditures for education-from state as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
and 1067 expellCiitures increased by approximately
500jln.":; In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion "" and these
increases have been reflected in consistently nsmg per
V Go,·emor'::; Committee Report , at 44-4R.
At jlrc8cnt then· arc 1,161 ~ chool cli ~ trict ~ in Trxn s. Tcxn:-; R c~:>ea reh Lraf?:uc, su wa. n. 19, at 12.
"" In 19-1-8 tlw Gilmcr-Aikrn Committee found that somr ::;chool
district s wNe not lrYying any local tax to support education.
Gilmcr-Aikrn Commit tcr, su pra, n. 14, at 16.
21
Gilmrr-Aikrn Commit tee, suwa. n. 1-J., at 15.
"" I Go,·crnor'~:> Committee Hcport, :1t 51-53.
2
" Texas Rc~:~rn reh Lcagur, supra, n. 19, at 2.
21

22
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pupil expenditures throughout tho Stato. 27 Minimum
teacher salaries-by far tho largest single item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years. 2 8
To illustrate the manner in which tho dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to ,whi<th substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22.000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city scetor of 8an Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 9o r(l of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6r(l
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertytho highest in the metropolitan area- the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19671968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Mi11imum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
27

Tn the yc:us between 1949 and 19137 the nvcrngP pN pupil
expend it me for all Cl ltTcnt opcrat ing cxpPnSP~ innea~cd from $2013
to S-Hn. In that same pcriocl capita l cxpcnclitmc:> increased from
$44 to Sl02 per pupil. I Go,·crnor'~ Committee Report, nt 5:3-54.
2
~ III CO\·crnor's Committee Heport , :~t 113-1-113; BPrkc, Carnnvale, l\Jorg:1n & 'White, Thr Texa~ School Finnnce Ca~e: .'\ Wrong
In Scarc·h of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Eclur. 659, 5Rl-G82 (1972).

.,
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total of $248."" Frderal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil.'' 0
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with thr Alamo Heights Inclepenclcnt School
District, the most affluent school district in an Antonio ..
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a rrsiclcntial community quite unlike·
tho Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly @
:-having onl:v 187r Mexican-Americans
ancl'loss than 1 <y,- X rgroes. Tho assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $40.000 and the median family income
is $8,001. In H>G7- 1068 tho local tax rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 proviclrcl from that Program, the clistrict
was able to supply $558 prr student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1067- 10(:)8 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aiel ,'' ' more recent partial statistics indicate that
~ v ThC' i\1-nilahli:' Rchool Fund, trchnicnll~· . ])l'OI'idr:-: a ~C'cond
f'OUI'C'e or state' !ll()J1('~'· That Fund ha~ ('Oiltinurd :1~ in ~· c·nr·~ past
(:;C'e trxt accompan~· ing nn. 15- l.S , SUJH'a) to di ~ trihutC' nniforrn
per pupil gmnt~ to ewr.\· distri ct in the Statr. Tn HHl.S thiH Fund
n!JottC'd S9.S pC'r pupil. IImn•,·C'r, becnu ~C' thC' AYailablr Rchoul
Fund euntrlbution i~ nlw~1y~ subtracted from n di~trict 's rntitlement undc•r the Founcln t ion Program , it play~ no ~ignifirant rolo
in eclucationnl finance todny.
3 0 '\Vhile l'c•dNal nsHi ~ tanrc• haH an nmeliorating effC'ct on thC' diffC'reneC' in ~ chool budget s bC't wrC'n WC'~dth~· and poor di~t riC't H, t be.
DIHtriet Court rrjrrted an :n·gunwnt muciC' b.1· the St:lte in thnL
eourt that it should eon ~ idC'T' the dTect of thC' fC'drrnl grant in
a s~C'~~ing the di:;rrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., nt 28-1-. ThC' State
ha:; not rr nc·wC'cl that contC'ntion herC'.
:n The figure'~ quotC'd above' vary Hlightl~· from tho,;r utilizC'd in
the Distriet Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782, ThC':;e trivial
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the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970- 1971 school year the Foundation 8chool Program allotment for Edgewood was·
$356 per 11upil. This constituted a 62 o/c increase over
the three-year period since 1967- 1968. Indeed , state'
aiel alone in 1070- 1971 equaled Edge\\'ood's entire 19671968 school budget---from local. state. and federal sources.
Alamo Heights en.loyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $401 per pupil. These
recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth ,
\Vas required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil. or about 20 %
of its Foundation grant. Eclge\YOOd, on the other hand ,
paid only $8.46 per pupil. which is about 2.4% of its
grant."" It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 3 '1
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
, disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
diffrrenrrs [)!'<' npparpnt]~, n product of that court's reliance on
diffNrnt statistical data than we have rdied upon.
a2 Texa~ Rr~mrrh LengtH', supra, n. 19, at 13.
31
' The Economic IndPx, which determines each count~·'s sh:Hr of
the total Lor[)] Fund Assignment, is based on a complex formula
conceived in 1940 when the Foundation Program was instituted.
It has frrqurntly been ;.;uggestcd by Texas researcher~ that the
formula bE' altPrrd in spveral respects to provide a more accurate
reAection of local taxpa~·ing ability, especial!~· of urban sc hoob.
V Govemor'~ Committee Report, at 48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan &
WhitP, supra, n. 28, at. 680-681.
~lightly
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degree throughout the State."' still exist. And it was'
these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the'
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the Distriet Court to conclude that Texas'·
dual system of public school nnance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that tl1C'
"' Thr District Court relied on the fimli"ngs presrntcd in an
nffi&n·it submit ted b~· l)rofrs~or Berke of ~~T:H·u~e. Hi~ ~ampling ·
of ll 0 Tcxm.; school cliKt ricts drmon;-;t rated a din'c t corrdat ion
between the amount of a cliKtriet',.; taxable propnty and it~ lew!
of pc·r pupil expend it me. His stud\· :d::;o I' on nd a d ireel correl:it ion
bt't \\'N' ll a di::;t rict '::; lllC'd ian fam il~y income and per pupil expendilurC'::; as well as an iin·rrKe correlation brt ween percentage of minoritir:; nf1d cxprmht nrc".
Categoriz<'d l.J.,. Equalized Propert~· Value",
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue
J1J arket l' alue
J11 edian
Sta[e &
Local
of 'l'a:rablt'
Family
Per Cent
R.e11e11urs
Prowrty
Income
J1Tiwn·it!l
From I.'J()O
Per Pupil
Prr Pu]Ji/
Pupils
Abo,·c SlOO,OOO
S5,900
SR15
8%
(10 Districts)
;31 00,00(1-8.'50,000
S544
S4,425
:32%
(2(i DiKt rich)
S5CJ,OOO-S:30,000
$4,900
2:3 %
S41-l3
(:30 Di,.;t rirt:,;)
$462
$:30,000-:310,000
$5,050
31%
(40 Distriets)
Below :\110,000
S305
S3,325
79 %
(4 Districts)
Although thr corrd:ltim1s with rc~])('rt to fnmil~ ' inromr and rare
appeal' onfr to cxi:.;t ni the rxtrcmcs, and nllhough the nflian!',;
met hodolng~· ha,; he<'n qul'~t ionrd (~cc Gold.-:trin, Tnt Prclist riel
Tnequnlit ir:< in School Finnn<'ing: a Crit i(·:tl J\ n:d)·si" of Serrano v.
Priest and i l~ PI'O(Jl'IIIJ, 120 U. Pa. L. Re,·. 50..J, .')2:3-525 1111. 67 and
71 (1972)) , m~ofnr as an~· of the;,;e three ronclations iK rclcYnn!
to the co11stitu!io11:1l thesis prc~ented in this ra~r \\'P mn~ · arrrpt
it~ ba;;ic thru~t. For a dcfrn~c of thr rclinhilit~· of the afTiclnvit, ~cC"
Bcrkr, Canw,·nlr, l\Iorgan & ·w hite, supra, n. 2 .
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effect of the Texas system was to discriminate on the·
basis of wealth in the manner in which education was
provided for its people. 337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding
that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that educa~
tion is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held
that the Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it \\·as premised upon some compelling
~tate interest.. !d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court
9onclucled that "In lot only are defendants unable to
().emonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.''
ld., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual syl"tem of financing education could not \\'ithstancl
the close juclicial scrutiny that this Court has found
~;~.ppropriate in revie\Yi ng legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights''" or that
involve suspect classifications."(; If. as we have frequently held, close scrutiny means that the State's system
is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate Qbjectives, ancl that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,"7 the Texas
financing syst<•m- ancl its counterparts in virtually every
other State--will not pass muster. The State candidly
a9mits that "[nJo one familiar with the Texas system
:~<; E. (! .. Police DC'pt. of Lite City of Chicaoo Y. Mosle!J, 40R U. S.
92. (1972) ; Dunn v. Blumstriu. 405 U. S. 330 (1972) ; Sha]Jiro v.
7'hompsou, 39-J- U. R. 619 (1969).
:wE. fl., Graham v. Rithard~on, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Lovin{! v.
'(i?'Qinia, :3RS U.S. 1 (1967) .
"'Sec Dwm \'. Blumstei,l, 405 U. S. 330, 3..J:3 (1972), and the
Q (L~c~

rollcC'tcd 1herein.

71-1332-0PINION

i2:

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ.

would contend that it has yet achievc'd perfection.'' 38
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" "' and "imperfections," ''0 the State
d~fends the system's rationalitY with vigor anci dis!)utes
the ' District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable'
basis.';
·
.
.
This, then , establishes the framework for our analysis ..
\:Ve must decide; · first, whether the Texas system of
:fi..nancing· public edl.wation must be stibjdcted' to strict·
judicial scru~iny. If so, the' fudgment of the Distri~t
Court should be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational
basis must be considered.

If
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
'appellees' challe11ge' to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the- rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and
appellate proccsses," 1 and on cases disapproving wealth
barriers imposed on the right to vote.' ~ Those cases,
the District Court concluded , established wealth as a
suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisiotis of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education,J:j that there is a
:Js Appelhnt;,;' Brief, at 11.
:w

Ibid.

40

Tr. of Ornl Arg., at 3.
E. rJ., Griffin v. llhnu'is, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) ; Douglas v. Califonu:a, 372 U.S. 358 (1963).
"~ 1/m']JCI' v. Bel. of Elections, 883 U.S. 663 (1964); McDonald v,
Bel. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969) ; Bullock v. Cm·ter, 405 U. S.
134 (1972).
43
Sec ca;,;cs cltrd in text, at-, infra .
11

..
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case. which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
iJ1to the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
under the Rqual Protection Clause. Indeed. for the
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuasive.

A
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Since
all children in any givrn school district receive the same
pllblic rducation. irrrsprctive of family wealth. the District Court found the operative class to be all citizens
in "poor school districts." 337 F. Rupp., at 282. The
Statr's rlependence on local property taxation to pay a
portion of the totRl cost of rducation vvas found to constitutr de facto discrimination against those school districts that have, vis
vis other school rlistricts,
relatively less proprrty to tax per pupil. Because higher
rates of taxation failrd to comprnsate for disparities in
property valqe. the class was found to be rxpending
relatively less in its schools and. therefore, providing a
lower quality education for its children.
In one sensr this rliscrimination is geographical rather
than financial. But thr Court hns never questioned the
Statr's power to draw reasonablr distinctions between
its political subdivisions. Gnffin v. County School Board
of Prince Edtcard County, 377 LT. S. 218. 230-2iH (1964);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420. 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 54.") (1954). Recognizing
the force of those cases. appellees have focused instead
on the "inclivicl uals who reside in the relatively disad-

a
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vantaged districts. Y ct, for two related reasons, the'
status of those individuals is simply not comparable to
that of the individual complainants who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws as invidiously
discriminatory against the poor.
1. In Griffin v, Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), and
Douglas v. California, 372 U, S. 353 (1963), and their
p'rogeny,·•·• the Court invalidated state laws that denied
a fair and adequate crim'ina.l appeal to indig-ents. Sim.1larly, Williams v. Illi·nois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970) , and
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S .. 395 (1971), struck down criminal
penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply
betausc they were unable to pay fines. In each of those·
cases th~ Court was not clealing' witl1 relative impecunity
but with some level of absolute poverty, i.e., because of
their incligency, each complainant was totally unable to
pay for the state-proffered benefit. Those cases did not
deal witl~ the plight of those on whom state laws impose'
a weighty but not insurmountable burden. The mere
fact that if may have been more difficult for one citizen
than other to purchase a trauscript or to hire an attorney on appeal would not alone have been enough td
cbmpel judicial invalidation of those barriers. The Court
has never questioned that the nonindigent citizen must
pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have never
lield that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's
ability to pay .in order to avoid the unequal burdens
'created by a system of absolute fines.
In the instant case, appellees have endeavored to show
dnly that children from relat.iv6ly iJoorer families tend

. r.,'

..
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to reside in relatively poorer districts. 4 " No effort was
made to prove, however, that the financing system operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more
clearly definable class of indigents. Incleccl, there is reason to believe that the poorest families arc not invariably
clustered in the poorest districts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded
that "r i lt is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 'poor'
llvc in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major factual
assumption of Serrano-that the educational finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in
Connecticut." w Defining "poor" families as those below the Bur<'au of the Census "poverty level," ' 7 the
Connecticut study found. not surprisingly, that the poor
are clustered around commercial and industrial areasthose same areas that provide tht' most attractive sources
of property tax income for school clistricts! 8
Thus. we arc asked in this case to extend for the first
time the Court's most exacting equal protection standard
to a large. diverse and amorphous class. And, unlike
racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it is not a class
4
" A~
indira Irei in n . :3:3, supra, thrrr is rrn~on to (]llrstion
whrt hcr-r,·rn in Trxas-t hrrr i~ a dirrct corrrlal ion brt wPrn fa mil~·
wen it h mea:>mNl b~· income and district wralt h measmrd h~ · n~~e~~rd
propPrl y valu:t t ion~ . St udir;; in other Sl ale,.: haw found e,·pn Jp"~

r•nrrPI q f ln•"'

..
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saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness. or subjected to such
a history of unequal treatment as to command extraordinary judicial protection from the rnajoritarian political
process. It has never been 'vithin the constitutional
IJrerogative of this C'ourt to nullify state action simply
because its burdens fall more heavily on those of lower .
than average income.
2~' Moreover, the nature of the injury alleged ·by the·, .
disadvantaged \~lass ~6rovides another significant factor
differentiating the present case from those relied upon
by the District Court. The disadvantaged class iden .., __
tiified by appellees in this case has sustained only a rela-· _
tive deprivation, i. e., the poorer districts in terms of
assessable property per pupil tend to devote relatively
less to education. This difference poses questions of considerable complexity in terms, first , of determining
whether equal protection has been denied and, second,
of finding and imposing an appropriate remedy.
In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury was apparentd-enial of a transcript on appeal- and the remedy could
be easily and effectively secured. What was required
was some means of assuring an "adequate appellate·
review." 351 U. S., at 18. The Court did not hold that
!llinois was required to provide a full stenographic transcript in every case. Broad leeway has been permitted
for the States to select their own means of meeting their
constitutional obligation. Sec Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971) , Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S.
226 (1971). And, where an "adequate substitute,"
Gardner v. Calijor11ia, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969), is provided, the Court will approve its use. See Britt v,
N orlh Carolina, supra; Draper v. ·washington, 372 U. S.
487 (19,6 3); Erski:ne v. Washington Prison Board, 357
U. S. 214 (1958). Likewise, in Douglas v. Califor·nia,
supra, the Court, while requiring counsel for indigents

..

.

.
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perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained
from mandating "absolute equality." 372 U. S., at 357.
No attempt has yet been made to guarantee as a constitutional requirement that all citizens, regardless of
relative wealth, receive the same quality of legal
representation .'1!)
In analogizing from those cases in which the deprivation was absolute to the present case in which such
deprivation as exists is relative, must the threshold finding of unconstitutional discrimination depend on whether
Texas is presently providing an "adequate" education to
children in poorer districts? The founders of the Minimum. Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that .
. By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating
funds, the ~~exas Legislature hope to "guarantee, for the
welfare of the State as a whole, that all people shall have
at least an adequate program of education. This is
what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of
.Education.'" r.o Must we decide whether, in fact, Texas
has fulfilled its promise and that, as the 'State repeatedly
asserts in its briefs in this Court, "the state has assured
every child m . every school district an adequate
education?" 51
Even assuming that the Court possessed the tools and
expertise to conclude that the present system is inadequate, how are we to irnplement the remedy'? Appellees
have steadfastly asserted that they do not demand equal
tu Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), in which an
indigent':; due proccs;; right of acceHR to a divorce tribunal wa:;
found noi. to rcquirr more than a "meaningful opportunity" to
obtain a divorce. !d., nt 379-380. The Court did not command
that 1he procrdure:s a,·nilablr for rich and poor br equal: it only
reqnirrd that the~· be aclrquate and effrctive. !d., at 382.
5 ''Gilmrr-Aiken Commit!rr, supra, n. 14, at 13 (empha:si~> addrd).
51
ApprllantH' Briel', at :15; 'Reply Brief, at 1. But :sec V Governor':; Committee Report, at 32.
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expenditures.. Rather, they profess to endorse almost
any system of expenditures that is not limited by the
local district's lack of relative taxable wealth. Yet any
alternative short of equal expenditures is bound to result,
at least occasionally, in lower expenditures in schools
attended by children of poorer families . In each such
case, our prior wealth discrimination cases would indicate that the Court must decide wl1ether the amount
spent in the disadvantaged schools is sufficient to guarantee those children as adequate an education as is
afforded other children in the State. That is a function
for which we are quite obviously ill equipped ..
There are, theu, these two demonstrable differences
bet>veen the present case and those relied o'n . by the '
District Court: ( 1) the claimed disadvantaged class is
significantly larger as well as more ubiquitous and diverse;
and (2) the injury alleged is in no sense an absolutE!
deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance
system might be hypothesized , however, in which the
analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be
considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State only to those who
are able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil,
there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" peopledefinable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed
sum- who would be absolutely precluded from receiving
an adequate education. That case would present a far
more compelling set of circumstances for judicial al';lsistance than the case before us today. After all, Texas
has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide a1
education to those who can afford it. It has provided
what it considers to be an adequate base education for all
children and has drawn no explicit lines designed to
separate out the poor for disfavq_retf' treatment.
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding
of ~1 discrimination ~lone has never been held to
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constitute a sufficient basis for subjecting state lcgisla~
tion to rigorous judicial scrutiny. fi ~ Before such close
i·eview is required, a ~tate's laws must be found to
interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" right.
It is this question- \\'hether education should be counted
among the small circle of rights that heretofore have
been found to be "funciamental"- which has so consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent
years." 3
/

B
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "eel ucation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.'' !d., at 493. What \vas said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
r. ~ For !hi~ rra::;on npprllC'rH wrrC' abk to draw Ii!tlr prrrC'clrn!ial
HUK!rnancc from thr Comt 'il raHPS drallng with wralt h clailHification~ touching on thr right to ,·otc.
lldrper v. Virginia Bd. of
Electious, :3R:3 U. S. 66:3 (1966); Bullock v. CartC'1', 405 U. S. 1:34
(1972) ; JlfcDonald \'. Bd. of Election Comm'rs , :39..J U.S. 802 (1959)
. (dictum). Earh of tho~(' railr~ involHd thr right to voir on an
C'qunl bailis with thr rr:-<1 of tbr r!C'etora!r- n right rC'prntedl~ · hdcl
to br co nil! it ut ionnlly funclamrntal. E. g. , Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. :3:30, 33G- 3:37 ( 1072) .

Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic cleclication to public education. We
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the
three- j uclge panel below that "the grave significance
of eel ucation both to tho in eli vicl ual and to our society"
cannot be doubted:' ' But the importance of a service
performed by the E-Jtato docs not clotcrminc whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice
Harlan , dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging upon tho right of interstate
"' :3:37 H. Supp., at 283.

..
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travel, admonished that "[v]irtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree'
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority;s view of the importance of the
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
Wf3
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
one for which the Court lacks both authority and competency. But MR. JusTICE Sn;wAR'r's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the narrow limits of the "fundamental rights''
rationale of the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today docs not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection .... ' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and give~'
to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Emphasis from original.)
MR. JusTICE STE"\VART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
r·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling gover11mental interest, is unconstitutional." !d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized

t,.\
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as a right of constitutional f:ignificancc,''" and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importance of that right."11
Lindsey v. JYonnet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only
last Tenn, firmly reiterates the Court's vic·w that social
importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting
state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants
in that case, involving a challenge to the procedural
llmitations imposed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation
of the statute under "a more stringent standard than
mere rationality." !d., at 73. tho tenants argued that
the statutory limitatioHs implicated "fundamental interests which arc of particular importance to the poor,"
such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to
retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid.' The
C~urt's analysis is instructive:
"We clo not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
docs not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic m. We are unable to perceive in
that document a.ny constitutional guarantee to access
to dwelling·s of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
"" E. fl., L'nitfd SLates \'. Guest, :383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v.
Mitchel/, 400 U. R. 112, 2:{~ (1970).

:m7

U. 8. 471 (1970), th<'l'r could

be no lingPring qur,.;tion about thr

con~titutional foundation for

"

11

Aftrr Dandrid(Jf' , .. Williams,

thr Court'~ holding in Shapiro. ln Dandridoe the Court applied
t hr rat iunal baHi,.: t p,.:f in n·1·ir\Ying :!\far~·land ',.; maximum family
grant pro,·iHion undrr it,.: AFDC program. A frc!Pral di~triet court
hrld thr provi~ion UII<'Oll~t it ut ional , appl~·ing a ~t rietpr ;;tnndard
of rr,·i<'\\'. In t IH' ro\ll·~r of rr1 · rr~ing t hr lowrr eomt t lw Court
di,.;tingui~hPd Shapiro proprrl~· on thr ground thnt in that rase
"tlH' Court found l'tatP intrrfrrpner with thr eon,.;titutionally prolected freedom of inter~tatr t l'<l\ el." Id., at 484 11. 16.
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property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional m.andal:e, the asrourance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
Id., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... involv.es the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," '' 7 provided no basis for departing from
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. Hackn ey, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question
11ow before the Court is plain. The key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found
rn comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is
it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel. Rather, the answer lies
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself,
the right to education is fundarnental. E ·i senstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 ( 1972); !\R Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
57
The Conrt refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970), that " welfare provide~ the means to obtain e8sential
food, clothing, housing and medical care."
58 In Eisenstadt the Court strmk clown a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that
the law failed "to sati~f~· even the more lenient equal protection
standard." ld., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, tl1e Court

'<
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U.S. 330 (1972); ""Mosley v. Police Department o{
the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); "" Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535' (1942). 01
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of eclucatioll would not alo'ne cause the Court to depart from
the usual standard of reviewing a State's social and
economic legislation, appellees contend that education
is distinguishable from other services a1KI benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close
I"Clationship to other rigf1ts accorded protecti.on under
rreitC'd thr propC'r form of C'CJII:ll protrrt ion nnal.1·~i~: '' if 1\'E' wNr
to conclude t hn t the ::\1a;;sn rhn,.;rt t ~ ;;tat ut P imptll!J:P~> upon fundnmrntnl frrrdom ~ undrr Gri~wold fv. C'onnerticut, as1 U. S. 4'79
(l96.'i) ,j tlw Hlatutor.1· dn;;~ificntion would han· to br not ntrrclr
rationally related to a Ynlid puhlir purpoHC' hut 11ecessm·y to thr
arhicvrmC'nt of a compellinQ ~tate intcn~~ t. " Ibid. (etnpha;;is in
original).
'·" Dwm fully rnnvnHscs thi,.; Court~~ rf]ual prot Pet ion vot inp; rights
ra~P:s nnd rxpl:tinH that '' thi'R Court h:t ~ mndr rlrar that a citizen
hn,.: n ron.,titulionalty wotected rioht to part ir·ipat <' in drrt ion~ on
an PCJU:t! ha~is with other <'itizrn,.; in thr .iuri ~di<'ti o n." frl .. nl :3:36
(rmpha~i .-< ~upplird). Thr eon"tilnlion:tl undc• rpi11rtinp:~ of thr rip;ht
to rqu:1l trP:l tmrnt in thr 1·oting; proc•r,;,; c:ttt 110 long;rr lw cloublrd
r\ rn though, a.-< tlll' Comt 11otrd in Jlarper \'. T'iroinia l3rl. of Elections, ~R:~ D. R. 66:~. 665 (106o) , ''llw riQ;ht to YOtr in ,.;lal<' rl<•c·lion,;
j,; nowhrrr rxprr~~~~· mrnt ionrd ." Srr l3ullotk \'. Cartel'. -+05 U. S.
1:3..J. (197:2): Kram er v. ['nion F1'ee Sthool f)i;~i ritl , :)f.).') U. R. 621
(19G9) : Reynolds "· Si111s. 377 U.S . .')~3 (l9G..J.).
'"'In Mosleu thr Comt ,;lrul'k down n Chic·ap:o :tntipirkrting;
ordinnnl'r whirh rxrmptrd l:t bor pirkrt ing from it : < prohibition ~.
Thr ordin:t ncc• wa H hrl'd im·a lid ttndrr Ihr Equnl Prot c•c·t ion Clnn8r
aftrr suh.ir<'linp: il to c·arpful ~c· ntti11~· and findirtg; thnl tlw ordi11nnc-r
\Yas not narro11'1 .' · drawn. Thr ~ lrictrr ,;Ianda rei nf rrl'i<'ll' 1\'H"' nppropriatrl~· :tpplircl ;;inc-r t hr onlinfUH'C' w:1s OI1P "a ffrrt ing Fir~t Amenclmrnt intrrr,;t ::;." Jd. , at 101.
'" Ski11ner appli(·d lhr ,;t:mcl:ml of c·lo~r srrutin~· to :1 ~ tatr lnw
prrmit t inp: forl'rd ,;(C'rilizat ion of " hnbit unl crimina b." Tmplieil in
the Coml's opinion i~ tlw rrrop:nition thai tlw rig;hl of prot·n·ation
i,; among; thr right ,; of pN,;onnl pri,·nr~ · protrctrd undrr the Constitution. Srr Roe v. Wade , - U.S.-,- (19n).
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the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
·and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the
·speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intclli. gently and pcrf'uasively. The "marketplace of ideas"
· is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative
tools. Likewise, the corollary right to receive informa. tion ';~ becomes little more than a hollow privilege when
the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and
utilize available knowledge.
line of reasoning is pursued with respect
A si1 ·
to th righ to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contendec , an not be divorcod from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a. voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unl0ss his reading skills and thought processes
· have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individ. ual's constitutional rights to speak ~to vote. . . · et
we have never presumed to posf'ess eitnertlie ability or
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or th0 most informed electoral choice.
That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a reprcscn tativc form of government is not to be doubtecl.';'1 These arc inclccc.l goals
"~

ro.

Rrr. e. a .. Red Lion Rroadcastina
v. FCC. :30-'i U. R. 367,
(1069): Stanley v. Groraia. :m-1 1T. R..'i.'i7, 56-1 (19HO); La111ont
v. Postmas~er General. :~S1 U. 8. 301 (1905).
1
"' Thr Rtai<'S hnn• oftrn pm~urd thrir rntirel~· lrg;itirnntr intrrc•Ht
· m ns::;uring ''intelligent rxer<'i~e of thr franrhise," Kalzen bach v.

· :mo

71-1332-0PINION

26

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs
are freed from governmental interference. But they are
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
othenvise legitimate statr activities.
Even if it were conccdrd that some quantum of education is a constitutiona
1~rotected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise o eitber right. "\YO have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditure provide'
an education that in Texas falls short. Whatever merit
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing:
system occasioned an absolute clenial of educational op.:"
portunitics to any of its children, that argument provides.
ho basis for finding an interference with fundamental
rights where only relative differences in spending levels
are involved and where-as is true in the present caseno charge fairly could be inade that the system fails to
j)rovido each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for tho enjoyment .of
the rights of speech and of full participat~.irf ·the
political process,
?.__
Furthermore. the logicallimitati~ort appellees' nexus
theory arc difficult to perceive. ~w, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed. ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
ilfoman, 3R+ U. S. G-11, 6.'54-655 (HlGG), tl mgh ~uch d01·ieP~ as
and :IIJ:C' rrst rit·t ion~ on the ·ight o 1·ot0. Srr ibid.;
'Oregon\', Mitchell, -100 U.S. ll2 (19i0). _ <. 11hrrr thosr rrstrirtion:; h:l\'0 brrn found to promote intellig<·nt u,.;p of th(' b·tllot without
di,.:f'l'illlin:t t ing a~J;nin,;t t hosr rnrial nnd l't hni(' minorit i<',.; lwrPtofore
clepri1·0d of nn C'(JU:11 C'dll<':ltion:tl opportunity, thi~:; Comt ba~ uplwlcl
th0ir lli<C'. Comp:ll'<' Lassiter v. Northampton Election !3d .. :360 U.S.
45 (195!)), \\'ith Oregon v. Mitchel! . .J-00 0. S., nt 133 (;\Jr. Justirr
Blark) , l.J-cl- 1+7 (::\IH. J Ul'i'l'lC(,; Dou<:L ·\I'i) , 216-21 i (:\ [r. Just icc
Harlan) , 2:H-2:3G (l\In. Ju,;'t'lm BneNNAN), 21'2- 21'-l (:\In ..1Cl'Tlcg
RTBWAH'l'), aucl Gaston County v. United Slates, 3!)5 U.S. 285 (1969).

litC'l'a(',\'

tr~t~
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't he most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
·benefits of the First Amendment. 04 lf so. under appellees' thPsis. Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey
v. Normet, supra, would no longer be good constitutional law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context. In one
further respect \\"e find this a particularly inappropriate
case in which to subject state action to close judicial
scrutiny. The present case, in one most basic sense, is
significantly different from any of the cases in which
the Court has applied close scrutiny to state or federal
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived,"
"infringed." or "interfcrrecl" with the free exercise of
some fundamental prrsonal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535. 536 (1942); Sha7Jiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S.
330. 338-343 (1972). The critical distinction bet\\"een
those cases and thr one now before us lies in what Texas
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR.
JusTrCE BRJmNAN , writing for the Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient
point: ar.
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or dilute-d anyone's right to
,.., Src Srhorttlr, Tlw Equal Protrrtion Clnu;;C' in Publir Education , 71 Col. L. HC'v. 1:355, 13R9-1:mo (1971); Comnwnt, Trnant
IntrrC'st RrprC'~rntation: Propo~nl for n i\ation;d TC'nnnt:,;' As~ocia
tion, -+7 TC'x. L. Hr\'. IHiO, 1172- lln n. 61 (1969).
"" Kal zrn b!l("h ,.. Morgan im·olwd n challrnf!:r b~· rrgi-:trrrd ,·ot rr;;
in NPw York Cit_,. to a provi~ion of tlw Voting Rights Art of 1965
that prohibitrd enforcrmrnt of a ~tntr J:m calling for Engli~h
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti~
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] ....
"[The federal law in question l does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was
permissible. In ciecicling that question, the prini
Ciple that cails for the closest scrutiny of distinc~·
tions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap"
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 1statilte is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a. legislature need not strike at all
evils at the same time,' and that 1reforms may take
one step at a. time, addressing it.self to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla:.
tive mind ... .' ,; Id., at 656- 657. (Emphasis from
original.)
1

The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
literacy lests for voting. The lnw wns suspended a;:; to residents
from Puerto Rico who hnd completed at lea~l six ~·en rH of education at an "Americnn-nap; " school in that. c:ountr~r oven though
the language of inst ruction wa s other than English. Thi ~ Court
upheld the quc~tioned provision over tho clnim th:1t it disrritninated
against those with a sixth grade education obtainrd in non-English
speaking schools ot;her than the ones designated by the federal
legislation.

'

.
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'

Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting·
,(.,
~-.
( ~c. j-1
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expandin!l: state aiel-was implemented in
an effort to ext end public education and to improve its
qualj.ty..0 ? Of course, every reform that benefits s~
more .than others may be @ <;lemuet.l"'for what it.{fails
to accomplish. BLLt we think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re'fonnatory and, therefore. should be scrutinized under
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's
efforts. 67

c

·· · it should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated
above, that this is an inappropriate case in which to
subj ect· state action to the sort of searching scrutiny
reserved for laws that involve suspect classifications or
fundamental rights.
We need not rest our decision, ho",:ever, solely on the
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply reve·
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi·
Cf. Meue1' v. Nebraska, 262 U.S . 390 (1923) ; Pie1'ce v. Society
of Siste1's, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Ila1'grave v. Kick, 31:3 F. Supp.
V44 (MD Fla. 1970) , v::tcat cd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) .
c7 Src Schilb v. KuebeL, 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; M cDonaLd v.
Boa1'd of ELection Commissione1's, 394 U. S. 802 (1969).
66
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tionally deferred to state legislatures.nR Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's admonition , in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney,
311 U. S. 435 (1940), against interference '"ith the
State's fiscal policies is worth repeating:
"[t]hc responsibility for devising just and productive sources of revrnue challenges the ®t of legis~
laturcs. Nothing can be less helpful thn,n for courts
to ... inject themselves in a n1erely negative way
into the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making."
Id., at 445.
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution,
the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and
the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising
and disposition of public revenues. Y ct we are urged
to direct tho States either to alter drastically the present
system or to throw the property tax out altogether in
favor of some other form of taxation. Are vve, for
example. to counsel the States that an income or sales
'tax would operate less dif'criminatorily against the relatively impecunious clements of society? o !J
r: ~ Srr , e. g. , Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pemu;yl1•ania, 1:3,~ U.S. 2.'32 (1890) ;
· Carmichael \'. South er// Coal Co .. 301 (J. R. -~95 , .'iOI\- 509 ( 19:)7) ;
;Wied SLores of Ohio v. Bowe1·s, 358 U.S. 52:2 (19.19).
u!> Tho,.;r \\'ho ur~J:C' that thr prr~rnt ~) ·::~ !<'m hr im·alid:rtrcl ofTcr
littlr guitlanrr a,; to what t)·pr of "<'hool finnrwing ~hould rrplncc
lt. Thr almo~t im'l'itablr rr~ult of rr.irction of thr rxi~ting ~~·~ trm,
howcvrr, \\'ould he ~tntrwidr finanrin~J: of all public rduC':I!iou with
fund ~ dnivrd fronr i:rxHt ion of proprrty or from t lrr :HI opt ion or
rxpnnHi 1m of ~air,; nnd inronlC' taw~ . Thr author~ of Pri1·:rtr \Vr:rlth
nnd Public Ed11cation , supra. n. 1:2 , at 201 - 2-1-2, ~uggr~t nn a\icmatil'<' 8chrmr, know11 n~ '' di~t rirt powrr rq11:dizing." Tn ~implrs t
(C'I'rn ~, thr S!:ttr would guar:11rtrr that at nn~· particul:ll' mtr of
proprrt~· t:rxation thr di,.;trirt \\'OIIld rc•c•riw n :-;tntrd nunrbrr of
Qfoll:rr~ rrg:rrdlr~~ of ibr cli~trid ';; i:rx bn ~r. To fin:rncr thr ""h~idir::;
to "poorer" cli~trirt:-; , funcb wo11ld bl' t:rkrn nwny from thr " wralthirr"
cdi ~ t rict:-; thnt collect more than thr ~tatrd nmount at any given

\
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Nor is this Court-indeed any court-competent td
make informed judgments on the cr1tical issues confronting those who must determine educational policy
at the state and local levels. Edueation, perhaps even
more than public welfare assistance programs, presents
a myriad of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems." Dandridge v. ·w illiams, 397 U. S.,
at 487. The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statevvide public school system suggest that "there \\'ill be more than one constitutionally
permissible method of solving them," and that, within
the limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to
tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On
even the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts arc divided. Indeed, one of
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education 70ratr . This is not thr pbrr to weigh the arguments for nnd against
JlOIYCr rqualizinp:," hr)·oncl noting that rommrntator:; nre
in disngrrrmrnt as to whrtlwr it iH frasiblr, how it would work, and
i'nc!rrcl whrthrr it would not Yiolat<' th<' <'qnal prot<'rtion theory
undrrlying apprllr<'H' (':tHe. PrcHidrnt's Comm'n on School Finnnrr,
Srhools, Proplr & :\fonr~ · :3:3 (1972); Batcmnn & Brown, Somr
l~rflrctions on Serrano v. Priest, 49 T. Urban L. 701 , 706-708
(1972); Brr~t. Book Hr1·irw, 2:3 Stan. L. Rrl'. 591. .')94-596 (1971);
Wi~r , Sehool Fin:1 nrr Equalir.ntion Lawsuits: A :.\Iodrl Lrp;iHiativc
RrsponHr, 2 Yair Tl<'v. of L. & Sor. Art ion 12:), 125 (1971);
Silard & Whitr. Tntmstatr Inrqualitirs in Public Edur11tion: The
CnRr for Judicial Rrlid Undrr thr Equal Protretion Cl:lll~<', 1970
Wis. L. RrY. 7, 29-:30.
70
The qualit~·-ro~ t rontrol'<'rsy ha~ recrivrd ron,idNnhlC' at trntion. Among thr notabl<' nuthoritie' on both side' nrr the following. C .. Jrnrks, Tn<'qunlit~· (1972): C. Silbrrm:1n, Cri::;i' in the
CIHsHroom (1970): Oillr<' of Ecl\\l·ation, Equalit_1· of Edu('ational
Opportunit)· (19(i()) (Tiw Coleman Heport): On Equ:dit~· of Educational Opportunit~· (1972) (l\Ioynih:1n & 1\fost<'llrr ('(!~.): .J. C:uthrir,
" di~trirt
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an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District
Court in this case. TI.C'latecl to the quC'stionecl relationship between coF:t and quality. is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the propC'r goal s of a system of public
~clucation." And the qtH'F:tioll of the proper relationship between F:tate hoards of education and local school
'boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and
degree of control. is now unclrrgoing searching rf'-examination. It hardly need bC' said that non<' of these questions is amenable to inte-lligent resolution through the
judicial procws. TndeC'd. thC' ultimate wisdom of these
and like problems of C'clucation is not likely to be clevined
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly
debate the issue's. At thC' very leaF:t, the judiciary should
not circumscribe m· handicap- by interposing inflexible
constitutional con~traints-the continued research and
exprrimcntation so vital cvrn to partial solutions and
to keeping abreast of changing conditions.
It must be remember0d also that every ~ase arising
under thr Rqual Protection C'lauRe haR implications for
the relationRhip behwen national and Ptatr power under
onr federal system. QuC'Rtions of federalism are inherent in the procrss of cletrrmining whether a State's \
laws are to br F:uhjC'ctC'cl to thr compelling interest or
the rational baRis tcF:t. While II rt lhe maintenance of
the prinriples of federaliF:m is a foremo st consideration
m intC'rprcting any of the pertinent provisions under
G. Klrinclorkrr, H. LrYin, & T. Stout , Srhools :1ncl Tnrqwtlity
(197 J) ; Pre~ icl< • nt 's Comm 'n on Rrhool Finanrr, SU]Jra. n. 60; Swnn::;ou, The Cost-Quality· Rrl:ltionship, in lOth :Nnt 'l Conf. on Rrhool
Fin:tnrr, th<' Ch:tllrngr or Chanf!:r in Rchool Fin:1nrr 151 (1007) .
71
See thf' re~ ults or the Tf'x:l ~ GO\'C'l'll01' 1S Committf'f' 1S statr\\'idc
i>UJ'\'ry on thr p;oals or <'duration in that Rtatf'. I Govrrnor's
Commit tf'o Rrport, at 59- 68. Sf'f' al ~ o GoldstPin , supra, n. 28,
at 510-522; Schoct tlr, supra, n. 63 ; :111thorit ir~ (·itrd in n. 69, supra.
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which this Court examines state action, 72 it would be
difficult to imagi nc a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before
us, in which wC' are urged to abrogate the systems of
financing publir. education presently in existence in
virtually every Rtate.
~~
, Th~ forC'going considerations buttress our concluaion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap~
propriate candidate for JosC' judicial scrutiny. These
same. consickrations arc rC'lcvant to the dC'termination
whet]wr that system. "·ith its concC'clecl in•perfections, is
supported by a rC'asonable or rational basis. It is to this
question that we next turn our attention.

III
The basic contoms of the Texas school finance system
'
have
been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more c!C'tail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the issue of
rationality.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from each source."1 The
$tate's contribution. under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
arc distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstatecl at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 7 ·' Each school district's other
7
~ Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 858 U. S ..522, 582 (1959)
(Mn . .Tm:-~'l'ICI" BHENNAN, ronrutTing); Katzcnbach v. Morgan, 384
U, S. 0+1 , 6G1 (1965) (1\Ir . .Tu~tiee Harlan, di~;;enting).
73 In 1070 Te'.::1H expetHkd approximat<'ly 2.1 billion dollars for
education and a littl<' O\' Pr one billion eamc from the l\Tinimum
Foundation Program. Texas Re~<'arch League, supra, 11. 19, at 2.
7 ' Tex. Educ. Code § 1G.13.

..
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supportive personnel arc provided for: one principal for·
every 20 teachers; 7 " one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 76
vocational instructors, ce>unselors, and educators for cxeeptional children arc also providcd. 77 Additional funds
are' earmarked for current operating expenses and for
student transportation. 7 x The State also provides free
te'xtbooks. 70•
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the T6xas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation ~o and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standarcls.H1 As reflected by the 62.r;c increasE! in funds allotted
to the Eclgev,:ood School District over the last three
ye'ars, ' ~ the State's financial contribution to education i$
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, however, has been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
assure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more emiched educational program.' 'l Every
district upplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
ii1substantial, as in Eclgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1067. In other districts the
Tex. Eclur. Code
Tex. Edue. Codr
7
'
Tex. Educ·. Codr
78
'
Trx. Eclur. Code
70
Trx. Edu<'. Code
140 Tex. Eclue. Code
81
Trx. Edur. Codr
8 2 Ser ante, at-.
7

"

qo

§ 16.18.
§ 16.15.
§§ l().Jfl, 16.17, 16.19.
§~ 1fl.45 , 16.51.
~ 12.01.
~ 11.2G (5).
§ 16.301 et. seq.

o~ Cilmer-Ai.ken Commit1ee, supra, n. 14, aL 15.

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

35

local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
the market value for any category of property varies from
its assessed value.H' The greatest intcrdistrict disparities,
however, arc attributed to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability of supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
arc devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attrl.=
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupilteacher ratios and highor salary schedules. 85
~ · Thrrr i~ no uniform >< tatrwidr a~~r~smrnt prartirr in Trxns.
Commrrri:d property, for rxnmplr, mi~J;ht br taxrd at aO% of
markrt valur in one rount~· and fit 50% in anothrr. V C:o\· rrnor'~
Committrr Rrport , nt 2,5- 26; Berke, Carmwale, Morgnn & White,
supra, n. 2R, at GGG-667 n. 16.
Ho Trxas Rr~enrrh Leagur, supra, n. 19, nt
18. AH prrviously
notre! , trxt IH'COillJXtn~·inp; n. GO , supra, tlw extrnl to which the
,qunlity of rdurnl ion varirs with rxJwndit mr per pupil is drbated
ineondu~ivrly h~· the mo~t thoughtful studrnt~ of publie education.
Whil0 all would ngrrr thai thrrr i~ a rorrrlation up to thr point
of JH'o\·iding thr rreognizrd rs:-:rnl inls, thr i:-:sues of grralr~ t dis;,grrrmrnl ineludr thr rfTrrt on qu:dity of pnpil-trarhrr ratios and
of lraehrr hi~J;hrr salary srhrdulrs. Thr sl<ilr funding in T<•xa:-:
is drsignrd to assurr, on thr a\·rrngr, onr trarhrr for r\· rr~· 25
studrnts, whirh iR ronsidrrrd to bra fa\·orablr ratio by most standards. Whrl hrr the minimum sal a r~r of $6,000 prr ~·r:u is suflirrnl
in Trxns to attmrt qualifi0cl traehrrs may br morr drbat:lblr, deprnding in major part upon thr lor:ttion of thr school di~triet. But
there· npprar~ to be little rmpiriral datn whirh supports thr aclvnntagr of any particular pupil-trarhrr ratio or whirh dorumrnt~ tho
\·irw that rYN highrr salarir;; rr~ult in morr comprlent leaching.
An intraetabl0 problem in dealing with trnrhrr~' ;;al:\rirs i~ tho
absrncr, up to this limr, of Hali~fnrtor)· trrhniqu0,; for judging
thrir ability or prrformanrr. Thr rrsult iR thai rrlatiwl~· frw
~rhool s~ ·:strms havr merit plans of any kind, with trarhrr:-;' salnrir,;
being incroa8ed ''by rotc" and acro::;s thr board in a wn~· which

.-
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This, then. is tlw ha!"ir ontlinr of thr Trxas finance'
strnrtnrc. BrcRni"r of diffrrenrrs in exprndihm> levels
occasio11ed by dis pari tif's in propertv tax income, ap-·
pelJPefl claim that children in lcsf' afflnent distrirts have·
be_rn mack the f'llhjrrt of invidious discrimination. The
District C'ot1rt found that the State had failed even "to·
establish a reaf"onahlc basis" for a fl,Vi"tcm "·hich rrsnlts
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. \V e disap;ree.
The Texas syi:'tem, in its reliance on state ai" well as
· local resources. is comparable to the systems employed
· in virtually every other Atate.Ro ·The power to tax local
reward~

the least de~rrving on t hr K:tme hnsis ns t hr most drHrrving. Rni:Hir:-; arr usunll~· rni~rd automaticnll~· on thr ha~i:-; of
prrdetrnninrd ''strp~." rxtrnding O\'N 10-to-12 ~·r:u pNiodH.
Tn m:tking thrsr ohsrn·ntions, \\'<' intf·nd no rriti<"ism of rxisting;
prnct icr" nnd rrrt:~inl~· \\'<' irnpl~· no opinion th:tl trn<"hNs' :-;alnrir:-;
g;rnrr:dl~- nrr ndrq11:1tr.
AH rompnrrd with othrrs of comp:1mblr
rcluration thrre is r1·rry rr:1s011 to hrlir1·r that tr:1rhrr"' s:dnries
gr11rralh·. stnrting from :111 undul~· low hnsr, hal'r fnilrd rwn to
kerp nbrrn~t of innntion. Wr h:wr indudrd this commrnt:ll'~' on
pupil-trnrhrr ratios and :-;al:ll'\' lr1·rl:-; not to rxprrs~ f\11\' opinion
with rc~pr<'t to t hr :~drquar~· of t ho:-;r in Trxas OJ' rl~<'ll'herr, bui
mrrrh· to indi<":ltr thnt thr two principal fnctor:-; distinguishing the
school~ in thr more nfTlurnt di~trirt:-; from tho~e rl:-;rwhrrr do notin the opinion of m11n~· rxprrts--demon~t m bl~ · :llld nrcrssnril~· nfTrct
thr qu:dit~· of thr tr:~rhing.
Rl: Prrsidr·nt's C'onnn'n on Rf'hool Fin:1nrr, S?ITJI'a. n. fiR, nt 9.
Until
rrrcntl~· Hawaii ll·n:-; thr on]~- Rt:~tr thnt m~1intninrd a purrl~· stntrfundrd rdll<':ltionnl progrnm. Tn 19fl, , howrwr, thnt Rtatr nmrndrcl
its rducntirm:ll fln:uwr stntutr to pNmit r'OilllfirH to collrrt ndditional fund~ lor:1ll~· :\lid sprnd thosr nmounts on it~ ~chook Thr
rationnlr for th:1t rrrrnt lrgi~Intil'r choler is in~tructiw on tho
qurstion hrl'orr thr C'ourt todn~·:
''Undr'r r'xi~ting Jnw, C'OIIntie~ arr prrr•lmlrd from doing an_,·thing
in thi:-; nrrn, r1·rn to ~prnd thrir 0\\'11 fund~ if thr~· so dr~irr. Thi,.,
rorre<'t i1·r kgi-d:!f ion i~ ur_grntl~- nrrdrd in ordrr to nil ow rountirH
to go :1 bow nnd hr~·ond t hr Rt :1 t e ·~ sf nndnrcb and pml'idr rdncnt'ionnl f:wilitirs :1:-; good :1~ the peoplr of thr countir~ w:mt :~nd
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property for educational purposes has been recognized
in Texas at least since 1883. 87 When shifts in the distribution of ponnlation, Rrrompaniecl b:v changes in local
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 88 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital clement of local
participation. The Straycr-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
articulated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shovYS a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for
its child." 89
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring
are
and
ngct>
Art.

willing to pa,v for. Allmving local communitieR to go above
beyond C8 tabli~hed minimum~ providrd for thrir people cmomthe be::;t fentures of dcmoeratic government." Haw. Sri:i8. Law:,;,
:38, § 1 (1968).
87
Sec text nrrompan:-·ing n. 7, supra.
88 G. Str!l:-·rr & R . Il:iig, F'inancinQ; of Education in the State of
New York (192:3). For a thorough analy::;iH of thr contribution
of thc~c reformer,.; and of the prior and ~ub~cqucnt history of educational fin:l!lre , ~ee J. Coons, 'vV. Clune & S. Sugann:1n, supra, n. 12,
at 39-95.
8 0 .T. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 12, Foreward b:-r
.Tames S. Coleman, at vii.
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a basic education for every child in the State, it permits
and encourages a large meal'ure of participation and
control of each district's schools at the local level. In
an era that has witnessed a consil'tent trend toward
centrali:mtion of the functions of government, local sharing· of responsibility for public education has survived.
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v·,
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1072). M1t.
JusTIClD 8TEWATI'l' E<tatecl there that "fdlirect control
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society.'~·
/d., at 460. THE C'HrEF Jus·rrcE, in his dissent, agreed
that "fl]ocal control is not only vital to continued· public
support of the schools. but it is of overriding importance
from an educational standpoint as well. " !d., at 478.
The persistence of this attachment to government at
the lowest level "·here ed'ucation is concerned· reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote morE' money to the E'ducation of one's
child. Equally important. however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the clecisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also L\_ffords some opportunity
for experimentation, nvocation , nd n henlthy competition for eel ucatio11al excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis iclen tified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." 90 No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi"0

New State lee Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932),
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})licity of viewpoints and from a. diversity of approaches
.than does pubiic education.
Appellees do not seriously question the validity of
· Texas' dedication to local control of education. They
focus their attack on the school financing system on the
ground that it debases the concept of local control because it docs not provide the same fiscal flexibility to
poor districts as it affords the rich. It is no doubt true
that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re!"pcct to
expenditures for some districts than for others. Local
control. ho\Yever, connotes more than the power to make
an autonomous decision on how much to spend. It also
, con~emplatcs freedom to decide how available funds will
be allocated and is an c~sential clement in local participation in the operation of the schools.
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They sec no .i ustification for a system that allows, as
they contend. the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political suhclivi~ions and the location of valuable com. mercia] and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable
. local governmental units- requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.
It is equally inevitable that some localitirs arc going
to br blrssecl \Yith more taxable assets than others. Nor
is local wealth a static quantity. Arc boundary lines to
be rrdrawn with every shift in population or with every
discovery of valuable minerals or with the completion
of every new industrial park? Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditurE' is an unconstitutional method
of providing for education then it must be equally im-
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permissible in providing every other necessary service
currently financed from local property taxes, including
local police and fire protection. public health and hospitals, and pnhlic utility facilities of various kinds. We
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of
local property taxa~ion and control as would follow from
appelfees' contentions.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas systen1 of school
finance results in c-Hset;iminutoJ¥ ~l1ildren
who happen to reside in certain districts. we cannot say
that such discrimination is tho product of a system that
is without rational basis. Its shortc01uings have .been
acknowledged by Texas, which has persistently endeavorecl-not without success- to ameliorate tho differences
in levels of expemliture without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local participation. The continued
,persistence of "some ineqnality" is not alone a satisfactory
basis upon \vhich to conclude that the Texas system
lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425- 426 (Hl61 ). Nor may it be condemnecl simply
because it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals.
Dandridue v. Wnliams, 397 U. S., at 485·.
The Texas pl:=tns is not the result of some hurried,
ill-conceived legislation. Tt is certainly not the product
of pmposefu 1 discr'im ination against any group or class.
On tho contrary. it 'is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elPcwhcro. and in major part is the product
of responsible studios by qualified people. In giving
,s ubstance to tho presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled. L1:ndsey v. National Carbon·ic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69- 70 (1913). One also must remember, when weigh~

\'L-vV--./"/
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~ng the is ue of rationality, that the system here chal1!-:mgecl is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State.
In its essential charactrristics thr Trxal' plan for financing public education ref:lects what many educators for
a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
\visdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 40 States, especially where the
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and nowhere yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether
there is a rational baFis for the challenged state action.
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly meets this test.

IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on
the District C'ourt opinion in this case ami on its California predecessor, Setmno v. Ptiest, 5 C'al. 3d 584, 487
P. 2cl 1241 (1071 ). a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. TheFr decisions have been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major state legislative
reform. The derisions have been variously touted as
the "ans"·er" to removing the ron.clblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have
even vie\\'cd them as thr ultimate solution to the urban
crisis in education. Indeed. in their enthusiasm for
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed. 0 '
"FisrnlJH'Hirnlil~· " i~ 1hr nnmr ~i1 · en b~ · Profr~sors CoonH, Clunr,
and Su~arman lo lhrir lhr:-;i:-; lhal " lhc qunlit~· of puhli<' rdu<'alion
mny nol bP a fun<·tion of II'P;dlh othrr 1han the wraith of lhr slnlr
a~ a wholr." .T. Coon:-;, W. Ch1nr & 8. Sn~nnn:m , suwa. n. 12, :tt 2.
Thrir I hough I ful nnd im:tginn ti 1·c ll'ork pa 1·ed tlw w:1~· for t lw
suits, indudin~ thr prr~ent onr, ntlnc·king lhe ~rhool fin:mc·e ~~·~lrm.
Indeed, t hr Di:-;lri<'l Coml approvrd the :lUI hor~' t hr,;is \'Prb:tt im.
:337 F. Supp. , al 2ilt). The author~ haw often cautioned lhrir Kllp01
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The truth is that it is too 0arly, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
empirical study, to make consider0d judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or thP political frasibility of the "fiscal
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to rmrrg0 from some commentators. It is beginni.i1g to b0 r0cognizecl that the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" altNnatives could have con~equences disquietingly different from those initially assumccf.n" There is,
porter::;, ho\\'P\·rr, again::;! ::;prrulaling that "fi,.;cal nrulrali1~· " woulti
br n pan:trl'a for lhl' poor or for racial minoriiirt->. lhid .' ; Coon~,
Chtn<· & ~uganna n, A Fii·"l Appr:t i~:tl of' ~rrntno , :3 YaiP Rev. oi
L. & Roc. Action 111,11-1-115 (Hli1).
!!"An initial problem, more oh1·iou::; lo rkr!Pd offirinl~ than 1o
lho~r of u,; who writ!' opinion" for thr c·oml" or r~,;ay~ for thr law
rcvi!'w~. i~ I hl' eril i<':tl OJH' of mmu•u.
\Vh:t1rn•r formula mny be
<·mplo~· rd , thrrr arr r;;,;rnli:tll~· only two wn~ · "' to a""urr rqual prr
pupil Pxprndilun·~ (r1·rn :tpproximnlrl.l·) in el'f'r~· ~chool dil'l riel:
(i') rx]wndilttrr,; ('OIIld hr rqn:tli~rd h.1· tal(ing rrYrmtr,; away from
"omr di"t ri(·l..; :t nd nppl~·ing I hrm Io I he ll<'nrfil of ol hrr,;, a prorrss
of lr1·eling do\\'11 to ~Otltr rommon drnontin:tlor; or (ii) Ynsl ncldi1i()llnl lax rr,·rtntr" would hn1·r lo hr rni,;rd ' to rl<'ntlr prr pupil
exprndilmr lo lhr highe"l lr1·rl now obtaining in lhr di,; lric·l,; which
pro1·ick tiH· grC':tl r,;l snpplc•mrnt a I ion of state fund,.;. :\ rit hrr of
thr:-<r :tiiNnnli\'C's srrm,.; rrali,;lir. Thr rr,.;iclrnl" of n di,.;tri<'t whirh,
with good fortnn<' and ' drdicntion lo pnblir rdiH':tlion, ha1·r 11 high
lrYrl of rxprnditure :trr not likrl~· lo br loler:utl of n lr1·rlinp; plan
lh:tl rrducp,.; funding; for lhrir di~tri<'l lo inrrrnsr it rl~riYhrrr. \Vould
leadwr,;' s:t!:trir:-< in that cli,.;lriC'I br rrdurrcl ronr"pondingl~, ? If
pupil-trac·hcr rnt ios wrrr inrrr:t"ed, whnt would hnppen lo the
IC'arhrr,.; no longrr emplo~wl? What, ill(l!'rd, would happrn 1o
school bomb i~,.;ued ptn·,-uanl lo :t. \'OIC' of citizens proud of their
schoob :tnd ll'illing to pn~· mor<'?
The olhrr :t!IC'rnnli1·r. thr t·ni:-<ing of suffirirnt nclclitionnll:tx monry
slalcwidr , is no morr p:tl:ttnblr politlc·:1ll~· . Tt h:ts br<'n c:tlr-ul:ltrd
1hnl S2.-l billion nf additional "chool fumb would hP tWptirrd lo
bring; nil Trxas di ..;lriet~ tip lo the prp,.;rnt lrvrl of exwmlitmr in :tll
buL tho we nit hie:;t di,.;trict:;-nn amount morr 1han double that
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the Coons'
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
~ndustrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the
District Court. 9 " has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance. 91 That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
-lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas. 0 "
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation bet"'een the location of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools. 911 Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
clustered in school districts that have relatively less
eurrrntl~-

being spent in TPxns on public rdurntion (TexnR Hesrarch
Lengur, su]n·a, n. 19, at 16- 1R. At n time whrn even· Sl-niC' nne!
loralil y i:,; suffering from fi~cn 1 11 nclprnomishmrnt, and with c!Pmnncls
for RC'rv icr~ of nll kindR bmgPoning nnd wi1h wcnr~' tnxpa,·p rs nlrrady
rrsl:,;1 ing tax increases, on]~' those who li\'C' in n drenm world could
bdicw 1hnt a cleei"ion of 1hi~ CollTt nullifving present Rtatc 1axing
~~'si· rm~ would rcstdt in doubling public funds committed to ccluration. RnlhPr, tlw result in terms of ron fu sion and cli~rupl ion wmtlcl
be profound, and in thP end the lrwling proces;; could well menn a
lower qwdil y of education for all.
ua Sec n. 38, sv,pra.
91 Select Comm_ on Eq\181 Eclncfltionnl Opportunity, lnrquitics
in School FiHance (1972) (Monograph prepared by Profcs;;o r T::lC'l'kc).
ac. Sec :1lso U.S. Offier of Eduea1ion, Finance~ of Large Cit~r School
Sy~lems: A Comparative Anf\ly~i~ (1972) (HEW Publication).
an Sre Note, A Stnti~tirnl Analy~i~ of the School Finn ncr Deris ions: On Winning Batiks nnd LoRing Wars, 81 Yale L.
1303
(1972); see 1cxt accompanying n. 45, supra.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1332
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the
United States DisDistrict et al., Appellants
trict Court for the
v.
Western District of
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al
Texas;
[January -, 1973]
MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opuuon of the
Court.
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated l:Jy Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elerncntary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Tcxas. 1
They brought a class action, on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who arc poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants"
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
1

Not all of the children of thrse compbinant;,; allrnd public ;,;chool.
family';,; children arc enrolled in private school " becau::;c of the
condition ol' the ::;chool10 in the Edgewood Indeprndcnt School Di::;trict." Third Amrndcd Com]>laint, App., at 14.
"The San Antonio Independent Sclwol Di::;trict, whosr name I hi::;
case still bears, was one of scyen school di~lrict~ in thr San Antonio
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendant::;.
Al'tcr a pretrial conference, the District Coml is;;ucd fill orclrr dismissing the school di~tricts from 1he case. Snbsrqucntl)·, tho San
Antonio Inclcpendrn t School Di::;t rict has .i oincd in the plnint iffs'
challenge to the Slate'::; school finance sy::;tem and hns filed an
amicus curiae brief in ::mpport of that. position in this Court.
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permissible in providing every other necessary service
currently financed from local property taxes, including
local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of
local property taxation and control as would follow from
appellees' contentions.
Tn sum, to the extrnt that the T0-xas system of school
finance results in discriminatory tr<>atment of children
~
who happen to reside in certain districts, we cannot say
that such discrimination is the product of a system that
is without rational baPis. Tts shortcomings have been
acknowledged by Texas, "·hich has persistently endeavored-not without success-to ameliorate the differences
in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local partieipation. The continued
persistence of "some inequality" is not alone a satisfactory
basis upon which to conclude that the Texas system
lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425- 426 (1061). Nor may it bo condemned simply
because it imperfectly effcetuatos the State's goals.
Dandridge v. W1:Zl1'ams, 397 U. S., at 485·.
The Texas plans is not the result of some hurried,
ill-conceived legi slation. Tt is certainly not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class.
On the contrary. it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the. presumption of validity to which the
Texas systmn is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropol1:s Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69- 70 (1013). One also must remember, when weigh-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED Sie\J~~lated:
Xo. 71-1332
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the
District et al., Appellants
United Stat<.'s District Court for the
v.
Western District of
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al
Texas.
[January - , 1973]
MR. Jus•riCE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
1 Not all of the children of thel:le complainants attend public l:lchool.
One family's children arc enrolled in private school "bccau l:lc of thecondition of the school. · in the Edgewood Independent School Di;;trict." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
~ The San Antonio Independent School District, who ·e name this
('Hf<e still bear:>, wal:l one of seven school dist ricts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants.
After a pretrial conference, the District Court is:;uecl an order di~:>
mi;;;;ing the school districts from the case. S ub se qu e nt!~·, the San
Antonio Independent School Di:;trict has joined in the plaintiffs'
challenge to t he State';; school finance system and has filed an
amicus curiae brief in ~:; upport of that position in thi;; Comt.
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of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court
1
\\"aS impaneled in January 1969.'
In December 1971 •
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court.
I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools." Early in its history,
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
a A three-judge court was properly convened and there an· no
que,.tions as to the District. Court's juri~diction or the direet appealability of its judgment. 28 U. S. C. §§ 22R1, 1253.
'The trial was drlayed for two year~ to permit cxten~in• pretrial
di~eo,·e ry and to :tllow completion of a pending Texas lrgi~lative
im·e~ tigation concerning the need for reform of its public school
finnnce ~.,·stern. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 3:37
F. Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Tex. 1971).
r. :~37 F. Supp. 2RO. The Di~trid Court sta~·ed its mandate for
two year.• to pro,·ide Texas an opportunit~· to remcd~· the inequitie8
found in it~ finaneing program. The court, howe,·e r, retained jurisdiction to fashion its own remedial order if the State failed to offer
;,n accrpt:tble pbn. !d ., at 2R6.
"Trx. Const., Art. X, § 1 :

" A grnrral dilfu~ion ol· knO\I"lrdp;e lwinp; c~s<'nti:tl to thr pre~rtTalion
of the rights nnd librrties of the proplc it sh:1ll be thr dut~· of the
Lrg;i ~ lnture of this Statr to make ~uitable pro, · i~ion for thr support
nnd maintenance of puhlie srhoob."
!d .. Art. X,§ 2:
'·Thr Lcgi~la t ure ~ hall us early n~ prnet icn hle establish frrr· sf'hool~
throughout the State, and shall furJti.~h means for thPir support , by
taxation on property."
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution ·was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildings" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds. 8 The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854, 0 was endowed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support.' 0 The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes,'' served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State. 12
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State. 1 " Sizable differences
Tex. Const.. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug. 14, 1R83.
Tex. Const.., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.
0
Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2
(interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor';,; Committee on
Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 (1969)
(hereinafter GoYcrnor's Committee Report).
10
Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 5 (see also the interpretive commentary);
·v Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12.
11
The various sources of revenue for the Available School Fund
nrc cataloged in Texas State Bd. of Educ., Texas Statewide School
AdeCJuacy Survey 7-15 (1938).
12 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Nov. 5, 1918 (sec interpretive commentary).
13 I Governor's Committee Report, at 35; Texas State Bel. of
Educ., supra, n. 11, at 5-7; J. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman,
7

8
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in the value of assessable property bet\\"een local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced.'' The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.'"
In clue time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities. 1 G Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.' 7 Although the
amount vvas increased several times in the early 1940's.''
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.'"
Priv:tte Wealth nnd Publie Education 49 (1970); E. Cubberley,
Sl'hool Fund~ nne! Thrir Apportionment 21-27 (1905).
11
B.1· 1940 one-hnlf of the Stnte\ population wa~ rlu~terecl in itf:
metropolit:m renter~. I Govrrnor's Conunittee Report, at 35.
'"Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Hnve "\Vhat We Mu~t (194R).
1(; n. Still. The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12
(1950) ; Trxa~ Bel. of
Edur. , supra, n. 11.
17
n. Still, supra . n. 1G, nt 12. It should br notrd thn1 during this
prriod thP rnrdinn prr pupil expenditure for all ~<'hool~ with nn
rnrollmcnt of more 1han 200 wn~ npproximat ely $50 per ~·c:tr.
Dming t.hi~ snme period n sun·e.1· eoncluetecl by the StntP Bo:ncl
of Education concluded that "in Texas the best educational ndnm1ng;r~ offrrecl by the Sta1e a1 prr~rnt ma~· br had for the median
ro~t of 852.67 per year pC'I' pupil in avC'l"age clail~ · nttrndanre."
Texa~ State Bel. of Ecluc., suwa. n. 11, nt 56.
' ~ 1 Genrrnl Law~ of Trxas, 40th Legis., Rrg. Se~~. 1\):~9 , nt 274
(822.50 ]WI' ~tudcnt); GrnNnl & Sprr. Law~ of Trxa~ . -l-Rt h Lrgi~.,
Rrg. Se~~. 194~ , c. lGl , at 262 ($25.00 prr Htudrnt).
1
" Grnernl & Spec. Ln11·s of Trxas, 49th Lrgi~ ., Tirg. Sr~s. 19-!5,
c. 53, at. 75.
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Recogniz:ing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In Hl47 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators. was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that "·ould guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program." 0 It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas.~
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses. and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 8051, of the Program and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com1

"° For a complrtc biRtor~· of thr ndop1ion in Trxa ..; of :1 foundation program, sec R Stills, S111Jra, n. 16. Rro ah'o V C:o1·rrnor't<
Committrc Rrport. n t 1-J.; Texas RrRr:lrch Lrng;ur, Public School
Finance Problems in Trxn:; 9 (Int crim Report 1972).
"'For the 1970-1971 school yrnr thi~ stn1r aid prog;ram ac·eountcd
for 4S.O% of all public school fund~. Local taxation contributed
·fl.l % nne! 10.9% was prol'iclccl in frdrrnl funds. Trxa~ Research
Lrngur, supra, n. 20, at 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing. mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent. considers each county's share of all property
in the State.~~ Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county.t" The
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children 24
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.t5 Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well
as local sources- have increased steadily. Between 1949
V Go ve rnor '~ Commit trr Report , at 44-48.
At present there are 1,161 ~c hool di ~trict ~ in Texas. T exas R esea rch League, supra, n. 20 , at 12 .
t·• In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that some school
di ~tri et s were not lev~' ing ::my local tax to support rduration .
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supm, n. 15, at 16. The Texas State
Board of Edu cation Survey found that over 400 common and
indeprndent school districts wr re lrvying no local proprrty tax in
1935-1936. T exas Sta te Bel. of Educ., sup1'a n. 11 , at 39- 42 .
2
" Gilmer-Aikrn Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15.
22
t

3
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
5007( .26 In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 28 Minimum
teacher salaries--by far the largest single item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years. 2 "
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-·
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 907o of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6%
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960--the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest." 0 At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district conI Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
Texn~ Research League, sup1'a, n. 20, at 2.
28 In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupil
expenditure for all current operating expcn~c~ increa~ed from 8206
to 8493. In that same period capital expenditure~ incrca~ed from
SH to S102 per pupil. I Govemor'~ Commit tee Report, at 53-54.
2 " III Governor's Committee Report, aL 113-146; Berke, CarnaYalc, l\Iorgan & White, The Texas School Finance ca~e: A Wrong
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972).
:w The family income figures are based on 1960 census stati~lics._
26

27
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19671968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248."' Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil.""
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 studellts,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edge,Yood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo. having only 18% Mexican-Americans
and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49.000 '"'and the median family income
"' Thr A\·ail:tble School Fund, trrhnicnll~· , pro\·idr~ a ~crond
of ~t n te monc~· · Thn t Fund ha~ continuPd n~ in ~ · r:l r~ pa~t
(~cr trxt :lC'C'Otnpan.\·in~ nn. Jo-19, Str])l'a) to distributr uniform
prr pupil grant~ to rwr~ · district in thr Stair. In 196S thi~ Fum!
allot trd ~9S prr pupil. liO\\'C\' N , bec·nusc thr .\ \·aibblP f't·hool
Fund contribution i~ alwn~·s ~ubtractrd from a district'~ entitlement under the Foundation Program, it pb~·~ no ~ignifirnnt rolr
in rduentionnl finnncc toda~·.
"" \Yhilr frdrral m;~istmwr ha~ nn nmrliorat ing; rffret on thP difTrrrncr. in ~rhool budg;ets bet ween wrnlt h~· and poor di~t riel~, the
District Court rrjectrcl an nrgtunent mndr by the Statr in that
court ih[lf it ~hould ron~idrr the rffrct of thr frdrr:d gr:tnt in
as~t·~sin~ t hr discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., nt 2S4. Thr Rt a tc
ha~ not rcnrwed that rontention here.
"" A map of Brxar Count~· itwludrd in the record show,; that
Edgrwood and .\lama Hrights nrr among thr ::;mallr~t di~trict~ in
ihr ('Ollnty and Hl'l' or approximate!~· equnl size. Yet , a~ the figmc~
:d)o\·r indie:1te, Edgewood'~ ;;tmlrnt popul:~tion is morr than four
t imr:-; t hal of Alamo Bright~. Thi~ Lt('for ob\· iou~J~· arf•otmt~ for
a significant pererntngr or thr diffl'!'rJJC'r:> brtwern the two di~t ridH
in prr pupil JlropC'rty \·:tlues :tnd rxprnditurr ' . H Alamo llright;;
h:td as man~· ~tudenb to Pclw:ttr :1~ Edgr\\·ood dar~ (22.000) its per
pupil :tR~r~srd proprrly vnlur would br Hpproxima!t'ly $11.100 rather
than $40,000, nnd it:; prr ]Htpil rxpenditmes would there fore have
brrn ronsiclrrnbly lo\\·er.
~ourcc
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is $8.001. In 1967- 1068 the local tax rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources. Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1067-1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid,"' more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has beE'n
significant. For the 1070-1971 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62/{ increase ove1·
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state
aiel alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671068 school budget--from local, state. and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil."" These
1
" Thr figurrs quot rd a bo\"C' ,.:11"~' 81 ightl~· from tho~l' 11 t ilizrd in
the Dio-:t rirt Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 7S2. Thrsr trivial
diiTrrrucrs :ur npparrntl~· n product of th:1t rourt'~ r<'lianec on
slight]~· dilirrrnt :;tatistir:d data than "·e ha\"C' rrli<'d upon.
1
' " Although thr Foundation Program has mndr ~ignifirantl~· grratrr
contributions to both school di~tricts oYrr the lnst se1·eral year~ , it
is apparrnt that Alamo llright~ hns rnjo~·rd a lnrgrr gain. Thr
siz.1blr diffrrrncr brtwrrn t hr Alnmo Hril);hts and Edgrwood ~);rants
is dur to thr emphasis in thr Statr's allocation formula on the
g1mrantcrd minimum salarirs for tcarhrrs. Higher salnrirs nrc
guaranteed to trnchcr~ h:11·ing more years of experienrr and possr.ssing more ad1·:mcrd clrgree~. Thrrcfore, Al::nno Hrights, which
hns a grratcr prrcentngr of rxprrirmrcl prrsonncl with advanced
drgree~, rrcri\"C's more Rt ate support. In this rrgnrd the Texas
Prog:ram is not unlike thnt prcHrntly in existrnce in n numbrr of
other State~. C. CoonH , ,V. Clune, 8. Sugarman, supra. n. 13. at
63-125. Brcnusr more dollnr~ haYe been gi1·rn to di~trirts thnt
alrr,1cl~· spend morr per pupil, ~uch Foundation formulas haYc been
dr~cribcd as "anti-equalizing." Ibid. The formula, however, i ·
:111! i-cqunlizing only if Yiewed in absolute terms. The percentage
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment ..
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth ,
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20 %
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4 o/r· of its
grant."6 It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio aud in varying
degrees throughout the State, 38 still exist. And it was
disparity between the two T exas distri ctii iR diminished sub~ tnnti a lly
by State aid . Alamo Height s derived in 1967-1968 almo~ t 13 times
ns mu ch money from local tax e~ as Edgewood did. The State aiel
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approximately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice
:1 s much money to ~ p end per pupil from its combied State and local
resources.
16
'
Texas Resea rch League, supra, n. 20, at 13 .
7
'l The Economic Index, whi ch determines each county's shn re of
the total Local Fund Assignment , is based on a complex formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was in ~ tituted .
Sec t ext at pp. - - - supra. It has frequ ent!~· been suggeiitcd
by T exas researchers that the formula be alt ered in several respects
to provide a more accurat e refl ection of local taxpaying ability,
especially of urban s chool ~ . V Governor's Committee Report, at
48; Berke, Carnavale, l\forgrm & White, supra, n . 29 at 680-681.
as The District Court relied on the findings pre:-'onted in an
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His sa mpling
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated n direct correlation
between the amount of n district 's taxable property and its level
of per pupil expenditure. His s tud~' also found a direct correlation
between n district's median family income and per pupil cxpendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
337 F. Supp., at 282.
Finding that wealth is a
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it was premised upon some compelling·
tun's as well as an inven;c correlation between percrntngc of minorities and expenditures.
Categorized by Equalized Property Valur:;,
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue

Market Value
of Taxable
Property
Per Pupil

Median
Family
Income
F'rom 1960

Per Cent
Minority
Pupils

State &
Local
Revenues
Per Pupil

Above $100,000
85,900
$815
8%
(10 Districts)
5100,000-850,000
$4,425
$544
32%
(26 Districts)
$50,000-$30,000
$483
$4,900
23%
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
$462
$5,050
31%
(40 Districts)
Below $10,000
$3,325
S305
79%
( 4 Districts)
Although the correlations with respect to family incomr and race·
appear only to exist. at the extremes, and although the a!Iinnt's
methodology has been questionrd (sec Goldstrin, Intrrdi,;t riet
Inrqualitirs in School Financing; a Critical Analysis of Serrano v.
Priest and its Progrny, 120 U. Pa. L. Hcv. 50-~, 52:3-525 nn. 67 and
71 (1972) ), insofar as any of thrsr three corrrlation:; i:; rrlcvant
to the constitutional thr;;is presrntcd in this ca~c we may accept
it~ basic thruHt". For a defense of the rcliabilit~r of the affid:wit, see·
Brrke, CarnnYalr, l\iorgnn & Whitr, supra, n. 29.
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state interest. I d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court
concluded that "[n]ot only arc defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
Id., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not "·ithstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights :w or that
involve suspect classifications.''" If, as '·
fre~ld, strict scrutiny means that the State's system
is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,", the Texas
financing system- and its counterparts in virtually every
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that " [ n l o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." ··~
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" • a and "imperfections," 14 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
"''E. (!. , Police Dept. of the City of Chica(!o v. ilfoslc!J. 40~ U. S.
(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. ;3:~0 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
·"'E. (!., Graham v. Richard~on, 403 U. S. 3G5 ( 1071) : Lovin(! v.
\"irQinia, 388 U. S. 1 (19()7); JllfcLauQhlin \'. Florida. 379 1J . S. 184
(1964).
·" Sre Dunn v. Blu111stcin, 405 U. S. 330, 3-1-3 (1972), :lllcl the
ca~rs collected therein.
''"Appellant s' Brirf, at 11.

!)2

·"' Ibid.
·•·• Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3.
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the District ( 'omt's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of
financing public education must be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed. If not. Texas' claimed rational
basis must be ronsiclerrcl.
II

The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
Tn concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatn1ent in the criminal trial and
appellate processes, 4 " and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote:'" Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established 'vealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system. discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court affirming tho
undeniable importance of education)' 7 that there is a
fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
\Ve are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, :n2 U. S. 35:-l ( 1963).
"" llwper v. Bd. of Elections, 38:3 U. S. 66:3 (1964); McDonald v.
Bd. of Elections, 39-! U.S. 802 (1969); Bulloc/,: v. Carter, 405 U.S.
40

1;).f (1!)i2).
·•

.

'

7

Sec rase::; ritrd in text., nt -,infra .
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under the Equal ProtPction Clause. Indeed. for the
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuasive.
A

"1

@

The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Comt in this case. and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing laws in other
States,"8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. The juclieial examination of any state law, challenged on the
ground that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of
any class of the State's citizens, requires at the outset
delineation and description of the class alleged to be
discriminated against. In each of this Court's equal
protection decisions in which state laws were found to
have occasioned de facto wealth discrimination, the disadvantaged class could be easily identified and described.
The contours of the class in the present case have not
been so identified. Indeed, appellees and the District
Court have characterized the class in at least three different ways and have not settled on any particular definition. In their complaint, appellees purported to
represent a class composed of persons who are "poor"
and who reside in school districts having a "low value
of property." "u Yet appellees have not defined the term
"poor" with reference to any describable minority of
persons whose incomes fall below any identifiable level
~~ who might be characterized as "indigent." 5 0 Their
proof at trial focused instead on comparative differences
1
~ Se1'rano v. Pl'iest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241. 5 Cal.
3d 584 (1971); Van Dusal'tz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (l\Iinn.
1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187
(1972).
•r•Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
0
" See Appellees' Brief, at 1, 3; Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20--21.

'.
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in family incomes between school districts. They endeavored, apparently, to show that, because median
family incomes are higher in wealthier districts and lowe1
in poorer districts, the Texas system discriminates
against a class composed of all families residing in relatively poor districts. The District Court may have been
relying on this notion of relative discrimination based on
am1 y
Its opinion emphasizes that "those districts most rich in property also have the highest median
income ... while the poor property districts are poor in
income .... " 337 F. Supp., at 282. A third possible
delineation of the class is also suggested in the District
Court's opinion. Since all children in any given district
receive the same educational offering, the court apparently
concluded that the individual wealth characteristics of
the residents in the district were irrelevant. Thus the
District Court might have determined that the Texas'
:finance system occasions relative discrimination against
districts based on their property wealth rather than on
the personal wealth of ~ residents. This characterization would account for the court's description of appellees' class as being composed of "all . . . children
throughout Texas who live in school districts with low
property valuations." lbid. r' 1 The vagueness and imprecision with which the classification scheme has been
described may well suggest the absence of a discrete,
identifiable class necessary for equal protection analysis.
It is clear, in any event, that however described the class
lacks the traditional indicia that have rendered other
class.ifications suspect and is markedly dissimilar to
"'At oral argument and in their brief, appellees ,;uggP~ t that
de;;crip1 ion of the personal status of the rei:> iclcnti:> in di:-:;1rict!:i that
i:>pend less on education is not critical to their rase. In their Yicw,
the Tcxai:> system is impermissibly discriminatory even if relatively
poor district s do not contain poor people. Appellees' Brief, nt 43-44;
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20-21.
t
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classes involved in the several precedents relied upon
by appellees and the court below.
The individuals or groups of individuals who have
constituted the class discriminated against in prior cases
have shared ~ distinguishing characteristics: ( 1) because of thei/\mpecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and (2) as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. 8. 12 (1956), and its progeny,"" the Court invalidated state la\\·s that prevented indigent criminal
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case "·ere found to occasion de facio discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. Aile!, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been shown if the State had provided some
"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript.
Britt v. A·orth Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner
v. California, 303 U.S. 367 (1060); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay
for counsel from their own resources and who had no
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides
"" Mayer v. City of Chirago, 40-J. U. S. 1~9 (1971); William s Y.
01.-/ahoma Citu. :30.5 U. S. 458 (19()9) ; Gard11a v. California, :39:3
U.S. :3oi (19G9); Roberts Y. LaVallee, 389 U.S . .J.O (19Gi) ; Lono v.
District Court of lo11:a, 385 U. S. 192 (19GG); Draper ,.. lrashinuton,
:372 U. S. 4i:>i (19(i0); E'rskinc v. Washinutvn J>ri~on Roard, ;357
U.S. 214 (1958) .
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no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for
a criminal defense arc, relatively speaking, great but not
insunnountablr. Nor docs it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less
wealthy.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v.
Short, 401 r. S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penaltics that subjected indigents to incarceration simply because of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class \\"as composed only of persons who
vverc totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens.
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fcc requirement for
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts
found in the previous cases were present he+if.
1e size
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars,
effectively singled out all potential candidates who were
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot"
(I d., at - ) , inability to pay occasioned an absolute
denial of a position on the primary ballot.
In the present case neither of these two distinguishing
characteristics of '"calth classifications can be found.
First, although appellees have charged that the Texas
system discriminates against the "poor," they have made
no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clus-

'

'

71-1332-0 PINIO:\f
18

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTHICT v. HODHIGlTEZ

tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "[i lt is clearly incorrect ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Sen·ano-that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in Conuecticut." :>:J Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," 54
the Connecticut study found , not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts."5
Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people--defined by
reference to any level of absolute impecunity- are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases,
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it, 5 " a sufficient answer to appellees' argu"" 1\ ote, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Deci~ionH: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. J. 1303, 1328-1329
( 1972).
51
I d., at 1324, n. 102.
r.r, !d., at 1328.
""Each of appellees' po sible theories of wealth di;,;crin.1ination is
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varie::;

..
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ment is that the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute or complete equality.';7 Nor, indeed, in
view of the infinite variables affecting the educational
process, can any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts
that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an
"adequate" education for all children in the State. By
assuring teachers, books, transportation and operating
funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, for the welfare of the State as a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.' " 58 The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education." 50 No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, therefore, the difference in quality betw en two schools can be de..!£!::-mined), y looking at the difference in per pupil expen 1 ure~ . Thi::;
i ~ a matter of considerable dispute among educators and commentators. See nn. 86 and 101, infra.
57 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); May er v.
City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. lVashington,
372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S.
35:3, 357 ( 1963)
'''Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 1:3 (emplw~i~ ndd<'d) ..
Indeed, even though local funding has lon~ been a ::;igniflcant a~peet
of educational funding, the State alway::; ha::; Yicwed pro,·iding an
acceptable education a::; one of its primary function::;. Sec Texas
State Bel. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 1, 7.
'"'Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1.
0

.,
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class is not susceptible to identification in tradition a1
terms.r.o As suggested above, appellees and the District
Court seem to have embraced a different approach, \\·bich
might be characterized as a theory of relati \'e or comparative discrimination. Appellees sought to prove that
there is a direct correlation between the personal \\·ealth
of the citizens with in each district and the cxpencli tures
therein for education. The principal evidence adduced
in support of this comparative discrimination claim is
an affidavit submitted hy Professor Joelc f3. Berke of
Syracuse University's li;ducational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, rclying in major part upon
this affidavit and apparently accepting th<' substa nee of
appellees' theory, noted, first, a direct correlation between
the wealth of school districts, measured in terms of
assessable property per pupil, and their levels of perpupil expenditures. Second, the court found a direct
correlation between district wealth and the personal
wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median
family income. 337 F. Rupp., at 282, n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then
it might be argued that expenditures on eclucationoquated by appellees to the quality of education-arc
dependent on personal wealth. Appellecs 1 comparative'
r.o An rdurat ional finance :,;y;;trm might br h~·pothr~izrcl, howc.vcr, in which thr amdogy to the wc·allh di~('rimination rasrs would
be con;;iderabl~· rlo::;er. If rlrmrntar~· and secondary rdueation were
made twailablc by the Statr only to tho:sr who arr ablr to p:1y a
tuition as;;r:sHrcl again"t raC'h pupil, thrrr wonld bra elr:1rly defined
cia:;:; of "poor proplr-drfinablr in terms of their inability to pay
tho prr~rribrcl snm-who would br ah~olutcl~· prreluded from rerriving an rducation. Thnt ra~r would prrsrnt a far morr compPlling set of cirrum~t :1 nrcs for judicial a~~ist anrr than t hr rase
bcforr us tOlby. Aftrr all, Trxnl' has unclNt:1kon to do a good
dc>al morr than providr :~n rcllleat ion to tho~r who ('::tn aJTord it.
It has pnn·iclrd what it ron~idcr~ to bran :Hl('quatc ba::;r education
for all childrrn :111cl has nttcmptrd, thougl1 imprrfrctly, to amrlioratc
by statr funding and h~· the local assr~smcnt progmm tho cli~parilie;;
bot ween !oral tax rcsomcos.
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discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
questions, including whrthrr a bare direct correlation or
ome higher drgree of correlation nt is necessary to provide a basis for concluding the financing system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the
com.paratively poor,G" and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need
not be addressed in this casr. however. since appellees'
proof fails to support their allegations or the District
Court's conclusions.
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 10~ of the school districts in Texas. His
findings, set out in the margin,"" show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
"'Abo, it ~hould be recognizrcl that mrdinn inromr" ~tnli"tir:-;
not define \\'ith an.'· prrei~ion the stntu~ of indi,·idual farnilir~
\\'it h in an~· gi,·en d i~t rirts. A morr drprnc\a blr ;;bowing of compara! iYc \\·calth clisrriminat ion \\'Ould rxnminr fartor;; Sll('h as the
a\'crnge inromr, thr mode, and tht' conrPntrntion of poor fmnilir~ in
au~· clistri('t in addition to the mrc\inn inromr.
·n~cr. Jefferson\'. Ilarkuey, 406 U.S. 505,547-5-10 (1972).
n:: ftJ Mket Value of
Jlf edian Ji'amily
Staie & [,otaf

ma~·

Ta.tab!e Property
Per f>'Upi!

hlcomf'
in 1.')(i0

Expf'nditw·es
Pel' Pupil

Abow 8100,000
(10 districts)
8100,000-.'50,000
(36 c\ist ri('ts)
$50,000-830,000
(:30 cli~trictR)
S00,000-Sl0,000
(40 clist rirt s)
Brlow $10,000
(4 cli~trict;;)

S5,900

SRI.')

$4,4:25

85-14

$-1,900

$48:3

$;'),0.50

$463

$:3,:33.5

$005
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to education. For the remainder of the districts-96
districts comprising almost 907o of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest median
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions >vere answered favorably to appellees,
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination. 64
Since the only correlation indicated by the evidence
is that between district property wealth and expenditures,
it may be argued that the class could be defined, without regard to the individual characteristics of their residents, to include all persons, or all chiklren, in every
district in the State except the district or districts that
have the most assessable wealth and spend the most on
education. 65 Assuming a perfect correlation from top
to bottom, every child in the class would be disadvantaged
r.l St1Hlirs in other State~ havr al~o que::;tionrd t hr rxi,lrt•rr of
:my drprndablr correlation brtwrrn a di:>trict '::; \Y('~]t h J'l<'a~urNl
in terms of assr~~able proprrty and thr coll~?ctivr wen! th of fn•nilirs
re.:~iding in the cli~trict m~?nsured in t~?rm~ of mrdinn famil)'
n1rom<'. Ridennur & Rid~?nour, S"rrano Y. PriPst: ·wPalth nne!
Kansns s~hool Finnncr, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) (''it ran be
nrgnrcl thnt thf?r(' rxists in Kansas almost an im·N,;r Porrelati •n:
di~tricts with highest inromr ]Wr pupil havr low nsse~~rd Ynlur ]Jrr
pupil, and di::;trirts with high assrssl?d valur prr pupil ha,·r low
income> per pupil"); Davirs, Thr Ch:'tllrngr of Ch:tn;rr in School
Finance, in Nnt'l Edurationnl Assn., lOth Annunl Coni'. on Srhool
Finn ncr (1967). Note, Rl Yale L . .T., supra, n ..53. Src nho Gnlclstrin, supra, n. 33, at 522-527.
60
Indeed, this i~ prrci::;el~· how thr plnintiffs in Serra?lll Y. Priost.
supra. cl~?finccl the cln~s thry purported to reprc,rnt: "Pininliff
l'hildren claim to rcprrscnt a dnss consisting of nll public S('hool
pupil~ in California, cxrcpt childrrn in thnt school di~trirt . . .
whieh ... afford~ the grcati•st cdmnl ional opportunil )' of :dJ ~chool
distrirtH within California." 9fl Cnl. Rptr .. nt oO-L 487 P. 2cl. nt
124-l, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. 8rr al~o Van Dusartz "· Hatfi eld. 334 F.
Supp., at 873.
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relative to all children in each of the wealthier districts.
Viewed in this manner, appellees' suit asks the Court to
extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system
that allegedly discriminates against virtually the entire
population of the State. The class is as large, diverse,
and amorphous as could be imagined, unified only by
the common factor of residence in districts that happen
to have less taxable wealth than the district or districts
with the greatest such wealth. 66 Nor would the class
be significantly less ambiguous if defined more restrictively to include only districts below the median, or
below the average, or below some other artificially defined
level of expenditure. Whatever its contours, it is not a
class saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such
a position of political powerlessness, or subjected to such
a history of unequal treatment as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Moreover, it has never been within the constitutional
prerogative of this Court to nullify action of state legislative governments merely because the burdens or benefits
thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth
of the political subdivisions in which citizens live.
In any event, appellees have not contended that a
finding of wealth discrimination in this case would alone
constitute a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's
system to rigorous judicial scrutiny. 67 Before such re<w Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texa~ s~ stem
as one resulting merely in di~crimination between cli~tri cts ~incc this
Court has never questioned the State's power to draw rea;;onable
di~tinctions bPtwcC'n political subdivi~ion;:; within it s bordPrs. Griffin
''· County School Board of Prince Ed ward County, 377 U. S. 218,
230-231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, -1-27 (1961);

Salsburg v. Marylaad, 346 U. S. 545 (1954).
·G< The Court hai:l never heretofore hdcl that the exi~teucC' of
de facto wealth discrimination alone provide~ an adequate ground
for invoking strict scrutinr. Sec, e. g., Ilarper v. Virginia Bd. of
U. S.
Blections, 31l3 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kms, -

- - (1972).
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view is required, the State's system must be found to
interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" right.
And, it is this question-whether education should be
counted among the s1nall circle of rights that heretofore
have been found to be "fundamental"-which has so
consumed the attention of courts am! commentators in
recent years.as
B
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognir.ecl that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.'' !d., at 493. 'What \\'as said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality \Yith the passage of time:
"Compulsory chool attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, ·e ven service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citir.enship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training. and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days. it is doubtful that any child
m.ay reasonably be expected to succeed in lif.e if he
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an
'"Srr S!'rrano \'.Priest, 5 Cal. :3d. 5SJ, -JB7 P. 2d 12-n (1971);
1'an Dtt8actz \'. Hatfield, 3-!-! F. Supp. t-170 (l\finn. 1971): llobinsoll Y. Cahill, llR ::.r . .T. Suprr. 22:3, 2R7 .\. 2d 1S7 U972); .J. Coon,.:,
W. Clu11r, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. n, nt 339-:~9-!; Goldstrin, Sli]JI'a, n. :3S, nt 5:3-1--5-!1; ~ore, Ed11rat icnall<"innn('ing & l·:qual
Protc·riion of tltr Lnw:s, nnd thr Suprrmr Comt, 70 Mich. L. H<'Y.
1:32-!, J:l:3.5- 1:)-J-2 ( 1972) : X ote, The Puhlir Srhool Financing Ca~r~:
Intrrdistri('(, TnPqnalitir~ and 'Yrnlth Di~crin1inaiioll, 1·1· Ari7.. L ..
HeY. 88, 120-124 (1972).
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opportunity \Yhcre the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right "·hirh must be made available to
all 011 equal terms." Ibid.
This theme. expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205. 213 (THE CHIEF Jus'riCE), 237,
238-239 (MR. J1.'STICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v.
Rd. of Education, 333 F S. 203 ( 1948); Pierce v.
Soc·i ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebm.ska, 262 U. S. 390 ( 1923); Interstate R. Co. v.
Massachusells, 207 L. S. 79 (1907).
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic dedication to public education. We
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
of education both to the individual and to our society"
cannot be doubted."'' But the importance of a service
performed by the State docs not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a la\Y impinging upon the right of interstate
travel, admonished that "I vJirtually C'very state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. 'l.'hompson, 394
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his vie\\', if the degree
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importance of the
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
We
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
one for which the Court lacks both authority and comnu

337 F. Supjl., :tt 28:3.
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petence. But MR. JuS'riCE STEWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr . .Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the "fundamental rights" rationale -of
the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection ... .' To
the contrary. the Court simply recogni11es, as it
must, an established comtitutional right, and gives
to that right no Jess protection than the Constitution itself demands." 304 U. S., at 642. (Emphasis from original.)
MR. JusTICE SrEWAR'r's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to clo~e judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
r·esiclency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penali11e the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.'' I d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long beeu recognized
as a right of constitutional significance, 70 and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importance of that right. 71
E. g., United States Y. Gue~t, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970).
71
Afler Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), there could
70

be no lingering fJUe::;tion about the constitutional foundation for
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Court applied
the ral ional ba ::; i~ test in reviewing Maryland':; maximum family
grant provi~ion under its AFDC program. A frdcral di::;trict comL
hrld lhc provitiion mlconstitutional, applying a stricter ::;tandard
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Lindsey v. 1\"ormet, 405 U. S. 56 ( 1972) , decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law,
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
Id. , at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," such as the "need for
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is
instructive:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee to access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any r-ecognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
Id., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
( 1970) , the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... involv-es the most basic economic needs of impoverished
of reYicw. In the cour~r of reYer:sing the lower court the CourL
distingui:shed Shapiro properly on the ground that in that ea~e
.. the Court found staLe interference with the con::;titutionnlly protected freedom of interstate travel." ld., at 484 n. Hl.
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human beings," 7 " provided no basis for departing from
tho settled modo of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring tho State to justify its law by
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 40G U. S. 535 (1072); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of those cases in addressing the question
now before the Court is plain. Tho key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is
it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, tho answer lies
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself,
tho right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 7 3 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1!)72); •• Mosley v. Police Department of
"Thr Court rduRrcl to nppl,1· thl' strict Rrrutin~· tl'~t clr,;pitr its
contrmpor:mrou,; rrrop;nition in Gnldberq Y. Krlly. :397 lT. S. 2.54,
10-l (1970), that " welf:1n• proYide:-; the mrnn~ to obtain r,;~rntial
food, clothing, houRing and mt'clieal enre."
•~ In Eiscnsladl t hr Comt ~truek down a 1\I:I"~:lrhu,;rt ts :-;talute
11rohihiting the distribution of ront r:1rrpt in• dr1·iees, finding that
t hr 1:111· f:l ilrd "to sn t i,;f~· c1·en the more lenirnt equal prot ertion
:-;tandard." !d .. :1t 447 n. 7. Xr\·rrthf'le,;,;, in dithnn. thr C'omt
r<·(·itrd the ]li'O])CI' form of rqu:d protection nn:d.1·.•i,;: '' if wr wrrr
to Poncludr th:ll thr J\Tn~,;aehn~rttR ~t atutr im])ingr~ upon fumblll('lltal fn·rclmns llllclN Orif<1 I'O{r1
C'mmectirul. 3S1 F 8. 4i!)
(J!)(\.5),] tiH' statutor.1· <·la~,;ifiC'ntion would hn1·r to be not mrrd~·
rationaUtt related to n nlid puhlir purpo~r hut nctC-'·''(11'!/ to thc:1rhie1·rmrrlt of :1 rompeffing ~tate intNe~t." Ibid. (rmph:1~i" in
orirdnal).
71 Dunn full~· r:ITll'fl~~r~ thi ~ Court',; C'fl\1:11 protection 1·ot ing rig:hts
r:t~es :1nd rxpl:Jins th:1t "thi:; Comt ha .., m:"1dr rlrar that n citizen
h:1s n constitutionally wotected right to p:wtirip:lte in eleetion.• 011
7

r\'.
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the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); 7 " Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 7 n
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education "·oulcl not alone cause the Court to depart from
the usual standard of reviewing a State's social and
economic legislation, appellees contend that education
is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close
relationship to other rights accorded protection under
the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas"
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative
:111 rqnnl bn~is with othrr
(rmphnsis Rnpplircl). The
1o rqu:ll 1rr:ltmC'nt in 1hr
r1·rn though, as thr Court

('iti;r,Pn~

in thr juri~di<·tion." !d .. nt 0213
constitutional und<'rpinnin~~ of the right
1·oting prorr"s f':ln no lon~rr br donbtrd
notrcl in llarper v. Virginia lld. of Elertions. 0S0 U. S. 6!J:1, 66:) (1966), "thr right to Yotr .in st:ltr rlrrtion~
is nowhrrr rxprr~sl~· mrnt ionrd." Srr Bullock v. Cartrr. 40.') U. ~ .
18-1: (19i2): E.ramrr v. Union Free School Di.~tl'ict. 395 U. S. 621
(1960); R e?Jnolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7 "ln Mosle)t
til(' Court strnf'k dowJJ a Chir:lgo :mtipil'krting
orclin:mrc whirh cxrmptrcl labor pirkrting from i1~ prohibitiom:.
Thr ordinanrr \\':l~ hrld inv:llid limier 1hr Eq11al Protrrtion Clausr·
:1ftrr sub.irrting it to ('!lrrful ::;rrutin~· nne! finding th:1t 1hr ordinnn('c
11·as uot nnnowl~· drawn. Thr stricter Rtn nd:ncl of rr\'ic•w \\'fiR :l ppropri:ltrl.'· applied sinrr thr ordinanrr wa~ onr "affrrting l'ir"t Amrnclmrnt intrrrst~." !d., at 101.
7
" 8ki11nrr :lppliPd t hr ~tnndard of do~r srrut iny to a statr lnw
JWrmitting forercl ::;trrilir.:ltion of ''hahitual rrimin:tlR." Implicit in
thr Court':-: opinion i~ the rrrognition that thr right of prorrrntion
is among thr rights of prr~onal privae~· protcrtrcl nndrr thr Con~ti
tutinn. Srr Roc\'. ·w ade,- U. S. - , - (1973).
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tools. Likewise. the corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little more than a hollow privilege when
the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and
utilize available knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect
to the right to vote.'s Exercise of the franchise. it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: n. voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of those propositions. The
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference v.·ith the individual's constitutional rights to speak and to vote. Yet
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or tho most informed electoral choice.
That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubtecl. 79 These are indeed goals
77
See, r. g., Red Lion BroadcastinQ Co. '"· FCC. 3f)5 r. S. 367,
390 (1!)69); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 5G..J. (196!)): Lamont
Y. J>ostmaster Genrral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
7
H Since the right to vote, per se, is not a con~tit utiollally protected right, we as~ume that appellerH' reference~ to that right are
~imp!~· shorthand rrferrnces to the const itutionnll~· protected right
to partiripatc on an equal basi:; whenrvrr the Sta tr ha.• adopted
an elrct ive process for drtrnnining who will repre~r nt an~· srgmcnt
or the Stnte's popubtion. Sec n . 74, supra.
70 The States hn \'r often pur::;ued their cnt ircly Jrgit imatc interest
in a::;suring ''intelligent exrrci~c of the franchi~r," Katze11 bar·h v.
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (1966), through ~ u rh d c\·icr:;; as
li terary tests and age re~ trirtionii on the right to vote. Sre ibid.;
Oreqon v. Mitchell, 400 U. R. 112 (1970). And, where tho"r rr~tr ir
tion~ have bern found t o promote intclligc·nt uHc of the b:tllot without
di,nimina ting agn in ~t 1ho~r racial and ct hn ic minorit i r~ pre\·iou~ly
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs
are freed from governmental interference. But they are
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
otherwise legitimate state activities.
Even if it were conceded that some quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditurE}fproviae·
an education that ia Texas falls short. Whatever merit
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental
rights where only relative differences in spending levels
are involved and where-as is true in the present caseno charge fairly could be made that the system fails to
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process.
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?·
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so, under apdeprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld
t hr ir usc. Compare Lassiter v. N orthampton Elel'tio11 Bd., :3GO U. S.
45 (1959), with Oregon v. ll!itchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (l\fr . .Justi rc
lll <ll'k), 144-147 (Mn. J uH'l'ICE DouGLAs ) , 21 6-217 C~Ir . .Ju ~ t irP
Hnrlan ), 231-2:36 (l\fn . .Ju ,.;TICJ" BHENNAN ), 2 1-\2-2 ~-l (J\TH . J u~:;·rr c J·;
S TE W ,\H'l'), and Gaston County v. United Statrs, 395 U.S. 2S.'i (1969) .
' "Sec Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clatt ~c in J' ublic Educat ion, 71 Col. L. HeY. 1:3.55, 1389- 1:390 (1971) : Co mment , T c· na nl
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pellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey
v. Nonnel, SUJJra, ''"ould no longer be good constitutional law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental ri~~:ht and hav0 found those arguments unpersnasive in the pres0nt context. In one
further rcsp0ct we find this a particularly inappropriate
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial
scrutiny. The present rase. in on0 most basic sense, is
significantly different from any of the cases in '"hich
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived."
"infringed." or "interf0rr0cl" '"ith the free exercise of
some fundamental personal right. Sec Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535. 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. R. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330. 338-343 (1972). The critical distinction botm'cn
those rases and the one now before us lies in what Texas
is endeavoring to do ,,·ith respect to education. MR.
Jus1.'ICE BRENNAN. 'niting for the Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, B84 lT. S. 641 (1966). expresses well the salient
point: 81
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitu tionall:v denied or diluted anyone's right to
Intrrr.-'t Hrprr~rnl:ttion: Propo~al for a Xational Trnanl~' .\,-,o<'i:ttion, -!7 Trx. L. HrY. llGO, 1172-ll/;) n. 61 (19G9).
" Katzen bath "· M oroan inYolwd a ehallrngr b~· n•g-i~ll'rrd Yotrr:<
in Xl'\\' York Cit.'· to a proyi,-ion of tlw Yotinp: Hight,; A<·t of lfl(i.')
that prohibitrd enforcrmrnt of a 'tale l:m c·:dlinp: for Eng]i:-;h
liiC'rnr~· tr:-;t:-< for YIJting-.
Thr l:tw w:l" :-;u~prllfhl a~ to rr,;id t'llts
from Puerto Hico \\'ho had <·omplrtrd at lra~t ,;i, Y<•;lr' of <•ducat ion at an ". \ mrrira n-Aa~" ~chool in that count r.'· C'\' <'11 I houg-h
thr lan~uap;r of in~trurtion \\'as othrr th:1n Fng-li~h. Thi~ Court
uphrld t11C' qur ..:;lionrd prO\· i~ion O\ rr the claim thnt it di,nimin:ltrcl
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relirf effected rto others
similarly situated] . . . .
"[The fcdcralJa,y in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. . . . \Ve need decide only \Yhether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... \Ya.s
permissible. 1n deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we arc guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take
one step at a time. addressing itself to the phase
of the problem \Yhich seems most acute to the legislative mind ... .'" !d., a.t 656- 657. (Emphasis from
original.)
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aid-was implemented in
an effort to e~rtend public education and to improve its
ng:1inst t ho::<r with n Rixt h gradp rdnc·at ion obtninrd in JJon-En .gli~h
~pr:1king l'rhoob ot hrr i han t]l(' onrs dr~ignatrd by the frc!Praf
kgi~ln tion.
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quality. 82 Of course, every reform that benefits some
more than others may be criticized for what it fails
to accomplish. But " ·c think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and , therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles f:eneitivc to the nature of the State's
efforts. 83

c

It should be abundantly clea.r, for the reasons stated
above. that this is an inappropriate case in which to
subject state action to the sort of searching ecrutiny
reserved for laws that involve suspect claesifications or
fundamental rights.
We need not rest our decision, however, eolely on the
inappropriatenefls of the compelling interest test. A
century of Suprerne Court adjudication under the Equal
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
vVe have here nothiug less than a direct attack on the
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. 81 Mr. Justice
'" Cf. Meyer\'. ll'ebrasl.-a. 262 U.S. 390 (192:3); Pil'l'('(' \'. Society
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Ilargmve Y. Kirk, 31:~ F. Supp.
9-1·~ (MD Fla. 1970), Yarnlcd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971).
"' Srr Schilb \'. Kuebel, 40-t U. S. 357 (1071); JlfcDonald \'.
Board of Election Cormnissioners. 394 U. S. 802 (196D).
HI Sec, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1:3-t U.S. 2:32 (1890);
Crmnirhai'l v. Soutlu.'1'11 Coal Co., 301 U. S. 49:3, 5011-.500 (1D:l7);
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 ( 1959).
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Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney,
311 U. S. 435 (1940), against interference with the
State's fiscal policies is worth repeating:
"[t]he responsibility for devising just and productive sources of revenue challenges the wits of legislatures. Nothing can be less helpful than for courts
to ... inject themselves in a merely negative way
into the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making.'r
!d., at 445.
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution,
the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and
the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising
and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are urged
to direct the States either to alter drastically the present
system or to throw the property tax out altogether in
favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. 8 "
~ " Those who urge that the present ~y~tem he invalidated otTer
lit tlc guidance as to what t~·pe of school financing ~hould rt'pl::trc
it. Tlw almost inevitable result of rejection of the exi~ting ~~·~tC'm ,_
however, would be stntewidt' financing of all public education with
funds derin•d from taxation of property or from the adoptiou or
exp[)nsion of sales and income taxe~. The author;; of Private \Yrall h
and Public Education, S1L]!ra, n. 13, at 201-242, Ruggest an altcrnai in' scheme, known a;,; "diRtrict powrr equalizing." In ~im plest
trrms, the State would guar:tntee that at an~· partieul:tr rate of
property taxation thr di;;trict would rereivr a Htatecl nmnlwr of
dollar8 regardk-<.,; of the di~trict';; tax ba~r. To fin~mcc· the ~~~h~idic:-;
i o " poorer" districts, funds would br taken a\\·:1 ~· from the ''wrall hier"
cli:-;t riels that collect more than the stated amount at nny gi1·eu
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy. this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy, another area in which this Court'sincleed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and
against premature interference with
experience counsel~
'-J
the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public v>clfare assistance programs, presents a myraicl of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S .. at 487. The very
complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggest that "there
will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them," and that, within the limits
of rationality. "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On oven
the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts are divided. lndeed. one of
the hottest sources of rontroversy conc-erns the extent
to '"hich there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education ~r._
r:tlr. Thi~ i~ not thr plncr to wril):h thr nrguuwnt~ for nnd ng:lill!'t
"di-;1 riet powrr rqmdizin~J:," br~·ond noting that ronnnrntator~ nrP
in di"ngrrrmrnt a~ to ll'hrther it i~ feasihlr , ho\\' it \\'ould work, and
indeed whcthrr it would violatr thr rqual prolrf'tion 1lwor.1· 1111flc-rl~· ing n pprller~' ca~r.
Prr~idrnt'~ Comm'n on Rrhool Fin:mcr,
Rrh()(,[c', Peoplr & ::\fonr~· 3:-J (1972): lhtPman & Hro11·n. Romr
Heflrrlion.< on Serrano "· Priest. 40 T. Urban L. 70J. 7f1fi- 70S
(Hl72): Brf'~t. Hook Re1·irw, 2:-J St:m. L. Hr,·. ~391, .59-l-!i0o (1071):
Wi~r. School Fin:111rr Equalization Lnw.<llil~: .\ Model Lrg-i.< latiw
Hr~pom:r. 2 Ynlr Hr1·. of L. & Roc. Arlion 128. 12.1 (1971):
Silard & \\'hitr. Tnt ra~ta tr Inequ:dit ie~ in Puhli" Edur·a1 inn: ThrC:ISe for .Tudiri:il Hrli<•f Umkr I he Ertu:il Prot ret ion C'l:lll"<'. 1970
·wi~.

L. Tk\'. 7, 20-:)0.

Thr qunlit~·-ro~t contronr~~· hns rrrei1·cd ron~idrrablr :1llrntion. Among thr notnhlc nulhoritir~ on both :;idr~ nrc tbr follm\'ing: C . .Jrnrk~, Inequ:1lity (1072): C. Rilbrrmnn. Cri~i~ in 1hrM:
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an assumed correlation the validity of \Yhich underlies
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District
Court in this caf'e. Related to the questioned relationship bet,Yeen cost and quality. is the equally unsettled
controyersy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education.~And the question of the proper relatioltship between .::tate boards of education and local school
boards, i11 terms of their re1'pective responsibility and
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-examination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like
problems of education is not likely to be devined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing
conditions.
It must be remembered also that every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for
tho relationship between national and state power under
our federal system. Questions of federalism arc always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws are to be subjected to the compelling interest or
the rational basis test. While "[t]he maintenance of
7

Cln~~room

(1970); Office of Edneation, Equalit~· of :Edttcational
(196fi) (The Colrman Ticport): On Equality of Educationnl Opportunit~ · (1972) (\fo.vnill:m & l\Jostt•llcr cck): .T. Guthrie,.
G. 1\:!Pindorkcr, TJ. Lc1·in, & T. Stout, Srhool~ and lncqu:dity
(Hl71); Pre~iclcnt'~ Conun'n on Sdwol Finanrc, supra. n. S5: Swnnson, The Co~t-Qu::tlit~· Hclation~hip, in lOth Kat'! Conf. on School
Finanrto, The Challenge of f'h:mgr in Sf·hool Finn nrc 151 ( 1967).
M Sec the rc~ult~ of the Tcxn~ Gowrnor'H Committee's ~t:~tcwidc
~un ·p.1· on the gonls of rdur:1tion in that Stntc.
I C:owrnor'~
Committee Report, at 59-6, . Sec al~o Golcl~tcin, supra, n. 38,
nt 519-522: ~rhocttle, svpra, 11. 80; :1uthoritic~ ritccl inn. Sli, supra.
Opportunit~·
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the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
which this Court examines state action, 88 it '"ould be
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before
us. in which "·c arc urged to abrogate the systems of
financing public education presently in existence in
virtually every State ..x-The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These
same considerations are relevant to the determination
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, is
supported by a reasonable or rational basis. It is to this
question that we next turn our attention.

III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates. as these facts bear directly upon the issue of
rationality.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from each source.Ro The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher~" Allie d

Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, .'):32 (1959)
Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384

(:\IR. JusTICE BnEKNAN, concurring);

F. S. 641, 661 (1965) (Mr. ,Ju:;ticc Harlan, di~~cntinp;).
'" In 1970 Texas expended approximate!~· 2.l billion dollar~ for
education and a lit tic over one billion came from the l\finimum
J<"ouudntion Program. Texas Rc:;ca rrh League, S1l]lra , 11. 20, at 2.

'.
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compenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 90 Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 20 teachers ;!) 1 one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 92
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided. 93 Additional funds
arc earmarked for current operating expenses and for
student transportation °4 as well as for the free
textbooks. 05
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation 96 and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.97 As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted
to the Edgewood School District over the last three
years, 08 the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, however, has been content to rely alone on funds from the·
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
assure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program. 99 Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
90

Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13.

n Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18.

Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15.
Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.Hi, 16.17, 16.19.
91
Trx. Educ. Code ~§ 16.45, 16.51.
1
'" Tex. Ecluc. Code § 12.01.
on Trx. Ecluc. Code § 11.26 (5).
"'Tex. Ecluc. Code § 16.301 et. seq.
1
' ' Sec ante, at - .
9
" Gilmrr-Aikrn Commit trc, supra, n. 15, at 15.
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In some districts the local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edge"·ood "·here the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share nmy far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part local differences are attributable to differences in the rateR of taxation or in the degree to " ·hich
the market value for any category of property varies from
its assessed value.wo The greatest interdi:::trict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available with in any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability for supplementing state
funds. Tn large measure. these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more
teachers. Therefore. the primary distinguishing attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pU]1ilteacher ratios and higher salary schedules.' 0 '
Thrrr is no uniform st atrwidc ns~r~~mrnt prarl irr in TPX{IS.
C'ommrrria! proprrl ~-, for rx:1mplr. might hr t :1 wd nt ::30~; of
markPt Y:lhtP in OJH' rount~ · and at 50)< in nnolhrr. Y Gon•rnM's
Commitlrr Rrport, nt 25- 2G: Hrrkr, C:trna,·alP, 1\Iorg-:ln & Whitr,
supra. n. 29. at 6fi6-(i67 n. 16.
101
Trxn~ Rr."Pnrrh LPague, supra. n. 20, nl JS.
A~ prr1· iou~l~·
notrd, trxt :lrcomp~m~·ing n. 86. SU]lra. the rxtPnt to whirh I hf'
qu:dit~· of rdur[ll ion Yarirs with rxpr nditurP prr pupil i-< dPhatrd
inronrlu ~ i,·rl.'· h.1· thr mo~l thnngbt ful stmlrnls of puhlir rdncation.
WhiiP [Ill would agn•r that thrrP i" a rorrrlalion up to thr point
of proYiding thr rrcognizPd rssrntial~. t hr i~sur~ of grratpst di:o<agrrrmrnf. irwludr thr rffrrl on qualit~· of pupil-tr;1rlH'r r:1tios :n1d
of higher trarll('r S[lbr~· ~ehrdulr~. The ~t[ltr funding in Trxns
i..; dr~igned to assurr. on thr fii'N[lgr, onr lrar·hrr for r1·rr.1· 2.'i
~tudrnl~, whic·h i~ ronsidNPd to hr n f:t1·omhlr mlio b~· most .-tnmlnrd~ . Whrthrr the minimum ~:dnr~· of $6 ,000 prr ~· rnr· i~ sufllrrnt
in Trxas to nttr:tct qunlifird trnc·hrr~ lll[l~· br n1orr clPhatnhlt>. drpending in !ll{ljor pari upon thr loc[ltion of thr ~C'lwol di~trict. Hnt
thrrr [lj)JlPflr,.: to br little· rmpirical dnt:1 that ~upport~ thr aclnmtngr of any partiC'ulnr pupil-tParhcr mlio or that dorumrnts thC"
rxistrnrr of a drprndablr rorrrlat ion hri wrrn 1he l<' l·rl of pnblie
100
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees clairn that children in less affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasOJmble basis" for a system \\·hich results
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp ..
at 284. We disagree.
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as \\·ell as
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State. 10 " The povver to tax local
~chool

trachrr::;' ~nla rirs nnd thc qunlit~· of thcir rl:l'~room in~trur
An intr:wtnhlr prohlrm in drnling with tr:lrl}('r~' ~:ilnrir~ i~ thr
:th~<'nrr. up to thi~ tinw. of i'i: tti~fnctor~· trchniqurs for .indging·
thrir abilit~· or ])('rformnncr. Thr rr~ult i~ thnt rrl:lti1·rly frw
~rhool ~~·strms hnYc mrrit pl:m~ of nn~· kind , with tr:1chrr~' >'nlnrirs
bring inrrrnsrd acro~s thr bonrd in a w:1~· whirh rrwnrd~ thr lra;;t
dr,rn·ing on thr ~amr bn~is ns thr most drsrn·ing. Rnlarirs nrr
ll'ltnlll· raisrd :111tomnt ic:dl~· on thr bnsis of lrngth of ;;rrl"irr nne!
ncro rding to prrdrtrrminrd "~trps," rxtrnding m·rr 10-to-12 ~ ·rnr
prrioc!:<.
In making thr~r obsrn·ntions. wr inl('nd no rritiri;;m of rxisting
pr:1rti('rs nnd crrtainl~· IH' imp!~· no opinion that trnrhrrs' ~nlnrir~
grnrrall~· nrr ndrquatr.
As compnrrd with othrrs of compnmhlr
rducat ion 1hrrr i" rYrr~· rrnson to brlirvr thnt tr:trhrr~' .~:1lnrirs
g;rnrr:lll~·, stnrting from an unduly low hflsr, hnvr fnilrd ewn to
kerp :1brrast of inOntion. Wr h:we inrlnded this rommrntnr~· on
pnpil-tearher ratio~ nnd sal:lr~r levels not to exprrss nn~· opinion
with rr~prrt to thr ndrqu[lcy of those in Trx:1~ or ebrwhrrr, but
mrrrl~· to indicatr that it i~ not nt all drar-in the 011inion of ~omc
rxprrtf'-thnt thr 1"-o principal fncton; di~tinl);uishing t hr schools in
t hr more nfflurnt cli~trirts from thm'P cl~cwhrre docs dC'mon"trnbl~·
nnd nrrrs~nril~' afTrrt thr qualit~· of thr traching.
10
~ Prr~ident';; Comm'n on Srhool Finnnrr, suwa, n . 8!i, at 9. Until
rrrrntl~· Hnw:-tii IY:ts thr onl.1· St[ltr th:tf mnini[lined :1 pmrl~· Rfntrftmdrd edurnt ionnl progmm. Tn 1961', howrwr, thnt St:1fr mnrnclrd
it~ rclnr[ltionnl finnncc Bi:li utP to prrmit countir:< to c0llert addi1ioml fund~ lornlly and spend thosr amounts on it~ srhook Thetion.
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property for educational purposes has been recognized
in Texas at least since 1833.' 03 When shifts in the distribution of population, accompanied by changes in local
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills. was a product
of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of local
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
articulated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
rationnlc for that recent legi~latiYe choice is in~t l'llet i\'(• on the
before the Court toda~·:
"Under exiRting law, counties are precluded from doing an~·t hing
in this area, even to spend their own funds if the~· so de~ire. This
rorrecti\·e legislation if< urgent!~· needed in order to allow counties
1o go nbovc and beyond the State's standardR ancl pro\·idc edura1ional facilities as good as the people of the countie~ \\·:lilt and
arc willing to pa~· for. Allowing local communities to go nboYc
and beyond estnblished minimums provided for their people rncour:lges the best features of democratic gowrnment." Haw. Se~~. Laws,
Art. 38, § 1 (1968).
10 B See text accompanying n. 7, supra.
101 G. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State of
~cw York (192a).
For a thorough analy~is of the contribution
of these reformers and of the prior and f<Ub~equent history of educational finance , see J. Coon~ , \V. Clune & S. Snp:arman, su]n·a. n. 13,
at :30-95.
(]\le~t ion
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opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for
its child." 10 G
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality
of the Texas system of school finance. ·while assuring
a basic education for every child in the State, it permits
and encourages a large measure of participation and
control of each district's schools at the local level. In
an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward
centralization of the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived.
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Mn.
JusTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]irect control
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society."
!d., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed
that "fl]ocal control is not only vital to continued public
support of the schools. but it is of overriding importance
from an educational standpoint as well." !d., at 478.
The persistence of attachment to government a.t
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be ·
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
10

"

J. Coons, IY. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 1:), Forcward by
S. Colrman, at vii .

Jam c~
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X ation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." •on No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of vie\\"points and from a diversity of approaches
than does 1111blic education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the coutrary,
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely
because it does not provide the same level of local
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in
more equality in educational expenditures. ·while it is
110 doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with
respect to expenditures for some districts than for others,
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
" ·hich the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.
McGowan Y. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425- 426 (1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates th e State's goals. Dandridge '"· Williams, 397
U. R., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interests. " ·hile occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only
where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental rights must it be found to have chosen the least
restrictive altcrnative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330. 343 (1972). It is also " ·ell to remember that
even thos0 districts that have reduced ability to make
""' !1'r1c State lc r Co. v. Lribmmm , 2S.') F. S. 2()2, 21--0,

:~ 11

(19:32).
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free decisions with respect to how much they spend
on education, still retain under the present system the
prerogative to decide bO\\" available funds wj]l be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous
other decisions 'Yith respect to the operation of the
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of school finance, which place
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along
with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies.
Appellres further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it alJO\YS the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They see no juc::tifiration for a system that allows, as
they contend. the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political suhclivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation- indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that arc inevitably arbitrary.
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going
to be blessrcl with more taxable assets than others. Nor
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable \Yealth within any district may result from
any number of events, some of which local residents
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within
a district by various actions-public and private-of its
residents.
Moreover. if local taxation for local expenditure is an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then
it must be equally impermissible in providing other necessary services currently financed from local property
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taxes, including local police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total
abrogation of local property taxation and control as
"·oulcl follow from appellees' contentions.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures bet\.veen children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that
is without rational basis. Its shortcon1ings have been
acknowledged by Texas, and it has persistently endeavored-not 'vithout some success-to ameliorate the
differences in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local participation.
The Texas plan is not the result of wme hurried. illconceived legislation. It certainly is not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class.
On the contrary. it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69 - 70 (1913). One also must remember, "·hen 'veighing the issue of rationality. that the system here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State.
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for financing public education reflects "·hat many educators for
a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
\Ve are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and eclu-
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cational authorities in 49 States, especially where the
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no''"here yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether
there is a rational basis for the challenged state action.
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly meets this test.

IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on
the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. These decisions have been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major state legislative
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed. 107
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
107 ".Fi~cal neutrality" is tlw name givrn by Profe;;~or~ Coons, Clune,
and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of public education
mn,y not be a function of wraith othrr than the wraith of the ~tate
as a wbolr." J. Coons, vV. Clune & S. Suganmm, supra, n. 13, at 2.
Their thoughtful nnd imaginatiYr work pa,·ecl thr wa)· for the
suits, including thr pre~rnt one, attacking the sc hool fimmre ~)·:,;tC'm.
Inclcrd, t lw District Comt appro\·C'd t hr :l1lt hor~' t hr~i~ Yerbat im.
i337 F. Supp., at 28.5. The author:,; ha ,.r oft011 cant ionrd t brir ~up
]!ortrr~, ho\\·r,·C'r, [tgainst Rpcculating that •·fi~cal nrutralit)·" would
he a panacea for the poor or for racial minoritic,.;. Ibid.; Coon~,
Clune & Sugarman, r\ Fir::;t Apprai:-;al of S0rrano, 3 Yair He,·. of
L. & Soc. Aetion 111, 114-115 (1971).
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neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts havE>
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the:>
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from those initially assumed. 108 There is,
in particular, increasing concern as to whether the
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lm,·est income families who tend to reside in
urban areas ''"here the assesf'ecl value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas '"ere relied on by the
District Court.' ~ has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
0

11
" An~· nltrrnnti1·e th:1t
providr~ signifi('antl1· morr monr~· for
nn.1· major pNeentap;r of thr 8Uitr's ~<'hool s i~ crrtain to rtwotmtN
pol it irnl btnriNH. An.1· ~ueh nr11' plan "·ould rrquirr add it ionnl
rrsourcrs from ~omr ~ourcr: fund~ will ril hrr hnYr I o l>r ta krn
awn~· from morr proHprrou~ dist rirts or nr11· rrYrnuC' ~Olll'P<'" will
nrrcl lo br lnpprd. The former nltC'rnatiw i~ not JikC'l~· lo hr f'Upporlrd h~· lho~e di~trirt~ that hal'e ht'td the good fortunr to
haYr de,·rloprd attrnrtiYr rducntion farilitirs and progmm". Thr
l:lltrr nlternnti1·c, i. c., nrw tnxation , npprars to br no
morr pnlatab!C' polilicnll~· . It lw" brrn calrulntrd thai S2.4
billion of adclilionnl school funds would br rrquirrcl In bring
:til Trxn s di,.:tricts up to the prr~ rnt lrvd of rxprnditurr in all
hut the wrnlthirst di"trirt,.:-;m amount morr thnn douhlr thai
<'IIITPntl~· bcinp; sprnt in Trx~ts on public rducat ion (TC'XflH Rr,.:r:11·rlt
Lrnp;ur, supra. n. 20, at 16-18. i\t n tinw whC'n nr:1rl.1· rwr~· State
:md Joralit~· j,.: ;.:uffNing from fii<c:ll undrmomi~hment, :1nd 1rit h drmn nd,.: for ~C'ITicC';.: of nll kind,.: bml):roninl): and with \YC'fl r~· t nxjw~ ·rrH
:tlrrncl~· rr ~ i~ting tnx incrC'a,.:r" , t hrrc i,.: con;.:idrrn blr rr a ~on to
qurstion whethrr n rlrC'i~ion of thi,.: Court nullif~·ing prr~C'nt stntr
l:txinp; s~·s trm s would rr,ult in doubling public fund .-; commillrd
lo rdurntion.
10
H 8C'r 1111. 3S nnd 68 , supra.
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of educational finance." 0 That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-cxpcnd.itures alternative
to the present system. would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.11L
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the location of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools."~ Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chanc-e that racial minorities will be
clustered in school districts that have relatively less
assessable propcrty. 1 '"
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional function res.train us from undertaking through the
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state
taxation a.ncl education-subjects of great complexity
and vital concern to the States and localities. That
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the various States. and we do no violence to the values of feel110 Srlrct Comm. on Equal Edurntionnl Opportunit~ ·, Inrquitirs
in School Finnnrr (1972) (1\Tonogrnph prrpnrrd b~· Profrs~or Brrkr).
111
Srr nl~o U.S. Offirc of Education, Finanr·rs of L:trgr Cit~· Srhool
S.,·~trms: A Comparatiw Anal~·~ i~ (197:2) (HEW Publi(·ntion).
"~ Srr Notr, A Stati~tical Anal~·s is of thr School Fin:nlC'r Drrisions: On Winnin~ Battlrs nne! Losing 'N:trs, Rl Y:1lr L . .T. 1803
(1972): ~rr irxt nrcompnn~·in::.; n. -1-.5, Hupra.
11
~ Srr Golclstrin, su7Jra, n. 3R, nt 52o; C . .Trnck,, supra, n.
Sf\, at 27. .T. Coons, W. Clune & S. Su~arman. su]n·a. 11. 18 ,
nt 85o-:3.57 11. 47, hnw notre! that in Cnlifornia, for rxnmplr,
"59% of minorit ~· ~tudrnt s l ivc in cl i~t rid~ :1 bo\'C the mrclinn
a1·rra~r Y:lluation p<•r pupil." In Brxnr Coun1~· b: ' far ihr
l:lr~r~t
cli~trict-thr
San Antonio Tndrprndrnt School Di~
trirt-is nbovr thr local nwm~r in ho1h thr :-tmount of taxnblr
\l'r:-tlth prr pupil nnd in mrdian fnmil~' inconw . YC't 72% of its
stuclC'nts nrr Mrxiran-Amrricans. And , in 1967-1968 it spent on!~·
a vrr~· frw dollnrs lrss prr pupil thnn thr North East and North
Sidr Indrprndrnt School Di~trirt~, whirh hnw on]~· 7 % nnd 1S%
:\'Trxirnn-Amrricnn rnrollmrnt rrsprctiwl~·.
Brrkr , Cnrnnvnlr,
l\Tor~nn & Whitr, supm, n. 29, nt 67:l.
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eralism and separation of po\\'ers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax
systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new thinking as to public education IS necessary
~-......._....:a:::.·=
U::..:
re both a higher level of quality and greater
uniformity These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much
by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must
come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.
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This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants 2
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner

Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school.
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School District." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
~ The San Antonio Independent School Di~trict, whose name this
ca~e still brar::;, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area which were originally named as party drfendants.
After a pretrial conference, the District Court iHsued an order dismis~in~ the school districts from the case. Subsequently, thr San
Antonio Independent School Di ·trict has joined in the plaintiffs'
challenge to the State's school finance sy~tem and hns filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of thn t. position in thi~ Court.
1

197~

______
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of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court
was intpaneled in January 1969.'1 In December 1971 •
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam, opinion
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court.
I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools.G Early in its history,
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
a A thrre-judge court wa~ properly con\·encd and thrrc an• no
qur><tions a~ to the Di~triet Court's juri~dirtion or the dirrct nppralability of its judgment. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 1253.
'1 The trial wa~ drlaycd for two year~ to permit. extrn~i,· r pretrial
di~ro\·Ny and to allow completion of a pending Texa~ lrgi~latiYe
inw~tiga1ion concerning the need for reform of its public school
finaner s.'·"trm. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 3::!7
F. Supp. 280, 2il.5 11. 11 (WD Trx. 1971).
r. 337 F. Supp. 280. The Distriet Court ~tn~·ed ii~ mnnd:il<' for
two yrar~ to JH'O\·ide Texas an opportunit.'· io remedy the inequilirR
found in its financing program. The court, howc,·er, retained juri~
dic·t ion to fn~hion it;; own rrmrdial ordrr if the ::;tatr failrcl to offrr
an ncceptnble plan. !d., at 286.
"Trx. Con~t., Art. X,§ 1:
.. .\ grnrral difl'u~ion ot' kno\\'lrdp:r being e~~c·nl i:il to t hr prr~Nn\1 ion
of ibe rights and librrtie~ of the proplc it ~hall be the dut~· of the
Lrgi~lnturr of lhi~ Statr to makr ~uitablr pro, · i~ion for thr ~upport
and maintrnancr of public schools."
!d. , Art. X, § 2:
" The Legi~latme Hhall as rarly nH pmrl icahle rslnbli~h frrr s(·hool~
throughout thr Slate, and ~hall furnish mmn~ for thrir support, b~·
taxation on property."

r
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorern
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildillgs" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." ' Such local funds as were
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds.b The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854," was endo\\'ed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorern property tax and
other designated ta.xes, 11 served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State. ~
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State.' 3 Sizable differences
1

7

Tex. Const. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug;. 14, 1883.
Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.
D Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2
(interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor's Committre on
Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 ( 1969)
(hereinafter Go,·ernor's Committee Report).
10 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 5 (sec al~o the interpretive commentary);
V Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12.
11
The various sources of rcvemte for the Availablc School Fund
are catalog;ed in Texas State Bd. of Edur., Texas Statewide School
Adequacy Survey 7-15 ( 1938).
1
~ Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amrndcd, Nov. 5, 1918 (sec interpretive commentary).
13 I Governor's Committrc Report, at 35; Texas State Bd. of
Ednr., supm, n. 11, at 5-7; .J. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman,
8
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced.' 1 The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property bet\Yeen districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.' "
In due time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities.'a Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the
amount \Yas increased several times in the early 1940's."
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.' r>
Pri\·:tte Wraith aud Public Education 49 (1970): E. Cubberlry,
School Fund~ and Thrir Apport ionmrnt 21-27 ( 1905).
H H~ · 1940 one-half of th e Statr's population \\":t~ elu~trrrd in .itR
metropolitan rrntrr~. I Go\·rrnor's Committrr Rrport , at 3.5.
'" Gilmrr-Aikrn Committre, To HnYe '''hat We l\fu~t (194R).
l G R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (19.50) ; Trxa ~ Bel. of
Edur., wpra, n. 11.
' 7 n. Still, su pra. 11. 16, nt 12.
It should lw noted that during this
period the median prr pupil exprnditurr for all ~chools \\"ith all
rnrollment of more than 200 wa R approximatrly 1150 per ~· car .
During thi~ ~ame period n s un ·e ~· eondurtrd b~ · thr Stntf' Board
of Education concluded that "in Tcxn s the brst f'clu<"ntional nclvnn1ngcs offered b~ · the State at prr~rnt ma~· br lwei for the mcdinn
cost of .';.52.67 p er ~·enr rwr Jlupil in nvrrage dail.\· nttcndnncc ."
Trxa ;; Stntr Bel. of Educ· .. supm, n. 11 , nt 56.
" 1 Gcncr~1l L n \1'~ of Trxns, 46th Legi~. , Hrg. Sr~s. 19:-!9. at 274
(~22 .5 0 p r r ~tudrnt): Grnrral & Sprr. La\\'~ of Trxa~. -+~th L<'gi~ .,
Reg. Se~~. 1948, c. Hil , nt 262 ($25.00 JlC'I' studrn1).
"' Grnrml & Sprr. Ln ~rs of T rxas , 49th Lrgis ., Rrg. Sr~~. 1945,
r. 5:3, nt 75.
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Recogni1.ing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In Hl47 an 18-membcr committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome intcrdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. ~" It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas."'
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 807c of the Program and the school districts
arc responsible- as a unit- for providing the remaining
20<;'o . The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-

"° For n romplrtr hi~ tor~· of thr adoption in Trxa~ of n found:-~
tion program , ~rr H . Stills, supra . n. Hi. Srr : tl~o Y Go,·rmor's
Committ~~ Rrport , nt H; TrxaR Rr~rarch Lragur, Publir Srhool
Finanrc Problrms in Trxns 9 (IniNim Rrport 1972) .
21
For thr 1970-1971 ~choo.l ~·r:-~r thi~ ~t:-~tc aid pro~~:mm arrountcd
for 4R.O% of all public S('hool fumk Local taxation rontributcd
41.1 % :mel 10.9% was pro,· idee! in frd('rnl funds. Texa s Rr~('arrh
Lcnp;ur, supra, n . 20, :-~t 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing. mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property
in the State. 22 Each county's assignment is then divided
among its sehool districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county.:!:l The
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels bet>veen school districts by plaeing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children 24
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.2" Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
V Governor'~ Committee Report, at 44-48.
At present there arc 1.HH ~chool di~tricts in Texas. Texas Rcr:;rarrh League, supm, n. 20, at 12.
"'' In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committre found that some school
Ji~tricts were not levying any local tax to support education.
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, nt 16. The Texas State
Board of Education Sm'\'cy found 1hat over 400 common and
independent Rrhool districts were levying no local property tax in
1935-1936. Texas State l3d. of Educ., supm n. 11, at 39-42.
:Jr. Gilmer-Aikm Committee, supra. n. 15, at 15.
22
2"
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
5009'o. 2 n In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 28 Minimum
teacher salaries--by far the largest single item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years. 2 "
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90o/o of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6o/o
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the·
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district conI Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2.
28
In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupil
expenditure for all current operating expcn~e~ increa~;ed from $206
to S-W3. In that ~-<arne period capital exprnditurc:; increased from
84-l to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Committee ReporL, at 5:3-54.
'2 " III Governor':; Committee Heport, at 113-146; Berke, CarmtYale, l\Iorgan & White, The Texas Sc-hool .Finance Ca~e: A Wro11g
in Search of a Remedy, 1 .T. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 ( 1972).
:w The family income figures arc ba:;ed on 1960 cen:;us statii:ilics_
26

27

..
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19671068 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248.~' Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil." 2
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted "·ith the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo, having only 18% Mexican-Americans
and less thau 1% Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49,000 :'"and the median family income
The Antilnble School Fnnd, trrhnicnll~·, providr~ a Hrrond
of ~laic mom·~·. That Fund ha~ eonl"inuPd as in _,·rar~ past
(~er tPxt nccompan.vin~ nn. 16-19, SU]Jra) to distribute nnifor.m
per pupil grnnl;;: to c1·rr.\· di~trict in the StntP. ln 19GS !hi~ Fnnd
allollrd $9S prr pupil. I-Iom:n·er, becau~e thP Antilablr Sehool
Fund contribution iH alwn_, - ~ ~uhtraetrd from rt di~tric•l's entitlement under the Foundnlion Progr:un, it pla~·s no Ri~nificnnt role
in rduralional finnncr toda~·.
ll ~ \Vhilr frclerul as~i..;lamc has ::tn amrlior:rlin~ rffrrl on the cliffrrrn<'e in ~rhool budgets between "·rallhy ;mel poor di~trict~ , the
Di~trict Court rc.iectrd an argument madr by thr Stair in that
court, that il should con~idN the effect of the frdrral gnmt in
assp~~ir1g tlw discrimination ela.im. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State
ha~ not renewed that contention here.
'"'A map of Bexar Connl.v inclnded in the rrrord ~how~ that
Edgewood :mel Al::tmo Hright~ nrc among the Rtmllr~t cli~tric• ts in
the rount~· and nrc of approximate!~· equal ~ir.c. Yet, as the figure~
a bo1·r indicate , Edgewood',; ~tnc!Pnt popul~ttion is more 1han four·
times that of Alamo Heights. Thi~ factor ob1·iou~ly accounts for
a ~ignifirant prn·rntagc of the diffNrncPs brt\\'('rn tlw two cli~tricts
in prr pupil pro]wrt ~' Y:tiup...; :1 nd ('xpcnditmrs. If Alamo Heights
had as mnn~· studrnt~ to Pclncatp n~ Edgewood dor~ (22,000) its per
pupil :Jf'Scsscd property value wonlcl be npproximatcl~r $11,100 rnthcr
than $49,000, and it" per pupil expenditures would therefore hav('
bern considerably lowrr.
"

1

~Ollt"('e

'.
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is $8,001. In 1967-1068 the local tax rate of $.8:5 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1067- 1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakclo\\'n for each category of aid,"' more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aiel has been
significant. For the 1070-1071 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood \\'aS
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 627r increase over
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state
aiel alone in 1970-Hl71 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budget-from local, state, and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil."" These
'" Thr fi!l:nrrs qnotrd abo,·r Yflr.v ~light!.'· from tho~r utilizrd in
the Di:<trict Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 7R2. Thrsc 1ri,·inJ
diffrrrttcrs nrr nppa rrntl~· n product of that ronrt '~ rrliance on
;;light!~· diffrrrnt st:1tist ical dnta 1han we hnw rrl ird upon.
~r. Although t hr Foundation Program has mnde ~ignificantl~· grratrr
contributions to both school di~tricts o\·er thr. b8t sc,·rrnl ye:us, it
is npparrnt that Alamo Brights hns rn.ioyrd 11 lnrger !l:nin. Th<'
;;:i?.:~ble diffrrrner brtwrrn thr Alamo Bright~ nnd Edgrwood grnnt~
is dur to the <'mphnsis in the Stnte's tdlocntion formula on the
gunrantrrd minimum snl:uirs for trarhrrs. Higher salaries nrr
gnarnntrrd to trachrr~ having more yenrs of rxperi!'n<'C and possessing more ad,·mwed dr!!:I'C'<''. ThC'rcfore, Alamo Brights , which
hns n greater J)('rcentagr of CX]Writ'nrrd prr~onnel with ndYanced
clrgr<'r<', recci,·rs more ~tat<' support. In this rrgnrd the Texns
Program is not unlike that pre~rntl:v in existrnre in a number of
ot.hrr StntrR. C. Coon~ , W. Clunr, R. Sugarman, su7n·a. n. 13, at
68-12ii. Bt'cnu;;:r more dollnrs htl\·e brcn given to districts that
[t]rr:td~· Rpencl morr per pupil, such Foundation formulas haYe been
dt'srribcd ns "nnti-equalizing." Ibid. The formuln,, however, is
nnti-rqualizing only if Yicwrd in absolute trrms. The percentage
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights. because of its relative property wealth,
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20%
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
grant.~
It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial interclistrict
disparities in school expenditures fom1d by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State, 38 still exist. And it was
6

disparity betwecn the two Texa~ districts is diminished sub:::tantially
by State aid. Alamo Heights dcrived in 1967-1968 almost 13 times
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State aid
!J;rants to each di~trict in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to llPJ1roximately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice
as much money to spend pcr pupil from its combied State and local
rcsources.
10
'
Texas Research Leaguc. supra, n. 20, at 13.
17
' The Economic Index, which determine~ each county's share of
the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a romplrx formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program wa~ in:-;titutcd.
See text at pp. - - - supra. It has frequently been suggested
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered in several respects
to provide a more accurate rrflection of local taxpaying ability,
cRpecially of urban school~. V Governor's Committee Report, at
48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, supm, n. 29 at 680-681.
"'The Di~;trict Court relied Oil the findings pre;,<rntrd in an
nffidavit submitted by Profesi>or Berke of Syracuse. IIis :-;ampling
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct correlation
betwren the amount of a district's taxable property and its level
of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct correlation
bctwccn a district's median family income and per pupil expendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the·
amounts of money collected through local property taxation , that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'·
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
T exas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
337 F. Supp., at 282.
Finding that wealth is a
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun-·
damental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it was premised upon some compellingtun'S as well as an inverse correlation between percentage of minorit ie;: and expenditures.
Cat egorized by Equalized Propert y Valu e~,
M edian Family Income, and Stat e-Local Revenue

Mark et Value
of Taxable
Property
Per Pupil
Above $100,000
( 10 Districts )
$100,000- S50,000
(26 Districts )
$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
( 40 Districts )
Below $10,000
(4 Districts )

-r:j

Median
Family
In come
From 1960

Per Cent
Minority
Pupils

State &
Local
R evenues
Per Pupil

S5,900

8%

$815

$4,425

32%

$544

$4,900

23%

$4R3

$5,050

31 %

$462

$3,325

79 %

S305

Although the correlations with respect to family income and race
appear onl~· to exist at the extremes, and although the affia nt 's
methodology ha s been ques tioned (Ree Golds tein , lntrrdistrir t
Inequalities in School Financing ; a Critical An a l ys i ~ of Serrano v.
Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rrv. 50-l, 523-525 nn . 67 :111d
71 (1972)) , in::;ofar as any of thrse
corrrlations is rrleYant
to the constitutional thesis presented in this ea ~e we may arC'
it ~ basic thrn ~ t. For a defen He of the reli a bilit~r of the affid:wit , ~ rc
Berke, Carnantlc, Morgan & Whitr, supm, n . 29.

G-

·'
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state interest. !d., at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
!d., at 284.
Texas virtua.Uy concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not \\"ithstand
the strict judicia1 scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights ~n or that
1
- "~" 1011.$
wolve suspect classifications.•'' If. as l.\"C have f~- f> >- 4- V\O I),S ~
~-uently-~Tefi, strict scrutiny means that the State's system h ,._v ~ 1 nd tca.+~cl
s not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives. and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives.' 1 the Texas
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection.'''"
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" 4 " and "imperfections." 11 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes

[j

::"E. fl., l'olice Dept. of the City of Chicano 1". Mosley. -J.OS 1.'. R.
92 (1972); Dunn Y. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 3:30 (1972); Sha]Jiro Y.
'l'hompson, 39-t U.S. 619 (1969).
10
" E. fl .. Graham 1". RichardMm, 40:3 U. R. 30.') (1971): Loz•ino Y.
l"iroinia, 388 U. 8. 1 (1967); Mr-Lauohlin \". Florida. :~79 U. R. 184
(1964).
11
Srr Dunn 1". Blumstein. 405 ll. S. 3:30, 343 (1972), :1nd the
ca~r~ collrclecl i herrin.
'" Apprllant~· Brirf, at 11.
·"' Ibid.
4 1
' Tr. of Oral Arl!:., at 3.

1
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.
\Ye must decide. first, whether the Texas system of
financing public education must be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. lf so, the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational
basis must be considered.
II

The District Court's opinion docs not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finanee.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and
appellate processes,"" and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote.w Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned. based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education,'" that there is a
fundamental right to education and that. absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional aualysis
"·'E. (! .. Griffin \'. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (195G): Douolas v. California. 372 U.S. 353 (19G3).
''" Ilarwr v. Brl. of Elations, 383 U.S. GG3 (1964): M!"Donald v.
Bd. of Elrctions. :39-l U.S. 802 (19G9); Bullock Y. Carter, -l05 U. S.
1:3.J.(1972)) xJoo~I.Jv
"' Sec ra~es cited in text., at -,infra.

1

_

CI.L_ (1 '173) .

A

The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and iby several other courts that have

48/
recently struck down school financing laws in other States,
is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination
heretofore reviewed by this Court.

Rather than focusing

on the unique features of the alleged discrimination,
the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their
a

findings of/suspect classification

through a simplistic

two-step process of analysis• since, under the traditional
schools,
systems of financing public ld41iiidj some poorer
c
people releive less expensive educations than other more

ill

affluent people, these systems discrimiate on the basis
of wealth.

This approach largely ignores the hard

a-

threshold questions, including whether it makes aay
A

differencel for purposes of consideration under the
0

Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "pi'or"
cannot be identified or

def~~o~~ms,
1\

ajnd

whether the relative rather than absolute nature of the

A
asserted deprivation is

·~

of t~~quence.
A.

Before a

State's laws and the justifications for the classifiiications
they create are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny,
we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed
more closely than they were in the court below.

·.

L

50

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTHTCT v. RODRIGUEZ

trality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed. 110
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be sus11ected that the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from those initially assumed.m There is,
110 "Fisc:1llH'utrnlit)'" is the n:nne gi,·en bv Profe.~s or~ Coons, Clune,
nnd Sugarman to their thesis that " the (]Unlit)· of puhlie education
may not be a func·tion of \\'e:1lth other tlwn the wealth of the state
as a whole." J. Coons, 'iV. CluJJC' & S. Sugnrman, supra., n. 13, :1t 2.
Their tho11ghtful :1nd imagimti1·e work pa1·ed tlw W:t)' for the
suits, inrluding tlw pre~ent one, :1tt:1rking the school fin:\llce ~~·stC'm.
Tncleed, the Di~trirt Court npprovrd the :~ulhor,.;' t hrsi~ Yerhntim.
337 F. Supp., at 2S5. The author~ haYe often raul ioncd tlwir supportC'r..:;, hO\\'C'VC'r. against spC'rubting th:tt " fi scal neutralif~·" would
h0 a panacea for the poor or for raci:1l minoril ic·~. !bid.: Coon~ ,
C'lune & Sugarman, A .Fir~t Apprais:~l of Serrano, :3 Y:t!C' He'\'. of
L . & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971).
111
Any alternatin· thai 11rovidr~ ~ignifirantl)' more mom'~' for
an~' major prrrent:1ge of tlw State's schools is rminin to C'ncmmtrr
political barrier~. AnY such nrw plan would rC'CJUire ncldit ion a!
resources from some 801li'CC': funds will cit h0r hn \'C i o lw takC'n
nw:~y from more prospcron~ districts or nC'w rC'n•mtC' sourer~ will
need to be tapped. The former altrrnati\"C' is not !ikC'IY to br ~up
ported by those districts thnt haw h:~d th0 good fortnnc to
haw developC'd at tr:1ctiw educ:~tion faeilitirs and programs. 'The
latter altern:1ti1·e, i. c.. llC'"' tnxation, apprarR to lw no
more palat::tble pol it ira II)'.
It hns lwrn ralculated i hat S2.4
billion of add it ionnl Rrhool fnnds wonld bC' required to bring
nll Texas districts up to thr pr0~rnt lew! of expenditure in all
hut. the wrnlthi0st cli~trict~-an amount more than clonhle 1hn.t
eurrently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Rr~earrh
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lo\\'est income families v. ·ho tend to reside in
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke. whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas ''.:ere relied on by the
District Court, 112 has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance." " That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas. 114
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the location of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools.m Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
Lea!J:ue, supra, n. 20. :1t. 16-18. At a t imr whrn nrarl~· evrr:v flt:1tr
and localit~· is snfTering from fisc:1l undrrnonrishment , and with demands for sen· ires of :til kindR burgroning :1nd with weary tnxpa~·cr~
already resisti ng t:1x increases, thrre is considerable reason to
C(twstion whether a drci~ion of t hi;; Court. nullif~·ing present state
taxing s:vstems would rr~ult in doubling publir· fund~ committed
to cduc:ltion.
An amir1ts rurial' hrirf filed on brhnlf of almost :m
State~, focu~ing on these prac1ir:tl ronsef)ucnrcs, claims with some
justification that "ench of the undcr,igned states . . . would suffer
~r1·ere finanrin l stringency." Brief of A min: Cu1'ine in Support. of
Appellants, nl 2 (filed A1t. Gen. of l\fd., et nl.).
112
See nn. 38 and 63, supra.
113
Select. Corum. on ECJu:ll Edurat ional Opportunity, Incqnitie:
in School Finance (1972) (~Tonograph preprrred bY Profe:::~or Berke).
114
Sec al~o U.S. Offirc of 'Education, FinanreR of Lar~e City School
f;y~tems: A Comparat iYe Anal~·~i~ (1972) (HEW Publif':tlion).
nr. Sre Kotc, A Statistical Annl~·~i;: of the Srhool Finanre Derisions : On Winning BattleH nne! Lo~ing Wars, 81 Yale L .•J. 1303
(1072); see text aeromp:tn~·ing 11. 4.'5, supra.

71-1332-0PINION
52

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT

1>.

RODRIGUEZ

clustered in school districts that have relatively less
assessable property. 110
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional function restrain us from undertaking through the
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity
and vital concern to the States and localities. That
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax
systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These
matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed much by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions much come from the lawmakers
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.
116
Sec Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 526; C. Jencks, supra, n.
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugrmm.n, supra, n. 13,
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example,
"59% of minority students live in districts abo,•e the median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School District-is above the !oral average in both the amount of taxable
wealth per pupil and in median family imomc. Yet 72% of its
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North Eust and North
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18%
Mexican-American enrollment respectively.
Berke, Carnrrvale,
Morgrrn & White, supra, n. 29, at 673.
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type already set. Note that each footnote
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except notes 48-51, which are clipped onto
the end of the section.
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL.
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financingpublic education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner·
Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school.
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School District." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
2
The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name this
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants.
After a pretrial conference, the District Court is~ued an order dismissing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San
Antonio Independent School District has joined in the plaintiffs'
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of that position in this Court.
1
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of Education, the State Attorney General. and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court
\\·as impaneled in January 1969." In December 1971 4
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional
under tho Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted probable .i urisdiction to co11sider tho far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court.
I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into tho Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools. 6 Early in its history,
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
"A thrre-judgr court wa~ proprrl)· con1·rnrd and tlwrr arr no
qur;;tion.-; a~ to thr Di~triet Court'~ juri~diction or thr dirr('( ap]>l'alability of ih .iuclgmrnt. 28 F. R. C. §§ 2281, 1253.
'Thr trial was drla~·pc[ for two yrars to pNmit exten ~ i1· l' prrtrial
di~rovrr~· and to i~llow complrt ion of a prnding Tex.L> l('gi~lat i1·p
illi'C'~ti:wtion ronrrrning the nerd for rrforrn of its public school
finanrr ::;~·~trm. Rodriouez Y. San A11tonio Ind. Sl'hool Dist .. :~37
V Rupp. 2RO, 2R.'i 11. 11 (WD Trx. 1971).
" :3:37 F. Supp. 2SO. The DiHtrict Court st:1~·ed itK nmnd:IIP for
two ~·<':HH to providP TPxa~ an opportunit ~· to remedy the i1wqnit i<•s
found in it~ financing program. The court, howci·('J', rC'taincd .imi~
dict ion to fa:-;hion it..: own rrmcdial ordrr if the Rt :ll c failrd to offer
:tn n<•cppt:1blr plan. Id .. :11 2~o.
(;Tex. Con~t ., Art. X, § 1:
' ' ,\ g;cnrral difl'u~ion ol knowlrdgc bring e~"<·nti:1l to thr prc~<·n· at ion
of thr right~ and lilwrtic" of the proplr it "hall br the clut~· of the
Legislature of this Statr to make suitable JH'OI'i"ion for thr support
:1nd maintrnancc of public schoob."
!d., Art. X, § 2:
''The Lcgi ..:lature shall as carl~· as pract irablc r~t[1bli"h frrr S<"hooh'
throughout the State, and shall furnish means for their support, by
taxation on proprrty."
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schools. relying on mutual participation by the local
school districts and tlw State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
taxes '"ith the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school builclittgs" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds.' The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854." 'ms enclo\\Wl with millions of acres of public land
set aside to a:;:;ure a continued source of income for
school support."' The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes.'' served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State. 1 "
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth \\'Pre spread
relatively evenly across the State.'a Sizable differences
Tex. Con~t. lR76, Art. 7, §a, ns :mtenclrcl, Aug. 14, 11-\, :~.
'Trx. Con~i ., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4. 5.
!! Canmld'~ L:1ws of T(·xa~. p. ll7R.
Sre Trx. C011Rt., Art. 7, §§ 1, Z
(intrrpreti1·r rmllmentarir~); T Heport of G01·ernor'~ Committee on
l'uhlic School Education, The Chnllrnp;r and the Chanrr 27 (Hlf\9)
(berri:naftN Go\'(~rnor'H Committee Report).
10
TPx. Con~t ., Art. 7, § 5 (~PP nbo t hP int rrprrti1·e comment:n~·);
'i' C:ow•n1or'i> Committee Report, nt 11-12.
11
Thr vnriou~ ~omreR of rr1·rmtr for the AYailnblr School Fund
:tre ratalop;ecl in Trxa~ Statr Brl. of Edur., Trxas Statewide Rrhool
Adeqnnr.1' Run·r~r 7-15 ( 193R).
12
Trx. Con~t., Art. 7, § 3, as :unrnclrcl, Nov. 5, 1918 (Her interprrtivr commentar~·).
": 1 Co\'C'rnor's Committee Re]Jort, at 35; Texns State Bel. of
Edur., supm, n. 11, at 5-7; J. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sup;arman,
7
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronouncecl. 14 The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education!"
In due time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities. 11; Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's/8
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946. 10
Private Wraith and Public Education 49 (1970); E. Cubbrrley,
School Fundti and Their Apportionmrnt 21-27 (1905).
11
By 1940 one-half of the State'~ populntion wa~ clu:>trrrd in its
mrtropolitan renterti. I Governor's Committee Rrport, at 35.
Jr. Gilmer-Aiken Committre, To Have What We l\Iust (1948).
JG R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950); Texas Bd. of
Educ., supra, n. 11.
17
R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. It should be noted that during this
pNiod the mrdian per pupil expenditure for all schools with an
enrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year.
During this same period a survry conducted by 1hr f'tatr Board
of Education concluded that "in Trxas the best educational advantages offrred by the State al presrnt may be had for the median
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average daily attendance."
Texas State Bd. of Edur., supra, n. 11, at 56.
tH 1 Gener:.tl Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 19:39, at 274
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Trxas, 48th Lrgis.,
Hrg. Srss. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per student).
10
General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg. Sr~~. 1.945,
c. 53, at 75.
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 20 It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas. 21
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 805'(1 of the Program and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20<jc. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com2
°For a complete hi~tory of the adoption in Texas of a foundation program, ~ce R. Still~, supra, n. 16. Sec al~o V CoYernor's
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research League, Public School
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972).
21
For the 1970-1971 school year this :;tate aid program accounted
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation co11tribULed
41.1% and 10.9% was provided in federal fund~. Texm; HPsParch
League, supra, n. 20, at 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent. considers each county's share of all property
in the State.t" Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county."a The
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children 24
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources."5 Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well
as local sources--have increased steadily. Between 1949
22

V Governor's Commit tC'r TIPport. nt 4.J.-4S.
""At prc.~C'n( thC'rC' arr 1,Hil ~t'hool di~trirtl' in Tcxa!'. Tr.xa:; Re-·
~-;mrrh LrnguC', s1tpm. n. 20. :1t 12.
4
" In 194S the GilmC'r-Aikt•n Cormnittrr found th:1t ~omc :;chool
di~trirts wPrr not ley~·in)! an~· lora! t:1x to support rduc:\1 ion.
Gilmcr-Aikrn Committrr. supm. n. 15, nt Hi. Thr Trxas State
Bo:~rd of Education Sm\'l'~· found th:1t o1·C'r 400 common :1nd
incleprndent, school di~t rirt~ ll'f'I'C' Ir,·ying no lor:ll proprrty tnx in
1985-1981l. Toxao; St.1to Bel. of Eclnr., supra n. 11, at 39-42.
5
:! Gilmcr-Aikrn Commiltrc, 81/pra, n. 15, at 15.
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19G7 expenditures increased by approximately
In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion"' and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil e,.,xpenditures throughout the State."R Minimum
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years.""
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains. the plaintiff school district
may be compared "·ith another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elcmentnry and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are prcdominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90';0 of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6%
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,9GO-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.~ At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district con500 ]'o .~r.

0

I GoYcrnor's Committee Urport, at 51-53.
TcxnH Rr~rnreh Lrflguc, supra. n. 20, nt 2.
28
In the ~-m rs brtwren 19-1-0 nnd 19fi7 the n\·erngr prr pupil
exprnditurr for nil cmrcnt oprrnting r:q)('n:-:r,.: inr:·rn:-:ed frnm 8206
to $403. In that ~amc period rnpit:1.l CXJX'nditurr~ iucrra"Pd from
S44 to $102 ])('r pupil. I Govrrnor',; Committrc Heport, at 5:~-54.
20 III Governor's Committee Report, aL 113-146; Brrkc, CnrmYalt', Morgan & Whitr, Thr Tcx:\S SC'hool Finnnrc ca~r: A Wrong
in SrarC'h of :1 Rrmccly, 1 .J. of L. & Educ. o59. 6Rl-6, 2 (19i2).
""Tho fnmily income figurr.; arc bnsecl on 1960 census statistirR.
20

27
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19671968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248.~ Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupiV~
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contr·asted with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo. having only 18% Mexican-Americans
and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49,000 '1" and the median family income
1

:n The Availablr School Fund, trcll!licall~·, providr~ rr H<'rond
source of state monr:·. That Fund has continued as in ymrs past
(src text accompan.\·ing llll. 16-19, supra) to distribute uniform
prr pupil grant::: to e\"Pr~· district in the State. In 196.S this FH11d
allotted $M prr pupil. Howrn'r, becausr the A Yailablr School
Fund contribution is alwa~·s subt raclcd from a distrirt's entitlcmrnt. under the Foundation Program, it 11lays no significant role
in edurat ional finance toda~·.
~ 2 While fpdrral as~i;;tancr has an ameliorating effect on the di!Trrenre in school budget~ brtwern wealthy and poor di~tricts, the
District Court rejrcted an ar.g ument made by the Stn tc in that
comt thflt it should consider the effect of the federal grant in
as:;rssing tho discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State
haH not renewed that contention here.
~ 3 A map of Bexar Count:.' included in i hr record shows that
EdgC'wood and Alamo HeighlH arr among the smallC'::;t cliHtrict~ in
the county and are of approximately equal size. Y ct, aH thr figurcH
above indicate, Edgewood'~ studrnt population is more than four
timrs that of Alamo Heights. Thi::; factor obviom;l~, accounts for
a significant percentage of the differences between the two diHtricts
in per pupil property ya]ues and exjwnclitures. If Alamo Heights
had as many students to cducatr ns Edgewood does (22,000) its per
pupil assessed property value would be npproximately $11,100 rather
than $49,000, and its per pupil expenditnrcs would therefore have
been considerably lower.
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1967- 1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid,a1 more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62o/o increase over
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state
aid aJone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budget--from local, state, and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil.'15 These
'1 J Thr figurrs quoted above vary slightly from those utilized in
the Di~trirt Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782. These trivial
differenres arc apparently a product of that court's reliance on
slightly different statistical data than we have rrlied upon.
35 Although the Foundation Prcgram has mncle significantly greater
coni rihutions to bo1 h school districts over the last several years, it
is apparent that Alamo Heights ha s en,ioyed a larger gain. The
sizable difference brtween the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Higher salaries are
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and possessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Heights, which
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced
degrees, receive:> more State support. In this regard the Texas
Program is not unlike that presently in existence in a number of
other States. C. Coon:>, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to districts that
already spend more per pUJlil, such Foundation formula~ have been
described as "anti-equa lizing." Ibid. The formul:.L, however, is
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms. The percentage
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their om1 required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth,
vvas required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20%
of its Foundation grant.. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
gra.nt."" It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State,aH still exist. And it was
dispnrity hetweon thr two Te:ms districts is diminished substnntially
Alamo Heights dcriYed in 1967-1968 almost 13 times
as much money from loeal iaxcs as Edgewood did. The State aid
grants to c.'leh distriri in 1970-1971 lowrred thr ratio to approximately two to one , i. c., Alamo Hrip;hts had a little mow than t1Yice
as mnrh mon.ry to sprnd per pnpil from its rombicd State and local

by Rtnte aid.

rr s ourc e.~.

'"'Texas Resmrch Lcagur. su7n·a, 11. 20 , at 18 .
11
'
The Econom ic Index, wllirh cleterminr" rach county'~ share of
i he total Local Fn11d As.,;igmucni , is basrd on a rom]llex form11la
eonreiYcd in 1949 when thr Foundation Program wa~ in"tit ntrd.
Roc text at pp. - - - supra. It hn s frrqnrni 1~, horn sug~rc~i eel
h~· Texas re~m.rrher~ i hat thr formnla hr alterrcl in l"rveral rrspeets
to proYide :1 more arrurntc rrflrction of local taxpaying ability,
l'Sperially of urban school:.:. V Govrrnor's Committee Report', nt
48; Brrke, Carncm1.lr , ~forgan & iYhitr, supra, n. 29 nt 680-681.
:;s The D iHtrirt Court relied on the finding:-; pre:.;ented in nn
nffid rtv it submitted by Profr:.;:-;or Berke of R~Taru,r. HiH :.;amplillg
of 110 Texas srhool cli"t ricts dcmonstraied a direct rorrclntion
between 1hr amount of a cli<;trict's taxable Jlroprrt~' and its len!
nf ]Jrr pupil rxprnditmr. His study also found n dirrrt rorrrl:ttion
hetwcrn a district's median family income and per pnpil rxpcudi-

..
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
Finding that wealth is a
337 F. Supp., at 282.
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it was premised upon some compelling
turrs as wrll ns an inverse corrrlntion bet wrrn prrrentnp;c of minorii irs and rxprnd it 11 res.

Catrgorized b.v Eqnnlized Propcrt~· Yalue~,
Median Family Tncome, nnd State-Local Revenue

M at'ket Y alve
of Taxable
Property
Per Pupil
Abo\·r S100.000
( 10 Districts)
~ 100 ,ooo-s.'Jo
(26 Di~trirt s)
$!i0,000-S:30,000
(~0 Districts)
$:30,000-510.000
(40 Districts)
Brlow $10,000
(4 Districts)

,oon

111 edian
Family
lnf'ornr
fi'm111 I !1(,'0

Per Cent
Minoril!t
Pupils

State &
Local
Revenues
Per Pupil

M,900

S%

$815

M,425

:~2%

$544
$483

$4,900
85,050

31%

S4G2

1;3.32.)

79%

S305

Although tlw correlations with resprrt to familY incomP nnd rnrc
appen.r on!~· to exist nt 1he extremes, and nlthongh the affinnt 's
mt>thodolog~· hns been que~tioned (~ee Goldstein, Jnterdistrict
Inrqualitirs in School Financing; a Critical Anah·si;.; of Srrrano v.
Priest and its Progrny. 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 523-525 nn. 67
and 71 (1972)), insofnr a~ nny of thrse rorrelntions is relevant
to the constitut.ionnl tht>,;;i~ presentrd in this cnse we mny accept
itR bn.sir thmHt. For a. dcfen~e of the reliabilit~, of the affidavit, sec
Berke, Camayn.Je, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29.

71-1~82-0PINION

SAN A?\TONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. HODRTGUEZ

12

state interef':t. I d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court
concluded that "[n]ot only arc defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
Id., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights :l9 or that
involve suspect classifications. 10 If, as previous decisions
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives.'11 the Texas
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 12
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" ~ and "imperfections," '' the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
4

30

E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.

92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
10
'
E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971): Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (19G7); McLaughlin v. Florida. ~79 U. S. 184
(1964).
41
Sec Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 34:3 (1972), and the
cases collected therein.
42
Appellants' Brief, at 11.
"' Ibid.
1
· • Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3.

'<
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of
financing public education must be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational
basis must be considered.
II

The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and
appellate processes/" and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote:a Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education, 47 that there is a
fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4
c Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1964); McDonald v.
Bd. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S.
134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser,- U. S . - (1973).
41
See cases cited in text, at-, infra.
45
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The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing Jaws in other
States,18 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination ]wretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the
traditional systems of financing public school~::. some
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other
more affluent people, these systems diecriminate on the
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard
thre~hold questions. including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms.
and vYhether the relative-rather than absolute-nature
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court
below.
The case comes to us with no definitive description of
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs. and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which
the discrimination claimed here might be described.
" 8 '' 1Ta?W Y. Priest. 96 Cal. Tiptr. ()01, 4~7 1'. 2d 1:2·1-1, 5 C'nl.
:)d 1)~4 ( 1971) ; Von Dusarlz Y. II at field. ::;:N F. Supp. ~70 (]\[inn.
1971); Robinson ,.. Cahill. US ?\ . .T. Snpn 22:3, 2~7 A. 2d 1~7
(1972); Mil/il,·en v. Green. No. 54,809 ("\fich. 8. C., .Tan.-, 197~:!).
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The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as
discriminatory (1) against "poor" persons ·whose incomes
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 19 or
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others,"0
or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in rclati vely poore1·
school districts."' Our task must be to ascertain whether,
in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate
on ~1J1Y of these possible bases and, if so, whether the
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as sus'"In tbrir rompl:1int. appellrr~ purported to reprr~cnt a cla~s
composed of prr~ons who are " poor " nnd who rc."iclr in l'rhool dis1ricts having a " low Yn lu r of prOJ1C'rt~• ." Third Amrnclrd Complaint,
App., at 14. Yet apprllrrs h:tvr not clrfinrd thr term "poor" with
rrfr rrnce to ::m.v ab~olutr or funetional lrvrl of imperunity. See
text infra, at - . Sre a l ~o Appcllre~· Brief, at 1, 3; Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 20-21.
r.o Appcllrrs' proof nt t ri:tl foru~rcl on romp:nntivr cliffrrrncrs in
fnmil .v in co mrs hrl wern rr~idcnt~ of wr:dt h~· nnd poor di~t rirts. They
rndr:wored, nppnrrntl~·. to show thnt ihNc rxist~ a dirrrt ron·elation
hetwrcn prri'on:tl fmnily income and rdurntionn l C'XpC'nciitures . Sec
tC'xt infm, nt - -. The Di ~ trict Court mn~· hnvC' been rel~·ing on
this notion of rC'lati,·c cli~rriminntion ba~rd on family wealth. Citing
npprllcr;;' s tnti~tical proof. tlw comt rmphnsizrd thnt "those disriels most rich in propcrt~ · also hnvr the hip;hrst median income ...
while the j)Oor property districts nrr poor in income .... " 337 F .
Supp., at 282.
1
" At oral nrgumrnt and i11 their brid, :tpprl!C'r~ s ug;gr~t
that
drscription of the per~onnl status of the rrsidrnts in dic;tri<"ts that
sprnd le~ s on rducation is not critirnl to their rase. In their ,.iC'""•
the Texas s~·;o;tem i~ imprrmi ~sihly di~criminntor~ · C'I"C'n if relativrly
poor districts do not contain poor pcoplr. Amwll rrs' BriC'f, at 43-44;
Tr. of Oral Arg., at. 20-21. Thrrc arr indications in the District
Court opinion thnt it adopted this theory of district discrimination.
The opinion repeatedly emphas izes the eomparntive financial ~t:ttuR
of di~trict s and carl~' in the opinion it drscribrs appcllers' class as
bring comJ10~rd of " all .. . childrrn throughout Trxas who live in
school disi ricts with low properl~· valuation~." 337 F. Supp., at 282 ..
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pect. It is, after all, the first function of courts. " ·hen
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause, to examine
the classifications drawn by state laws.
The several precedents of this Court relied upon
by appellees and the court below provide the proper
starting point. The individuals or groups of individuals who constitutC'd the class discriminated against in
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny," 2 the Court invalidated state la \YS that prevented indigent criminal
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigcncy, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been slwwn if the State had provided some
"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript.
Britt v. Nort.h Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
~ Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 45R ( 1969); Gardner \'. Califomia, 393
U. S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Lon(! v.
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington,
372 U. S. 487 (1DG3); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357
U.S. 214 (1958).
5
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Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay
for counsel from their own resources and who had no
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less
wealthy.
·williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and Tale v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply because of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively Jess money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens.
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts
found in the previous cases were present there. The size
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars,
effectively singled out all potential candidates who were
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot"
(I d., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute
denial of a position on the primary ballot.
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance systemdiscrimination against a class of definably "poor" persons-might arguably meet the criteria established in
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however,
demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishi11g char-

71-13:i2-0PINION
18

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. JWDRIGUJ,;z

acteristics of wealth classifications can be found here.
First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "rilt is clearly incorrect ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in Connecticut.""" Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," G<
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
al·eas-those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts."''
Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas
.is not kno\vn but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases,
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
"" J'lote, A St~tti~ti<'nl An:d.1·~i~ of thr 8l'hool Finanr<' DPC'i~ions: On
and Losing \Yars, 81 Yale L . .J. 1308, 1:328- 1:)29

"~inning Battle~

( 1972) .
1
" I d., nt 1324, n. 102.
'"'I d., al 1328.
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assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather. it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it."" a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that at least where wealth is involved the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute
or complete equality."7 Nor, indeed, in view of the
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of education except
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequa.te"
education for all children in the State. By assuring teachers, books, transportation and operating funds,
the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee,
for the welfare of the State as a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.' ""8 The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled
r.G Earh of appellee~' po~~ible thcorir~ of wealth discrimination i:;
founded on the a~sumption th:1t the qualit~· of eclur:11ion Y::trirs
dirrrtl~· with the amount of fund~ rxprnclrd on it and 1h:1i, thcrrforc, the difTrrcncc in quality brtwrrn 1wo schools cnn br detrrminecl simpli~t iralb• h~· looking at 1hr clifferrnrc in J1Cr pupil expenditure~. This is a. matter of ron~ickrnhlc di~putc among rducalors nnd
commrnk1tor~. Src nn. 86 and 101 . infm.
r- 7 E.(! .. Bullork v. CartPr, 405 U. R 13-!, 137, 149 (1972): ilfaycr v.

City of Chi('a(!o, 40-l U.S. 18!), 19-t (1971): Drapc>.r "· Washinoton,.
:)i2 U. R. -!R7, 495-496 (1963); Douglas "· California. 372 U. S.
:).')3, 357 (1963).
"' Cilmrr-Aikrn Committrc· , suwa. n. 15, at 1:3 (rmph:1~i~ added) .
Indrrcl, C' \·rn though loen l funcling hns long brcn a, ~ignifiC'nnt n~prrl
of rdurnt iln1:11 funding, thr Rtatr nlwn~·s ha s Yirwrrl ])I'O\'iding an
:1r.rrptnblr rduration n~ onr of its primar~ · fnmtion s. Srr Trxns
State Bel. of Ecluc. , supra, n. 11, at 1, 7.

·•
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this desire and that it no"· assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education." w No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional
terms. <w
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court
may have embraced a second or third approach, tho
second of which might be characterized as a theory of
relative or comparative discrimination based on family
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower
the dollar amount of education received by the family's
children.
The principal evidence adduced in support of this
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub0

Apprllants' Brirf, at :35; Reply Brief, at 1.
An educational fiuance syo;lom might be hypothesized, howovPr, in which tho analogy to tlw wealth discrimination casE's would
hP considerably closer. If olomontary and secondary 0dncation wore
made available by tllP State only to those who arc able io pay a
tuition assessed against ench pupil, there would be a clear]~· defined
class of "poor" people--definable in terms of their inability to pay
the prescribed s11m-who would be ab:;olutely precluded from rocPiving an education. That case would present a far mon' rom]1C'IIing set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case
bPfore us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide an education to those who cnn afford it.
It has provided what it considers to be an adequatP bnso education
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliornte
b~· state fundin!l: and by the local asses~ment program the disparities
bet ween local tax resources.
"

Go
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mitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory,
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures.
Second, the court found a direct correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.
Supp., at 282, n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then
it might be argued that expenditures on educationequated by appellees to the quality of education-are
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative·
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or
some higher degree of correlation °1 is necessary to provide a basis for concluding the financing system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the·
comparatively poor, 62 and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees'
proof fails to support their allegations or the District
Court's conclusions.
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His
Also, it should be recognized that median income statistics
may not define with any precision the status of individual familie;;
within any given districts. A more dependable showing of comparative wealth discrimination would examine factor;:; such as the
average income, the mode, and the concentration of poor families in
any district in addition to the median income.
6 " Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-549 (1972).
61
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findings, set out in the margin/:' show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96
districts comprising almost 90% of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest median
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees,
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination.G(
n::

Marl.-et Falue of
'l'a:rable Prowrty
Pa Pupil
Abo\'(' $100,000

(10

l\Jedian Family
In rum!'
in lfJ60
~ .1,900

Slate ,c· Lur:al
E.r)lcw/iturrs
Per Pupil
~sli5

di~trirH

8100,000-~50.000

(2G di~t rirt;;)
$50,00()-.$:30,000
(:30 di~trirts)

$4,000

s:w,ooo-sw,ooo

S!}.oso

s-tG2

(40 diHtrict~)
Below $10,000
83,:32.'5
s:m5
( 4 di~t riels)
""Studies in othrr Stntr~ ha1·c a!Ho qtH'-<tiOJH'd thr rxi.:tcncr of
ml~' drprndablr rOJTPlat ion hPtwrrn a di~trirt ·~ 11·ral1 h mra~mrd
in trrm~ of a~~rs~ablr proprrt~· and thr collrrti1·r wcnlth of f:llniliPs
rr~icling in thr di;;trirt mrnsmrd in trnm of mrdi:tn famil~·
inromr. RidPJlour & Ridrnour, Serrano Y. Priest: Vi' r:dth and
KnnH:1 f< Rrhool FinanrP, 20 Kan. L. 213, 22.'5 (1972) (' 'it ran br
nrgurd that thrrr exi.;;ts in Knn"ll" almo~f an im·rr~r rorrrl:1t inn:
di~t rirt s with highrst inromr prr pupil hnw low n>"~r,;srcl 1·a.Iur prr
pupil, and di~triets with hip;h nHsr ,,_rcJ Ynlur prr pupil h:wr low
inrome prr pupil"); Dnl'irs, Thr Challrngr of Ch:mgr in Schon!
FinnnrP, in Nat'! Educational A,;,;u., lOth Annu:ll Conf. on School
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This brings us. then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by
the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it ma.y be argued that discrimination might
be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be
viewed as encompassing every child in every district
except the district that has the most assessable wealth
and spends the most on education."" Alternatively, the
class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property which falls
below the statewide average, or median , or below some
other artificially defined level.
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happC'n to have
less taxable wealth than other districts.or. The system
Finance (1967). Kotr, f\1 Yak L . .J., S1tJI1'a, n. 5:3. Srr ;d ~o Goldwpra.. n . 3R. at 1>22-fi27.
6 " Indeed, thi,; if; prrri ~el:v how thr plnintiff~ in Serrano 1·. Priest.
supra, defined th e rla HH t hr~r purport eel to repre~eut: " Plnintiff
rhilclrr n daim to reprr~ent a eln~s ronHi::;t ing of nll public ~rhool
pupils in California, exrrpt rhilclren in that Rr hool di~tri rt . . ..
which ... afTorc!R thr p;reate~t edurational opportunit~r of nll school
di:::tri cts within Cnlifornia." 9fi Cnl. Tiptr., at 604. 487 P . 2d, at
1244, 5 Cal. ~d, at 589. See nl~o Von Dusactz v. Ilatfield, 334 F .
Rupp., at R73.
(;G Appellee~, hm1·eyer , ha\'C' a1·oided clr~ rribing thr TPxa ::; s~·F trm
ns onr r esulting merely in di ~ rrimination brtwecn distrif't s pe1' se
sinre thi8 Court hns ne\'C'r qnr:o:tioned the Stntc's power to drnw
r e::1~o n abl e di ~t inrt ions bet ll'rrn J10ii ticnl ~ubdivi s ion :; within its
b orclrrs. GrijJin v. County School Board of P1'ince Edward County ,
:177 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGO'!ran v. Jlfaryland, 3GG U. S.
420, 427 (1961) ; Solsbu1'g v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954) .

~tein.
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of alleged discrimination and the class is defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system docs not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect classification. But appellees have not relied solely on the
contention that wealth discrimiuation would constitute
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to
rigorous judicial scrutiny.a• They also assert that the
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a "fundamental" right and that accordiugly the prior
decisions of this Court require the application of the
strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richm·dson, 403 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1971); Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this questionwhether education should be counted among the small
circle of rights that heretofore have been found to be
"fundamental in a constitutional sense"-which has so
consumed the attention of courts and commentators in
recent years. 68
07

The Court has never heretofore held that the exi~tc·nce of

dr facto wealth di::;crimination alone pro1·ides an adNt1WiP gronnd
for invoking ~<rict scrutiny. See, e. g., Ila1·per v. Virr;inia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, U. S.
(1972).
us See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 5,4, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971);
1'an Dusactz v. II at field, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); .J. Coon::;,
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 3:~9-394; Goldstein, supra., n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L.
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note. Educational Financing & Equal
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B
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),.
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." I d., at 493. What v,·as said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition 6f the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an
opportunity where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms." Ibid.
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF Jus'ricE), 237,
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v.
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v.
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 l\lich. L. Hev.
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School .Financing Ca~es:
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Di~crimination, 14 Ariz. L.
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).
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Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (Hl07).
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic dedication to public education. We
arc in cornpletc agreement with the conclusion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
of education both to the individual and to our society"
cannot be doubted.nu But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice
Harbn, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate
travel, admonished that "[vhrtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. S. 618, 665. 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importance of the
interest affected, "·e would have gone "far toward
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
We
would indeed then be assuming a legislative rolr and
one for ·which the Court lacks both authority and compotence. But 1\IIR. JrSTICE S'rEWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the "fundamental rights" rationale of
the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities. charactori11e them as "fundamental," anrl give them added protection .... ' To
the contrary, tho Court simply recognizes. as it
must, an established constitutional right, and gives
to that right no loss protection than the Constinv 337 F. Supp., at 283.

!-.
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tution itself demands."
phasis from original.)

394

u.

fi. , at 642.
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MR. JPS'l'ICE STEWART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
residency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right. and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right. unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.'' I d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
as a right of constitutional significance, 70 and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importance of that right. 71
Lindsey v. J.Y onnet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972). decided only
last Term. firmly reiterates that social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to tho procedural limitations imE. g., Uuitl'd Statl's v. Gttest, 3R3 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v.
Mitchell. 400 U. S. 112, 2aR (1970).
71
Aftrr Dandridgl' v. Williams. 807 lT. S. +71 (Hl70), t hrrr ronld
70

he no lingE'rinp; qurstion about the ron~titutionnl foundation for
thr Court ',_ holding in Shapiro. In Dalldridrw the Court npplir.d
the rn t imwl l>asi~ tr~t in r<'l·irwinp; :\Ia r~·l:i tHI ·~ maximum fnmiJ~·
g;rClnt pro1· i~ion under its AFDC program. A f'rdrral di.-d rir·t court.
hc·ld the proYi~ion llllCOJt~t it nt ional, Cl]lpl~·inp; 11 ~trictrr standard
of re\iew. In ihc cour~c of rci'C'r,.:inp; thr lowN eomt the Comt
dist inp;ui><lwd Shapiro proprrl~· on tho p;rou ncl 1hat in that i'a~r
"the Comt found :<tate int erfNrnrr with the con~t itution:dl~· protr.rtcd freedom of intNstatc in1wl." !d., ai 48-f. 11. 16.
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posed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law.
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
I d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limitations im.plicated "fundamental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," such as the "need for
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peacefu 1 possession of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is
instructive:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee to access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970), that "welfare provides the means to obin in c:; . ,eni.inl
food, clothing, housing and medical care."
72
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of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by
showing some compelling state interest. See also J efferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question
now before the Court is plain. The key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is
it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself,
the right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 73 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 ( 1972); 74 Mosley v. Police Department of
In Eisenstadt the Court struck clown a 11assachusetts statute
!Jrohibit ing the clist ribution of contraceptive cle,·icc:s, fincli11p; that
the law failed "to satisfy eYen the more lenient equal protection
standard." !d., at 447 n. 7. Neverthclc>~s, in dictum, the Comt
rc>citcd the proper form of c>qual protection analy::;it;: "if \\'P wc>re
to conclude that the Massarlm~etts statute impinges upon fnndamentnl frc>c>doms under Griswold
Connrcticut, 381 U. R. 479
( 1965),] the> statutory classification would h:we to be not nwrely
rational!!! related to a valid public purpo:.;e but necessary to tho
achic,·ement of a compelling state interest." Ibid. (emphasis in
ori!J;inal).
74 Dunn fully canvasses this Court's equal protection Yoting rights
cases and explains that "this Court has made clear that a citizen
has a con8titutionally prot!'cted right to participate in electionR on
an equal basis with other citizens in the jmi::;diction." !d., at 336
(emphnfli~ Hupplied). The constitutionnl underpinning~ of the right
to equal treatment in the voting proce~ · can no longer be doubted
en·n though, as the Court noted in 1/m']Jel' v. VirQinia Bd. of Elections, 3R3 U.S. 663, 665 (1966), "the right to Yote in state cleclion~
i8 nowhere expressly mentioned." Sec Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S.
1:34 (1972); Kramer v. Union F1·!'e School District, 395 U. S. 621
(1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (196-l) .
70

rv.

.-
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the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); 70 Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 7 "
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would not alone cause the Court to depart from
the usual standard of reviewing a State's social and
economic legislatiou. appellees contend that education
is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close
relationship to other rights accorded protection under
the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas"
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative
tools. Likewise, the corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little more than a hollow privilege when
the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and
utilize available knowledge.
7
" In Mosley the Court· ~trurk down a Chir;lp;o antipickr·ting
ordinance which cxrmptcd labor pirkrt ing from its prohibitions.
The ordinnnrr w:1 s hrlcl innlid under the ECJll:ll Protertion f'Ll11 se
aftrr subjecting it to r·nrefnl srrutin~· and fmcling th;lt thr orrlinanrr·
"·as not narrow]~· drnwn. Tbr strirtcr ~tambrd of rr,·ie"· wn~ appropriatelr :t.pplied sinrc tbe ordinnnre wn~ onr '':1fTertin!!: Fir~t .\mrnclment interests." !d., at 101.
"'Skinner applircl tlw ~tnnclnrd of rln~r srrutin~· to n st:t1r law
prrmit ting forrccl ~tcriliz:1 tion of "h:1 bitnal rriminnl.-'." Implicit in
t hr Court'f< opinion i.-; thl' n'r·u~rnition tlwt thr righ1 of prorr0:1tion
i~ :Jmong the right~ of pPr~onal pri,::.~ r~· protrrtrcl undrr thr Con~ti
tution. Sec Roc v. Wndr>.- TT. S. - . - (l(:Jn).
77 Src, e. g.. R ed Lion Broadcasting Co. Y. Ji'CC, i~9t) F. S. :JG7.
:190 (1969): Strwleu v. Georgia. 39-t n. S. 557, 5f\4 (l9f\D): Lamont
Y. Postmaster General, 081 U.S. 301 (19fl.'i).
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A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect
to the right to vote. 7 H Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's constitutional rights to speak and to vote. Yet
we have never presumed to pos. ess either the ability or
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.
That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted. 7 n These are indeed goals
' ~incr the rig;ht to 1·otr, ]Jer se, i~ not a con~titutionnlly protrrtrd right, wr n~~umc that apprllrrH' rrfrrC'ncrs to that right nrc
~impl~· shorthand refrrC'nrrs to the con~titutionall~· protC'ctrd right
to participatr on an equal basis whrnC'vrr the State has adopted
:Ill rlrrtin• procr~~ for clrtrrmining who will rrprr~cnt an~· ~rgmrnt
of thr State'~ popubtion. Srr n. 7+, R1t]n·a.
7
n Thr States hnw often pursurd thC'ir rntirrly lC'gitimatr intrrrst
in n~sming ''intrlligrnt exrrei~r of thr frnnchi~r," Katzenbarh v.
Morgan. 3R+ U. S. 641 , 65+--65.") (1966), through ~urh dr1·irrs as
litrrary ((•:-ts and age rrstrirtions on tho right to Yotr. See ibid.:
Oregon Y. Mitchell, 400 U. R. 112 (1970). And , whrrr those rrstricLion~ haw bern found to promote intrlligrnt u~r of tlw ballot without
di~rriminating against thosr rarial and rthnir minoritir,.; prC\·iouRiy
cl r priYrd of an equal rdurational opport unit~·, this Comt haR upheld
t hrir u~r. Compnrr Lassiter \'. Northampton Election Brl .. 860 U. ~.
45 (19.')9), with Or-er10n v. Mitchell. +00 U. S., at 133 (Mr . .Ju~tieP
l3lark) , 14+--1+7 (Mn. .TuwrTC'E Don:JAk), 216-217 (Mr. .Jus tier
Harlan), 2:H-28G (Mn. Ju,;Trcg BlllmNAN) , 282-284 (1\'fn . .TuwrrcE
7

STJ·JWAHT),

and Gaston County v. Un'it('d States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) .

'•
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs
are freed from governmental interference. But they are
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
otherwise legitimate state acti vi tics.
Even if it were conceded that some quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental
rights where only relative differences in spending levels
are involved and where-as is true in the present caseno charge fairly could be made that the system fails to
provide each child ·with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process.
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so, under appellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey
Ro Sro Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Publir Education, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, n. 68,
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for
a National Tenants' Association, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173
n. 61 (1969).
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v. N ormet, supra, would no longer be good constitutional law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context. In one
further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial
scrutiny. The present case, in one most basic sense, is
significantly different from any of the cases in which
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived,"
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of
some fundamental personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 338-343 ( 1972). The critical distinction between
those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas.
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR.
JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient
point: 81
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six year~ of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even though
the language of instruction was other than English. This Court
upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it discriminated
against those with a sixth grade educ-ation obtained in non-English
speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal
lc·gislation.
81
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] . . . .
"[The federulla w in question 1 docs not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons "·ho othenrisc would be denied it by
state ]a"·· . . . \Ve need decide only whether the
challenged limitati011 on the relief effected ... was
permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strikr at an
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take·
one ste1) at a tinlC'. addressing itself to the phase·
of the problem "·hich seems most acute to the lcgisla-.
tive mind .... '" !d., at 656- 657. (Empha!"is from
original.)
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the·
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally. and creating and
continuom;ly expanding state aid-"·as implemented in
an effort to extend public f'ducation and to improve its
quality. ~ Of course. every reform that benefits some
8

'" Cf. Me!Jer , .. 1\'fbraska. 262 U.S. 390 (192:-l): Piercf \'. Socifly
Sister8, 2(i, U. S. 510 (Hl2.'i): Ilarora?'(' \'. Kick, :n:~ F. 1:\Hpp.
944 (1\TD Fla. 1970), Yaratrcl, 401 U.S. 476 (Hl71).
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more than others may he criticiz:ed for what it fails
to accomplish. But \\'e think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and. therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles sensitive to thr nature of the State's
efforts.s"

c

It should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated
above, that this is an inappropriate case in which to
subject state action to the sort of searching scrutiny
reserved for laws that involve suspect classifications or
fundamental rights.
\Ve need not rest our decision, however, solely on the
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case·
represe11ts far more than a challenge to the manner in
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothiJJg less than a direct attack on the
\\·ay in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. vYe are asked to condemn
the State's judgment in confrrring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures."' This Court has
often admonished against such interferences with the
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause:
"The broad discretion as to classification possessed
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
":: Rrr Schilb Y. Kuebd, 404 U. S. :~57 ( Hl71) : i1I cDonald ·-v.
Board of Election Commissionprs. 89-J. U. 8. R01 (HHl9).
M Srr, e.(!., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 13-! U.S. ~32 (1890);
Cannitlwcl v. Southerll Coal Co .. :301 U. S. 40.1, 508-509 (l0:-l7) ~
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 ( 1959).
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been recogllized. . . . [T]he passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a
familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes . . . . " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83,
87- 88 (1940).
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., U. S. (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
u. s. 435, 445 (1940).
Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. 8 "
sr. ThoRo who urge thu1 the pre~cnt system be invalidated offer
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy, another area in which this Court'sindeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsel's against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public welfare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very
complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggest that "there
will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them," and that, within the limits
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing; ~)·stem,
however, would be statewide financing of all public education \Yith
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or
expansion of Sillcs and income taxes. The author,; of Private Wealth
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alternative schrme, known as "district power equalizing." In simplest
trrms, the State would guarantee that at any particular rate of
property taxation the district would receive a stated number of
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the :-;ubsidies
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier"'
districts that collrct more than the stated amount at any given
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against
"di~trict power equalizing," beyond noting that commcntntors arc
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory underlying appellres' case. President'~ Comm'n on School Finance,
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 705-708
(1972); Brest , Book ReYiew, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-595 (1971);
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Lrgisbti\·e
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971);
Sibrd & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Eduention: The
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Eqtml ProtPction Clnuse, 1970,
Wi,;. L. Re\·. 7, 29-30.
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problems" should be entitled to respect. J efjerson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even
the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of
the hottest sources of controversy conc-erns the extent
to \vhich there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education 8 " an assumed correlation the validity of "·hich underlies
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationship between cost and quality, is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education. 87 And the question of the proper relationship botv,·eon state boards of education and local school
boards. in terms of their respective responsibility and
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exarnination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like
problems of education is not likely to be devined for
all time eveu by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
8
" The qualil y-co~ t ront ro\·rr,;~· ha ..; rrrrin•d ron~idrrablr :i l lrntion. Among the notable authoritie~ on both ~idr~ arr t hr following: C. Jrneks, Incqnalit~· (1972) ; C. Silhrnn:m, C'ri~i~ in thr
Cla~.'lroom (1970) : Offir•e of Eclnration, Eqn:dit .\· of Ed>lc'niinnal
Opportunity (HlGG) (Thr Colrm:m Report): On Eq\l:llity of Educ·ational Opporlunit~· (1912) (:\1oy nikln & l\To~lrllrr rck): .T. GuthriC',
G. lClriuclorkrr, II. LrYin. & T. Stont , Sehool~ and ln r rll! ; llit~·
(1071); Prr.-idrnt ' ~ Comm'11 on Srhool Financr , Stt)lra. 11. S!'i: Sw:lll~on , The Cos t-Qnnlit~ · nc:lation~hip, in lOth Nat '! Conf. on Sc·hool
Fin:tncc, Thr Challc11gr of Changr in School Finanrr 151 (1967).
R< Sre the rrsult~ of t!Jr 'Trxas Go\·rrnor 's Commit trr'~ statrwiclr
Hun·r~' on thr goals of rclu ratinn in th:tt Statr.
I Go1·rrnor's
Committee Hrport, at 59-68. Sec alHo Golcb!C'in. supra. n. 3~ ,
:tt 519-522; Srhorltlr, supra, n. 80: nuthorities riled inn. 86 , supra.
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so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing
conditions.
It must be remembered also that every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for
the relationship between national and state power under
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws arc to be subjected to the compelling interest or
the rational basis teE:t. While "rtJhe maintenance of
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
which this Court examines state action, 88 it would be
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before
us, in which "·e arc urged to abrogate the systems of
financing public education presently in existence in
virtually every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These
same considerations are relevant to the determination
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, is
supported by a reasonable or rational basis. It is to this
question that we next turn our attention.

III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the issue of
rationality.
""Allied Storrs of Ohio Y. Bowe1·s, 35R U. S. 522, 532 (1950)
(Mn .•JusTicE BRENNAN, eonrurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384
U. S. 641, 551 (1955) (Mr . .Tu~liC'C' Harlan, di~~cnting).
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Apart from federal assistmJCe, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average. a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from each source.' 0 The
State's contribution, under the Minimum. Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 00 Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 20 teachers;'" one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; ~
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children arc also provided. 93 Additional funds
are earmarked for current operating expem:es and for
student transportation ut as well as for free textbooks. 9"
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation nn and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.97 As reflected by the 627o increase in funds allotted
to the Edgewood School District over the last three
years, 9 8 the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how9

so In 1970 Tex::tii expended approximately 2.1 billion dollars for
ednration and a little over one billion came from the Minimum
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2.
90 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13.
91 Tex. Edur. Code § 16.1R.
92
Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15.
n3 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.
04
Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51.
05 Tex. Edur. Code § 12.01.
OG Tex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5).
07
Tex. F.duc. Code § 16.301 et. seq.
ns Sec ante, at - .
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ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
assure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program.on Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edge·wood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
the market value for any category of property varies from
its assessed value. 100 The greatest interdistrict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability for supplementing state
fund s. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupilteacher ratios and higher salary schedules. 101
vo Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15.
100

There is no unifonn statewide assessment practice in Texas.
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Go\·emor's
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, l\lorgan & White,
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16.
101 Texas Rel:iearch League, supra, n. 20, at 18.
As previou::;ly
noted, text accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the
quality of education varie:; with expenditure per pupil is debated
inconclusively by the most thoughtful :; tudent:; of public cdueation.
While all would agree that there ic a correlation up to the point

71-1332-0PINION
42

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasi.oned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in loss affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results
of pro1·iding the recognir.rd C'i'senliab, the i~sues of grratc•sl cli~
:tgn'rmrnt inrlucle thr effect on quality of pctpil-trachrr ratios ~mel
of higher lraclwr ~alary sehrdule~. The state funding in Texas
i~ dr~ignrd I o assure, on the n ver:tgc, 011r trn chrr for r1·cr~· 2fi
sl udrnt~. which ici considerrd to be a fnvornblc rntio b~· most ~~ nndnrds. Whether the minimum srd:tr~· of SG,OOO per ~·rnr is sufficrnl
in Trxn~ to ntlr;td qualifird tr:tchrrs ma~· hr morr drhat:tblr, drpending in major part upon the locntion of thr school di~trict. Bul
thrre appr:trs to br litllo rmpiricnl d:tta that mpports the ndvantage of any particular pupil-tracher ratio or thai docmnrnts the
cxistrnce of a dcprnclable correlation between the lrn·l of ]lUblic
school teachers' sr1larirs atHl thr qunlit~· of thrir elns.'> room instruction. An intrartnblc problrm in dealing with tr:whrr.,' salarir" i~ the
nhscncr, np to thi.· timr, of sntisfactorv trchniqnr::; for judging
1hrir nbilitY or Tll'rformnnrr. Thr rrsnlt is 1hal rrln1i1·r]l· frw
R<'hool s.l·fltrm~'< h:we mrrit plnn8 of nn~· kind, "·ith 1P:whrr~' ~n h riPs
bring inrrrascd n rro8s 1hr board in n way which rc1v:ud~ 1hr lcnst
drsrn·ing on the snmc bn~is as thr most clesrn·ing. Salarirs ar0
nsnnll~· rni~rd nntomaticnll~· on the b:1sis of lrng1h of srrvice nnd
;wrording to prrdctrrmincd "steps," rxtending owr 10-t o-1::? ;.·car
prriods.
Tn mnking thc"r obsrn·n tions. wo intc·nd no cri1 iri~m of 0xi~t ing
practicrs and crrtninh· '"c implv no opinim1 th:tt trnrhrr ..;' s:1lnri<'~
r.:<>nrrnll~· nre adequntr. .1\s rolll]lrtlw\ with othrr:-; of r·ompnrahlr
rducatio11 there j,; r1'rr~· rra~on t0 brlirYr thnt 1rarhrrs' ~:t!:uirs
gcncrnlly, starting from :111 11ndul~· low b~se, hnvr fnilrd rvrn to
krrp abreast of inflation. ·we hr1w inf'lndrd this rommrrtlnr~· on
Jmpil-trnchrr rntios and snlnry lr1·rls not to rxprcs" nn~· opinion
with r•'spret to the :1clrq11:1rv of thosr in Tcxns or rlsr,Yhrrr. but
mrrrl:; to indicate thnt it i~ not at nil clc::tr-in thr 0pinion of somr
rxprrts-t hat t hr two principnl factors di~tinguisbi11g the 'rhoob in
1br more afflurnt districts from tho~e rlsewhcre docs demon~! r:. hly
and necessarily nffcct tho qunlit~· of tho teaching.
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in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. We disagree.
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as well as
local resources. is comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State."'" The power to tax local
property for educational purposes has been recognized
in Texas at least since 1883.'"" When shifts in the distribution of population, accompanied by changes in local
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial
and industrial ceHters, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a
10 2

Prr~irlrnt

':-; Comm'n on School Financr, supra. n. 85 , at 9. lTntil
Hawaii was thr on]~· ~tatr that maint:tinrd a purr!~· ~t:ltr
l'nndrd rclnrntiomtl prog-rnm. Tn 1958, howrwr, that 8tntr nmendccl
it~ rrlurntionnl finnnrr statutr to prrmit conntirs to rollrrt :tclclit ional funds lorn !I~· and sprnd t hosr :11nount~ on itR ~ehools . Thr
r:ttionnle for t hal rrrcnt lrp;i~lnti,·e choicr is instrnrt iw on the
question brforc t hr Court todn)· :
rrr<'ntl~·

" Unclrr rxi~tinp; bw, count irs are preclnclrd from cloinp; m1.\·t hinp;
in this arra, rwn to sprnd thrir own fund .;; if thr~· RO dr~irr. This
corrr ctiw lr.gi~lation is urp;rntl~· ncrdrcl in ordrr to nllo"· rountirs
to p;o abow :mel hr~·ond thr State'~ stand:trcls nnd pro,·iclr rdurat ionnl farilitir,; ns p;ood as the pcoplr of thr ronnt iPs wnnt and
:tre willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to p;o aboYe
allll br)·ond r~tnbliHhcd minimumR pro,·idcd for thrir proplc rneourngr~ the br~t fraturcs of clrmocratie p;onrnmrnt." Hnw. Srs~. Lnws,
Art. 3~. § 1 (195~).
10
'l See trxt nccompnn)·inp; n. 7. supra.
104
G. Strayrr & R. Haip;, Financin!!; of Educntion in the Stntr of
).Tow York (1923). For n thorough anal~'sis of thr contribution
of these rrformrrs and of the 11rior nml Rubscqucnt hi~t . ory of cdue:ltion:tl finauer, ser J. Coons. vV. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at :·>9-95.
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means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of local
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
articulated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for
its child." 10 "
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring
a basic education for every child in the State. it permits
and encourages a large measure of participation and
control of each district's schools at the local level. In
an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward
centralization of the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived.
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v.
Coundl of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972). MR.
JusTICE STEWART stated there that " [d] irect control
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society."
Id., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed
that "fl]ocal control is not only vital to continued public
support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance
from an educational standpoint as well." I d., at 478.
The persistence of attachment to government a.t
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
" J. Coons, iV. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, .Forrwarcl by
.Tames S. Coleman, at vii.
10
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freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the clecisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." ' 0 G No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches
than does public education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary,
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely
because it does not provide the same level of local
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others/ 07
New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,280,311 (1932).
MR. Jus TICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that tho Texas
system is irrationn l bern use the mrnns it has selected to effectuate
it interest in locnl autonomy fail to guarantee complete freedom of
choice to every district. He places special emphasis on the statutory provision which establishes a maximum rate of $1.50 per $100
valuation at which a local school district may tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The maintenance rate in
Edgo\\'oocl when this case was litigated in the District Court was
106

107
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the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. TVnliams, 397
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interests, while occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only
where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental rights must it be found to have chosen the least
restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330, 343 ( 1972). It is also well to remember that
even those districts that have reduced ability to make
free decisions with respect to how much they spend
on education, still retain under the present system the
prerogative to decide how available funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous
other decisions with respect to the operation of the
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of school finance. which place
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired
local autonomy. That is. they may believe that along
with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies. to R
$.55 per $100, barrl.v onr-third of the nllownblr mtr. (Thr tnx
rntr of $1.05 per S100, ~er p. 7. infra. is thE' rqualizrd r:1te for
maintenance and for thr rrtirrmeni of bonds.) Apprllrr~ do not
claim that tlw criling prr~rntly bar~ cle~irrd tax inrrrases in Edgewood or in any other Trxa~ cli8trirt. Therefore, the rons1i1 ul ionnlity
of i bat ~tntuo r~· pr01·i~ion i>' not bdorr u 8 and must await Iii iga1 ion
in a rase in whirh it j,; properh· presented. ('f. Ilargravr v. Kir!.-,
313 F. Supp. 944 (:\1D Fin. 1970) , nrated, 401 F. S. 476 (1971).
10 R This theme--that ~renter sintc control over funding will lend
to ~renter state powrr \Yith rc~pcct to local educational programs
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Appellees fnrther urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary brcause it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They sec no justification for a system that allows, as
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.
It is eq ua.lly inevitable that some localities are going
to be blessed \vith more taxable assets than othors.10 " Nor
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable wealth within any district ma.y result from
and polirir~-is ::t rcrurrrnt onr in thr litrraturc on fin:mring public
('([ur:-ttion. Sec, e. (!., Colemnn, Thr Rt ru~rgle for Control of Edur:-ttion. in Edurntion and Social .P olicy: Lor:il Control of Educ:1tion 64,
77-7/<. (BO\n.>rs rd. 1970); .T. Con:-tnt, Thr Child, The Parent, :md
The State 26 (19fi9) ("Unlr~s n loc:1l community, throu~rh its school
ho:-trd, has sonw ront rol o\·rr t hr purse, therr r:1n be lit t lr real frrling; in the romm1mit~· ihilt Rchool~ nrr in fad local schools . . . . ");
Howe, Anatomy of n ReYolution, in Sat.. Hev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971)
("It iR an axiom of Amrrir:m politirs ilwt control :md power follow
monr~· .... "); Hutrhin~on, Statc-Admini~tercd Locilll_v-Shared Taw,.;;
21 (1931) ("rS]tilte admini~tration of taxation i~ the fir:'! strp towards stnte rontrol of the functions supported by these tnxe.; .... ").
IrrcRpertiw of ,,·hether one regnnb ~urh pro~prctR n~ drtrimentnl.
or whether he agrrc8 that the ron~rfJucncr is ine,·itable, it rertainl.r
crumot be donbt.rd that there i~ a mtionnl baRis for thi~ conrrrn on
thr part. of pnrent~. educators, and legi~lator~.
100
This Court hils nc,·rr doubt eel thr proprirt~· of maintaining
political subdiYi~ions within the States and has never found in the
bqunl Protection Clau~c any pe1· se rule of "territorial uniformit~r."
l\Jr·G01can \'. i1Iaryland, 3(i6 U. R. 420, 427 (1961). See also G1·i!Jin
v. County School Board of Pr-ince Edward Co·unty, 377 U. S. 218,
230-231 (1964); Salsburo v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Cf.
Board of FJclucation of Muskoor·c v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668
(CAIO 1969).
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any number of events, some of which local residents
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within
a district by various actions-public and private- of its
residents.
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then
it must be equally impermissible in providing other necessary services currently financed from local property
taxes, including local police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total
abrogation of local property taxation and control as
•vould follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this
Court to nullify statewide schemes for financing public
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subdivisions in which citizens live.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that
is without rational basis. Its shortcomings have been
acknowledged by Texas, and it has persistently endeavored-not without some success-to ameliorate the
differences in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local participation.
The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, illconceived legislation. It certainly is not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class.
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the

50
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trality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed. 110
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be sus11ected that the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from those initially assumed.m There is,
110 "Fisc:1llH'utrnlit)'" is the n:nne gi,·en bv Profe.~s or~ Coons, Clune,
nnd Sugarman to their thesis that " the (]Unlit)· of puhlie education
may not be a func·tion of \\'e:1lth other tlwn the wealth of the state
as a whole." J. Coons, 'iV. CluJJC' & S. Sugnrman, supra., n. 13, :1t 2.
Their tho11ghtful :1nd imagimti1·e work pa1·ed tlw W:t)' for the
suits, inrluding tlw pre~ent one, :1tt:1rking the school fin:\llce ~~·stC'm.
Tncleed, the Di~trirt Court npprovrd the :~ulhor,.;' t hrsi~ Yerhntim.
337 F. Supp., at 2S5. The author~ haYe often raul ioncd tlwir supportC'r..:;, hO\\'C'VC'r. against spC'rubting th:tt " fi scal neutralif~·" would
h0 a panacea for the poor or for raci:1l minoril ic·~. !bid.: Coon~ ,
C'lune & Sugarman, A .Fir~t Apprais:~l of Serrano, :3 Y:t!C' He'\'. of
L . & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971).
111
Any alternatin· thai 11rovidr~ ~ignifirantl)' more mom'~' for
an~' major prrrent:1ge of tlw State's schools is rminin to C'ncmmtrr
political barrier~. AnY such nrw plan would rC'CJUire ncldit ion a!
resources from some 801li'CC': funds will cit h0r hn \'C i o lw takC'n
nw:~y from more prospcron~ districts or nC'w rC'n•mtC' sourer~ will
need to be tapped. The former altrrnati\"C' is not !ikC'IY to br ~up
ported by those districts thnt haw h:~d th0 good fortnnc to
haw developC'd at tr:1ctiw educ:~tion faeilitirs and programs. 'The
latter altern:1ti1·e, i. c.. llC'"' tnxation, apprarR to lw no
more palat::tble pol it ira II)'.
It hns lwrn ralculated i hat S2.4
billion of add it ionnl Rrhool fnnds wonld bC' required to bring
nll Texas districts up to thr pr0~rnt lew! of expenditure in all
hut. the wrnlthi0st cli~trict~-an amount more than clonhle 1hn.t
eurrently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Rr~earrh
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lo\\'est income families v. ·ho tend to reside in
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke. whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas ''.:ere relied on by the
District Court, 112 has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance." " That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas. 114
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the location of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools.m Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
Lea!J:ue, supra, n. 20. :1t. 16-18. At a t imr whrn nrarl~· evrr:v flt:1tr
and localit~· is snfTering from fisc:1l undrrnonrishment , and with demands for sen· ires of :til kindR burgroning :1nd with weary tnxpa~·cr~
already resisti ng t:1x increases, thrre is considerable reason to
C(twstion whether a drci~ion of t hi;; Court. nullif~·ing present state
taxing s:vstems would rr~ult in doubling publir· fund~ committed
to cduc:ltion.
An amir1ts rurial' hrirf filed on brhnlf of almost :m
State~, focu~ing on these prac1ir:tl ronsef)ucnrcs, claims with some
justification that "ench of the undcr,igned states . . . would suffer
~r1·ere finanrin l stringency." Brief of A min: Cu1'ine in Support. of
Appellants, nl 2 (filed A1t. Gen. of l\fd., et nl.).
112
See nn. 38 and 63, supra.
113
Select. Corum. on ECJu:ll Edurat ional Opportunity, Incqnitie:
in School Finance (1972) (~Tonograph preprrred bY Profe:::~or Berke).
114
Sec al~o U.S. Offirc of 'Education, FinanreR of Lar~e City School
f;y~tems: A Comparat iYe Anal~·~i~ (1972) (HEW Publif':tlion).
nr. Sre Kotc, A Statistical Annl~·~i;: of the Srhool Finanre Derisions : On Winning BattleH nne! Lo~ing Wars, 81 Yale L .•J. 1303
(1072); see text aeromp:tn~·ing 11. 4.'5, supra.
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clustered in school districts that have relatively less
assessable property. 110
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional function restrain us from undertaking through the
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity
and vital concern to the States and localities. That
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax
systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These
matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed much by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions much come from the lawmakers
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.
116
Sec Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 526; C. Jencks, supra, n.
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugrmm.n, supra, n. 13,
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example,
"59% of minority students live in districts abo,•e the median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School District-is above the !oral average in both the amount of taxable
wealth per pupil and in median family imomc. Yet 72% of its
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North Eust and North
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18%
Mexican-American enrollment respectively.
Berke, Carnrrvale,
Morgrrn & White, supra, n. 29, at 673.

PRINTER:
This op~n~on contains few changes, with
one major exception. Pages 14-24 have been
substantially revised, although you will be
able to use well over half of the same
type already set. Note that each footnote
is attached to the bottom of the page
except notes 48-51, which are clipped onto
the end of the section.
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UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1332

~an Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the
Distnct et al., Appellants,
United States District Court for the
'L'.
Western District of
DemN.rio P. Rodriguez et al.
Texas.
[February -, 1973]

MH. JvRTICE PowELL delivered the opinio11 of thP
Court.
This smt, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-·
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
1
Not all of the children of these complamants attend public school.
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the
conditiOn of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School DiHt,nct.'' Th1rd Amended Complaint, App ., at 14
1
The San Antomo Independent School District, whose name tlus
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants .
After a pretnal conference, the District Court Issued an order dJsmissmg the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San
Antomo Independent School District has j omed m the plmnti/Ts'
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an
om1.r11~ r11.nae bnef m support of that position in tlus Conrt.
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of EJucat]on, the ~tate Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed iu the summer of 19(38 and a three-judge court
was impaneled in January 196H. 3 In December 1971 4
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas ·school finance system unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 The· State appealed and we noted probable j'urisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu~
tional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of thE' District Court.
T

The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools. 6 Early in its history,
'Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
' A three-judge court wa~ properly convenrd and thcrr arr 110
questwns a:s to the Dt:si nct Court':; junwictwn or thr dtrrct appealabihty of Its judgment :JH ll S. C. §§ 2281, 1253.
' The t nal was delayPd for two yearH to permit extrm1vr prrtnal
d1:scovery and to allow completiOn of a pendmg Texas Jrgi;;Jativr
investigation concerning tb r nred for rrform of 1t;; public school
finance system. Bodnguez \. Sau Antonio Ind. 8chool Dist ., 337
F . Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Trx. 1971)
'' 337 F . Supp. 280. The DI:st nct Court stayt•d Jts mandatr for
two years to provide Texas an opportunity to rrmrcly the mr(!mtJes
found in It ~ financmg program. Thr court, howrver, rctamcd junsdiction to fashwn its own rrmrdml orc!rr 1f th<• Statr failrd to offrr
an accrplablr plan . !d ., at :ZHR
' 1 Tex. Con;;t., Art. X, § I
•· A genrral dill.'u~10n of knowlt•dge belll!!; r~HrntJ:d to t hr prrHrrvatwn
of thr ngbt s and libE'rties of tlw peoplr tt ::;hall br thr dut~· of tlw
Lrgi::;lature of this Statr to makr ~ uital>IP proviHion for thr ::;upport
und mamtenancr of public :;ehool :; '
!d., Art X,§ '2.
" The Legislature> ~;hall a~; early m; pmctieablr PstabiiHh frr<' sc hool~
throughout the State, and ~;hall fnrm sh mean~ for their ::;upport, by
1axat JOn on rropPr1 v,
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildiugs" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." 7 ~uch local funds as were
r.aised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds. 8 The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854,0 was endowed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes, 11 served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providinp; free textbooks throup;hout
the State. ~
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
Sta.te and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State. 13 Sizable differrncf's
1

Tex. Canst. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amenrlrd. Au~ . 14, IHS3
Tex. Con;:;t., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.
0 Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Cons!., Art. 7, §§ l, '2
(interpretive commentaries); I Rrport of Ctovcrnor's Committer on
Public School Education, Thr Challenge and the C'hance 27 ( l9n9)
(hereinafter Governor's Committre Report)
10 Tex. Canst., Art. 7, § 5 (see also the interpret tv<• commrntarv).
V Governor's Committee Report, itt 11-12.
, 11 The vanous ~:>ourcrs of revenue for the A v;ulnble School .FtuHI
are cataloged m Texas State Bd. of Educ. Texa:; Statrwtde Srhool
Adequacy Survey 7-15 (1938)
12 Tex. Con8t., Art. 7, § 3, a~ amrndrd, Nov li, HJlS (srr tnterprctivr commentary)
1 ~ I Governor's Comm1ttC'C' Rrport, at :~5; Texas State Bel. of
Edur., 8Upra, n. 11, at .".--7. ,] . Coons, W ClmH', S. Su~nrman,
7

8
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced.'·' The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.'r'
In due time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities.' 6 Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,lb
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946."'
Private Wealth and Public Education 49 (1970), E. Cubbcrley,
School Funds and Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905).
14 By 1940 one-half of the State's populatwn wai' rlusterecl in ItR
metropolitan centers. I Governor's Committee He port, at 35.
15 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Have What We Must (1948) .
16 R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950); Texa~ Bel. of
Educ., supra, n. 11.
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12.
lt , should be noted that dunng thi::>
period the median per pupil expenditure for all ~chools With an
enrollment of more than 200 was approximatE'ly $50 per year
During this same period a survey conducted by the State Board
of Education concluded that "in Texas the beHt rducatwnal advantages offered by the State at preRent may be• had for the medmn.
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil m average daily attendanrc: .' '
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 56
18 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Se::;s. 1Y39, at ~74
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th Lrgis,
Reg. Sess. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per student)
1 9 General & Spec. Laws of Trxm;. 49th Legis ., Reg. Ses::.. 1Y45;·
53, a.t 7.'5.

c.
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua~
tion of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 20 It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of thf' total educational
expenditures in Texas.~'
The Program calls for state and local contnbutions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salariet:,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80% of the Program and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districtR
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment JS first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-

°

2
For a complete history of the adoption in Texa~ ol a foundation program, see R. Stills, supra, n. 16. See abo V Gon•rnor'H
Committee Report, at 14, Texas Research Lea!-(UC', Public School
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Intenm Report 1972)
21
For the 1970-1971 school year this state tud program accounted
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxatwn contributed
41.1% and 10.9% was provided m federal fund~ . TPxtu,; HrHrarrh
League, supra, u. 20, at 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property
in the State." 2 Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county. ~ The
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children 24
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.25 Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for educ'ation-from State as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
2

22 V Governor's Committee Report, at 44--48.
At present there are 1,161 school dilltricts m Trxas. Texas Rrsea.rch League, supra, n. 20, at 12.
24
In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that some school
districts were not levying any local tax to ~upport education.
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 16. The Texas State
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and
independent school dtstricts were levying no local property tax m
1935-1936. Texas State Bd. of Edue., supra n. 11, at :39- 42
25 Gilmer-Aiken Committee. supra, n. 15, nt 15
23
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
500o/a. 26 In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 2 g Minimum
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years. zu
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6%
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960-the lowest. in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district conI Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2.
2.8 In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pup1l
expenditure for all current operating expenses mcr('ased from $206
to $493. In that same period capital expenditures mcrea~('c[ from
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Committee Report, at 53-54
20 III Governor's Committee Report, at 113-146; Berkr, Carnn vale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Ca:;(': A Wrong
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972)
30 Thfl family income figures ar(' based on 1960 C('nsus Rtat1st irH.
26
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967~
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248. 31 Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil. 32
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo, having only 18tfo Mexican-Americans
and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49,000 aa and the median family incomP
•11

The Available School Fund, techmcally, provideH a :srcond
source of state money. That Fund has continued as in ~·rars pas1
(see text accompanying nn. 16-19, supra) to distnbute uniform
per pupil grants to every district in the State. In 1968 this Fund
allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available 8chool
Fund contribution is always subtracted from a d1stnct 's entitlement under the Foundation Program. it plays no significant rolr
in educational finance today.
3 2 While federal assistance has an ameliorating effect on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor diHtriCtH, the
District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that
court that it should consider the effect of the federal grant m
assessing the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. Thr Stat('
has not renewed that contention here.
33 A map of Bexa.r County included m the record show8 tl1a1
Edgewood and Alamo Heights are among the smallest districts m
the county and are of approximately equal s1zr. Yet, a:; t hr figures
above indicate, Edgewood's student populat wn Is more than four
times that of Alamo Heights. This factor obviously account::; for
a significant percentage of the differencrs bet ween the 1wo di::;t net~
in per pupil property values and expenditure::;. If Alamo Height;;
had as many students to educate as Edgewood dors (22,000) Its per
pupil assessed property value would be approximately $11,100 ratht>r
than $(9,000, and its per pupil expenditures would thert>fore havn·
been considerably lowt>r.
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures providE'
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid/ 4 more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62% increase over
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, statE'
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budgetr-from local, state, and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil. 3 ~ ThE>sE'
34 The figurc·s quoted above vary slightly from thosP uullzrd in
the Drstrict Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782. Thrse tnvial
differences are apparently a product of that court's rdiance on
slightly different statistical data than we have rrlied upon
3
~ Although the Foundation Program has madr significantly greater•
contributions to both school districts ovrr the last several years, n
is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. Thr.
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grant~
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. H1gher salanes are
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and po, -·
sessing more advanced degrees . Therefore, Alamo He1ghts, whrch
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Texa;,
Program is not unlike that presently in existence m a number of
other States. C. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at,
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to distncts that
already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formulas have been
described as "anti-equalizing.'' Ibid. The formula, however, lt-1
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms The perrentagr-

71-1332-0PINION

10

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth.
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20%
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
grant. 36 It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State, 38 still exist. And it was
disparity betwee,n the two Texas di trJCts is diminished sub~ tanhally
by State aid. Alamo Heights derived in 196'7-1968 almost 13 times
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State aid
grants to ec'l.ch district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio lo approximately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than tw1ce
as much money to spend per pupil from its combied State and local
resources .
36 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13.
37
The Economic Index, which determines each county's share of
the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a complex formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was mHtitutrd.
See text at pp. - - - supra. It has frequently been suggested
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered m several respects
to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying abihty,
especially of urban schools. V Governor's Committee Report, at
48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29 at 680-681
38 The District Court relied on the findings presented in an
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. H1s sampling
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct rorrela110n
between the amount of a district's taxable property and its level
of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct corrrlatioi)
betwren a district's median family income and per pupil expendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the.
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
Finding that wealth is a
337 F. Supp., at 282.
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun~amental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it was premised upon some compelling
tures as well as an inverse correlation between percentage of mmonties and expenditures.
Categorized by Equalized Property V::tlues,
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue
Market Value
Median
State &
Per Cent
Local
of Taxable
Family
Mtnority
Revenues
Property
Income
Pupils
Per Pttpil
From 1960
Per Pup!l
$815
Above $100,000
$5,900
R%
(10 Districts)
:$544
8100,000-$50,000
$4,425
32%
(26 Districts)
$483
$4,900
$50,000-$30,000
23 %
(30 Districts)
$462
$5,050
$30,000-$10,000
:H%
(40 Districts)
Below $10,000
$3,325
79%
(4 Districts)
Although the correlations with respect to family mcomc and rare
appear only to exist at the extremes, and although thr affiant's
methodology has been questioned (sre Gold::;tein , Interdistnct
Inequahties in School Financing; a Critical Analysis of Serrano v
Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Hrv. 504, 523-525 nn . 67
and 71 ( 1972)), insofar as any of t hesr correlations is rclrvant
to the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may accrpt
i~s basic thrust. For a defense of the reliability of the ailidavrt. srf>
.Berke. Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra. n. 29

)'.

71-1332-0PINION
12

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

state interest. I d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
!d., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights ao or that
involve suspect classifications. 40 If, as previous decisions/
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, ' 1 the Texas
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 42
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
39 E. g., Police Dept . of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson) 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
40 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184
(1964).
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and the
cases collected therein.
42
Appellants' Brief, at 11.
43 Ibid .
44 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3 .

..
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of
some suspect classification or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined
to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II

The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and
appellate processes/ 5 and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote.'' 6 Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education,'17 that there is a
E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
46 Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1964); McDonald v.
Bd. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S.
134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser, U. S. (197a) .
47
See cases cited in text, at-, infra.
45

f
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui gJneris, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuasivE'.
A
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing laws in other
Htates, 4 8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the
traditional systems of financing public schools, some
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other
more affiuent people, these systems discriminate on the
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms,
and whether the relative-rather than absolute- nature
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial
48
Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241, 5 Cal.
3d 584 ( 1971); Van Dusartz v. Hat field, 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn.
1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187
(1972) , MiLliken v. Green, No. 54,809 (Mich. S C'. , .Jan. - , 197:3) .
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scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court
below.
The case comes to us with no definitive description of
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which
the discrimination claimed here might be described.
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as
discriminatory ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," ''9 or
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, 50
or ( 3) against all those who, irrespective of their persona] .incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer
school districts. 51 Our task must be to ascertain whether.
49 In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a clasi:i
composed of persons who are "poor" and who reside in school districts having a "low value of property." Third Amended Complaint.
App., at 14. Yet appt>llees have not defined the term "poor" with
reference to any absolute or functional level of impt>cunity. Set>
text infra, at - . See also Appellt>es' Brief. at l, 3 ; Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 20-21.
50 Appellees' proof at trial focused on comparative differt>nces in
family incomes bt>tween residents of wt>althy and poor districts. Tht>y
endeavored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct correlation
between personal family income and educational expenditure . Sec
text infra, at - . The District Court may have been relying ou
this notion of n>lative discrimination based on family wt>altb. Citing
appellees' statistical proof, the court emphasized that "those diHricts mo ·t rich in property also have the highest median mcomP ...
while the poor property districts are poor in incomp .... " :337 F'.
Supp., at 282.
51 At oral argument and in their brief, appellees suggrst that
description of the personal status of the residents in districts that
spend less on education is not critical to their case. In their vww,
the Texas system is impermissibly discriminatory even if relativdy
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Bnef, at 43-44;

I
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in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discrimmate·
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as suspect. It is, after all, the first function of courts, when
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause, to examiJW
the classifications drawn by state laws.
The several precedents of this Court relied upon
by appellees and the court below provide the proper
starting point. The individuals or groups of individuals who constituted the class discriminated against in
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny, 52 the Court invalidated state laws that prevented indigent criminal
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been shown if the State had provided some
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20-21. There are mdicatJOos m the District
Court opinion that it adoptE-d this theory of district discrimination .
ThE' opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial statu~
of districts and early in the opinion it describes appellE-es' class a~;
being composed of "all ... children throughout Texas who live in
school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp., at 282
52 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Long v
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington,
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357
F. S. 214 (1958).

I
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effectively singled out all potential candidates who were
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot"
(!d., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute
denial of a position on the primary ballot.
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance systemdiscrimination against a class of definably "poor'' persons-might arguably meet the criteria established in
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however,
demonstr~t-es that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics ~ of wealth classifications can be found here.
First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates agaii1st the "poor," appellees have made no
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in Connecticut." 53 Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," 5 J
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts. 55
53 Note, A .Statistical Analy;;is of the School FinanrP Dcci;;ions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YalP L..T. 1303, 1a2R-1329
(1972).
s..J !d., at 1324, n. 102.
55 !d., at 1328.
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Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases,
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it, 56 a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal/
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages.'n Nor, indeed, in view of the
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of education except
in the most relative sense. Texas assorts that the
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate"
education for all children in the State. By assuring teachers, books, transportation and operating funds.
~6

Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth discrimination is
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, therefore, the difference in quality between two schools can be determined simplistically by looking at thP difference m per pupil expendi- I
tures. This is a matter of considerable di;;pute among educators and
commentators. See nn. 86 and 101, infra.
(
~ 7 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137,149 (1972) ; Mayer v.
c~ty of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington,
372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963): Douglas v. CaLifornia, 372 (T S
as:~, 357 (1963).
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to 11guarantee,
{or the welfare of the State a.s a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 1A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.~" 58 The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court . that it has fulfilled
this desire and that it now assures uevery child in every
school district an adequate education." 59 No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional
terms. 60
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court
may have embraced a se~ond or third approach, the
58 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 13 (emphasis added) .
Indeed, even though local funding has long been a significant aspect
of educational funding, the State always has viewed providing an
acceptable education as one of its primary functions. See Texas
State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 1, 7.
59 Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1.
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would
be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary educatiOn were
made available by the State only to those who are able to pay a
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined
class of "poor" people-definable in ferms of their inability to pay
the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case
before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide a~ education to those who can afford it.
It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base educatwn
for all children and has attempted, though imperfecily, to ameliorate
by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities
between local tax resources.

I
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second of which might be characterized as a theory of
relative or comparative discrimination based on family
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower
the dollar amount of education received by the family's
children .
The principal evidence adduced in support of this
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory,
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures.
Second, the court found a direct correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.
Supp., at 282, n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then
it might be argued that expenditures on educationequated by appellees to the quality of education-are
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to provide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-·
Also, it should be recognized that median income ~tatistics
may not define with any precision the status of individual familirs
w1thm any given districts. A more dependable showing of comparative wealth discrimination would examine factors such as the
average income, the mode, and the concentratwn of poor families m
any riJ::;trirt m addition to the median incomP.
1
"· ·
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the
comparatively poor, 62 and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees'
proof fails to support their allegations or the District
Court's conclusions,
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 101o of the school districts in Texas. His
findings, set out in the margin, 63 show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
to education. For the remainder of the districts- 96
districts comprising almost 90 % of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest median
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees,
<()

2

63

Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U . S. 535, 547-549 (1972).
Market Value of
Median Family
State c~ Local
Taxable Property
Income
Expenditures
Per Pupil
Per Pupil
in 1960
Above $100,000
$5,900
$815
( 10 districts )
$100,000--$50,000
$4,425
$544
(26 districts )
$50,000--$30,000
$4,900
$483
(30 districts)
$30,000--$10,000
$5,050
$462
(40 districts )
Below $10,000
$3,325
$:305
(4 riistrict R)
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no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination. 64
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined- district wealth
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by
the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might
be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might b
viewed as encompassing every child in every district
except the district that has the most assessable wealt
and spends the most on education. 6 ~ Alternatively, th
class might be defined more restrictively to include chil
dren in districts with assessable property which fall
64 Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured
in terms of assessable property and the collective we!llth of families
residing in the district measured in terms of median family
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation:
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per
pupil, and districts with high asses ed value per pupil have low
income per pupil"); Davies, The Challenge of Change in School
Finance, in Nat'! Educational Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School
Finance (1967). Note, 81 Yale L. J ., supra, n. 53. See also Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 522-527.
6 ~ Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest,
supra, defined the class they purported to represent: "Plaintiff
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school
pupils in California, except children in that school dist rict .. ,
which ... affords the greatest educational opportnnit y of all , chooJ
districts within California." 96 Cal. Rptr., at 604, 487 P. 2d, at
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. Sec also Van Dusactz v Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp., at 873.
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below the statewide average, or median, or below some· /
other artificially defined level.
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts. 66 The system
of alleged discrimination and the class~ defines nave
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majorita.t;ian
political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect classification. But appellees have not relied solely on the
contention that wealth discrimination would constitute
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to
rigorous judicial scrutiny. 67 They also assert that the
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior
decisions of this Court require the application of the
strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1971); Kramer v . (Inion
66

Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texas system
one resulting merely m discrimination between distnrts per se
smce this Court has never questioned the State's powt'r to draw
reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions wit bin its
bordprs. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Ed·ward County,
:377 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGo1can v. Maryland, 366 U S,
420, 427 ( 19Gl) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 ( 1954).
67
The Court has never heretofore held that thP exJstt'nce of
de facto wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate ~round
for invoking strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
U. S
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, (1972).
a~

_!;.

_---
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Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this questionwhether education is a fundamental right, in the sense
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by
the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention
of courts and commentators in recent years. 68

B
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." !d., at 493. What was said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may oreasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an
68

See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971);
Van Dusactz v. Hat field, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons,
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 339-394; Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 534--541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note, Educatwnal Financing & Equal
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. L. Rev.
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases:
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth DiscriminatiOn, 14 Ariz. L .
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).

-
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opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro.:
vide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.'' Ibid.
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237 1
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v.
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907).
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic dedication to public education. We
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
bf education both to the individual and to our society''
cannot be doubted." 0 But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Claus.e. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging· upon the right of interstate
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importance of the
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
We
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
bne for which the Court lacks both authority and com•w ::3il7 F . Supp , at. 28il.
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petence. But MR. JusTICE S·rEWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale of
the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection ... .' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and gives.
to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Emphasis from original.)
MR. JusTICE SrEWART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
r,esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." I d,, at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
as a right of constitutional significance/ 0 and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importance of that right.71
70
E. g. , United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,238 (1970) .
71
After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), there could
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Court applied
the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family
grant provision under its AFDC program . A frdcral district court
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Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla...
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im. .
posed on tenants in f:lUits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law,
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita. .
tions implicated "fundamental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," such as the "need for
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is
instructive:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee to access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... inheld the provision uncon~titutional, applying a stricter standard
of review. In the course of reversing the lower court the Court
distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that in that case
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel." Jd., at 484 n. 16.
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volv-es the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by
showing some compelling state interest. See also J efferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of th-ese cases in addressing the question
now before the Court is plain. It is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guarjiteed by the Con~
stitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 7 :l
The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despitr its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970) , that "welfare provides the means to obtain rssential
food, clothing, housing and medical care."
73 In Eisenstadt the Court struck down a Massachusel ts statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection
~tandard." !d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, thr Court
recited the proper form of equal protection analysis: "if wr wrre
io conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479
(1965),] the statutory classification would have to be not mrrely
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state intrrrst." Ibid . (emphas1s in
original).
72
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 ( 1972); 71 M osley .y.
Police Department of the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92
('1972); '" Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942)..'';
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution . .t'1~El-:-t--~c::;;
as we have said, the undisputed importance of education
~ill not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation. It is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded pro~
tection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist
71
Dunn fully canvasses this Court's voting rights ca::;es and explains that ''this Court has made clear that a citizen ha~ a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdictwn." Jd., at 336 (emphasis
supplied). The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal
treatment. in the voting process can no longer be doubted evrn
though, as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in state elections is
nowhere expressly mentioned." Src Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.
112, 138-144 (MR. JusTICE DouGLAs), 241-242 (MR . .Ju~:-~TTCE BRENNAN); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 140-144 (1972); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 625-630 (1969);
Rey1wlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554--562 (196-±); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 379-381 (1963).
75
In Mosley the Court struck down a Chicago antipicketing
ordinance which exempted labor picketing from its prohibitions.
The ordinance was held invalid under lhe Equal Protection Clause
after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the ordinance was one "affecting First Amendment interests." I d., at 101.
76 Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a state law
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals." Implicit in
the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation
is among the rights of personal privacy protectrd under the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade,- U. S. ·- , - (1973).
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that education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the /
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not
been taught to read, assimilate and utilize available
knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect
to the right to vote. 78 Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded vigoroH~ protection agamst unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never I
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or
77

See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367,
390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) .
,
.
78
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally pro~
tccted right, we assume that appellers' references to that right are . / 1
simply shorthand references to the C9fHiltitB1igm Jly protcctrd righ V,
~ Cru--vto participate on an equal basis with other qualified voter8 whrnever
A
IJ /1
I
n
the State haH adopted an electiw procr~s for drtermining who will
~
represent any segment of the State'::; population. Ser n. 74, supra .

I
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the most informed electoral choice. That these may be
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and
of a representative form of government is not to be
doubted. 70 These are indeed goals to be pursued by a
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan- /
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short.
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of
educational opportunities to any of its children, that
argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process.
79
The States have often pursued their entirely legitimate interest
in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise," Katzenbarh v.
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (1966), through such dcYicrs as
literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to vote. See ibid.;
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970). And, where those rrst rictions havebeen found to promote intelligent use of tlw ballot without
discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previously
deprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld
their use. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S,
45 (1959), with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (Mr . .Justice
Black), 144-147 (MR. JusTICE DouGL ...s), 216-217 (Mr. Justice
Harlan), 231-236 (MR. Ju;:;TICE BRENNAN), 282-284 (MR. Jusncr~
S1'EWART), and Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1069) ,
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Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so, under ap-.
pellees' thesis, Bandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey
v. N ormet, suj:mi, would no longer be g~od constitutional law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found I
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly dif- I
ferent from any of the cases in which the Court has
applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of I
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived;''
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of
some such fundamental personal right or liberty. Sec
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 ( 1942); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 338- 343 (1972). A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies
in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court
80

See Schoettle, The Equal Prot ection Clause in Public Education, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 13 9-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, n. 68,
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interc~:~t Representation : Proposal for
a National Tenants' A~sociation, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173
n. 61 (1969).

,.
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in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses
well the salient point: 81
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] . . . .
"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was
permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla81

Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rigl1ts Act of 1965
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English
literncy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even though
the language of instruction was other than English. Th1s Court
upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it discriminated
against those with a sixth grade education obtained m non-English
speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal
legislation.
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tive mind .... '" Id., at 656-657.
original.)
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(Emphasis from

The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes to.d ay-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aid- was implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its
quality. 82 Of course, every reform that benefits some
more than others may be criticized for what it fails
to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re~ormatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's
efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the J
Constitution. 83

c

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, c§]fthat
this is not a case in which the challenged state action
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.
we need not rest our decision: however' solely on the
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of
the traditional standard of review, which requires only
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This casf"
02 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society
vf Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kick, 313 F. S11pp.
944 (MD Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) .
83 See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; McDonald v,
Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U. S. 802 (1969) .

..
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represents far more than a challenge to the manner in:
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.s' This Court has
often admonished against such interferences with the
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause:
"The broad discretion as to .classification possessed
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a
familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes . . . . " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83,
87- 88 (1940) .
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., U. S. (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U. S. 435, 445 (1940).
84
See, e. g ., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890) ;
Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 508- 509 (1937) ;
.A.llied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959) .
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Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. 85
85 Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace
it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing system,
however, would be statewide financing of all public education with
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or
expansion of sales and income taxes. The authors of Private Wealth
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alterna~
tive scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In sunplest
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particular rate of
property taxation the district would receive a stated number of
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier"
districts that collect more than the stated amount at any given
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators arc
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory underlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance.
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701., 706-708
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-596 (1971);
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971) ;
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The

·'
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of ·
educational policy, another area in which this Court'sindeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsel's against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public wel- ·
fare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. 8., at 487. The very .
complexity of the problems of financing and manag- .
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there
will be more than one constitutionally permissible .
method of solving them," and that, within the limits
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even
the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education 86an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationCase for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30.
86 The quality-cost controversy has received considerable attention. Among the notable authorities on both sides arc the following: C. Jencks, Inequality ( 1972); C. Silberman, Crisi~ in the
Classroom (1970); Office of Education, Equaliiy of Educntional
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Educational Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller eds.); J. Guthrie,
G. Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. Stout, Schools and Inequality
(1971) ; President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swan80n, The Cost-Quality ·Relationship, in lOth Nat'! Conf. on School
Finance, The Challenge of Change in School Finance 151 (1967) .
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ship between cost and quality, is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education. 8 7 And the question of the proper relation~
ship between state boards of education and local school
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-examination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like
problems of education is not likely to be devined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing
conditions.
It must be remembered also that every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for
the relationship between national and state power under
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While "[tlhe maintenance of
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
which this Court examines state action~ 88 it would be
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before
87 See the results of the Texas Governor's Commit tee's st atcwidc
survry on the goals of education in that State. I Governor's
Committee Report , at 59-68. See also Goldstein, supra, n. 38,
at 519-522; Schoettle, supra, n. 80; authorities cited inn. 86, supra.
88 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 532 (1959)
(MR. J usTICE BnENNAN, concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U. S. 641 , 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting) .

I

71-1332-0PINION

40

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

us, in which we are urged to abrogate the systems of
financing public education presently in existence m
virtually every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These·
same considerations are relevant to the determination
whether that system, with, its conceded imperfections,
nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next
turn our attention.

I

III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands /
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from each source. 89 The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students.uo Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 20 teachers ;n one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 9 2'
ln 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billion dollars for
education and a little over on e billion came from the Minimum
Foundation Program. Texas Research League , supra, n. 20, at 2.
vo Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13.
91 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18.
112 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15.
89
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vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided. 93 Additional funds
are earmarked for current operating expenses and for
student transportation 94 as well as for free textbooks. 95
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation 96 and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.97 As reflected by the 621o increase in funds allotted
to the Edgewood School District over the last three
years,0 8 the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, however, has · been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
a~sure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program. 99 Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
the market value for any category of property varies from
J

Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.
Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51.
95 Tex. Educ. Code § 12.01.
us Tex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5) .
97 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.301 et. seq.
98 See ante, at - .
qg Gilmf'r-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15.

98

94
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its assessed value. 100 The greatest interdistrict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability for supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupilteacher ratios and higher salary schedules. 101
There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texas.
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White,
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16.
101
Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 18. As previously
noted, te>.:t accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated
inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education.
While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point
of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic
portunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include the effect on
quality of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher salary o;chc.'du le::;.
The state funding in Texas is designed to a::;sure, on the average, one
teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable
ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6,000 per
year is sufficient in Texas to att ract qualified teachers may be more
debatable, depending in major part upon the location of the school
district. But there appears to be little empirical data that supports
the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that document·
the existence of a dependable correlation between the level of public
school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruction. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the
absence, up to this time, of s:.ttisfactory techniques for judging
their ability or performance. Relatively few school system~ have
merit plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are
usually mcreased across the board in a way which tends to reward the
least deserving on the same basis as the most deserving. Salaries are
usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and
according to predetermined "steps,'/ extending over 10-to-12 year
periods.
100

op-1
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. We disagree.
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as well as
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State. 102 The power to tax local
property for educational purposes has been recognized
in Texas at least since 1883.103 When shifts in the distribution of population, accompanied by changes in local
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
1Q 2 President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85, at 9. Until
recently Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely statef\.lnded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amended
its educational firwnce statute to permit counties to collect additional funds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The
rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the
question before the Court today:
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educational facilities as good as the people of the counties want and
are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above
and beyond established minimums provided for their people encourages the best features of democratic government ." Haw. Sess. Laws,
Art. 38, § 1 (1968).
1 03 See text accompanying n. 7, supra.
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of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a.
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of local
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
artic].llated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for
its child." 105
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large
measure of participation in and control of each district's
schools at the local leveL In an era that has witnessed a
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of
government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451
(1972). MR. JusTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education
of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our
society." ld., at 469. THE C:s:IEF J usTICE, in his disG. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State of
New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of educational finance, see J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at 39-95.
105 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by
James S. Coleman, at vii.
104
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sent, agreed that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as
well." !d., at 478.
The persistence of attachment to government at
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the decisionfnaking process that determines how those local tax tlollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory .. .
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches
than does public education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary,
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely
because it does not provide the same level of local
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re.ton New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932),
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spect to expenditures for some districts than for others/ 07
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425·-426 (1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interest:s-, while occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. On
where state action impinges on the exercise of fu amental constitutional rights or liberties must it be ound
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. C . Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972); S elton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is als well to
remember that even those districts that ha e reduced
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much
they spend on education, still retain under th present system t
ow availa 1 fun s will be
allocated. They further enjoy the~
107

s~/1

MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas
system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee
complete freedom of choice to every district. He places special
emphasis on the statutory provision which establishes a maximum
rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local srhool district may
tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The
maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the
District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable
rate. (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100, seep. 7, infra, is the equalized
rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellees do
not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality
of that statuary provision is not before us and must await litigation
in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk;
313 F. Supp. 944 (MD FLa. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
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ous other decisions with respect to the operation of the
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be"'
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along
with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies. 108
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They see no justification for a system that allows, as
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation- indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going
108 This theme--that greater state control over funding will lead
to greater state power with respect to local educational programs
and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public
education. See, e. g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Education, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64,
77-78 (Bowers ed. 1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and
The State 26 (1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school
board, has some control over the purse, there can be little real feeling in the community that schools are in fact local schools .... ") ;
Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution, in Sat. Rev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971)
("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power follow
money .... "); Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally-Shared Taxes
21 (1931) (" [S]tate administration of taxation is the first step towards state control of the functions supported by these taxes . .. .") .
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental.
or whether he agrees that the consequence is inevitable, it certainly
cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on
the part of parents, educators, and legislators.

'.
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to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.100 Nor·
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable wealth within any district may result from
any number of events, some of which local residents
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within
a district by various actions-public and private-of it~
residents.
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then - · _,;-it ~ilYiillPermisSilile in providing othe-; necessary services currently financedjlrom local property
taxes, including local police and 'ffre protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total
abrogation of local property taxation and control as
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this
Court to nullify statewide
for nancing public
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subdivisions in which citizens live.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that.
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Its I
shortcomings have been acknowledged by Texas, ~
has persistently endeavored-not without some success109 This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of "territorial uniformity''
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218,
230--231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Cf.
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668
(CAlO 1969).
.
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to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local partici~
pation. The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried,
ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class.
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69-70 (1913). One also must remember that the system
here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other
State. In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for
financing public education reflects what many educators
for a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 States, especially where the
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and nowhere yet adopted. The constitutional test under the
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or
(1973).
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-, We hold that the Texas plain abundantly survives this
test.

IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on
the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P . 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appro-
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priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major state legislative
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed.110
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
,empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from those initially assumed. 111 There is,
"Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors Coons, Clune,
and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of public education
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole." J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 2.
Their thoughtful and imaginative work paved the way for the
suits, including the present one, attacking the school finance system.
lndeed, the District Court approved the authors' thesis verbatim.
337 F. Supp., at 285. The authors have often cautioned their supporters, however, against speculating that "fiscal neutrality" would
be a panacea for the poor or for racial minorities. Ibid.; Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971).
111 Any alternative that provides significantly more money for
any major percentage of the State's schools is certain to encounter
political barriers. Any such new plan would require additional
resources from some source: funds will either have to be taken
away from more prosperous districts or new revenue sources will
need to be tapped. The former alternative is not likely to be sup110
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the
District Court, 112 has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance. 113 . That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.u 4
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the locaported by those districts that have had the good fortune to
have developed attractive education facilities and programs. The
latter alternative, i. e., new taxation, appears to be no
more palatable politically. It has been calculated that $2.4
billion of additional school funds would be required to bring
all Texas districts up to the present level of expenditure in all
but the wealthiest districts-an amount more than double that
currently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Research
League, supra, n. 20, at 16-18. At a time when nearly every State
and locality is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers
already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to
question whether a decision of this Court nullifying present state
taxing systems would result in doubling public funds committed
to education.
An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of almost 30
States, focusing on these practical consequences, claims with some
justification that "each of the under~igned states ... would suffer
severe financial stringency." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellants, at 2 (filed Att. Gen. of Md., et al.).
112 See nn. 38 and 63, supra.
1.1 3 Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, Inequities
in School Finance (1972) (Monograph prepared by Professor Berke).
114 See also U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City School
Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW Publication).

·.
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tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools. 115 Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
clustered in school districts that have relatively less
assessable property. 116
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional function restrain us from undertaking through the
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity
and vital concern to the States and localities. That
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax:
systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These
115 See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. J. 1303
(1972); see text accompanying n. 45, supra.
116 See Goldstein, supra, n. 38, al 526;
C. Jencks, supra, n.
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example,
1
'59% of minority students live in districts above the median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School District-is above the local average in both the amount of taxable
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72% of its
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and North
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18%
Mexican-American enrollment respectively.
Berke, Carnavale,.
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 673.
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matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed much by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions
come from the lawmakers
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1332
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the
United States DisDistrict et al., Appellants,
trict Court for the
v.
Western District of
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al.
Texas.
[February -, 1973]
Memutandam
MR. JusTICE PowELL of.~~
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts.
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants 2
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner

t"

1 Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school.
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School District." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
2 The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name this
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants.
After a pretrial conference, the District Court issued an order dismissing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San
Antonio Independent School District has joined in the plaintiff:/
challenge to the State's school finance system and ha;; filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of that position in this Court.
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of Education. the State Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court
was impa11cled in January 1969.~ In December 1971 4
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court.
I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools.(; Early in its history,
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
".\ three-judgr court \ra~ proper!)· convened and i here arr no·
question.,; a~ to the Di~trict Court'::; juri~dirtion or the direct appealabilit)' of it~ judgment. 2R U. S. C. §§ 2281, 125:3.
'Thr trial w:t~ delayed for two yo:u~ to permit C.litcnoin• pretrial
di~covcry and to allow completion of a prnding; Tcxa~ ]Pgi~lnti, ·c
inYc~iigntion concerning the nerd for rcform of its public school
fin,tncp systt•m. Rodripuez v. San Antonio Ind. S!·hool Dist., 3:17
V SnpJl. 280, 285 n. 11 (IVD Trx. 1971).
":337 F. Rupp. 280. The Di.-trirt Court ;;ta.wd its mand:tlr for
i wo yc:m; to pro,·idr Trxas an opportunit)· to n•mcdy thl' inrqui1 irs
found in its financing program. The court. howrrer, rC'tninrd jHri~
clirtion to fn~hion its own rrmrdial order if tbe St:nr failrd to ofTrr·
un nccrptahlr plan. !d .. at 2~fi.
n Trx. Con~t.. Art. X,§ 1:
·'A )l:rnrrnl diA'u,..;ion of kno\\'ll·dgc being Pl'~(·nti:tl to the prP~<'tTation
of the right~ :mel libN1ic~ of the pcoplt• it ~hall be iht' dut~· of 1hc
Legi~luture of this Statr to makr ~uital.Jlr pro,·ision for thr ~ll]lport
and mainten:mcr of public Rchoob."
!d. , Art. X, § 2:
" The LC'gi,..;Jaturr shall a;; rarl)· ns prartirahlr r~t:tbli~h frr<' schools
throughout thr Statr, and shall furuish mcnns for their support, by
taxation on property."

. '
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schools. relyillg on mutual participation by the local
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
taxes 'vith the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildittgs" ancl for the "further maintenance of public free schools.'' ' Such local funds as were
raised "·ere supplemented by funds distributed to each
eli strict from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds." The Pennane11t School Fund, established in
1854," "·as enclo\\'(:>d \\·ith millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support.'" The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes.'' served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational fnncls throughout the late
1800's and first half of this centur-y. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
the State.' ~
'Gntil recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State.' 3 Sizable differences
Tex. Ccm~t. 1~7G. Art. 7, § 3, n~ nmendrd , Aup;. 1~, 1~S3.
·' Trx. Cons!., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4, 5.
H Uammel 's Laws of Trxas, p. 117~.
Srr Tex. ConHI. , Art. 7, §§ 1, Z
(intrrpreti\·e rommrntnrie~); T Heporl of Go\·rrnor's Committee on
l'uhlir School Education. ThP Challenge and the Cbnn<·e 27 (19fi9)
(hereinafter Govrrnor'~ Committee Report).
"'Tex. Con~t., Art. 7, § 5 (~rr all"o tlw interprrti\·e rommentaTT);
\' Covrmor',.; Commit trr Hrporl, at 11-12.
11
The ,· ariou~ somrr~ of rrvrnur for the Available Rrhool Fund
arr ratalog<'d in Texns Sta1r Bel. ol' Edur. , Trxns Statrwide School
Adeqttar~· Run· e~ · 7-15 ( 108S).
'~Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amendrcl, ?fo\·..5. 1918 (~rr intrrprel i\·r commentar.\·).
" ' T Cio\·rrnor's Comrnittrc Hrport, at 85; TexaR Stair Bel. of
Edur., supra. n. 11, at 5-7; .T. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman,.
7
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State brcame
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced. 1 ' The location of commercial and industrial proprrty began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
·were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.'"
In due time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities."; Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's, 1 "
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.")
Private Wealth and Public Education 49 (1970); E. Cubberley,
School Fund~ nnd Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905).
11
B~· 1940 one-half of the State'l;l populntion wao; clu~tcred in itR
metropolitnn crnten-;. I Governor's Commit tcc Report, at 35.
15
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To llnvr What Wc l\Iust (1948).
JG H. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950); Texa~ Brl. of
Ecluc., supra, n. 11.
17
R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. It should be noted that riming this
period the median per pupil exprncliture for all schools with an
enrollment of more than 200 was approximately S50 per year.
Dming thi~ same period a surve~· conducted by the Statr Board
of Education concluded that "in Texas the best educational ad,·antagrs ofTered by the State at present may be had for the mrdian
cost of S52.67 per year per pupil in avrrage dail~· attrndance."
Texas State Bel. of Educ., SU]Jra, n. 11, at 56.
l H 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sc::;~. 19:39, at. 274
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th Lcgi~.,
Reg. ScK~. 1940, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per sludcnt).
10 General & Spec. Laws of Texa~, 49th LcgiH., Reg. Sc~s. 1945,
c. 53, at 75.
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to·
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that ·would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interclistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program.~" It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas."'
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80% of the Program and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20% . The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-

"° For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of a foundation program, ~C'c R. Stills, supra, n. Hi. Sec nl~o V Go,·ernor's
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research L0aguc, Public School
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972).
~ 1 .For the 1970-1971 ~:>chool year this state aid program accounted
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation contributed
41.1% and 10.9% was provided in fecl0ral funds. Texas Researcil
League, supra, n. 20, at 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent. considers <'ach county's share of all property
in the State.~ ~ Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county."" The
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children ~·
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.2" Today every school district docs impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in Hl49, expenditures for education-from State as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
22 V Governor's Commit trr Hrport , :1t 4-I-4R.
""At prt:>,,rni ihrrr arc· l ,Hi1 school di~trict<:l in Tex:l ~. Trxa~ Resrnrrh Lragur, suprn. n. 20. at 12.
21
' In 194R the Gilmrr-.\ikrn Commit1 rr found th:1 t ~omr school
di~trirts were not ley~ · in:r an)· local tax to suppo1i rdn<":lt ion.
Gilmcr-Aikron Committcr. supra. n. 15, at Hl. Thr Trxns State
Board of Eclucat ion Rurn~- found 1 hat o\·rr 400 rommon and
inclrpcndcnt srhool cli ~ t riri s wrrr lr\·ying 110 loeal proprrty tax in
198.'i-193fl. Texas Stnto Bel. of Edur., supra n. 11, at 39-42.
"" Gilmcr-Aikrn Committcr, suwa, n . 15, at 15.
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
500jo."" In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State."s Minimum
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years.""
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with another more affluent rlistrict in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-America1l descent: approximately 907o of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 67o
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960-the lmYest. in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district con~6
27

I Govrrnor's Committee Report, at 51-53.

Texas Rr,rnrrh Lra)l;ur, supra, n. 20, at 2.
In the ~·r: m; brl wren 19-Hl and 1967 the an>r:q~;e ]lOr pupil
rxpenditnrc for all rnrrcnl oprrating rxprnse~ irH·rea:·:rd from S206
to S493. In that ~amr period ca]1iial rxprncliture~ inrreasrd from
SH to $102 per pupil. I Govemor'..; Committee Hcport, a1 .13-54.
29 III Govrrnor's Committrc Heport, at 113-14(); Brrke, Carnavalc, Mor~?:an & White, Thr Trx:lR School Finance Cn~r: A ·w rong
in Search of a Hrmecl~·, 1 .J. of L. & Edur. 6.59, 6R1-Gi\2 (1972).
30 The family imomc figurrs are ba~ed on 1960 census statistics.
28
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tributed $26 to the education of earh child for the 19671968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248.'n Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil.')"
Throughout this litigation Edge>vood has been contrasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unl.ike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo. having only 18'}'o Mexican-Americans
and less than 17o Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49,000 "" and the median family income
"'The Avaibblr School Fund, tcclmicall~·, provide~ a ~rcond
:.;ource of state mane~·. That Fund has continued as in ~·r:HH past
(~ee text accompnn~·ing llll. 1f>-19, supra) to distribute uniform
per pupil grants to e\·er~· district in the St:1te. In 19f>R thi~< Fund
:>llotted $98 per pupil. However, because the A vnilablr School
Fund contribution is nlwars subtracted from a district'~ rntitlcmrnt under the Foundation Program, it plays no significant role
in rducational finance todn~·.
'" While federal as~i~tanre ha:-; an ameliorating effect on the di!Trrence in school budget::; between wealthy and poor di ~ trict;;, the
District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that
court that it should considrr the effect of t br frdrral grant in
assrRsing the discrimination cl::lim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State
has not renewed that contention here.
33 A map of Bexar Count~· included in the record shows that
Edgewood and Alamo Hrights are among the ~mallest dist ri cts in
the county and arc of approximate!:-,; equal size. Yrt, as the figures
above indicatr, Edgewood'~ student population is more than four
timrs that of Alamo Heights. This factor obvious!~· aecounts for
:t significant percentage of the clifTrrence~ between t hE' two districts
in per pupil proprrty nlnrs and expenditures. If Alamo Heights
had as many student;; to educate as Edgrwood docs (22 ,000) it::; per
pupil assessed property valne would be approximately $11,100 rather
than $49,000, and its per pupil expenditures would therefore have
been considerably lower.
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1967-Hl68 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid/' more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62% increase over
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budget-from local, state, and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupiP 5 These
:u Thr figurrs quoted above var:;· slightly from those utilized in
the Di~trict Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782. These trivial
differcncrs are apparently a product of that court's reliance on
slightly different ·tatistical data than we have relied npon.
35 Although the Foundation Program has mnde significantly greater
contributions to both school districts over the last several years, it
is apparent 1hat Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Higher salaries aro
guaranteed to teachers having more yenrs of experience and possessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Heights, which
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Texas
Program is not unlike that presently in existence in a number of
other States. C. Coon~, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to districts that
already spend more per IJUIJil, such Foundation formulas have been
described as "anti-equa,lizing." Ibid. The formula, however, is
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absoluto terms. The percentage
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth,
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 207a
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
grant.~a It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial .interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State, 3 s still exist. And it was
dispnrity between the two Tcxns districts is dimi.nished substantially
by State aid. Alamo I-Iei~hts derived in 1967-1968 almost 13 times
as much money from local tnxe8 as Ed~ewood did. The State aid
gr:mts to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approximately two to onr, i. e., Alamo Hrights h:td a little morr than twice
as mueh money to spend prr pupil from its combird Stnte nnd local
resourcr.-J.
:w Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13.
'"The Economic Indrx, which determines rach county's share of
i he total Local Fund Assigmnent , is basrd on n eomplrx formula
('onrei\·ed in 1949 when the Foundation Progrnm was in,titutrd.
See text at pp. - - - supra. It has frequently been suggrsted
by Texas resca,rrhrrs thnt the formul:t be nlterrd in s<:>vernl respects
to pro\·ide a more arruratr rrflrrtion of lorn! tnxpaying ability,
rspeeially of urban school>'. V Governor's Committee Report, nt
48; Berke, Carnavale, l\1organ & White, supra, n . 29 nt 680-681.
::R The Di~trict Court relied on the finding,.; pre~e nted in an
nfficl:wit submitted by Profe~;;~o r Berke of R)Taeu ~e. Hi,.; iinmpling
of 110 Texas school di~trirt s demonstrated a direct r·orrelation
between ihe amount of a di~triri ·~ taxablr propc·rty and its level
of per pupil expenditure. His siucly also found n direct corrclni ion
het ween a district's median family income and per pupil rxpendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the
anwunts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
337 F. Supp., at 282.
Finding that wealth is a
"suspect" classification a.nd that education is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show tha.t it was premised upon some compelling
turrs as well as n n im·erse correlation bet WC'Cil pcrc0n1 ngr of minori; ies and cxp0ndi1 mes.
Ca1 rgorizecl b~· EC]u:-tlizrd PropNt~· Ynlue~,
l\fedinn Family lnC'ome, and Sta1.e-Local Revenue

M a.rket T' a(ue
of Taxable
PropPrty
Per Pupil
AbOI'C 8100.000
( 10 Districts)
8lOO,OOO-S50.000
(26 Distrir1s)
550,000-830,000
(30 Di;-;tric1s)
$30,000-810,000
( 40 Districts)
B0low $10,000
( 4 Districts)

Median
Per Cent
lJJ inoril !I
Pupils

State &
Local
Revenues
Per Pupil

8%

$8115

84,42.'>

32%

S544

84,000

23%

5483

S5,050

31%

S-+62

83,325

79%

Family

Income
From 1000
85.900

Although tlw correlations with respect to fnmil~· income and r.1r·c
appear on!~· to exi<:>t at the C'xtr0mcs, and although the affiant's
met.hodolog~· hns been questioned (~C'e GoldstC'in, Interclistrict
Inrqunlitirs in School Financing; n Criticnl Annl~·sis of Serrano v.
P1"iest and it~ Progrny, 120 U. Pn. L. Rev. 504, 523-525 nn. 67
and 71 (1972)), insofar ns any of these correlations is relevant
to the constitutional thr~is pre~C'ntC'd in this cnse we mny accept
its basic thru~L For a defrnHc of the relinbility of the affidavit, see
Berke, Carna\·nlc, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29.
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that " [ n] ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
!d., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights '19 or that
involve suspect classifications. 10 If, as previous decisions
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,'11 the Texas
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." ' 2
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" ·~~ and "imperfections," '11 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
39

E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
'l'hompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
40
E. g., Graham. Y. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184
(1964).
11
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and the
cases collected therein.
42
Appellants' Brief, at 11.
1
'" Ibid .
.,. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3.

This, then,

.s

establishe~

the framework for our analysis.

We must decideaJ first, whether the Texas system of financing
public education

operates to the disavdantage of some

suspect classification or impinges upon a fundamental
right 61#1tilii# explicitly or implicitly protected by
the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial
scrutiny.

If so, the judgment of the District Court

should be affirmed.

If not, the Texas scheme must still

be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers
some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore
does not constitute an invideous discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed for the ~ ,_.
s~ve~~l r~asons that follow, ""e find neither th~ suspect ~
c assi c~twn nor the fundamental interest analyRis
1':1.
persuasive.
"
47

See cases cited in te:1.:t, a t -, infra.

~··
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The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing Jaws in other
States, 4 8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrirnination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination , the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the
traditional systems of financing public schools, some
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms,
and whether the relative- rather than absolute- nature
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial_.. . . . .
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court
below.
The case comes to us with no definitive description of
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which
the discrimination claimed here might be described.
'"8errano v. Priest. 96 C'nl. Rptr. IJ01 , ·l-1'7 P. 2d 124-1. 5 Cui.
:)cl .'iS4 (1971) ; Van Dusartz "· llatfielrl. :3;34 F. Rupp . S70 (l\'finn .
1971): Robin son v. Cahill. liS N . .T. RupPr. 22:3 , 2S7 J\. 2d uq
(1972); Millik en v. Green. No. 54.809 (Mirh . S. C. , Jan.-, 1973).

'

'

'.
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The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as
discriminatory (1) against "poor" persons whose incomes
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," "n or
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others,"0
or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happell to reside in relatively poorer
school districts.r.' Our task must be to ascertain whether,/
in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as sus4
n In thrir complaint, appellres purported to reprr:-;ent a cla~s
composrd of prr:-;ons who arc "poor" nne! who rr~idr in school districts having n "low valur of proper!~·." Third Amrndrd Complaint,
App., at 14. Yet apprllrrs havr not definrd the term "poor" with
rrference to any ubr::olutr or functional IPvrl of impeeunity. See
text infm, nt - . Srr also Appellee~' Brief, at 1, 3; Tr. of Oral
Aq~., at 20-21.
r.o Appcllres' proof at trial focu.~rd on compnrati1·e differences in
famil~· incomes bel wC'rn resident~ of we; til h~- am! poor distrirts. They
endcnvored, apparent!_,., to show thnt there e'-iRts a dirrrt rorrrlation
bctwern ppr,.:on:ll famil~· income and rduentionnl exprnditurcs. Sec
text, infra, at - . Thr Dir::triet Courl mny havP been relying on
this notion of rdnti1·e di~criminntion bn~ed on family wraith. Citing
apprllee...;' stal i~t ical proof. t hr t'Ourt rmJ1ha~izrcl thu I "those disricts moRt rich in propcrt~- al~o havr the highrst median income ...
while the poor pmpcrty district~ arr poor in income .... " 337 F.
Su11p. , at 282.
"'At oral argument and in thrir brirf, appellrr~ ~uggr,.:( that
drscription of the pcr::;onal statuH of the rrsidrnts in di~tricts thai
Rprnd lr~s on rducation is not critiral to their rase. In thrir Yirw,
the Trxa~ sy:>tcm is impermissibly di,.,rriminatoTT r1·rn if rrlativrly
poor cli~trirts do not contain poor peoplr. Apprllees' Brirf, at -+3-44;
Tr. of Oral Arg., ::t t. 20-21. There arr indication~ in the District
Court opinion that it adopt rei thi~ t hrory of eli At rict disrrimina.lion.
Tho opinion repeatedly emphasize~ the comparati1·e finnnrinl status
of di~tricts and carl~· in tho opinion it de~rribe::; apprllees' class as
bring romposrcl of "all . . . children throughout Trxns who live in
school districts with low property valuationR." 337 F. Supp., a.t 282.
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pect. It is, after all, the first function of courts, w·hcn
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause. to examine
the classifications drawn by state laws.
The several precedents of this Court relied upon
by appellees and the court belov> provide the proper
starting point. The individuals or groups of individuals who constituted the class discriminated against in
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a Ineaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny," 2 the Court invalidated state laws that prevented indigent criminal
defendants from acquiring a transcript. or an adequate
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been sho>VJJ if the State had provided som ~
"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript.
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
""Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971); Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner "· California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v.
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. ·washington,
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357
U.S. 214 (1958).
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dealt only with defendants who could not pay
,

p

--

~ £1.l llll

resonrf'=--n»rl ... J,~

1-.-J

Sentencing judges may, and often do, consider the
defendant's ability tii to pay, but in such circumstances
they are guilded by sound judicial discretion rather than
by constitutional mandate.
o1

--

! _...., .. ..., .._.. ...... ..._.

tt.L..LV

were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens. ~
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for
primury elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts
found in the previous cases were present there. The size
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars,
effectively singled out all potential candidates who wert'
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot"
(Id., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute
denial of a position on the primary ballot.
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance systemdiscrimination against a class of definably "poor" persons-might arguably meet the criteria established in
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however,
demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing char-
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acteristics of wealth classifications can be found here.
First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that th e poorest families arc not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "r i]t is clearly ill correct ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in Connecticut." "" Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," r. 4
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts."''
Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases.
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
1
' ''

X ote, A Sta ti ~ tica l Anal~·~ i s of tlw Sthool Finnn cr Dl' r· i ~ i o n ,.;: On

Winning Battl e:; a nd Lo~ in g Wars, Ell Yair L . .T. 130:3, 1:{2S-1:{29
( 197:l).
'''!d. , at 1324, n . 102.
"·' !d .. at 1328.
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assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather. it is that they arc receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it;;n a sufficient answer to appellees' argu~ t is that at least where wealth is involved the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute ~ e ~ v~kf/ 0 " p ...
or ~plete e~lia:lit)~ Nor, indeed, in view of the ~~vt<-1 ,.J ..,._,tfl.~4'
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of education except
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate"
education for all children in the State. By assuring teachers, books, transportation and operating funds, / '
the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee,
for the welfare of the State as a ·whole. that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.'" "8 The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled

e.'";J1

En,ch of apprl!rt•:;' po~~ible theories of wealth di~r·rirnination i~
founded on the m:sumption that the C)Ua!it~· of edul'ation ntriel:i
directly with the nmonnt of fundR expended on it :111d th:1t, therefore, the difierence in quality brtween two schooll:i can be drterminecl s impli~ticnlly by looking n t t hr differenrr in J1E'r pupil expenditures. Thi>; is n, mnttrr of ronf'idrrnble di:,:pute :unong educator~ and
commentators. Ree nn . RG and 101. injm.
" 7 E. g., Bullock Y. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (19n); Mayer v.
Cit!! of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) ; DraperY. vVashinoton,
:~72 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douolas v. California, 372 U. S.
:35:3. 357 (1963).
"' Gilmer-Aikrn Commitlre, SU]Jra. n. 1.5, at 1:3 (rmpkt~i~ mldrcl) .
TnclePd. eYen though local funding has long bern a ~ignifif':mt asprct
of edn('ational funding;, tltr Statr always hm: Yie~Yed pro,·icling an
accrpt able education as one of its primary funr1 ions . Rre Trxas
State Bel. of Eclnc., supra, 11. 11, at 1, 7.
"

6
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this desire and that it 110\Y assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education." an No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional
terms. 60
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court
may have embraced a second or third approach, the
second of which might be characterized as a theory of
relative or comparative discrimination based on family
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower
the dollar amount of education received by the family's
children.
The principal evidence adduced in support of this
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub59

Appellants' Brief, at. 35; Reply Brief, at 1.
An educational finance system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination ca::;rs would
be considerably cloRN. If elementary and secondary education were
made available b~· the State only to those who are able to pay a
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a dearly defined
class of "poor" people--definable in terms of their inability to pay
the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would prrsent a far more rom]1clling set of circumst:mces for judicial assistance than Ihr case
before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide an education to those who ran a!Tord it.
H has provided what it considers to be an adequatr base education
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to amrliorate
by state funding and by the local a ·sessment program the dit'p:uities
between local tax resources.
60

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

21

mitted by .Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory,
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures.
Second, the court found a direct correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,.
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.
Supp., at 282, n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then
it might be argued that expenditures on educationequated by appellees to the quality of education-are
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative·
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to provide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-..,. . .
signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the
comparatively poor, 62 and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees'
proof fails to support their allegations or the District
Court's conclusions.
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately lOtJo of the school districts in Texas. His
G'l Also, it should be recognized that median income stati~tics
may not define with any precision the status of individual familie:;
within any given district~. A more dependable showing of comparative wealth discrimination would examine factor::; such as the
average income, the mode, and the concentration of poor families in
any district in addition to the median income.
6
~ Cf. Jefferson v. Ilaclcney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-549 (1972).
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findings, set out in the margin,n:• show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96
districts comprising almost 90% of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest median
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appelleesv
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination. 64
""Market Falue of
Taxable Prupert!J
Per Pupil

Median Family
Income
in 1960

State & Local
E:rpc11d£tures
Per Pupil

Abo,·e $100,000
$5,900
~Sl5
( 10 d i~trict~)
$100,000-$50,000
S-+,425
$514
(26 districts)
$c[~:3
$50,000-$aO,OOO
$-+,000
(80 di~trirtR)
84()2
$30,000-$10,000
$5,050
( 40 di~t rict~)
Below $10,000
$8,:~25
8305
( 4 districts)
4
(; Studies in other State~ h:n·e al~o quc~t ionPd thr ('Xi-<tCII('(' or
n n~' drpendablE' correlation betiYeen a dicit rirt ',; IYealt h mpasnrPd
in trnn:< of as8cs8nble prop<•rt~· nnd thr collcctiYr wealth of fcnniliC's
re~iding in the district mcasmecl in term~ of mC'di:1n fnmil~·
ineonw. Ridrnour & Uidrnour, Sermno \'. Priest: 'vVrnlt h and
Knnsas School Financr, 20 K::m. L. 213, 225 (1972) ('"it ran be
argurcl that thrre rxist:,; in Knnsas ;~hno~t an iuvrr:::c rorrrbtion:
distr•irts with highrE<t inromo prr pupil han· low :u;~cs~rcl Y:tlur per
pupil, and cli~trirts with high n~sr~~rd Yalue prr pupil hnYr low
income prr pupil"); Da l'irR, The Chnllrn11:e of Ch:111ge in School
Finnme, in Nat'! Educational Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School

y •
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This brings us, then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by
the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures. it may be argued that discrimination might
be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect cor-relation between district property wealth and expenditures
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be
viewed as encompassing every child in every district
except the district that has the most assessable wealth
and spends the most on education. 6 " Alternatively, the
class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property 'vhich falls_...-.below the statewide average, or median, or below some
other artificially defined level.
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts. 66 The system
Finance (19G7). Note, Sl Yak L .•T.. su]n-a. n. 53. 3el' nl~o Goldstein, supra, n. 3S. at 522-.'i27.
6
" Indeed, thi~ is preci~cl)· how the plnint iff~ in Serrauo v. PTicst,
sup1'a. defined i he rln;;s t hr~r purportrd i o rcprrse11i : "PlnintitT
ehildren claim to repre~rni a rln~~ ron~isting of nil ]lllhlic school
pupils in Cnlifornia, cxrrpt rhildrrn in thnt. srhool di~triet . . .
which ... afford~ the grcntest cducntionnl opportunit~· of all srhool
districts within California." 96 Cnl. Rptr., at 604, 487 P. 2d, at
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, nt 589. Sec nlso Vau Dv,sactz v. Hatfield. 334 F _
Supp. , nt Rn.
6
" Appeller~. howen~r, hn \ ' P :woidrd dr~rribing the Trxns s~·~tern
as one rcsuliing mrrdy in di~rriminntion between districts peT se
since this Comt h:1s nrvrr qur;;tionrd the State'::; power to draw
reasonable di;;tinrtions bctwrcn politirnl subdiviRions within its
borders. GTij]in v. County School Board of P1'ince Edward County,
877 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGwan v. MaTyland, 366 U. S ..
420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. MaTyland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
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of alleged discrimination and the class is defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is hot saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect classification. But appellees have not relied solely on the
contention that wealth discrimination would constitute
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to
rigorous judicial scrutiny. 67 They also assert that the
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise

~

whether education is a fundamental right, in the sense
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by
the Constitution
.,., The Court haR nevrr herrtoforr held that the rxi::;tener of
de facto wealth discrimTmttion alone providrs an adequate ground
for invoking strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Ilarper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, U. S.
(1972).
nssce Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 584,487 P. 2d 1241 (1971);
Van Dusactz v. II at field, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N ..J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons,
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 339-:394; Goldstein, supra, n. 3 , at 534-5-n; Virira., Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L.
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note, Educational Financing & Equal
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B

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." Id., at 493. What "vas said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of education. Such ao/
opportunity where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms." Ibid.
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237,
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v.
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v.
Protoct,ion of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 l\Iich. L. Rev.
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases:
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Di,;criminatiou, 14 Ariz. L.
Rev. 88, 120--124 (1972).
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Society of Histers, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v.
Ma.ssachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907).
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic dedication to public education. We
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
of education both to the individual and to our society"
cannot be doubted.r.u But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate
travel. admonished that v l irtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importallcc of the
interest a.ffectecl, ,,.e would have gone "far toward
Ibid.
We
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
one for \vhich the Court lacks both authority and com~
petence. But MR. JusTICE S'l'EWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the lfundamental rights~ rationale of
the Court's equal protection decisions:

"r

"The Court today docs not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection ... .' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and gives
to that right no less protection than the Constirw

:337 F. Supp., nt 28:3.
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tution itself demands."
phasis from original.)

394 U. S., at 642.

27

(Em-

Mrt. JusTIClD STrDWART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to close .i udicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
r·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right. and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." !d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
as a right of constitutional significaJJCe, 7 " and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importance of that right. 71
./"""
Lh1dsey v. 1\- onnet, 405 F. S. 56 ( 1972), decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is
Hot the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imE. (!., United States v. Guest. 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oreoon v.
JIJitrhell, 400 U.S. 112,238 (1970).
71
Aftrr Dandridoe v. Williams, 397 C :3. +71 (1970), therr could
70

br no linp;cring que~tion nboul the ron~titut.ional fcnmdation for
the Court':-; holding in Shapiro. In Dandrid(JI' the Coml :1pplied
the rational basi:> tr::;t in re,·iewing :.I:t r~·ln nd ',; maximum family
gr~mt proyi:-;ion under it~ AFDC program. A frdrl'<il di~trirt eourt.....hrld thr proYioion uncon:;titutional, appl~·ing a 'tridrr ~tandard
of review. In the cour~e of rewr~ing thr lower rom I t hr Court
distinguished Shapiro proprrl~· on the ground ihat in thnt C'ase
"the Court found state intrrfrrcnrc with thr con~titutionnll~· protcctrcl frreclom of inter:;tate trawl." Id., at 48-1: 11. 16.
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posed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law,
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
I d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," such as the "need for
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is
instructive:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee to access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
Id., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
( 1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in:_..,
volv·es the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
1
~ Tho Court refused to apply tho strict scrutiny test despite its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970), that "welfare provides tho means to obtain cs~cutial
food, clothing, housing and medical care."
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o doanofQ_

.. -·-

' ® It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional r1·ghts 1·n

•

the name of

guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.

\

in assessing whether~l;erltt~f the- te~n~l'Jtbttbwrr H~~
~ right to education iwHml~ Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 73 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972); 74 Mosley v. Police Department of

Thus the
.. ,,_,c.ltl'j
I

~?
~

/1 '- I

"Q. """"""'

h

" ..

'1

ff

:J In Eisenstadt the Court struck down it Massachusetts statute
11rohibiting the distribution of contraceptive device~, finding that
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection
~landnrd." !d., at 447 n. 7.
Nevertheless, in dictum, t he Court
rrcitrd the proper form of rqual protect ion analy~i~: "if wr wrre
to concludr that the Mas~achu set ts statute impingrs upon fundamental frerdoms undrr Griswold l v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479
(1965),] the statutory classification would hitvc to be nol merely
rationally related to it valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of it compelling state interr~t." Ibid. (emphasis in
orig;incd).
---rrnunn fully canva~ses this Court's W]J'Q] ]))"9t~eh¥ voting rights
cases and explains that "this Court has made clear that a citizen
has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." ld. , at 336
(cmphasi~ supplied). The constitutional underpinnings of the right
to equal treatment in the voting process can no lon!];er be doubted
even though, as the Court noted in Har]Jer v. Virginia Bel. of Elec~;). S- ~ 3 0
tions, 383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), "the righL to vote in state cleetions
is nowhere expressly mentioned." Sec ullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. /
~ 1:)4,'(1972); Kramer v. Union Free chool District, 395 U. S. 62-!,
(1969); R eynolds v. Sims, 377 U. . 53\(1964); ~'f. v, S'M-lJe"J~ c3 7 :;J. v,

7

$$ if·.S'J...

.s .

J'

)

3 )9-Jg} (.ICJ~J).
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the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972);
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 76

7

"

Skinner v.
_

®

catio would not alone cause the Court to depart fr m
the usua tandard of reviewing a State's social and
ion. appellees contend that education
economic leg1
is distinguishable
n other service~ a"nd benefits pr~~ I - .
vided by the State bee "'e iJ bears a peculiarly clos~
relationship to other ri~ht
corded protection under
the Constitution. / Specifically. the 'nsist that education is a fm1,.damental personal right because it is essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freed
an to intelligent.. .utilization. of tho right-to
Tin
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees 1
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas"
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative
~
tools. Likewise, ~the corollary rigllt to receive in formation 77 becomes little more than a hollow privilege when
the recipie11t has not been taught to read, assimilate and
utilize available knowledge.

-------.._

In Mosley the Comt ~trurk down a Chieal{o nntipirkrting
ordinance whic·h rxempted labor picketin~ l'rom it,; prohibitions.
The ordinance w~ts held im·alid under 1he Equal Protee1 ion Clan~c
aftrr subjec1inl{ it to enref11l ~crntiny and finding that 1he ordin:m!'e
was not narrow]~· drawn. The ~trirtcr standard of l'f'\·irw wa~ nppropriately appliC'cl Hillr<' the orclinmH'(' \\'as one "afTrrt ing Fir~t An•<·mlrnC'nt intNc~t s." !d .. at 101.
76 Skinner applird the ~tandard of rlo~c srrutin~· to a ~tntr law
J1f'rmit ting forcrd stc•riliznt ion of "habitual criminal~." TmpliC'it in
t hr Court's opinion iH t hr n•<·o~nition t h:1 t t hr right ol' Jll'O(·n•a t ion
is among thr right~ of prr~onal priYar.\· prolrrtrd undPr 1hr Constitution. Scr Roe\'. Wade.- U . S . - . - (197:~).
•• SL'<', e. g .. Red Lion Broadm~tin(! Co. v. FCC'. 39.'i U. S. :367.
390 (HJG9); Stanley \'. Georoia. 394 U. S. 557, 56-~ (1960); Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 3Rl U.S. 301 (19G5).
75

~~
0

H...cJ-

of course
Education,

i##IJJ#IIIII#II~IIdl,

~~~~~~#jil#lijilitll#jll61did

is not among the

rights ana lien r·ss afforded explicit protection under
our federal Constitution. And, as we have said, the undisputed importance of education

wdill not alone cause this

Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing
a State's social and economic legislation.

It is

appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close

~~~

relationship to other rights ~~~~ accorded
protection under the Constitution,

Specifically, they

insist that education is itself a fundamental personal
right because it is essential to the effective exercise
n

of First AmetSdment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote.

,, .
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Il

to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs
are freed from governmental interference. But they are
not values to be implement.ed by judicial intrusion into
oth~rwise legitimate state activities.
_
e. Yl f·, ~i11lo (t
Even if it were conceded that some lquantum of e ucation is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental
rights where only relative differences in spending levels
are involved and where-as is true in the present caseno charge fairly could be made that the system fails to
,.
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process.
. ... __..-...
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees'i1exus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so, under appellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey
Sec Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Edu cation, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971) ; Vieirn, supra, n. 68,
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for
a National Tenants' Association, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173
n. 61 (1969).
80

.

.
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v. N ormet, supra, would no longer be good constitutional law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-_ or
tion is a fundamental rightrand have found those arguments unpersuasive4 in tee f.)FQiJQ);)t QQJ~t~m\o. In one
further respect \Ve find this a particularly inappropriate
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial
6.
t j, ~ ,_.
scrutiny. The present case, in ene most(basic sense, is
significantly different from any of the cases in which
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal c,.un St1iiJ~ ICJrlll. l/ ~
legislation touching upon ~.mdanun~tat""hghts. Each or
p H.l +t:.r. 1-c:J
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived,"
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of
some; fundamental personal righ~ ~ee Skinner v. Okla7wma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S ..
330, 338-343 ( 1972). ~ critical distinction between
those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR.
JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient
point: 81
}7 ()

"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge b~· registered voter::;
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English
literacy tests for voting . The law was suspended as 1o rr ·idents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six ~·en r,; of ednration at an "American-flag" school in that co untr~· even though
thr language of inst ruction was other than Engli~h. This Court
upheld the questioned proviHion ovrr the claim that it di~crimin ntcd
ngainst those with a sixth grade education obt ainrd in 11011-English
~;peaking schools other t han t he ones designatrd by the federal
lrgislation.
81
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] . . . .
"[The federalla''" in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect -extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... wa.s
permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take
one step at a time. addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind .... '" Id., at 656-657. (Emphasis from
original.)
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today-iucluding the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aiel-was implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its
quality. 82 Of course, every reform that benefits some
Cf. Meyer Y. Nebraska. 263 U.S. il90 (1923): Picree \'.Society
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (192.5): Har(Jrave v. Kicl.· , :n:~ F. Supp.
944 (MD Fla. 1970), Yacntcd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971).
82

Rider A, p. 3;- Rodriguez

®
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in

accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not

®

a case in which the challenged state action must be ~ubjected
to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws

~~~~(..~i e...

A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the
Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the

applicatio~~i/traditional

standarddof review, which

requires only that the State's system be shown to bear
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes .
.
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
•"' Sec Schi/b v. Kuebel, 404 U. 8. :357 (1971); McDonald -v.
Board of Election Commissioners. :39-~ U. S. 802 (19()9).
84
Srr, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Peunsylvania, 13-l U.S. 232 (1890);
Cannicharl Y. Southem Coal Co., :301 U. S. 495, 50R-509 (1!);3i);
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959).
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been recog11ized. . . . LT]he passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is 11eeded
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a
familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes . . . . " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83,
87-88 (1940).
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,U. S. (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U. S. 435, 445 (1940).
Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.s"
sG Those who urge that the pres0nt. system be invalidat0cl otfer
liltle guidance as to what type of Rchool financing should r0place
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy, another area in which this Court'sindeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsel's against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public welfare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems.''
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very
complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggest that "there
will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them," and that, within the limits
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
it. The almost. inevitable result of rejection of the existing s~·stem,.
however, would be statewide financing of all public education with
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or
expansion of sale's and income taxes. The authors of Private Wealth
and Public Education, suwa, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alternative scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In simpleHt
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particulnr rate of
property taxation the district would receive a stated mnnbn of
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier"
districts that collect more than the stated amount, at any given
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and again~t
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators arc
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory underlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance,
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some
Refiections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 705-708
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, .594-59() (1971);
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A l\Iodel Legislative
Rel:lponsc, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 ( 1971);
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Ednration: The
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Cbu~e, 1970
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30.

. ..
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problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even
the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts arc divided. Indeed. one of
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education 811 an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies
virtually every legal conclusion dra,vn by the District
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relation-,.......
ship between cost and quality. is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education. 87 And the question of the proper relation-;.
ship between state boards of education and local school
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and
degree of control, is now undergoing scarchi11g re-examination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like
problems of education is not likely to be devincd for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible COJJstitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
sn The qunlit~·-co~L ront ro\·crs~· has rcf'CiYcd eon.-<iclcr:ihlc a11cn1ion. Among the notable authoritiPs on both ~ide~ nrc thr following: C. Jcnrks, Incqu:tlit~· (1972): C. Sillwrm:111. Cri~i~ in the
Classroom (1970) : Ollirc of Educn tion, Equ:ilit r of Educa1 ion:d
Opportunit~· (Hl6G) (The Colcmall Report): On Ecpwlit~· of Eduf'nt ional Opportnnit~· ( 1972) (}f oyJJihan & l\lo~tcllN Pck) : .1. (; u t ln·ic•,
G. Klcindorkcr, H. LcYin. & T. Stout, School" and Incqu:ilit~·
(1971); Prc"iclc·nt's Comm'u on Sc·hool FinancP, supra, n. S5: Sw:mson, The Cost-Qunlit)' Hrlation.,hip, in lOth N:11'l Conf. on School
Finnncc, TIH' Ch:tllcngc of Change in School Finanf'c 151 (1967).
~ 7 Src the rc~nlt~ of the TPx:ts Gowrnor'~ Commi1trc's ~in1P\Yidc
~mw~· 011 tht> gonl~ of cdnc:1tion in that State.
T Goycrnor's
Committee Report, at li9-68. See nl~o Gold~tcin, suprn, n. :31',
a1 519-5:22; Schor1tlc, supra. n. 80; nuthoritic~ cited inn. 86, supm.
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so vital to finding even part l solutions to educational
problems and to keeping a reast of ever changing
conditions.
It must be remembered also t at every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clau has implications for
the relationship bet\Yeen national a 1cl state power under
our federal system. Questions of f eralism are always
inhercn t in the process of detcrminin 0 whether a State's _..-----.;a..:._
laws arc to be snhjccted to the-oomt ~H interest o
~ r~~ While "[t]hc naintcnance of
the principles of federalism is a foremo consideration <..v•·HI-,t~11wa~f,Ay I
in interpreting any of the pertinent pr visions under
which this Court examines state action, 88 it would be o~o- ~"e. 't-o /,~
difficult to imagine a case having a great r potential Jv~ c.lc.c.i lh{feoJ.
impact on our federal system than the one 1ow before 1-0 r•" Cll-lllt
'
v
JC1'41~1~ 1
stems of
us, in which we are urged to abrogate the
Sr...~>uf,.,
financing public education presently in exi tence in
virtually every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our co1 elusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is ar inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny.
1cse
same considerations arc relevant to the determina 'on
---..,.....;.;.;-._
whe er that system, with its conceded imperfections, ~
.supp.o.r:ted bra- reasom'tbl~&tio-Ral-~st It is to t 1is
question that we next turn our attention.

III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the ~ of
~
-r.at.iona]ityto t-IM., (. ~
1 t) .J
I
V".;\
I' rll f I! t hU1-,
·- flvre.,
~' Allied Stores of Ohio Y. Bott•ers, 35R U. S. 522, 532 (1959)
(Mrc JuHTJCJo: BHEi'I'N'AN, concurring): Katzrnbarh Y. lllorgan , 3R+
U. S. 641, 661 (1965) (Mr. Ju~tiec Harlnn , di~dcnting).

I

IJ.
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Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from each source." 0 The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 00 Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 20 teachers ;n one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 02. . /
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided. ~ Additional funds
are earmarked for current operating expenses and for
student transportation"·' as well as for free textbooks. 0 "
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation no and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.07 As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted
to the Edge,vood School District over the last three
years, 08 the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how9

•u In 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billion dollars for
<'duration and a little over one billion came from the Miuimum
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supm, n. 20, at 2.
00 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13.
n Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18.
2
H Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15.
H ~ Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.
n4 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51.
!J;; Tex. Educ. Code § 12.01.
0
01'ex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5).
07
Tex. Educ. Code § 16.301 et. seq.
u ~ See ante, at - .
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ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
assure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program. 90 Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
tho market value for any category of property varies from
its assessed value. 100 The greatest interdistrict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability for supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupilteacher ratios and higher salary schedules.' 01
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15.
There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texas.
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Gon·rnor'::;
Committre Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, :Morgan & White,
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16.
101 Texas Re~earch League, supra, n. 20, at 18.
A::; pre\·iolii;ly
noted, text accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated
inconclusively by the most thoughtful student::; of public education.
While alL would agree that there is a correlation up to the point
00

100

)
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results

~ .. ~ .. ~·1~H

~~

of pro1·iding the recognized e,-sent inb{iilC i~sue . .; of greatrst disagreement inelnde the effect on quality of pupil-tt'nchcr rnt io;; ancl
of higher trachrr !'alar~· ;;chedulcs. The state funding in Texas
is designrd to assure, on the avcrnge, one tead1er for e,·rr~· 2!'l
student~. whic·h i~ considcrrd to be n favorable rntio b:-· most >;tnndnrck Whether the minimum salar:-· of M,OOO per year is ~ufficent
in Texa,- to attract qunlifiecl te:1elwr~ ma~· be more dehnt:1blc, depending in major part upon the location of the >;ehool dis1Tict. Rut
there appears to be little empiric:1l d:tta thnt i<nppnrti' the :1clvnn- /
tngr of nn:v particular pnpil-trachrr ratio or that clocnmrnts the
existence of n dependn ble correlnt ion betwern t hr lrvrl of pub 1{
oo teachrrs' sal:nies and the qnnlit)· of thrir rbi~"room in.· uction. An intractable problrrn in draling with trachrr~' i<nlari' i~ the
abRc•nc·e. up to t hi.;; time, of s:Jtisf:lrt or~· terhniques fo .indgino·
thrir abi[it~· or perfO!'ll'ance. ~hP I'Q>'lilt i.> 1J1.;rt
nti1·rl\· few
"rhool ~.~·~tem1' ha 1·e rnrrit plan~ of fm~· kine!, with t nrhrr~' ~:darips
~ incrensed ar'ross thr board in n "·n~· whirh cward/ the least
deserving on the same bn~i~ as thr most clrsen·in;:!;. R:il:ll'irs nrr
mnnlly rai~ecl automaticall~· on the basi~ of length of srryire ;lnd
ncrording to predetermined "steps," extrncling owr 10-to-12 yc•ar
prriocls.
In making thr~e ohsrryations, we intrnd no criticism of existing )
prac t~ncl eNtninJ,· 1re im]lh· no opinion thnt tenrhrrs' F~nlnrif's
g<'nerall,· arc adeqnatr. A~ compared with other.~ of compnrahle
rclaeatiou there is r1·ery rrns011 to belirn; that terrrher~' 'alarirs
genrmlly, stnrting from :111 undul~· low base, haw failed r1·en to
kcrp abre;l~t of inAation. \Yr haw indudrd this commrntnr~· on
pupil-tenrhrr ratio~ and snhlr~· lr1·els not to expres.o fm~· opinion
with rpsprct to the Miequar~· of those in Texas ot· elsrwhrrr. lmt.
mere!~· to indicatr that it i~ not at all clrar-in the opinion of some
exprrts-t ha{ thr t ,,.o principal factors distingui~hing the schools in /
the J)lorc affluent di::;tricts from those clsewhrrc does drmon~t rabl)·
ncfnecessarily affect the qualit~· of the teaching.
__..;

I

l
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in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. We disagree.
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as \Yell as
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State."'" The power to tax local
property for educational purposes has been recognized
in Texas at least since 1883.'":: When shifts in the distribution of population, accompanied by changes in local
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial
and industrial ce11ters, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
of the pioneering work of two New York educational re~
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a
1 0

~

Pre.;ideni 's Comm 'n on Srhool Finance, supra, n. S5, at 9. Fntil
Hnw:1ii "·:1~ thC' onl~· Rt:1te th~1t m:tin1:JinC'd a plll'C'l~· stntC'I'nnckd eclur:liional pro~ram. In Hl0S, howC'YN, that StaiC' amended
its C'cluration:d fimmr0 st:1t11t0 1o ])('rmit eountirs to coiiC'ct. !lcldi1ional funds lornll~· and spend i ho..;e nmounts on its srhook The
rationale for thai rrrent legislnti1·e rhoieC' i ~ instrurti1·C' on the
que~ tion hd orC' thC' Court today:
" Und0r C'Xistin~ Jaw, rotmties arC' prC'eluded fmm doing flnything
in this ar0n, C'YC'll to spend thC'ir own fund~ if the~· so clC',;irC'. This
rmTC'ctiw lC'gi,laiion is llt'~C'ntly nC'C'clC'd in order i0 nllnw ronnties
1o ~o a bow ~·nd bC'~'oncl the ~:Hate's st ancl:1rds flllCI proYiclC' C'clurntion:ll fncilitiC',.; as good as 1hC' p00plr of ihr counti0s want :md
arc willing to pny for. Allowing lora] communiti0s 1o ~o abo,·c
and b0~· oncl C'stnblislwd minimums provic!C'cl for Owir pcopiC' rncourn~c~ the best l'ratnrC's of dC'moerntic go1·0rnmC'nt ." Hnw. SC'~s. Lnws,
.\rt. 3S, § 1 (1908).
HJ:. See tC'xt :trrompnn~·ing n. 7, S1t]JTa.
10
~ G. Stnt~'C'I' & R. Hni~, Financing of Bdu('ntion in the Stn1c of
'\"cw York (1923). For a thoron~h nnalysiH of th0 ronirihution
of thcsC' rdornwr~ nne! of thC' prior nne! suhsc!lliCnt history of edurational finanrC' , see .T. Coon~ , W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at 39-95.
l'N'e ntl~·
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means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of local
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing force s. As
articulated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
....

..

... ..

,.

1

The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these
two forces.

While assuring a basic education for every

child in the State, it permits and encourages a large
\

(...;vi...

measure of participation and control Pf each district's
1\
schools at the local level.
Id. , at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreea
that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public
support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance
78;;;..·;- from an educational standpoint as well." Id., at ..=4..;..
The persistence of attachment to government at
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. Tn part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the

~I

1 0 " J . Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Fore\Y1rd by
.James S. Coleman, at vii.

.,'
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freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches
than does public education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary,
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely
because it does not provide the same level of local
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-,......
spect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 107
New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,280, 311 (1932).
MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas
syste1~ie-trratiumrl because the means it has selected to effectuate
it interest in local aut.onomy fail to guarantee complete freedom of
choice to every district. He places special emphasis on the statutory 1wovision which e~tablislm; a maximum rate of $1.50 per $100
valuation at which a local school district may tax for school mainiemmce. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The maintenance rate in
Edgewood when thit> case wa~ litigated in tho District Court was
106

_ _ 107
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the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 ( 1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge \'. Williams, 397
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interests, while occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only
where state action impin es on the exerci~ of fun~a.-_...J
m~n~:lJrights must it be found to have chosen the least
res nctive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330, 343 (1972)' \It is also well to remember that
even those districts t1lat have reduced ability to make
free decisions with respect to how much they spend
on education, still retain under the present system the
3 (,"+ (),~, "11~
I
prerogative to decide how available funds will be allo11 \( ~ (.1'16~) .
cated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous
other decisions with respect to the operation of the
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of school finance. which place
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along
with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies.' 08
.5fi ])('f $100, h:m'l~' one-third of thr nllowahlr rntr. (Thr tr~x
ato of $1.05 prr ~100. ~rr p. 7. infra. i~ thr CI'JURlizrd mtc for
naintrna nco nnd for t hP rrt ir<'mPnt of bonds.) Apprll ers do not.
nim that the rriling wr~!'nt !~ · bar~ d!',:irrd tftx incrmHrs in Edgrwood or in any other T rx ns di~trirt. Tlwrefore. the eon~titution:tlity
of thnt s tntuor~r pro1· i~ion .i,: not hrforr u,: and mu ~t nwait litigation
in n rnse in which i1 i~ properl~· pr e~rntecl. Cf. Ilargrau r v. Kirk,
313 F. Sn[Jp. 944 (l\1D Fl:t. 1970) , ntratcd, 401 F. S. 470 (1971).
10 g This theme--that grrater ~tate rontrol ovrr funding will lead
to greater state powrr with r e.~pect to local educational progmms

\j
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Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They see no justification for a system that allows, as
they contend. the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going/
to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.10 \) Nor
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable wealth within any district may result from
and policies-is a rcrmrcnt one in the literature on finnncing public
cclucaiion. Sec. e. (1., Coleman, Thr Strugglr for Control of Educntion, in Eduration nne! Social.Poliry: Lora! Control of Education 64,
77-78 (Bowrrs rei. 1970); .J. Conant. Thr Child, The Pnrent, :mel
The State 26 (1959) ("Unless a loc:1l community, through its school
board, h[tS some control over the pur~c, there can be little real feeling in the communit~r that Rrhools arc in fact local schools .... ");
Ho\Yr, Anatomy of a Tievohtlion, in Sat. Rev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971)
("It is an axiom of Amcric:m politics that control and power follow
money .... "); Hutchin~on, State-Administered Locally-Shrtred Taxes
21 (1931) ("fS]tatc administration of taxation is the first step tow:ucls state control of the functions supported by these taxes .... ").
IrrespectiYe of whether one regards such prospect s as dctrimentnl,
or vrhcther he ngrers that the conscqucnec is inevitable, it certainly
C[lnnot be doubted that there i~ a rational b::tsis for this concern on
the p8rt. of parents, educalor::;, and !C'gislator;:;.
109
This Court has never doubted the 11roprirty of maintaining
politira 1 subdi1·isions within the Statrs :1ncl ha~ never found in the
Equal Protcdion Clau~e any per se rule of "territorial uniformity."
McGowan v. Maryland, 36(i U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218,
230--231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954). Cf.
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668
(CAIO 1969).
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any number of events, some of which loca1 residents
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within
a district by various actions-public and private- of its
residents.
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then
it must be equally impermissible in providing other necessary services currently financed from local property
taxes, including local police and fire protection , public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total
abrogation of local property taxation and control as
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this
Court to nullify statewide schemes for financing public
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subdivisions in which citizens live.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that
::;)..witnont ratimHt1: basis. Its shortcomings have been
,..
cknowledged by Texas, and it has persistently en.. i" ~ 1 1 ~ ~1
~0
M
eavored-not without some success-to ameliorate the
1
,
ifferences in levels of expenditure without destroy+ Q he. r nvo Je..~...l 1 ing the acknowledged benefits of local participation.
( The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, illQi t ~ (, 1-1171,.," fell·'/ 1 12,onceived legislation. It certainly is not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class.
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the
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Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69--70 (1913). One also must rememberr wneH w-eigh:
ing- tfle- issl:le 6f f'~tti6nali~ that the system here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State.
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for financing public education reflects what many educators for
a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 States, especially where the·
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no- 1/V\ Jt.,..
here yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether p..,.. (J tl! c.
here is a Fa.-tiruual baiilii f81" the challenged state action\
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly ~ this test.. \...
--.---\--f-:-v-L t 1 ",_,
I.
f-G.,IIW\0,. lv
. . h~ r..,
IV
S vr-v, vc.s
(
1
~ ~ I h 1'11 ,d
(t c,/· C:.
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on
-nu,~~
the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
v ' (?"'I ~ f f' ~
\
P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems approv.
s.
J
( ,,
priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major state legislative
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neu-

O

----'---

-
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trality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed. 110
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from those initially assumed.'" There is,
110 "Fisrnl neutr:tlity" is thr name ~i1·en by Profe>'sors Coons, Clune,
and Sug:mn:m to their the,:is that "thr CJUalit~· of public· rdueation
may not be a function of 11·rnlth othrr than the wraith or thr ~tate
as a whole." .T. Coons, \V. Clunr &. S. Sugarman, supra. n. 1:3, at 2.
Thrir· thoughtful and imagin:divr work pavrcl tiH· wn~· for the
>mits, including thr prrsent one, att:1cking the ~rhool fin:m<'c :-;~·~trm.
Imleed, the Distri~'t Court approYed the :1ut hors' the"i~ yerbntim.
;337 F. Supp., :1t 2~5. Thr author~ ha1·e oftrn cautioned thrir fmp]Jortcr.~, howrver. ngainst speculating thnt '·fisr:ll neutralit~ · " would
hr a panacea for the poor or for rari:tl minorit ir~. Ibid.; Coons,
C'lune & Sugnrman, A Fir,;t Apprai8al of Sernmo, 3 Y:d<' Hr,·. of
L. & Roc. Action 111, 114-115 (Hl71).
111 An~· alternntiYe that providf>!' ~ignific:tntly more money for
an~· major percrntage of thr Stntr's srhools iR certnin to rn<•flunter
political barrierR. An~· surh new plnn would rr(Juirr :1ddit ional
re8ources from some ~ourre: fund:; will either h:l\r to lw taken
awny from more pro~Jwrou~ diHtrirt~ or 11('\1' rrvrnuc .oourer~ will
need to be tapped. ThP formrr altematin' is not likrl~· to br ~UP :-
portrd by those districts thnt haYe had thr good fortune to
havr drYcloprd attmrtiw rduration fnrilities and pro.g rams. The
l:ttter altrrnnti1·r, i. 1'.. nrw t:untion, nppr:m.; to he no
It has bern ral!'ulnted thnt $2.4
more palatablr politirull~·.
billion of additional Rrhool fnnd.-; would br requirrd to bring
all Trxas di:;trirts up to 1hr prr~ent levrl of expenditure in all
but the wrnlthiest di~trirt~-nn nmount morr than double 1 h:Lt
C'urrently being Hpenl in Texns on public ednration (Tex<ls Rr:-enrrh
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, \vhose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educatioual expenditure in Texas were relied on by the
District Court,1l:! has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance.''" That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.114
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-/
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools. 11 " Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
Lea~ue, supra, n. 20, nt 16-lR. At a tirnr wllC'n nrnr!Y m·erv State·
and lo('ality is suffrrinp; from fiscal nnclrrnonrishment, aud with demands for ~ervirr;:; of all kinds burgeoning and with wear~' taxpayers
already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to
f!Uestion whether a decision of this Court nullif~·ing present state
taxing syRtems would result in doubling public fund~ committed
to education.
An amicus curiae brief filed on behnl f of a !most 30
States, focusing on these practiral ronse(]nenres, claims with some
justification that "cnch of the 11ndcr;:ignrd st11tes . . . would suffer
severe finanrinl stringency." Brief of Amir-i Curiae in Support of
Appellants, at 2 (filed Att. Gen. of Mel. , et al.).
ll 2 See nn. 38 and 63, supra.
113 Select Comm. on Ef!ual Educational Opportunity, Inequities
in School Finance (1972) (Monograph prep:urd b~· Profrssor Berke).
114
Sec al8o U.S. Office of Eduration, Finanrrs of Large City School
S)·stem;;: A Comparative Analy8i~ (1972) (HEvV Publie:tlion).
11 " Sre Notr, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battlr;:; and Lo~ing \Yar:;, 81 Yale L. J. 1303
(1972); see text aecompan~·ing n. 45, wupm.
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clustered in school districts that have relatively less
assessable property.llG
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional function restrain us from undertaking through the
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity
and vital concern to the States and localities. That
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax
systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These
matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed much by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions much come from the lawmakers
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.
116
Sec Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 525; C. Jencks, supra, n.
85, at 27. ,J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugnrmrm, supra, n. 13,
at 355-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example,
"59% of minority students liYe in districts aboYo the median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar Count~· b~' far the
largest district-tho San Antonio Independent School District-is above the local average in both thr amount of taxable
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yrt 72% of its
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1957-1958 it spent only
a very few dollars lcsR per pupil than tho North Enst and North
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% nnd 18%
Mexican-American enrollment respectively.
Berko, Carnavale,
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 573.
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UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71- 1332
San An Lonio Independent School On Appeal from the
United States DisDistnct et aL, Appellants,
trict Court for the
?.'.
Western District of
DemPt.rio P. Rodriguez et al.
Texas.
[February -, 1973J

MR. JoHTlCE PowELL delivered the opinion of th(·
Court.
This sUit, attacking the Texas system of financing
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec~
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school olistrict in San Antonio, Texas. L
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants 1
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
1
Not all of the children of these complainants attend publtc school.
.One family's children are enrolled in privale school "because of the
condit10n of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Distmt.'' Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
1 The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name thJS
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area whiCh were originally named as party defendants.
After a pretnal conference, the District Court Issued an order disImssmg the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San
Antomo Independent School District has joined m the plamtiffs'
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an
(Jm?ru.s r:unae bnef m support of that position in this Conrt ..
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of Educatiou, the ~tate Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court
was jmpaneled in January 1969. 3 In December 1971 4
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas ·school finance system unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 The·· State appealed and we noted probable j'urisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu~
tiona] questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision
of the District Court
I
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas 1
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools. 6 Early in its history,
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its
:< A three-judg<· court waH properly convenrd and there arr no
till<'StlOns a:; to the Dt:-;tnct Court':; junsdiction or the dtrcrt appeaJabiltty of tts judgment 2H U S. C. §§ 2281, 1253.
~ Th<> tnal was drlayed for two yrars to permtt exteJJ~Ive prctnal
discovery and to allow rompletton of a pcndmg; Texas Jrgislative
investigation concerning the nerd for rrform of tls puhlic school
finance system. Rodnguez \. 8an Antonio lnd. School Dist., 3:37
F. Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Trx. 1971)
"337 F. Supp. 280. Thr Dtstnct Court stayed tts mancbtr for
two years to provide TPxas an opportunity to remedy the meqmties
found in Its finanrmg program. Thr court, howeyer, rrtmncd junHdiction to fasht.on its own remrdtal orrl.rr 1f thr State failrd to offer
an acccptahlr plan . !d ., at :21\(i
.; Trx. Consl., Art. X, § I
'' A genrral diffu~wn of kllowledgC' l>elll!l; r~srntt:~l to the prrservatwn
of the rights and liberties of the peoplr 1t shall be the duty of the
LPgislature of thts State to makE> ~uitable prov1;;ion for the support
1md mamtenance of pubhr Ke hool ~ '
!d., Art. X,§~ .
"The Legtslaturr shall a::, (•arly as prarttrablP C'stabltsh frer sc hool~
throughout the State, and ;;hall fur111~h means for thrir support, by
1axat 1011 on propertv,
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildiugs" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools.'' 7 Such local funds as were
r,aised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds. 8 Tho Permanent School Fund, established i11
1854,!! was endowed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support.' 0 The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes," served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program proviclin12: frt'e textbooks throughout
thE' State.'~
Until recent tunes Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State.'~ Sizable differcncC's
7

Tex. ConsL. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as nmE'nrlrd. Aug. 14. 1SS3
Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.
n Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Ari. 7, §§ 1, '2
(interpretive commentaries) ; I Report of Govrrnor's CommittE'e on
Public School Education, The Challrnp;e and t hr C'hatlC'P 27 ( 19fi9)
(herE'maftrr Governor's CommittE'e RE'port)
10 TE'x. Const., Art. 7, § 5 (seE' also the mterprrt1vr commE'ntarv).
V Governor'>; Committee Report, at 11- 1'2.
11
,
The vanous sources of revenue for t lw Ava tlable School Fund
are cataloged m Texas State Bd. of Educ. TexaR Statrwtdc School
Adequacy Snrvry 7-15 (1938)
12 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, a~ amendrd, Nov f), 191S (srr interpretivr commentary)
13
I Govc•rnor's Comm1tter Report, at :~5; TrxaH State Bd. ol'
Educ., :>u.pra, n. 11, at 5-7 . .T. Coon,;. W CltiiH', S. Sugarman,
x
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
'shifts became more pronounced. 11 The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education. 1r'
In due time it became apparent to those conccmed
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities. 1<l Prior to 1939 the Avallable
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the
amount was increased several times in the early Hl40's,'b
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946. 1"
Private Wealth and Public Educatwn 49 (1970) , E. Cubbcrley,
School Funds and Their Apportwnment 21-27 (1905).
14 By 1940 one-half of the State's populatwn was r!uHterecl in ns
metropolitan centers. I Governor's Committee Report, at 35.
15 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Have What Wr l\Iu~t (1948) .
16 R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950): Texas Bel . of
Ecluc., supra, n. 11.
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12.
lt should be noted that during this
period the median per pupil expe~1dit ure for all schools w1t h an
enrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year
During this same period a survey conducted by the State Board
of Education concluded that "in Texas the best educatwnal advantages offered by the State at present may be· had for the mcdwn
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average dmly attendance ."
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 56
18 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Se;,;s. 1ml0, at :l74
.($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Law::; of Texas, 41\th Lrgis,
Reg. Sess. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per student)
19 General & Spec. Laws of Trxns. 49th Lcg1s . Hf:'g. Sc~~ . 1045:·
153, at 7.5.

c.
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee'R
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. 20 It is this Program that accounts
today for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas!'
The Program calls for state and local co11tnbutwns
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salariefl,
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The 8tate.
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80o/o of the Program and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment 1s first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a corn2
°For a complete history of thr adoption in Tc·xas of a foundation program, see R. Stills, supra, n. 16. SPr alHo V Go,·crnor',_,
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research LPagur, Public School
Finance Problems m Texas 9 (Intenm Report 1972)
21
For the 1970-1971 school year tins state aid program accounted
for 4 .0% of all public school funds. Local taxatwn contributru
41.1% and 10.9% was provided 10 federal fund~ . TrxaH Rrsrarrh
League, supra, n. 20, at 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property
in the State. 22 Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county. 2 " The
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of
its revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold.
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children 2 '
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.25 Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for educ'a tion-from State as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
22

V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48.
At present there are 1,161 school districts m Texas. Texas HE-search League, supra, n. 20, at 12.
24 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee fou!lcl that some Hehool
districts were not levying any local tax to support rdneation.
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 16 . The Texas State
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and
independPnt school districts were lrvying no local property tax Ill
1935-1936. TPxas State Bd. of Educ., supra n. 11 , at 39-42
25 Gilmer-Aiken CommitteE'. supra, n. 15, 11t 15
23
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
5007a .26 In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising pet
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 2 H Minimum
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any
school's budget--have increased from $2,400 to $6,000
over the last 20 years. 2 "
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
may be compared with another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School District is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6%
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960--the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district conI Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at "2.
~In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pup1l
expenditure for all current operating expenses mcreased from $206
to $493. In that same period capital expenditures mcreasrd from
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Comm1lice Report, at 53-54
'29 III Governor's Commiitec Report , at 113-146; Berkr, Carnavale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Case: A Wrong
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972)
30 Tho family income fi11:ures are based on 1960 census Rtat 1st irs.
26
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967~
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248.:n Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil. 32
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo, having only 18% Mexican-Americans
and less than 1 'fo Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49,000 33 and the median family incomP
31

The Available School Fund, technically, provides a second
source of state money. That Fund has continued as in ~·ears past
(see text accompanying nn. 16-19, supra) to distnbute uniform
per pupil grants to every district in the State. ln 1968 this Fund
allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available ~chool
Fund contribution is always subtracted from a distnct 's t'ntitlcment under the Foundation Program, it plays no Significant rolt'
in educational finance today.
32 While federal assistance has an amelwrating efTect on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor dist nets, the
District Court rejected an argument made by tht' State in that
court that it should consider the effect of the federal grant m
assessing the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. Tht> State
has not renewed that contention here.
sa A map of Bexar County included m the record shows that
Edgewood and Alamo Heights arc among the smallest di;;tricts m
the county and are of approximatt>ly equal s1ze. Yet, a;; the fip;nres
above indicate, Edgewood's student populatiOn 1s mort> than four
times that of Alamo Heights. This factor obviously accounts for
a significant percentage of the differences bet ween the two diHt nctb
in per pupil property values and expenditurrs. If Alnmo He1ght:-;
had as many students to educate as Edgewood dot's (22 ,000) 1ts per
pupil assessed property value would be approximately Sll,lOO rather
than $(9,000, and its per pupil expenditures would therrfore havr,
been considerably lowPr
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to spend $594 per pupil.
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid, 34 more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62% increase over
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, statr
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budget-from local, state, and federal sources.
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupiP 5 Tht>sf'
The figurPs quoted above vary slightly from thosf' utiJrzrd rn
the District Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 7 2. These tnviaf
differences are apparently a product of that court's reliancr on
slightly different statistical data than we have rclird upon
35 Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greatrr'
contributions to both school districts over the last. several years, rt.
is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grant~
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Hrgher salanes aw
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and poR··
sessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo He1ghts, whJCh
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Trxa~
Program is not unlike that presently in existence m a number of
other States. C. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at,
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to distncts thar,
already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formula~ have been
described as "anti-equalizing.'' Ibid. The formula, however, H.i
anti-equalizing only if viewed m absolute terms The perccntagf'
34

71-1332-0PINIOK
10

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v . RODRIGUEZ

recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth,
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 209-'o
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
grant. 36 It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State, 38 still exist. And it was
disparity betwee;n the two Texas distrJCts is diminished ub~tantially
by State aid. Alamo Heights derived in 196'7-1968 almost 13 times
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State md
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approximately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice
as much money to spend per pupil from its combied State and local
resources.
36 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13.
37 The Economic Index, which determines each county'~ share uf'
the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a romplrx formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was JnRtituted.
See text. at pp. - - - supra. It has frequently been suggested
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered m several respects
to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying abihty,
especially of urban schools. V Governor's Committee Report, at
48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29 at 680-681
38 The District Court relied on the findings ]Jresented in an
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His l:lampling
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct rorrelat 1011
between the amount of a district's taxable property and its level
of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct correlatiol')
between a district's median family income and per pupil expendi~
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
!d., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental rights 39 or that
involve suspect classifications. 40 If, as previous decisions
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, 41 the Texas
financing system- and its counterparts in virtually every
other State- will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 42
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson) 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
40 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184
(1964).
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and the
cases collected therein.
42
Appellants' Brief, at 11.
43 lbid.
44 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3.
39

I
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."
This, then, establi~hes the framework for our analysis.
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of
some suspect classification or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined
to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and
appellate processes, 45 and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote:w Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education/ 7 that there is a
E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. CaLifornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
46 Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1964); McDonald v.
Bd. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. /
134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser,- U.S.- (197a) .
47 See cases cited in text, at-, infra.
45
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuasive.
A
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing laws in other
States,' 8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the
traditional systems of financing public schools, some
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms,
and whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicia
' 8 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 , 5 Cal.
ild 5 4 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield , 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn .
1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187
(1972), Milliken v. Green, No. 54,809 (Mich. S C., .Jan.-, 197:3) .
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scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court
below.
The case comes to us with no definitive description of
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which
the discrimination claimed here might be described.
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as
discriminatory ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 40 or
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others/ 0
or ( 3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer
school districts. 51 Our task must be to ascertain whether.
In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a class
composed of persons who are "poor" and who reside in school districts having a "low value of property." Third Amrnded Complaint,
App., at 14. Yet appellees have not drfined the term "poor" with
rrference to any absolute or functional level of imprcunity. Ser
text infr-a, at - . See also Appellees' Brief. at 1, 3: Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 20-21.
~ 0 Appellees' proof at trial focused on comparative differences in
family incomes between residents of wealthy and poor districts. They
endravored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct correlation
between personal family income and educational expenditures. See
text infra, at - . The District Court may have been relying on
this notion of relative discrimination ba;;ed on family wealth. Citing
appellees' statistical proof, thr court emphasized that "those dis-·
ricts most rich in property also have the highest median income . . .
while the poor property districts are poor in income .... " ~:37 F.
Supp .. at 282
5 ' At oral argument and in their brief, appellees sugge~t that
description of the personal status of the residents in districts that
spend less on education is not critical to their case. In their v1ew,
the Texas system is 1mpermiss1bly discnminatory even if relatively
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Bncf, at 43-44;
49
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in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as suspect. It is, after all, the first function of courts, when
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause, to cxaminf'
the classifications drawn by state laws.
The several precedents of this Court relied upon
by appellees and the court below provide the proper
starting point. The individuals or groups of individuals who constituted the class discriminated against in
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny, 62 the Court invalidated state laws that prevented indigent criminal
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been shown if the State had provided some
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20--21. There are mdicatwns m the District
Court opinion that it adopted this theory of district discriminatiOn .
The opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial status
of districts and early in the opinion it describes appellees' class atl
being composed of "all .. . children throughout Texas who live in
school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp., at 2 2
62
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) ; Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393
U. S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Long v
J)istrict Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) ; Draper v. Washington,
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357
fl . s. 214 (1958).

I
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"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript.
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing~
ton, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
( 1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay
for counsel from their own resources and who had no
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less
wealthy.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply because of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and
often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying fact$
found in the previous cases were present there. The size
of the fee , often running into the thousands of dollars.

l
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effectively singled out all potential candidates who were
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot"
(ld., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute
denial of a position on the primary ballot.
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance systemdiscrimination against a class of definably "poor'' persons-might arguably meet the criteria established in
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however,
demonstr~~s that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics ~ of wealth classifications can be found here.
First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in Connecticut." "3 Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," 51
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts. 5 :;
53 Note, A .Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Derision~: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. .J. 1303, 1:~28-1:~29
(1972).
51 /d ., at 1324, n. 102.
55 !d., at 1328.
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Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases,
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it, 56 a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages." 7 Nor, indeed, in view of thE'
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of education except
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate"
education for all children in the State. By assuring teachers, books, transportation and operating funds,

J

56 Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth discriminatiOn is
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, therefore, the difference in quality between two schools can be determined simplistically by looking at the difference in per pupil expcnd1- /
ture::; . This is a matter of considerable dispute among educators and
rommentators. See nn. 86 and 101 , infra.
(
~ 7 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); Mayer v.
Ctty of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington,
:172 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douglas v. C'alifurnia, 372 {T 8
;~f,;{, :157 (196:~).
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee,
~or the welfare of the State as a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.~" 58 The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education." 59 No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional
terms. 60
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court
may have embraced a seGond or third approach, the
fiB Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 13 (emphasis added) .
Indeed, even though local funding has long been a significant aspect
of educational funding, the State always has viewed providing an
acceptable education as one of its primary functions . See Texas
State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 1, 7.
59 Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1.
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would
be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were
made available by the State only to those who are able to pay a
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined
class of "poor" people-definable in terms of their inability to pay
the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case
before us today. After aU, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide a~ education to those who can afford it.
It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base educatJOn
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate
by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities
between local tax resources.

J
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second of which might be characterized as a theory of
relative or comparative discrimination based on family
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower
the dollar amount of education received by the family's
children.
The principal evidence adduced in support of this
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory,
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures.
Second, the court found a direct correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.
Supp. , at 282, n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then
it might be argued that expenditures on educationequated by appellees to the quality of education-are
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to provide a basis for concluding the financing system is dern Also, it should be recognized that median income ~tatistic~
may not define with any precision the status of individual families
w1thin any given districts. A more dependable showing of comparative wealth discrimination would examine factors such as th('
average income, the mode, and the concentratiOn of poor famil1es 1Il
unv rlJ~trict tn addition to t.he med1an mcomr.
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the
comparatively poor, 62 and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees'
proof fails to support their allegations or the District
Court's conclusions,
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His
findings, set out in the margin, 63 show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96
districts comprising almost 90<fo of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest median
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees,
'62
63

Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,547-549 (1972).
Market Value of
Median Family
State & Local
Taxable Property
Income
Expenditures
Per Pupil
Per Pupil
in 1960
Above $100,000
( 10 districts)
$100,000-$50,000
(26 districts)
$50,000-$30,000
(30 districts)
$30,000-$10,000
(40 districts)
Below $10,000
( 4 clistnct~)

$5,900

$815

$4,425

$544

$4,900

$483

$5,050

$462

$3,325

$305
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no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination. 64
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by
the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might
be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be
viewed as encompassing every child in every district
except the district that has the most assessable wealth
and spends the most on education. ~ Alternatively, the
class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property which falls
6

64
Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured
in terms of assessable property and the collective wealth of families
residing in the district measured in terms of median family
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inver~e correlation:
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per
pupil, and districts with high as-·essed value per pupil have low
income per pupil") ; Davies, The Challenge of Change in School
Finance, in Nat'l Educational Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School
Finance (1967). Note, 81 Yale L. J. , supra, n. 53. Sec also Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 522-527.
6 ~ Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest,
supra, defined the class they purported to represent: " Plaintiff
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school
pupils in California, except children in that school district . . ,
which ... affords the greatest educational opportunity of all Rchool
district~ within California." 96 Cal. Rptr., at 604 , 487 P. 2d, at
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. See also Van Dusactz v . Hatfield, 334 F .
Supp., at R73 .
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below the statewide averag~, or median, or below some· /
other artificially . defined level.
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts. 66 The system
of alleged discrimination and the class is defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majorita~;ian
political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect classification. But appellees have not relied solely on the
contention that wealth discrimination would constitute
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to
rigorous judicial scrutiny. 67 They also assert that the
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior
decisions of this Court require the application of the
strict standard of judicial review. Graha·m v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 3135, 375-376 ( 1971) ; Kramer v . Union
66

Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texns system
as one resulting merely in discrimination between distncts per se
since thiti Court has never questioned the State's power to draw
reasonable distinctions between political subclivitiions within its
borders. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U . S,
420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
67
The Court has never heretofore held lhat the existence of
de facto wealth discriminalion alone provides an adequate ground
for invoking strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras , U. S.
(1972).

'.
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Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 ( 1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this questionwhether education is a fundamental right, in the sense
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by
the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention
of courts and commentators in recent years. 0 "
B
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." Id., at 493. What was said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may ·reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an
68 See Ser-rano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 5S4, 487 P. 2d 1241 {1971);
Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons,
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13 , at. 339-394; Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L,
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note, Educational Financing & Equal
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. L. Rev.
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases:
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discriminatwn, 14 Ariz. L.
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).
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opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro.:.
vide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms." Ibid.
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237,
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v.
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907).
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic dedication to public education. We
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
bf education both to the individual and to our society''
cannot be doubted. 00 But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Claus~. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting· from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging· upon the right of interstate
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importance of the
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
We
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
bne for which the Court lacks both authority and com69

807 F. Supp, at 280.
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petence. But MR. JusTICE S·rEWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale of
the Court's equal protection decisions:
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection ... .' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and gives.
to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Emphasis from original.)
MR. JusTICE STEWART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
r·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." I d,, at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
as a right of constitutional significance/ 0 and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of
the relative importance of that right.71
70
E. g., United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,238 (1970) .
71
After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), thPre could
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Courl applied
Lhe rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family
grant provision under its AFDC program . A fpdrral district court
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Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla..
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in 1:1uits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law,
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," such as the "need for
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is
instructive :
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document a.ny constitutional guarantee to access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... mheld the provision uncon;;titutional, applying a stricter standard
of review . In the course of reversing the lower court the Court
distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that in that rase
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel.'' Jd ., at 484 n. 16.
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volv.es the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative
classifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question
now before the Court is plain. It is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guarnteed by the Con-·
stitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); ·~
72 The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970), that "welfare provides the means to obtain essential
food, clothing, housing and medical care."
73 In Eisenstadt the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection
standard." !d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court
recited thr proper form of rqual protection analysis: "if we were
to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479
(1965),] the statutory classification would have to be not merely
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state interest." Ibid . (emphasiS in
original).
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); 71 Mosley v.
Police Department of the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92
('1972); 75 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942)/"
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. And,
as we have said, the undisputed importance of education
will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation. It is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly closE'
relationship to other rights ami liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist
74
Dunn fully canvasses this Court';; voting right~ case;; and explains that "this Court has made clear that a citizen ha;; a constitutionally protected right to participate in elect ion;; on an equal
basis with other citizens in thf' juri;;dictwn." lcl .. at 336 (rmpha~is
supplied). Thr constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal
treatment in the voting process can no longer br doubted evrn
though, as thr Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U. S. 663 , 665 (1966), "the right to vote in ;;tate elections is
nowhere expre~sly mentioned." See Oregon v. Mitchell , 400 U. S.l
112, 138-144 (Mn. JusTICE DouoLAs), 241-242 (Mn . .JuwrrcE Bll.ENNAN); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 140-144 (1972); Kramer
v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 625-630 (1969);
Rey1wlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554-562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U. S. 368, 379-381 (1963).
75
In Mosley the Court struck down a Chicago antipicketing
ordinance which exempted labor picketing from its prohibitions.
The ordinance was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the ordinance was one "affecting First Amendment interests." I d., at 101.
76 Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a state law
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminalR." Implic1t in
the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation
is among the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade,- U. S. - , - (1973).

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

31

that education is itself a fundamental personal right be-~
cause it is essential to the effective exercise of First
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not
been taught to read, assimilate and utilize available
knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect
to the right to vote. 78 Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or
77

See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367,
390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U~ S. 301 ( 1965) .
78
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right, we assume that appellees' references to that right arr
simply shorthand references to the constitutionally protectrd right
to participatE' 011 an equal basis with other qualifird voters whenever
the State has adopted an elective process for drtrrmming who will
r epresent any segment of th e State's population . Scr 11. 74, supra.
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the most informed electoral choice. That these may be
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and
of a representative form of government is not to be
doubted. 79 These are indeed goals to be pursued by a
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan- {
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short.
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of
educational opportunities to any of its children, that
argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process.
79

The States have often pursued their entirely legitimat e mterrst
in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise," Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (1966), through such dm·iccs a;;
literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to votr. Sre ibid.;
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). And, where those rr~ tri c
tions have been found to promote intelligent use of thr ballot without
discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previously
deprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld
their use. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S.
45 (1959) , with 0Tegon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (Mr ..Just icC"
Black), 144-147 (MR. JusTICE DouGLo\S), 216-217 (Mr. Justice
Harlan) , 231-236 (MR. JusTICE BRENNAN), 282-284 (MR. J usncg
STEWART), and Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969),
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Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
· behefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so, under ap-.
pellees' thesis, FJandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey
v. N ormet, supri, would no longer be good constitu. tiona! law.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has
applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived,"
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of
some such fundamental personal right or liberty. Sec
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 338-343 (1972). A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies
in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN , writing for the Court
80

See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, n. 68,
at 622-623; Commrnt, Tenant Int ere~t Represrnt at ion : Proposal for
a National Tenants' A::;sociation, 47 Trx. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173
n. 61 (1969) .
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in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses
well the salient point: 81
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] . ...
"[Tho federal law in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was
permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla81

Katzen bach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even though
the language of instruction was other than English. Th1s Court
upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it discriminated
agamst those with a si}..'th grade education obtained in non-English
speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal
legislation.
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(Emphasis from

The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aid-was implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its
quality. 8 2 Of course, every reform that benefits some
more than others may be criticized for what it fails
to accomplish. .B ut we think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re~ormatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's
efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the J
Constitution. 83

c
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, and that
this is not a case in which the challenged state action
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that. create suspect classifications or
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the
jnappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Qlause affirmatively supports the application of
the traditional standard of review, which requires only
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case
~2

Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society

uf Sisters, 268 U . S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kick , 313 F. Supp.
944 (MD Fla. 1970) , vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) .
. 83 See Schiib v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; McDonald v,
Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U. S. 802 (1969) .
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represents far more than a challenge to the manner in:
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures."' This Court has
often admonished against such interferences with the
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause:
"The broad discretion as to .classification possessed
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a
familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes . . . . " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83,
87-88 (1940).
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., U. S. (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U. S. 435, 445 (1940).
84

See, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1 90) ;,
Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 508-509 (1937);
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959) .
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Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme o£
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. 8 5
85
Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace
it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing system,
however, would be statewide financing of all public education with
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or
expansion of sales and income taxes. The authors of Private Wealth
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alternative scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In sunplest
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particular rate of
property taxation the district would receive a stated number of
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the' "wealthier"
districts that collect more than the stated amount at any given
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators are
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory underlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance,
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 706-708
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-596 (1971) ;
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971) ;
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The

I
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of·
educational policy, another area in which this Court'sindeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsel's against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public wel- ·
fare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very .
complexity of the problems of financing and manag-.
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there
will be more than one constitutionally permissible .
method of solving them," and that, within the limits
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even
the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education 86an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationCase for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30.
86 The quality-cost controversy has received conciiderable attention. Among the notable authorities on both sides are the following: C. Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisis in tho
Classroom (1970) ; Office of Education, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report) ; On Equality of Educational Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller ed~:>.); J. Guthrie,
G. Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. Stout, Schools and Ine(!uality
(1971) ; President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swanson, The Cost-Quality Relationship, in lOth Nat'l Conf. on School
Finance, The Challenge of Change in School Finance 151 (1967) .
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ship between cost and quality, is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education. 8 7 And the question of the proper relation~
ship between state boards of education and local school
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-examination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like
problems of education is not likely to be devined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing
conditions.
It must be remembered also that every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for
the relationship between national and state power under
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While " [ flhe maintenance of
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
which this Court examines state actiorf~ss it would be
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before
See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's statewide
on the goals of education in that State. I Governor's
Committee Report, at 59-68. See also Gold~ trin , supra, n. 38,
at 519- 522 ; Schoettle, supra, n. 80; authorities cited in n. 86, supr a.
88 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 532 {1959)
(Mn. J usTICE BHENNAN, concurring); Kat zenbach v. Morgan, 384
U. S. 641 , 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting) .
87

~ urvry

I
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us, in which we are urged to abrogate the systems of
financing public education presently in existence m
virtually every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These
same considerations are relevant to the determination
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections,
nevertheless bears some rat.ional relationship to a legiti-J
mate state purpose. It is to th.is question that we next
turn our attention.
III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands J
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable
amount of funds is derived from each source. 89 The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students.vo Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 20 teachers ;n one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 9 z
In 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billwn dollars for
education and a little over one billion came from the Minimum
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2.
no Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13.
9 1 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18.
02 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15.
89
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vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided. 93 Additional funds
l:\-re earmarked for current operating expenses and for
student transportation 9 '' as well as for free textbooks. 95
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation °0 and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards.97 As reflected by the 627'o increase in funds allotted
to the Edgewood School District over the last three
years, 98 the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, however, has · been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
a~sure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program. 90 Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
the market value for any category of property varies from
98

Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.

o• Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51.

as Tex. Educ. Code § 12.01.
Tex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5).
07 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.301 et. seq.
08 See ante, at - .
~ 9 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15.

o6
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its assessed value. 100 The greatest interdistrict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have the greater capability for supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri~
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupilteacher ratios and higher salary schedules. 101
100

There is no unifoljll statewide assessment practice in Texas.
Commercial property, , for example, might be taxed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White,
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16.
101
Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 18. As previously
noted, teA"t accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated
inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education.
While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point
of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic op-~
portunities, the issues of greatest disagreem ent include the effect on
quality of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher sa lary schedules.
The state funding in Texas is designed to assure, on the average, one
teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable
ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6,000 per
year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers may be more
debatable, depending in major part upon the locat ion of the school
district. But there appears to be little empirical data that supports
the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that documents
the existence of a dependable correlation between the level of public
school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruction. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the
absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques for judging
their abi lity or performance. Relatively few sc hool systems have
merit plans of any kind , with the result that teachers' sa laries arc
usually mcreased acros,; the board in a way which tends to reward the
least deserving on the same basis as the most deserv ing. Salaries are
usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and
according to predetermined "steps,'' extending over 10-to-12 year
periods.
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. We disagree.
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as well as
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State. 102 The power to tax local
property for educational purposes has been recognized
in Texas at least since 1883. 103 When shifts in the distribution of population, accompanied by changes in local
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
102

President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85, at 9. Until
recently Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely statefl,lnded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amended
its educational fi:r~:;mce statute to permit counties to collect additional ft.1nds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The
rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the
question before the Court today:
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educational facilities as good as the people of the counties want and
are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above
and beyond established minimums provided for their people encourages the best features of democratic government." Haw. Sess. Laws,
Art. 38, § 1 (1968).
'J' 03 See text accompanying n. 7, supra.

'.
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of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a.
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of local
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
artic]llated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for.
its child." 105
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large
measure of participation in and control of each district's
schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of
government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972). MR. JusTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education
of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our
society.'' ld., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his disG. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State of
New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of educational finance, see J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at 39-95.
10 5 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by
James S. Coleman, at vii.
104
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sent, agreed that "[1] ocal control is not only vital to con~
tinued public support of the schools, but it is of over~
riding importance from an educational standpoint as
well. " !d., at 478.
The persistence of attachment to government at
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches
than does public education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary,
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely
because it does not provide the same level of local
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re1 06

N ew State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) ,
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spect to expenditures for some districts than for others/ 07
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interest~, while occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenqitures, might be conceived. Only
where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is also well to
remember that even those districts that have reduced
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much
they spend on education, still retain under the present system the prerogative to decide how available funds will be
allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numer107

MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas
system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee
complete freedom of choice to every district. He places special
emphasis on the statutory provision which establishes a maximum
rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local school district may
tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The
maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the
District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable
rate. (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100, seep. 7, infra, is the equalized
rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellee;; do
not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality
of that statuary provision is not before us and must await litigation
in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk;
313 F. Supp. 944 (MD Fla. 1970), vacated , 401 U. S. 476 (1971).
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ous other decisions with respect to the operation of the
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be"'
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along
with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies. 108
Appellees furt~er urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They see no justification for a system that allows, as
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation- indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going
108 This theme--that greater state control over funding will lead
to greater state power with respect to local educational programs
and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public
education. See, e. g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Education, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64,
77-78 (Bowers ed. 1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and
The State 26 (1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school
board, has some control over the purse, there can be little real feeling in the community that schools are in fact local schools.... ") ;
Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution , in Sat. Rev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971)
("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power follow
money .... "); Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally-Shared Taxe ·
21 (1931) (" [S]tate administration of taxa tion is the first step towardtl state control of the functions supported by these taxes .... ").
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental,
or whether he agrees that the consrquence is inevitable, it certainly
cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on
the part of parents, educators, and legislators.
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to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.109 Not
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable wealth within any district may result from
any number of events, some of which local residents
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within
a district by various actions-public and private-of itS:
residents.
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then
it must be equally impermissible in providing other necessary services currently financed from local property
taxes, including local police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total
abrogation of local property taxation and control as
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this
Court to nullify statewide schemes for financing public
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subdivisions in which citizens live.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that.
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Its I
shortcomings have been acknowledged by Texas, and it
has persistently endeavored-not without some successJon This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of "territorial uniformity."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218,
230-231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Cf.
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668:
(CAlO 1969).
.
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to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local participation. The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried,
ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class,
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69-70 (1913). One also must remember that the system
here challenged is not peculiar to Texa.s or to any other
State. In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for
financing public education reflects what many educators
for a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 States, especially where the
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and nowhere yet adopted. The constitutional test under the
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or
(1973).
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-, We hold that the Texas plain abundantly survives this
test.

IV
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on
the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P . 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appro-
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priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major state legislative
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably more credit than its
architects have ever claimed.110
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of
,empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from those initially assumed. 111 There is,
"Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors Coons, Clune,
and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of public education
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole." J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 2.
Their thoughtful and imaginative work paved the way for the
suits, including the present one, attacking the school finance system.
Indeed, the District Court approved the authors' thesis verbatim.
337 F. Supp., at 285. The authors have often cautioned their supporters, however, against speculating that "fiscal neutrality" would
be a panacea for the poor or for racial minorities. Ibid.; Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971).
111 Any alternative that provides significantly more money for
any major percentage of the State's schools is certain to encounter
political barriers. Any such new plan would require additional
resources from some source: funds will either have to be taken
.away from more prosperous districts or new revenue sources will
need 1o be tapped. The former alternative is not likely to be sup~
110
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to the relationship between poverty, race and
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the
District Court,m has since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to the present system
of educational finance. 113 . That study indicates that it
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.114
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded
that there is no dependable correlation between the locaported by those districts that have had the good fortune to
have developed attractive education facilities and programs. The
latter alternative, i. e., new taxation, appears to be no
more palatable politically. It has been calculated that $2.4
billion of additional school funds would be required to bring
all Texas districts up to the present level of expenditure in all
but the wealthiest districts-an amount more than double that
currently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Research
League, supra, n. 20, at 16-18. At a time when nearly every State
and locality is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers
already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to
question whether a decision of this Court nullifying present state
taxing systems would result in doubling public funds committed
to education.
An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of almost 30
States, focusing on these practical consequences, claims with some
justification that "each of the undersigned states ... would suffer
severe financial stringency." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellants, at 2 (filed Att. Gen. of Md., et a!.) .
112 See nn. 38 and 63, supra.
1.1 3 Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, Inequities
in School Finance (1972) (Monograph prepared by Professor Berke).
u 4 See also U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City School
Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW Publication).
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tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior
schools.115 Nor does it appear that there is any more
than a random chance that racial minorities will be
clustered in school districts that have relatively less
assessable property.m
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional function restrain us from undertaking through the
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity
and vital concern to the States and localities. That
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand.
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax
systems which may well have relied too long and too
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These
11 5 See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions : On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. J . 1303
(1972) ; see text accompanying n. 45, supra.
116 See Goldstein , supra, n . 38, a t 526 ; C. J encks, supra, n.
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman , supra, n. 13,
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example,
1
'59% of minority students live in districts above the median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar Coun ty by far t he
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School Dist rict-is above the local average in both t he amount of taxable
wealt h per pupil and in median family in come. Yet 72% of its
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only
a very few dollars less per pupil than the Nort h East and North
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18%
Mexican-American enrollment respectively.
Berke, Carnavale,.
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 673.

..
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matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed m_~ by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions m~ come from the lawmakers
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.
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The financing of publir ell'mentary and ~erondan' schoolH in Texas
is a proclurt of ~tate and local participation. Almo~t half of the
revenueH ar<' derived from a largdy Htate-funded program deHigned
to provide a baHic minimum educational alTering in C\'C'rY school.
Earh district SUJ1]Jlemcnts ~tate aid through an ad valorem tax on
property within it~ jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class
action on behalf of Hchool children said to be mcrnbcrH of poor
families who rc~idc in school districtH having a low propcrt~r tax
base, making the claim that the Texas sy::;tcm';; rcli:mcc on local
property taxation favor~ the more afTlurnt and violates equal
protect ion rrcruircmmts because of Huh~tantin l int rrcli~t rict di~
paritics in per-pupil rxpenclitures rrHulting primarily from diffcrcnc<'H in the value of aHses;.:ahlc property among thr districts.
The District Court, finding that wralth i~ a "su,;pert" classification
and that rducation is a "fundamental" right, concluded that the
sy~tcm could br 11pheld onlv upon a showing, which appellants
failed to make, that there was a comprlling ~tate intrrr~t for the
system. The court n!Ro concluclrd that appellants fnilrcl even to
demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's system.

Held:
1. This is not a proper rase in which to rxam inr n Stnte's laws
unclrr staudarcb of ;;trict judicial scrutiny, since that trst is rc~rrvcd
for rases involv ing Jaws that operate to t he disadva n tage of su~pcct
classrs or interfere with the exerri~c of fund::unenta l rights and
Iibert irs explicitly or implicitly protected by thr Constitution.
Pp. 14-40.
(a) Thr Texas system docs not disadvantage an~' ~u~pcct class.
It has not been shown to discriminate ngainst nn)' clcfinablr class
of "poor" 1)eople or to occasion discriminations depcn.c!ing on the
I
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relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as
the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their
individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor
school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect.
Pp. 14-24.
(b) Nor does tho Texas school-financing system impermissibly
interfere with tho exorcise of a "fundamental" right or liberty.
Though education is one of the most important services performed
by the State, it is not within the limited category of rights recogIiizcd by tl1is Court as guaranteed. by the Constitution. Even 'if
some identifiable qmmtum of education is arguably entitled to
constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise o[ other
constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that
purpose. Pp. 25-35. '
(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to ' invoke strict scmtiny sinre it involves tho most delicate and difficiilt
·questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and
fedc~·alism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of
review. Pp. 35-40.
2. The Texas system does not violate tho Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly imperfect, the system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose. While assuring basic education ' for every child in
tho State, it permits and encourages participation in and significant
control of each district's schools at the local level. Pp. 40-49.
337 F. Supp. 280, reversed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER,
C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUH>T, .J.J., joined.
STEWART, .J., filed a concurring opinion. BRENNAN, .T., filed a dissenting opinion. WHITE, .J., filed a di~~enting opinion, in which
DouGLAS and BHENNAN, .J.J., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DouGLAB, J., joined.

.

'

~:~./,t,/..J,_,zJ,.,Z$,..2~.4>; ,2!-1~ J~.. j?

jg ~

(/2, 4~ ~t .. ¥~ s-1, .5'.2.

~
j{th DRAFT

UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1332
LSan Antonio Independent School On Appeal from th e
United States DisDistrwt et aL, Appellants,
trict Court for th e
v.
Western District of
Derrwt.rio P. Rodriguez et al.
Texa1:1.
m~

.,. t,

[FebruatY -, 1973]

r/
~;

MR. JPSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of th(·
Court.
This smt.'C attacking the Texas system of financmg
public education,. was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-·
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. L
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants ~
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
1

Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school.
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the
cond1tlon of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Disrmt.'' Th1rd Amended Complaint, App. , at 14
? The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name tlus
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
metropolitan area Wfl!i:eh were originally named as party d('frndants .
After a pretnal conference, the District Court Js:mccl an order dlsrmssing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San
Antomo Indcpend('nt School District has joined m the plamtiffs'
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an
(JmU'1J.~ nmae brwf m support of that position in this Court
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of Education. the t;tate Attorney General, and the Bexar
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The %;S6., '-o'Wipl._,.,.,-twas filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court
was .impaneled in January 196V. 3 In December 1971 4
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion
holding the Texas ·school finance system unconstitutional
under · the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The· ::Jtate appealedl.\and we noted probable j'urisdiction to consider the f~r-reaching constitu~
tiona] questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For
the reasons stated iu this opimon we reverse the decision
of the District Court.
J

/4

The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas 1
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools. 6 Early in its history,
Texas adopted a clual approach to the financing of its
'A 1hree-judgf' court waH prorwrly convenrd and thrrr arC' no
ljllC'StlOn::; as to the ou,tnrt Court's jun::;diction or the dir('('( appealability of 1ts judgment 2H U. S. C. §§ 2281, 1253.
4
The tnal was delayrd for two yC'an; to perm1t extenHJV<' pretnal
d1scovery and to allow completion of a pendmg Texas JrgiHiative
investigation concerning the net>d for rC'form of 1ts public Rchoo l
finance system. .£,efirtf}bl!li! '•, .~tm 74ntcmio b~d. 8ehBBl Di~ 337
F . Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Tex. 1971)
· , 7 F Supp. 2~0. Tlw D1strict Court sta~·ed Jts mand:-tte for
two years to provide Texa~> an opport umty to remedy the meqmties
found in its financmg program. ThC' court, howrver, retamed junsdiction to fashton its own rrmt>tllal orrlrr 1f the State failrd to ofTC'r
an acceptable plan. ld ., at 2Hn
<l TE-x. Canst., Art . X,§ I ( I~

11-.S);

·A genc>ral diffu;-;wn of kuowlpdgt> hemg c~Hrntl:ll to the prrservatwn
of tlw nghltl and librrtie:-; of thP p(•ople-1111 ;;hall br the dut~· of the
Legislature of th1H i:3tatC' to make i:iuitable proviHton for thr :-;upporl
und mamtrnance of pubhc ;;ehool;; ··
ld .. ~§2 .
"Til(' LegJi:ilaturC' shall a" par!y as prarttcablc rstabllsh frrr schoo l ~
throughout the State, and ;;hall furnJHh mrans for their support, by
11
t axat ton on rropPt'tv.:Z: •
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorern
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildi11gs" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools.'' 7 Such local funds as were
r.aised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds.R The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854, 0 was endowed with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes, 11 served as the disbursing arm
for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, ill
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout
thf' State. 1 "
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
Sta.te and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively f'venly across the Statr."j Sizable differrncf'R
Tex. Canst. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amrnrlrcl. Auf?;. 14, ~~~3
Tex. Canst., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.
n Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. Srr Tex. Cons!., Art. 7, §§ 1,:2
(interpretive commentaries); I Report of Covrrnor's Committer on
Public School Edncatwn, The Challen~?:r and the C'hancr 27 (19o9)
(hereinafter Governor's Committre Report)
10 Tex. Con st., Art. 7, § 5 (see also t hr mterprrt Ive commrntarv) .
\'Governor's Committee R<'port, at 11-12.
11
;
The vanous sourcrs of r<'V<'llll<' for 1 hC' Av:ulabl<' School Fund
are catalog<'d m Texas Statr Bel. of Educ, TPxa~ Statrw1dc Srhool
Adequacy Survry 7-15 (1938)
12 Tex. Canst., Art. 7, § 3, m; amrndrd, Nov 5, 191~ (sc•r mtrrprct ive commentary)
1:1 I Governor's Committee Report, at ;)5, Trxns State Bd . of
Edue., supra, n. 11, at 5-7 : .l. CoonH, W Clmw, 8. Sugarman,
7

8
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in the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced. II The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources availf1ble to each school district. These growing disparities
in population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.' r'
In due time it became apparent to those concerned
with financing public educati011 that contributions from
the Available School Funcl were not sufficient to am<'liorate these disparities. 1 <> Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.' 7 Although the
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,"
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by HJ4t_:

'ff(-;

5

l-1!?Private Wealth and Public Educat1on 49 ( 1970) , E. Cubbrrlr.v,
1
School Fnnd~ and Their Apport wnment 21-27 ( 1905) .
11 By 1940 one-half of the Statr'~ population wa~ clu~tPrrd m 1t;;
metropolitan centers. I Govrrnor'K Cornm it trP .R rport, at 35.
15 Gilmrr-Aiken Comm1tter, To Have What We 1\lu::-;t I (194~)
~- Still, Thr Gilmer-AikE-n Bills 11-12 (1950): Trxa~ \Bel. of

L~~~~:: supra, n. 11.
,7 ·R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. lt .Hhould br uotrd that dmmg thi::;
period t hr median per pupil rxpend it urr for all school;; w1t h an
enrollment of more than 200 was approximatrly $50 prr year
During thi::; same period a surve~· conducted hy thr Statr Board
of Education concluded that "111 Trxas the br::;t rducatwnal advantages offered by the State at preHrnt may be had for thr !11('(ban
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil 111 avrrage dad~ nttrndaueP ··
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 5G
1 H 1 General Law~ of Texas, 4t)th Lrgis., Heg. 8r~~ . l\:J:3H , at :!74
($22.50 per student) ; Geneml & SpP<·. Law:; of Trxa~ . ..J.i\th Legi::-;.,
Reg. Se;;s. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 prr student)
'" Genrral & Spec. Laws of Trxn~. -l9tb Leg1s, H<'g. S<·H~ 194,'5;·
!·. 53, at 7.').

13
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee'R
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundan School Program. 20 ~this Program~ accounts
~ for approximately half of th. f' total educational
[ ] enditures in Texas.~'
P
~
The Program calls for state and local contnbutions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salarie1',
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The i::ltate.
supplying funds from its general revcn ues, finances approximately 80% of the Program..t\and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for p"roviding the remaining
20%. The districts' sharei.\tknown as the Local Fund
Assignment~is apportioned among the school districts
-.,./ pu~;ia&PL t~ a formula designed to reflect each district'fl.
/ relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment 1s first
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com2
°For a complete history of thr adoption in Trxas of n foundation program, see R. Stills, supra, n. 16. Srr abo V Gowrnor'o;
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research League•, Pnblic Rchool
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Intenm Report HJ72)
21
For the 1970-1971 school year this state aid program acconntcd
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation contribntcc.f
41.1% and 10.9% was provided m federal fundH . Trxa::; Hrsrarch
League, .supra, u. 20, at 9.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property
in the State. 22 Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county. 2 a The
aistricflle, finances its share of the Assignment out of
-+t,. revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex fffl'l'llYl3tiQi,_..w_a_s~t-w-o----::-fo'":'l"'''d. ~
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation
Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heav1es
burden on the school districts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
district to contribute to the education of its children "'
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.25 Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for educ'a tion-from State as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949
22

V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48.
At present there are 1,161 school districts 1!1 Texas. Texa~ RC'search League, supra, n. 20, at 12.
2 '1 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found. that some ::;chool
districts were not levying any local tax to support education.
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supm, n. 15, at lG. The Texas State
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and
independent school districts were levying no local property tax m
1935-1936. Texa::; State Bd. of Educ., supra n. 11. at il9-42
25 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, nt
15
23

The school district in which appellees reside, the
Edgewood Independent School District, has been compared
throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent
least
School District.

This comparison between the

~~~~

and

most affluent districts in the San Antonio area serves
to illustrate the manner in which the dual system of finance
operates and to indicate the extent to which substantial
disparities exist despite the State's impressive progress
in recent years.

Edgewood

RIDER A, PAGE SEVEN

Teacher salaries, by far the largest
item in any school's budget, have
increased dramatically--the minimum
teacher salary has risen from
$2,400 to $6,000 over the last
years.

29
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
500J'o. 20 In the last decade alone the total public school
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistcntly.J"or::.:i;.sl:;.n;.c..-=~
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 2 H Minimum
teacher wanes-by far the largest smgle item in any
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6 000
over the last 20 ears 20
o 1 us ra e
man
w 1c
e ua system
school finance operates, and to indicate ~the extent
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist despite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district
ma~r be comp11r~ with another more affluent district in
San Antonio. The E
od Independent School Di
tric 1s one of seven public school 1stricts m t e mctropo - ~
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the
student population is Mexican-American and over 6%
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil
is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed propertythe highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-

..r-

26

I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53.
Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2
28 ln the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupil
expenditure for all current operating expenses mcreased from $206
1o $493. In that same period capital expenditures mcrea~rd from
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Comm1t1ec Report, at 53-54
29 III Governor's CommiHPe Report, at 113-146; Berkr, Carn~
vale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Ca~e: A Wrong
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972)
30 Thfl family income figures arc based on 1960 census Rtati8tirH.
'27

e-
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J trihntod $26 to the education of each child for the

~chool

,...

1967~

year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248. 31 Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil. 32

Tluow~owl
lloio lili~&lion . ~·~:~
uallt t¥ Alamo Heights

,t.:~

!:a tt£"'S ~

----P....l-~J ___ c_. __

I)istriet' the most affluent school district in San Antonio.
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students,
are situated in a residential community quite unlike
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly Anglo, having only 18% Mexican-Americans
and less than 1 ~a Negroes. The assessed property value
per pupil exceeds $49,000 a:l and the median family incomr /

I

31

The Available School .Fund , techmcalty , provtdes a srcond
source of state money. That Fund has continued as in years past.
(see text accompanying nn . 16--19, supra) to distnbute uniform
per pupil grants to every district in the State. In 1968 t hiH Fund
allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available School
Fund contribution is always subtracted from a distnct 's entJtlement under the Foundation Program, it plays no stgmficant role
in educational finance today.
32 While federal assistance has an ameliorating efTrrt on the dd1Prencc in school budgets between wealthy and poor dist n et;,;, t be
District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that
court that it should consider the effect of the federal !frant m
assessiltg the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State·
has not renewed that contention here.
aa A map of Bexar County includ ed m the rPcord ;,; bows thnt
Edgewood and Alamo Heights arc among the smalle;,;t diHtrict;; m
the county and are of approximately equal stze. Yet, as the fi!);ures
above indicate, Edgewood's student populatwn 1s more than four
tJIDes that of Alamo Height s. This factor obviou;,;ly accouu t;s for
a :;ignificant percentage of the differences between the two di st n ct~
in per pupil property values and expenditures. If Alamo IIetghts
had as many students to educate as Edgewood does (22 ,000) 1ts pe y
pupil assessed property value would be approximately $11,100 ralher
than $(9,000, and its per pupil expenditures would t hercforf' hnvf'
been considerably lowPr.

1.$
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local ta.x rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above
1..--rt~'l'l'iYi
ntribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights
was able to Bflet~ $594 per pupil.
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid/ 4 more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school yea~ the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupi~ ~his eeRs~~ a 62% increase over
the 4J:uee yettt period-~ 1967-1968'-Indeed, state>
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 19671968 school budget,from local, state, and federal sources,
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupile These
34 The figures quoted above vary slightly from those ntrlrzed rn
the District Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., atz"gs2. These lnviaJ
differences are apparently a product of that court's reliancr on
slightly different statistical data than we have rrJied upon
35 Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greater'
contributions to both school districts over the Jn st several years, n.
is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. Th<>
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grant;,
is due to the emphasis in the Stale's allocation formula on th<>
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Il1gher salancs are
guaranteed to teachers having more yenrs of experience nnd possessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Ile1ghts, wh1ch
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with arlvn need
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Tcxa~>
Program is not unlike that presently in existence rn a number of
other States. C. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, a t /
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to distncts that
already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formulns have been
described as "anti-equalizing.'' Ibid. The formula, however, Is
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms The percentagE'

l"l'\

~

l'fl0-197t .
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two
districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment.
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth,
was required to contribute out of its local property tax
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20%
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
_,_p_a..,..id only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
grant.~
It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State 38 still exist. And it was
6

Tj

disparity betweep. the two Texas districts is diminished substantially
by State aid. Alamo Heights derived in 196'7-1968 almost 13 times
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State aid
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approximately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twic!.'
as much money to spend per pupil from its combi'Cd State and local
resources.
36 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13.
37
The Economic Index, which determinE's each county's share of
the total Local Fund Assignment, is basrd on a romplrx formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was mstit11ted.
See text at pp ..£.::. .fa...... supra. It has frequently been suggested }
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered m several respects
to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying abihty.
es11ecially of urban schoolJ. V Governor's Committee Report, at
48; Bqte, Can~va~gan & White, sup1·a, n. 29 at 680-681
8 The District Court relied on the findings presented in an
·
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His sampling
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a dirrct rorrelatwn
etween the amount of a district's taxable property and its lcvd
f per pupil expenditure. ~is study also found a dir!.'rtJ~orrelation
~en a district's median family income and prr pupil rxprndi-

!~
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the.
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
337 F. Supp., at 282.
Finding that wealth is a
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun~amental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it was premised upon some compelling

D--- {:::.""~........U~inverno
.

·/:;
-

'"relation between pmontago of mmo"-

and expenditures.

Categorized by Equalized Property Values,
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue
Mark et Value
Median
State &
of Taxable
Family
Per Cent
Local
Re11enues
Property
Income
Mmority
Per Pup![
Per Ptt,pil
From 1960
Pupils
$815
Above $100,000
85,900
R%
(10 Districts)
::)544
S100,000-S50,000
$4,425
32%
(26 Districts)
$483
$50,000-$30,000
$4,900
23%
(30 Districts)
$462
$5,050
$30,000-$10,000
31%
(40 Districts)
$305
$3,325
79 %
Below $10,000
(4 Dist ricts)
Although the correlations with respect to family mcomr and rare
appear only to exist at the e),'tremes, and although thf affiant's
ethodology has been questioned (see Goldstein, Intcrdistnci
nequahtics in "'School mancin~ ~ Critical Analysis of SPrrano v.
Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 523-525 nn. !i7
71 (1972)) , insofar as any of these correlations is rclevam
to the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may accrpt
i~s basic thrust.:\'; a defense of the reliability of the ailidav1t. BPO
Boeke. C"n~alo, (oogan & White, '"P'"· n. 29.

n

n;--ll>fl1l:

~,

ej -

(]ur '~<!

pf · ~ /-..< 3

111 t.;.a- ..

71-1332-0PINION
12

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that " [ n] ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."
!d., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative jud~ments that interfere with constitutional fundamental rights :Jo or that
involve suspect c ass1 cations.'' 0 If, as previous decisions
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
le_gitimate objectiv~and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, 11 the Texas
financing system and its counterpartt.in virtually every .a_.,
other Stat~will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 42
Apart from its concession that educational finance i~
Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes

I

E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley , 408 U. S.
92 (1972); Dunn v. BZwnstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson) 394 U.S. 61~1969).
40
E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184
(1964).
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and 1he
cases coli ected therein .
42
Appellants' Brief, at 11.
39

~I

43
44

Ibid .

Tr. ofOralArg.,at3J'

A pp~l /an+''
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financi~ublic education 01wratcs to the disadvalltage of
some suspect clasOOCQtioJ' or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined
to d termine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and
appellate processes, 45 and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote. 4 n Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea~
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education, 17 that there is a
E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
~
46
arper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (196i); McDonald v.
Bd. o ElectWn', 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bulloc/c v. Carter, 405 U. S.
34 (1972); oosby v. Osser,- U.S.- (197:3) .
'17 See cases cited in text, at
infra.
"15
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui g~neris, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuas1 ve.
A

(1S

The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing laws in other
States, '8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather
than focusing on the unique features ofthe alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through
a simplistic tu~e~o" process of analysis: since, under e
traditional systems of financing public schools, some
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard
threshold questions, including whether it makes a clil'ference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms,
and whether the relative-rather than absolute- nature
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial
' 8 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 , 5 Cal.
3d 584 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 ~l\finn.
1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187
(1972); Milliken v. Green, No. 54,809 (Mich. S C., .Jan.-, 1973) .

0.
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scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court
below.
The case comes to us with no definitive description of
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which
the discrimination claimed here might be described.
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as
discriminat6~ ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes
fall below· some identifiable level of poverty or who
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 19 or
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, 50
or ( 3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer
school districts. 51 Our task must be to ascertain whether.

In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a clas::;
composed of per ons who are "poor" and who reside in school dis' "
tricts havtn~ a "low value Of7property." Third Amended Complaint.
App., at 1-t. Yet appellees have not defined the term "poor" with
/1
reference to any absolute or functional level of impecunity. See
text~}lt:_;f--· See also Appellee~;' Brief. at l , 3; Tr. of Oral
~ Arg., at -=21.
__./
r.o Appellees' proof al trial focused on comparative differences in
~
.,
~
family
incomes between residents of wealt by and poor districts. They
1 1
endeavored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct rorrelation
between personal family income and educational expenditures. See
rrxt-1~ at 4-. The District Court may have been relying ou
t his1wtion of relative discrimination based on family wealth. Citing
H),.~~ ;,.,,},~~J..
appelleco' statistical proof, the court emphasized that '' those di81 ~
mts mo~t rich in property also have the highest median incomr . . .
while the poor property districts are poor in income . . .. " :337 F.
Su ., at 282.
5 1 At oral argument and in their brief, appellees suggrst thaL
description of the personal status of the residents in district s that
spend less on education is not critical to their case. In thrir v1ew,
the Texas system is impermissibly discnminatory even if rrlatively
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Brief, at 43-44;
49

\..
'/

s;
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in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate·
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the
~resulting classification -eehemt- may be regarded as suspect. :r.t-i&,-a,f.teP-a,ll, the ·fir~t fuootion of ~ourts, when ,;_asked to Hwelre--#te-&!ttal-Protection lam
-extn1u-t
·the classifioattion&-tiffiwn by state- laws.
The
veral precedents of this Court
by app.e.ll~-and the- cour:t b low provide the proper
starting point. The individuals or groups of individuals who constituted the class discriminated against in
t~cases shared two distinguishing characteristi~cause of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny, 52 the Court invalidated state laws that prevented \ indigent criminal O."Yl
defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an aaequate
/lr substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation_...........
would have been shown if the State had provided some

J

Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20-21. There arc mdicatwns m the District
Court opinion that it adoptrd this theory of district discriminatiOn .
The opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial stat us
of dist ricts and early in the opinion it describes apprllccs' class as
being composed of "all ... children throughout Texas who hve in
school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp., at~....,..52 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 ( 1971) ; Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v
D istrict Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington,
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357
F . S. 214 (1958).
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"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript;
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226\(1971); Gardner
( v. California, 393 U. S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing~
ton, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
'Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
0.. 1963), fle. decision establishing an indigent defendant's
If~ to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay
for counsel from their own resources and who had no
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less
wealthy.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal-·
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply because of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. ThosE>
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and
often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying fact$
found in the previous cases were present there. The siz~
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars.

1

I

)2Z~
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effectively .sinfiltd Otl.t all potential candidates who Were )
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot"
(!d., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute
denial of a position on the primary ballot.
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance systemdiscrimination against a class of definably "poor'' persons- might arguably meet the criteria established in
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however,
demonstr~~s that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics ' of wealth classifications can be found here.
First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the poorest families arc not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "[i] t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor' -is simply false in Connecticut." ~ Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," "'
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts. 5 ''
5

~I

53 Note, A .Statistical Analysis of the School Finanrr Drci ~ ions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yalr L ..J. 1:30:3, 1:{:28- 1:329
(1972) .
51
!d., at 132~. 102.
5
~
" !d., at 1328. ------
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Whether t.b.Q ;TI3e · fiw;;liJa~ would be discovered in Texas,
/
is not knownJmt there is no basis on the record in this
case for assulning that the poorest people-defined by
reference to any level of absolute impccunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of tho foregoing cases,
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it,S 6 a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that at least where wealth is involved tho Equal /
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages." 7 Nor, indeed, in view of thE:'
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of education except
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that thE:'
1\:!inimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate"
~ducation for all children in the State.
By_,rassuring teachers, books, transportation and operating funds.
56 Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth d1scriminat10n is
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, therefore, the difference in quality between two schools can be determined simplistically by looking at the difference m per pupil expencbtures. This is a matter of considerable dispute among educator~ and
commentators. See nn. 86 and 101, infra.
(
57
E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); Mayer v.
C~ty of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington,
an U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U S
3.5:{, a57 (1963),

I
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee,
{or the welfare of the ~tate as a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.' " 58 The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education.'' 59 No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional
terms. 60
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court
may have embraced a se.cond or third approach, the

f

Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 131.\teml'hMi~ ttal'lea) .9 ndeed, even though local fundin.g has long b.een a significant aspect
of educational funding, the State always has viewrd providing an
acceptable education as one of its primary functions. See Texas
State Bd. of Educ,, supra, n. 11, at 1, 7.
~pellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1.
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would
be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary educatwn were
made available by the State only to those whe !tF(\_able to pay a
0
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined
class of "poor" people-definable in ierms of thrir inability to pay
e prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would presrnt a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than lhe case
before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide a~ education to those who can afford it.
It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base education
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate
by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities
Gllti"I!Qft local tax resources.

U.

58
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second of which might be characterized as a theory of
relative or comparative discrimination based on family
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower
the dollar amount of education received by the family's
children.
The principal evidence adduced in support of this
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and
1 J- I
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory,
f 0 .\ 1 1 ! 1oted, first, a ii&eet correlation between the wealth of
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures.
s ·, VY> •' I a:. """ .....- econd, the court founa ~t correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.
Supp., at 282, n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then
it might be argued that expenditures on educationequated by appellees to the quality of education-are
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
I" .r d- 1 ,1 e...
questions, including whether a bare ~
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro+htA.t
vide a basis for concludingthe financing system is de-·

v"

<1)

Also, it should be recognized that median income t; ( ati ~; tic~;
may not define with any precision the status of individual families
within any given districtf:.JvA. more dependable showin of com parative wealth discrimination would examme factors such as the
average income, the mode, and the concentratiOn of poor fami!Jes in
Hny d1stricA ~f.!H.~ifttrmeom~
"

~;

1

.

tJ.).S ()

Ely, Legislative and Administrative

®

Motivat~ion

in Com-

stitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1258-1259 (1970);
Simon, The School Finance Decisions:

Collective Bargaining

and Future Finance Systems, 82 Yale L.J. 409, 439-440
(1973).
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the
comparatively poor,62 and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
- -a-cc-orded "suspect" classi~tiemt; These questions need
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees'
proof fails to support their allegations or the District
Court's conclusions,
-Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 10 % of the school districts in Texas. His
findings, set out in the margin,S 3 show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96
districts comprising almost 90 7'o of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest media~
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees,
62
'
63

Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-549 {1972)j@
Market Value of
Median Family
State(~ Local
Taxable Property
Income
Expenditures
Per Pupil
Per Pupil
in 1960
Above $100,000
( 10 districts)
$100,000-$50,000
(26 districts)
$50,000-$30,000
(30 districts)
$30,000-$10,000
(40 districts)
Below $10,000
( 4 rlist rictR)

$5,900

$815

$4,425

$544

$4,900

$4sa

$5,050

$462

$3,325

$305
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no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination. 64
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by
the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might
be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be
viewed as encompassing every child in every district
except the district that has the most assessable wealth
aiid spends the most on education. 05 Alternatively,,..,.,..~e_,_~ o. s
class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property which falls

3/

64
Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured
in terms of assessable property and the collective wealth of families
residing in the district measured in terms of median family
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation:
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per
upil, and districts with high asscsse
alu
er upil have low
income per pu il" · Davis, he Challenge of Change m c oo
Finance, · Nat'! Educationa
ssn.~ A1nm't Con f. on School
Finance (1967). Note, 81 Yale L. J., supra, n. 53. See also Goldsteu~. sup.ra, n. 38, at 522-527.
66 Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs m Serrano v. Priest
~~~ defined the class they purported to repreRent: "Plaintiff
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school
pupils in California, '-except children in that school di::;trict . . ,
which ... affords the greatest educational opportunity of all Rchool
districts within California~" 96 Cal. Rptr., at 604 , 487 P. 2d, at
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. See also Van Dusa<J!: v . liatfield, 334 F .
Supp., at 873.
~

tv~~ es +

.'
d -J

T (A. 'I p ,, 1'

)1

J

f) 10 I , .. ty

f1

Study

o

.f

+he f? , 1~ +to»lh,'p l?e.+ween W..J2.a..l+h
ca. I; f.,,;... c.,.,~
.
11'1

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

24

I below the statewide average, or median, or below some {
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other a.rtificially defined level.
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts. 66 The system
~+
of alleged discrimination and the class · defines ave
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritar;ian
political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect -e+!~-+!f-fiil..
~ifieitian. But appellees have not relied solely on
#- h
con en 1011
;;LJlJJfficieni asia ior ..auhjec.t.ing th& t~' ysteoi
rigorous. judicial scrutiny.
They also assert that
~
"' State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise
.....
of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior
......
~ decisions of this Court require the application of the
~
"'- -\ strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richard~
.....
~ son, 403 U.S. 365,375-376 (1971); Kramer v . Union
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Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texas s~·stem
as one resulting merely in discrimination between distmt::; per se
::;mce this Court has never questioned the State's power to draw
reasonable distinctions between political subdivi::;ion::; w1thm its
borders. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
:377 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGouan Y. Maryland, 366 U S.
420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland , 346 U. S. 545J\~(1;.;:,9;:...
54~).:....-..,.--~ 7 X~ll Cll'l.Ut SQ8 ;QQHQf b,g;r;Q.\,g,fg;r;Q eeld thttt tMB ll}'io;~ence
£c
de f!llltQ wcpl! h d,iscrjrgjpn1 jpp alone ~rovjdes OD nde't'lHQ [lP6tutd e,
66

for ~.Qer~ ~J. g., IIarper v. Vtrginia Bd. of

1 Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v Kras , - U. S.
~
~ .:? (1972).
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Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 ( 1969); Shapiro v.
1'hompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this questionwhether education is a fundamental right, in the sense
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by
the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention
of courts and commentators in recent years.u
B

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." Id., at 493. What was said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its
vitality with the passage of time:
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ.:;.......
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in li if.ll.!L_
.is denied the opportunity of e ucation. Such an
68

See Serrano v. Priest!(f-Cal. 3d. 584'\187 P. 2d 1241} (1971) ;
Van Dusaftz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp. 870 (\Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons,
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 339-394 ; Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira. Unequal Educational Expenditures : Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest , 37 ~
Rev. 61 , 618-624 (
);
Educational Financingi:\#Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich~ L. Rev.
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases:
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discriminatwn, 14 Ariz. L.
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972) .

o.
~
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opportunity~where the ;State has undertaken to pro.:
vide it, is aJ right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.' ' Ibid.

This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found in
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing
both before and afier Brown was decided. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF J u sTICE), 237 1
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203,.~ (196 ; McCo um v.
( M f?. Jvntc:.E
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 2Q9..J (1948); Pierce v.
f.f If liN 1\1
Socwty of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); M eyer v. e:u .2. (tv1 ~ Ju~TI(..£ ~ask. a, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate\!'· Q~ . v.
J
~§achusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907) .
Fro .. ~ f.<J 1- f<:.r-)
Nothing this Court holds today in any way de tracts C CIYI ~ r/lt a fc
from our historic dedication to public education . We
.S t-J-c.e r ,r':/. ,
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
bf education both to the individual and to our society' '
cannot be doubted."9 But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging· upon the right of interstate
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U. 8:618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importance of the__.../
interest affected, we would have gone "far towarcf
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
Ibid.
We
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
bne for which the Court lacks both authority and com-

;f)lf) j

J

.5 -

oo

~~ 7

F. Supp , at

28~ .
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petence. But MR. JusTICE STEWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articues the limits of the fundamental rights rationale -ek
e Court's equal protection decisions:
---::!
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "funda~
mental," and give them added protection ... .' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and gives.
to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Emphasis from original.)

q

~I
~oc.ta....l fi+
f>-t: l•cen ,. j
~

J
VW>

fllort

MR. JusTICE SrEWART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to
JU 1c1a scrutmy s ate welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
residency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained:
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." I d,, at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
as a right of constitutional significance/ 0 and the Court's
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc&alanciDg 9k
the
·
importance of that right. 71
70

E. g., United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 /(1966); Oregon v.
J
Mitchell,400U.S.112238(1970)(o p, ... ., .. o-5- "J~t+ICIH i'3r?I!'NN/1N 1
71 After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), tlwre could
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Court applied
the rational basi · test in reviewing Maryland 'H maximum family
grant provision under Its AFDC program. A federal district court

fo
7$1-757
W
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Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla. .
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in EJUits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law,
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita- 0 _
tions implicated "fundamental interests which a~~ .G!f..-I-Ja_r__---'"'-/-'-4/
ticula~~ importanej to the :Jf.oor," such as the "need for
decent sheltel" and tpe "right to retain peaceful possession of one's homl." Ibid.

--

~~.

3 v s_r:J.:..!_ Ul),: t e ',

.

tt/

-

"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
1 •
~nAI,trtJ,, 1n ntl.) .
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social rJ p , "~ •IM ~cH> t JJ
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
o .... +) 1 S
that document any constitutional guarantee access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogmtion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond ~e term of his
lease, without the payment of rent_ . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela~
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... inheld the provision uncon?titutional, applying a stricter standard
of review. In the course of reversing the lower cour~ the Court
distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that in' that case
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel.'' Id., at 484 n. 16.
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volv.es the most basic economic needs of impoverished
uman beings," 'provided no basis for departing from
e settled mode 01 constitutional analysis of legislative
assifications involving questions of economic and social
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971).
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question
now before the Court .is plain. It is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights
ill the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly gua~teed by the Con-·
stitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1072); 7 "
The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test de ~pite its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U. S. 254,
264 (1970)"'& that "welfare provides the means to obtain essential
food, clothing, housin~and medical care."
.... 1 ... +- L> ~
0
73 In Eisenstad~the 'Court struck down a Massachusetts statute .-n...
r
f!Fe8ibitit1& the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection
standard." I d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court,
recited the
arm o equal protectiOn ana ysis: "if we were
to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. ConnPcticut, 381 U. S. 479
(1965)~the statutory classification would have to be not merely
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state intere::;t." 1bid. (emphasis .iot, f r q r.1
original) .
72
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); 7 ~ ~
Police Department o the City of Chicago 408 U. S. 92
('1972); 75
tnner v. Oklahoma, 316
. 535 (1942) ..7
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
J!.S we have said, the undisputed importance of education
will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation. It is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly closE'
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist
(j

~(

-

71
Dunn fully canvasses this Cour1's voting right~ ca~:;cs and explains that "this Court has madt• clear that a citizen lut~ a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdictwn." !d., at 336 (rmphasi~:;
supplied) . The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal
treatment in the voting proce~s can no longer be doubted even
though, as the Court noted in Ilarper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in ::;tate election~; i::;
IJ.Sl
, nowhere expressly mentioned." Ser Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
S.
r
112,h38-144 (Mn. JUi:>TICE DouGLAS) ,1241-242 (~fit. .foSILCE
~ Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 , 140-144 (1972); Kramer
/
v. llnion Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 625-630 (1969);
Rey?Wlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554-562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 36 , 379-381 (1963).
- 'T!rfn Mosleyhthe Court struck down a Chicago antipickrting
~ 1" ... ordinanc~ exempted labor picketing from it s prohibitions.
~ ~nee was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of rrview was appropriately applied since the ordinanct> was one "affecting First Amendment interests." I d., at 101.
76
Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a ::;tate law
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals." Impliclt in
the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation
is among the rights of personal privacy protected unclrr the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade,- U. S. - , - (1973) .

nor Jo w-t.
f,.,.J 1 bo.r.is
tov H~Y')1j it ~~
Q.n

p/;,;1/~

so

Jo ro tec.kd.

n:E·

1\/,
J

+

(of1>1111"1

"f

(JH F..N,._. ~"IJ Wtitr~
~

f1'l ,. •.

I

;--

,_{.

)

(ICfiO)j

/?J...od

e$,~

s Cf 3 u. s . 2 ~~
2.

qI

30-.3 J (I''&');

71-1332-0PINION .
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

31

that education is itself a fundamental personal right be- ,
cause it is essential to the effective exercise of First
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and
education, appellees urge that the rjght to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the (
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not
been taught to read, assimilat)\ and utilize available
knowledge.
'
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect
to the right to vote. 78 Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-~
formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded ~ection agamst ui1justifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never I
presumed to possess either the abjlity or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or

1/

77

See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367,

"3 ~T-390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (196()) ; Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301~.,:?&> b ·JO 7
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78
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a const1tutionally protected right, we assume that appcllers' rcfrrences to that right arc
:simply shorthand references to the 89Aiitiktti!!n8ll::t protected right,
to participate on an equal basis with othrr qualifiPd votpr~ whrnrvrr
1
the Stat r has adoptPd an e!Prt i\·r prorP~s for clrtrrmining who will
t:.;re~Pnt any sPgmPnt of the State's population. Sec n. 74, supra.
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the most informed electoral choice. That these may be
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and
of a representative form of government is not to be
doubted. 70 These are indeed goals to be pursued by a
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan- /
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short.
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a /
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of
educational opportunities to any of its children, that
argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process.
79
The States have often pursued their entirely legitimatE' interest
in assuring "intelli e t exerciRe of the franchise," Katz('nbach v.
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641,
655 (1966), through such devices ~]
literacy tests and age restrictions on i he right to vote. See ibid.;
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970). And, where those rest notions have been found to promote intelligent use of the ballot without
discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previoui>ly
do rived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has uphPld
their use. Compare Lassiter v. N orthamptonrEkB6i~H Et\-:360 U. S.
45 (1959), with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (Mr ..Just ice
Black), 144-147 (MR. JusTICE DouGM.s), L216-217 (Mr. .Tu~t ice
Harlan , 231-236
, 282-284 MR .. J f<TTCg
TEWAR'l' , and Gaston County v. nited States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) ,
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Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so).\ MB Ehn; ap- .
pe ees t es1s Bandridge v_. Williams, supra, !lnd Lindsey
Y_· N ormet, sujmiA. would UQ lo.g~QF Q9 ~~od cgngtjty t._
.ti€Hl~

•

I •'

'

We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found /
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly dif- /
ferent from any of the cases in which the Court has
applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of I
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived,',.."infringed," or "interferied" with the fr·ee exercise of
some such fundamental'personal right or liberty. See
~vp 1-"J J
. . Skinner v. Oklahoma, ~H~ U. :!; . 62§> 536; ( HH9)fl Shap1-ro
v. Thorn:pson,
634,;-f~ Dunn v. Blum~
. .
, 338- 343,(1972:t A critical distincJ>~fl H~::, ~~be ween those cases and the one now before us lies
./
i~~•~hat Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court ·
~l

~.......

80

Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public EducaI ____t..,..io-n-,See
-:-7fl
.,., Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389- 1390 (1971) ; Vi eira, sup ra, n. 68,
at 622- 623 ; Comment , Tenant Intere;;t RPpresentation: Prop o~a l for
a National Tenant s' A~sociation , 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173
n. 61 (1969) .
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in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses
well the salient point: 81
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situated] . ...
"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected .. . was
permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reforir]..../'
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all Q .;
evils at the same time,' and that 'reformti may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla81

Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even though
the language of instruction was other than English. TI11S Court
'ltpheld the questioned provision\'Over the claim that it d1scrimmated
against those with a sixth grade education obtained in non-Englishspeaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal
legislation.

-

1\

71-1332-0PINION
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

35

\

tive mind(_ ... '" Id., at 656-657.
original.)

I

(Emphasis from

The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard.
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aid- was implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its
quality. 82 Of course, every reform that benefits some
more than others may be criticized for what it fails
to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re~ormatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's
efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the {
Constitution. 83

c

/
U

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in
ccord with the prior decisions of this Court,
:r-1'.~ar-+-J.L..;
this is not a case in which the challenged state action
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Qlause affirmatively supports the application of
the traditional standard of review, which requires only
that the Stat~ system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case
~ 2 Cf. Meyer v. N ebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Ki'0. , 31:3 F. Supp.
944 (MD Fla. 1970) , vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) .
83 See Schilb v. Kuebel 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; M cDonald v,
1
~of Elec tion~ 394 U.S. 802 (1969) .

I
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represents far more than a challenge to the manner in
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. 8 ' This Court has
often admonished against such interferences with the
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause:
"The broad discretion as to .classification possessed
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a
familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is ostile an oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes . . . . " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83,
87-88 (1940).
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,U. S. (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U. S. 435, 445 (1940).
84

See, e. g., B ell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890) ;.
Carmichael v. Southern Coal ~ 301 U. S. 495, 508-509 (1937);

35
Allied ,~t,., of Ohio(~"''('
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Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to
·acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the
present system or to throwlthe property tax&@altogether
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme o£
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. 85

I

85 Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace
e
it. The al~ iBevita,hle result of rejection of the existing s}•s1e~
I ):
~ would be statewide financing of all public education with
eC
funds derived from taxation of property or from the ado )iion or
S1 m rJ r1 jJ:'.f .!:.!!:-" /1 · b 2 • ,
'
expansion of sales and income taxes. T e authors of Private Wealth
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an a lterna~
tive scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In simplest
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particulnr ra e of
property taxation the district would receive a stated number oV
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies
1o "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier"
...districts tha0collect more than the stated amount at any given
rate. This IS not the place to weigh the arguments for and against
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators are
be
c.a.<~le of +in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and
)
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory underlying
appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance
_ 3 :J'J he~-- f ropev-t;
Schools, People & Money(33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 ,J. Urban L. 701, 706-708
~J n . J~.
1
v"'-luesJ
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-596 (Hl71); ..tl o Ivi $ tc:.l 11 1
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative
oJt- ~ 1/ ;J -S Jf 3 •
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971) ;
J
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The

hk /v

h
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of·
educational policy, another area in which this Court'~
indeed a10:y CQWPt's .flack of specialized knowledge and (
experience coun-;Fs against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local
-w-e~--.+--"'--levels. Education, perhaps even more than
fare ass1stancel.\~ ~~• presents a myraid of "intractable economic~ socia~and even philosophical problems."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very.
complexity of the problems of financing and manag- .
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there
will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them," and that, within the limits
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems'r should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even
the most basic questions in this area the scholars
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between- - - educational expenditures and the quality of education 861 J
assumed correlation tae ¥a.1ieity Elf waiBa tn1:EleF~iEis
v 1'\ cA e ~-' YIY1
tually every legal conclusion drawn by the District
urt in this case. Related to the questioned relation-

n

Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30.
1---'!!rl'"lle quality-cost controversy has received cono;iderablP attention. Among the notable authorities on both sides are the following: C. Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisi~ in the
Classroom (1970); Office of Education, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Edueational Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller ed~:;.); J . Guthrie,
C. G. KleindorJer, H. Levin, & ~· Stout, Schools and Inequality
J - (19'ij) ; fusident's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swan~~The Cost-Quality R'E~lationsfu in lOth Nnt'l fi onf. on
~
FinancZrThe Challenge of Change in School Finance 151 (1967) .
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ship between cost and quality, Is the equally unsettled
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education. 87 And the question
re ationship between state boards of education and local school
boards, in terms of their respective responsibilityf"and
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exami~~
natiOn. The ultimate wisdom as to these and l~+~il~~e........,a-- ~
-pi=Oblems of education is not likely to be devined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing
conditions.
It must be remembered also that every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for~
the relationship between national and state power under
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of J
con stitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While "[tlhe maintenance of
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
which this Court examines state action~ 88 it would be
J)
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
impact on our federal system than the one now before

-r

I

See the results of the Texas Governor's Commit tee 's statewide
r:; urvey on the goals of education in t hat Sta te. I Governor's
.Committee Report , at 59-68. See also Goldstein , su pra, n. 3 ,
at 519- 522 ; Schoettle, supra, n. 80; author it ier:; citrd in n. 86, surra.
88 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 1532 (1959)
1
(MR. J usTICE BHENNAN, concurring) ; Katzenbach v. M organ, 384
U. S. 641, 661 (196l) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dis:;enting) .
87

)
b 51)
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71-1332-0PINION
40

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ
.

~

us, in which we are urged to abrogate ~of
financing public education presently in existence in
virtually every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These
same considerations are relevant to the determination
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections,
nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legiti-,
mate state purpose. It is to this question that we next
turn our attention.
III

30

The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands J
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparabl~
amount of funds is derived from each source. 89 The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 00 Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 'Bb- teachers; n one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; oz

ln 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billwn dollars for
educat ion and a little over one billion came from the Minimum
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2.
9o Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13'-(... ( I ~ 7 2) .
L·~ TelL Bdt1e. Oode § 16.18.
92
Tex
CeQe § 16.15.
89

J.

Edt
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vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided. 03 Additional funds
are earmarked for current operating expenses... ~
'
~·
95
student
transportatio~·l ~free textbooks.
The program is administered by the State Board of
Education and by the ~ Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation ou\ and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification' standards.97 As reflected by the 62ro increase in funds allotted
to the Edgewood School District over the last three
years, 98 the State's financial contribution to education is
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how,;..-ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
a~sure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program. 99 Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part.Jocal differences are attributable to differences in the r'ates of taxation or in the degree to which
the market value for any category of property varies from

l]!..1 -G ':Pt-x. Ectdc . Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.
8

J

Tex~tc. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51 1~ ~
9"5Ten. EEltte. Getle..§J1,Ql._____
-: ~
~ 96 T8!$. Eebe, Ceae § 11.26 (5 ~ §
97 'J'ex.:J Ed11e. G6a6 §~6.301 et. seq.
J.
98
See ante, at ~·
S
94

[.. ·>-

7J, .

-

J...__

" Gilino<-Aik<m mmn;ttee, "'"'"' n. 15, •t 15,

1
ct-10.

o. "~"~ J
(
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its assessed value. 100 The greatest interdistrict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have ~ greater capability for supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher
salaries to more
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools ~e ~tHttsat districts are lower pupilteacher ratios and higher salary schedules. 101
There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texas.
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnt:vale, Morgan & White,
supr_a, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16.
~
101 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 18.
s previously
noted, teA"t accompanying n. 86, supra, the exi ent to w 1ich t e
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated
inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education.
While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point
of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic opportunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include the effect on
. of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher salary schedules.
l')oo,i---~
1e state funding in Texas is designed to assure, on the av<>rage, one
teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable
ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6 ,000 per
year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers may be more
debatable, depending in major part upon the location of the school
district. But there appears to be little empirical data that supports
the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that documents
the existence of a dependable correlation between the levE'l of public
school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruction. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the
absence, up to this time, of s:.ttisfactory techniques for judging
their ability or performance. Relatively few school system~ have
merit plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are
usually increased across the board in a way which tends to reward the
least deserving on the same basis as the most deserving. Salaries arc
usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and
according to predetermined "steps,'' extending over 10-to-12 year
periods.
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasonable basis" for a system ~
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. We disagree.

l~~?t:;::~~~~:a~~ "fp it~ _reliance

When the growth o f

on state aS-Jvall

commercial and

and ~ accompanying

t j, +lA

no

industrial centers

shifts in population

H> 2 President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85, at 9. Until
recently Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely statefvnded 1ducational program. In 1968, however, that State amended
its educat.ional fiw;mce statute to permit counties to collect additional funds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The
rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the
question before the Court today:
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educational facilities as good as the people of the counties want and
are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above
and beyond established minimums provided for their people encourages the best features of democratic government." Haw. Sess. Laws,
Art. 38, § 1 ( 1968).
1 'o3 See text accompanying n. 7, supra.
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of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a.
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of locay
participation. The Straycr-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
artic11lated by Professor Coleman:
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for.

r"':-;Jits~

5

own c.h.Jdr~n.

-

The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large
measure of participation in and control of each distnc s
schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of
government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and di~].g_9pin
IOns in Wright v. Council offCity of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972). MR. J usTICE STEWART stated there that "fd]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education
of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our
--~
society." !d., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dis-

:_1

ihe of Education in the State of
G. Strayer & R. Haig,fFinancing
New York ( 1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of e cational finance, see J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at 39-95.
105 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by
James S. Coleman, at vii.
104

-

. the.
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sent, agreed that "[l] ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of over~
riding importance from an educational standpoint as
well." !d., at 478.
The persistence of attachment to government at
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part,
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
~ Equally important, however, is the opportunity (
it offers for participation in the decision1making process that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches
than does public education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary,
they fljrpgrt ~ attack the school finance system precisely
because it does not provide the same level of local
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re'

06

New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932),
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spect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 107
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interest:s.; while occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenciitures, might be conceived. Only
where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 ( 1972); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is also well to
remember that even those districts that have reduced
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much
they spend on educati~ still retain under the present syr-- +
~-tem g}iij J?PeFegahv;l£0 ~~how available funds will be
·
allocated. They fufTiiBr enjoy the power to make numer-

I

~;

107
MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas
system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee
complete freedom of choice to ever:•h~:;ic~. b!Hh places sprcial
emphasis on the statutory provision
· es a IS es a maximum
rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local srhool district may
tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d) The
maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the
District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable
rate. (Thr tax rate of $1.05 per $100, see p. 7, ·
is the equalized
rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellee;, do .
not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality
of that statubry provi;,ion is not before us and must await litigation
in a case in "which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk;
313 F . Supp. 944 (MD FLa. 1970), vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971).

..
1081

states

Mr. JUSTICE MARSHALL

ld~~ijij in his dissenting

opinion that the State's asserted interest in local
control is a "mere sham," post, p. &0 , and that it has
been offered not as a legitimate

justifi~ation

an excuse • . • for interdistrict inequality."

fb .

but "as

!.d·, at

In addition to asserting that local control
/""""

would be preserved and possibly betlter served under
'--"

other systems--a consideration that we find irrelevant
for purposes of deciding whether the system may be said
to be supported by a legitimate and reasonable basis-the dissent

suggests that Texas' lack of good faith

may be demonstrated by examining the extent to which
the State already maintains considerable control..
State, we are told, regulates "the most
local public education,"

~minute

The

details of

id., including textbook

selection, teacher qualifications, and the length of the
school day.

This

~

·s~sgestion/

that genuine local control

r

~~A~.9r
does not exist in Texas 'A is abundantly refuted by the
elaborate statutory division of responsibilities set

cu.~~~'-·
~=

. ~~ ~~ 1-t.d-~k~r

out 1n the Texas Educat1on Code.

/\

~he

1,
~
ultimate

~ £-Lf- 1-o -~

Aauthority

over the "management and control" of all

public elementary and secondary schools is squarely
placed on the local school boards. Tex. Educ. Code ~~
(!fl..<) .
~il#ijl7.01, 23.26A
Among the innumerable specific

."

local
powers of the/school authorities are the following:
GXQFeiee

~

the power of eminent domain to acquire

land for the construction of school facilities, id.
~~

17.26, 23.26; the power to hire and terminate

H~
teachers and other personnel, i-id···}3 .101-.103;
the power to designate conditions of teacher employ-

~~
ment and to establish standards of educational policy,
id. ~ 13.901;

"

the power to maintain order and discipline,

id. § 21.305, including the prerogative to suspend
~

s tude o.t:.s--£o=

,:L:...--

~

' s, L•
"d § 21.301;

- --

I!)

:fer a kindergarten
vocational training

/

of special education
the power to control

bus program, id. § 16.52.

See also Pervis v. LaNargue

D.

Ind. School Dist,, 328 F.Supp. 638 (d. Tex. 1971);
~ichols

v. Aldine Ind. School Dist., 356 S.W.2d 182

(Tex. Civ. App. 196:21) WQ ele nat believe that J t

can~

be seriously doubted that in Texas education remains
largely a local function, and that the preponderating
bulk of all decisions

affect in&

lil~lii~~

the schools are made

and executed at the local level, guaranteeing the
greatest participation by those most directly concerned.

Professor Simon, in his thoughtful afinalysis of the
political ramifications of this case, states that one
of the most likely consequences of the District Court's
decision would be an increase in the centralization of
school finance and an increase in the extent of collective

p,v:~ · ~

~ i ff·
tor

bargaining by teacher unions at the state level.

He

suggests that the subjects for bargaining may include
many "non-salary"

such as teaching loads, class

item~#ldl#iii~ffiti#~~gl~iiiitd~
)

size, curricular and program choices, questions of student
discipline, and selection of administrative personnel-matters traditionally decided hereltofore at the local
level.

Simon, supra, nd. ~~. at 434-436.

,

L~~

L

-,

•

'1.

'
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ous other decisions with respect to the operation of the
(!)
school&rhe people .ifi Texas may be JUStified in be~
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along
with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies.~ J~
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They see no justification for a system that allows, as
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.___
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going

f

J

/

p

y ·.

\"\ ~ t. ~

~

~~

tC. Jd 0

/~This theme-that greater state control over funding will lead
.../to greater state power with respect to local educational programs

IO 1 and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing pu:;:.:b:::!l~
ic'-t-...,.

-nO

fr .~
~ .,

J_/1

6

- edumttioTr.l See, e. g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Education, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64 ,
77-78 (Bowers ed. 1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and
The State
(1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school
oard, as some control over the purse, there can be little real feeling in the community that schools are in fact local schools .... ") ;
Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution, in Sat. Rev. 4, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971)
("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power ------t-~
o ow
money .... "); Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally-Shared Taxes
21 (1931) (" [S]tate administration of taxation is the first step towa~ state control of the functions supported by these taxes ... .") .
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental "
or whether he agrees that the consequence is inevitable, it certainly
cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on
the part of parents, educators, and legislators.
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to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.-' Not
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable wealth within any district may result from
any number of events, some of which local residents
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and
ind~st~ial enterp~ises rna! be encou~aged to l.ocate~ Q
~by vanous actwn&-pubhc and pnvate:-""'~

~oreo~er, if local taxation for local expenditure is an

[-·-1-o__,...F--~----

unconstitutional method of providing for education then
be equally impermissible i
o er necessary services
financed f.F
local property
taxes, including local police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a tetal
~
of local property taxation and control as
•
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this
Court to nullify statewide sehemes for financing public
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof_,____
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subdivisions in which citizens live.
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that.
T <2. Y.fN~
~s
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. .ftot..'
o.c.l.< no«PI eJ 'Iq,J
shortcomings hal!P hfi'fi'R &ek~sdged -hy T~ an4 i
ha'i pQrsi:st8R:tl' cndeavm?f-not without some successSh o~i'~'"~S

1t ~

H

_

h

;10

~This

Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the
Equal Protection ClauRe any per se rule of "territorial uniformity."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218,
230-231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954). Cf.
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 66S:
(CAlO 1969).
.

,,

h().'

t+ .S
~

p e..r~1s. 'lcmtl y

1/(l,e.J....
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1/
b
+.c.s-1-eq ,

2/

f.h

to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditure without
benefits of local partici~
pation. The Texas plan is not the result of~ hurried, <2 ...
ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product
of purposeful discrimination against any gr6up or class.
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
exas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69-70 ( 1913). One also must remember that the system I
here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other
State. In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for
financing public education reflects what many educators
for a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholar~and educational authorities in 49 States, especially ~here the
alternative proposed is only recently conceive and nowhere yet~ a.ael"tet The constitutional
under the
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S. - , (1973).
We hold that the Texas pl~ abundantly
this

'f(). r::i::t~

-
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_..___

In light of the unpreced nted attention focused on
the District Court opinion · this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano . Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P . 2d 1241 (1971), a cauti 1ary postscript seems appro-

IV.
In light of the considerable attention that has focused
on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California
1/:; Co-/. f?pi-Y. t,0/1

(1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot
be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the
District Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval
~

in public education. ARG maay commentators have concluded
that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs
that might be devised and approved, the result could
avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is

~y

~

not

nothing

simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases,
,..,v~

there is nothing simple about predicting the consequences of

&

"

~~ ctrn-~ of:_~~·

massive cliange in ediiea:tiofttl:l
A

fifl8:BeS...

Those who have devoted

the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of
~~

these cases have found no~dependable

XliXIfXX

answers and

their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the

The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by
the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be said
with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or the
children in overburdened core-city school districts
benefitted by abrogation of traditional modes of

~

wm be

......

,

financ~ education.

Unless there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures
on education across the board

J an event the likelihood of which

is open to considerable question

111

}i these groups stand to

realize gains in terms of increased per pupil expenditures
only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively
low levels, i.e. , in those districts that would benefit from the
redistribution of existing resources. Yet recent studies have
indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered
in the most impecunious school districts . 112 · Nor does it now
appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial
.
·t·Ies are concent rae
t dm
. proper t y-poor d"IS t ric
. t s. 113 Add"Immori
tionally, several research projects have concluded that any
financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of
expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the major urban centers, 114 a result

that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing conditions in those areas.
These practical considerations, of course, play no
role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented
here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional
limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes
of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of
federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not b be viewed
as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need
is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied
too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly
innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods and its
funding, is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and
greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much

by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come

from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of
those who elect them .

111/
Any alternative that calls for significant increases
in

*d~itiid~

expenditures for education, whether

financed through increases in property taxation or
through other sourjces of tax dollars such as income
and sales taxes, is certain to encounter political
barriers.

At a time when nearly every State and locality

is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands
for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers already resisting tax increases, there is consider•
able reason to question whether a decision of this Court
nullifying present state taxing systems would result
in a marked increase in the financial commitment to
education.

See Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational
(J

Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., TijWard Equal Educational
Opportunity 339-345 (Comm. Print 1972); Berke & Callahan,
Serrano v. Priests Milestone or Millstone for School!

('Cf 7l)
Finance, 21 J. Pub. L. 23, 1125-21; Simon, supra, nd. 62,
at 420-21.

In Texas it has been calculated that $2.4

billion of additional school funds would be required to
bring all schools in that State up to the present level
of expenditure of all but the wealthies distriats--an
amount more than double that currently being spent on
education_..,n

I

Texas. Research League, supra, n. 20, at 16-18.

'
__...,., amzcus curzaeorief fiJea
b
i:itates, focusing on these pr f l
e on ehalf of almost 30
' justification that "each of thac JCad consequences, claims with some
.
e un er:::Jgned states
l
severe fi nancwl stringency " B . f f A . .
. .. wou d suffer
A""
·
ne o
mzc~ C ·
·
·~ellants, at 2 (filed rAtt G
f M
unae m Support of
L
. _::-::- . en. o d., et al.).
h

-

't

---

I

I

112/
See Note, supra, n. 53.

See also authorities cited

n. 114 infra.

1

113/
See Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 526; C. Jencks,
supra, n. 86, at 27; U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights,
Inequality in School Financing: The Role of the Law
3 7 ( 19 72 ) •~

-

\
\

J. Coons, W.
une & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13,
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example,
''59% of minority students live in districts above the median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School District-is above the local average in both the amount of taxable
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72% qf its
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and North
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18%
Mexican-American enrollment respectively.
Berke, Carn~vale, .
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 673.
'- e_

11~/

See Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., Issues in School Finance 129 (Comm.
Print 1972) (monograph entitled "Inequities in School
Finance" prepared by Professors Berke and Callahan);
U.S. Office of Education, Finances of Large-City School

6_

Systems:

A Comparative Analysis (19720(HE\v publicationfb);

U.S. Comm'n ob Civil Rights, supra, n. 113, at 33-36;

\

Simon, supra, n6. 62, at 410-411, 418.

'

'

-
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"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript.
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner'
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing~
ton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
( 1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay
for counsel from their own resources and who had no
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the , less
wealthy.
Williams v, Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply because of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and
often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay , but in
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying fact()
found in the previous cases were )resent there.
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San Alltouio Independent School On Appeal from c:the::u1at e :l : - - - -- - - - District rt al., Appellants,
United States Dis• / .... J trict Court for ~reircula t o d : __1_pJ~
a
.
Western District of
Demetrio P . Rodriguez et al.
Texas,
[March - _. 1973]
MR. JusTJCE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This suit attacking the Texas system of financing
public education was initiated by Mexican-American
parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1
They brought a class action on behalf of school children
throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner
1 Not all of the children of these complainants'attend pubhc sC'hool.
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School District." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14.
2 The San Antonio Independent School Distnct, who~e name this
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio
mf'tropo!Jtan area that werr originnll:> namrd aH part~· defendant"
After a pretrial conference, the District Court iHsued an order dismissing the school districts from the case Subsequently, the San
Antonio Independent School District has jomed in the plaintiffs'
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an
amir11.<1 curiae brief in support. of that pos1t10n in th1s Court.
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Hf Educatwn . th<> t-ltate Attorney GPneral, and the Bexar
( 'ou ll ty ( :--lan Antonio) Board of Trustee's. The com_plaint. was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judgE:'
court was impaneled in January 1969." ill December
1971 ' the panel rendered its JUdgment ill a per curiam
upinwn holding the Texas school finance system unconsti tutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'' The State appealed, and we noted
probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutwnal questions presented . 406 U . S. 9.66 (1972). For
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the deCJsion
of the District Court

T
The first Texas Coustitutwn , promulgated upon Texas'
Ptltry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish ment of a system of free schools. 6 Early in its history ,
Texas adopted a dual approach to the finaucing of its
" A thrt'e-Judge court wa::; properly conv<'IWd and thPre are no
(jUestion;,; a;; to the District Court 's juri ~;diction or thr direct appral abiltty of It s .Judgmrnt. 28 0. S C . §§ 22~1 , 1253
1
ThP tnal was delayed for two years to permit ext ensive prPtrial
fli:scovf'ry and to allow completion of a pending Tex,a;; lrgi;;lative
investigation eonccrning the nerd for reform of Jt~> public school
fin a nce· ~ y;,; t e m . 3;~7 F. Supp. 280 , :2R5 n. 11 (WD T r x. 1971) .
" 337 F . Supp 280. The Distnct Court ~ t a yed ItH mandai<• for
two year;; to provJck T exas an opi)ortunity to remrd y the meqmtw;;
found m its financm!!: program. Thr court , howrvrr, retained juri ~ 
di ction to fashion 1t:s own remedml orclt-r .if thr State failed to offrr
a n acceptable plan ld ., at 286.
" TPx . Con;;t. , Art. X . § 1 ( 11{-!5) .
''A genPI'al dilluswn of knowledgr l•r111g e~~> <'llti:II to the pn'servatioli
of the right ;,; and lii.Jrrtie::< of thr people. 1t ::;hall be the duty of th<•
Legislature of this State to makr ~ mtable provi;;IOn for the support
and maintrna m·e of publie ;;chooiR "
I d .. § :2
" The LPp;IslaturC' :shall m; Party as pracucablr establish frr r sehool,1hroughou t t he St at(•, and ~(1 all furni;,;h men nH for t hrir ;,;upport , b)'
1axa ti Oil on prop<•rt y .

71 - 1:132-0PIN!ON
SAN ANTONIO SCBOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

3

~chools,

relying on mutual participation by the local
districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state
ponstitution was amended to provide for the creation of
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem
tax~s with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection of school buildings" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each
district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds. 8 The Permanent School Fund, established in
1854, 9 was endoweq with millions of acres of public land
set aside to assure a continued source of income for
schoo,l support. 10 The Available School Fund, which
received income from the Permanent School Fund
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and
other designated taxes,'' served as the disbursing arm
for most s't ate educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to
finance a progmm providing free textbooks throughout
the State,J2
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural
State and its population and property wealth were spread
relatively evenly across the State.1 a Sizable differences
~chool

Tex, Com;t 187ti, Art. 7, § 3, as amendrd, Aug 14, 1KR3
Trx. Con1lt., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5,
u Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 117~. SE'r Tex. Con~t . , Art. 7, §§ 1. 2
(mterprctiw commentaries); I Report of Governor'1l Commttter on
Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 (1969)
(hereinafter Governor's Committee Report) .
HI Tex. Const., Art . 7, § 5 (1lee also the intrrprettvt' commPntary) ;
\ Governor'~; Committee Report, at 11-12.
11 The various sources of revenue for the AvailablE' School Fund
nre catalogt>d in Texas State Bd. of Educ , TexaH Statewidr School
Adequacy Survey 7-15 (19:~8) .
12 Tex ConHt ., Art
7, § 3, a:; amended , Nov 5, HJlH (see int<'rprettVE' commentary)
t:l r Governor's Committee Report , at 35, Texa:; State Bd. of
}<.;due , supra. n. II. M 5-7 . .) Coon~ . W Clune, S Sugarman,
1

~
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]n the value of assessable property between local school
districts became increasingly evident as the State became
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population
shifts became more pronounced.'• The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant
role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities
i,n population and taxable property between districts
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education.'"
In due time 1t became apparent to those concerned
with financing public education that contributions from
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities. H< Prior to 1939 the Available
School Fund contributed money to every school district
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's/ 8
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1945.'"
Private Wealth and Pubhc Educatwn 48--l\:1 (1970), E. CnbbcrlPy.
School Fund~ and Their Apportwnmcnt 21-27 (1905) .
11
By 1940 one-half of the Stat<>'s population was clustered in its
metropolitan c0nters. I Governor's Commtttre Report, at 35.
'" Gihmr-Aikru Committre, To Hav0 What We Must 13 (1948).
'"H. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Billli 11-12 (1950): Texa~ Stat.r Bd
of Educ ., supra, 11 11.
17
R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. lt should br noted that during thi;;;
penod the median per pupil expenditure for all schools with an
Otlrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year.
Durmg this same pertod a survey conducted by the State Board
of EducatiOn concluded that '·m Trxm; the best educational advantages offered by i he State at present may be had for the med1an
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average da1ly attendance " ·
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 56.
tH 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Scss. 1939, at 274
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Law~ of Texa;:;, 48th Legis ,
Reg. Se;;s. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per :student)
!9 General & Sp<.'C. Law~ of. T<.'XU~ , 49th LegiS., neg. se~s 1945 ..
{;. 53, at 7fi,
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Recognizing the need for mcreased state funding to
lfelp offset disparities in local spending and to meet
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore
alternative systems in other States and to propose a
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or
basic educational offering to each child and that would
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's
'Co-chairmen, establishiug the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program."" Today this Program accounts
for approximately half of the total E>ducational expendi tures in Texas." '
The Program calls for state and local contributions
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries,
operating expenses. and transportation costs. The State,
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80% of the Program, and the school districts
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining
20%,. The districts' share. known as the Local Fund
Assignment. is apportioned among the school districts
under a formula designed to reflect each district's
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first
divided amon~~: Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com~° For a completl' hi;;tory of thr adoption in Trxa;; of a foundation program, ~rc R. Stills, supra, n. 16. Sec also V Governor'~>
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research League, Public School
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (lntenm Report 1972) .
2 l For the 1970-1971 school year tlu::, state a1cl program accounted
for 4~ . 0 % of all public school funds . Local taxation contributed
41.1 % and 10.9% was prov1dcd 111 federal fund s. Texa:; HPsParch
Leagu(' , NIJprn , n. :W., at ~.
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plicated economic index that takes into account the
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property
in the State. 22 Each county's assignment is then divided
among its school districts on the basis of each district's
share of assessable property within the county. 23 The
district, in turn, finances its share of the Assignment out
of revenues from local property taxation.
The design of this complex system was two-fold. First.
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Pro~ram would have a\l eq!Jalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest
burden on the school d.istricts most capable of paying.
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school
~istrict to contribute to the education of its children 24
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.25 Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.
In the years since this program went into operation
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949'
V Governor'~ Comm1ttee Report , at 44-4!5 .
At pre::;ent there arc 1,161 school districts 111 TPxas. Texas Research League , supra, n . 20, at 12.
24 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Comm1ttee found that some ::;chool
di::;tricts were not levymg any local tax to support education.
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supm, n. 15, at 16. The Texas State
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and
independent school district::; wPre levying no lora! property tax ill'
, 1935-1936. Texa::; State Bel. of Educ., supra n . 11 , at 39-42
~" G\lmet-Aikel) Committee , supra, n. 15 , at 15.
22

23
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately
500%. 26 In the last decade alone the total public school
pudget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per
pupil expenditures throughout the State.~~ Teacher sal- ~
aries, by far the largest item in any school's budget, have
increased dramatically-the state-supported minimum
teacher salary has risen from $2,400 to $6,000 over tht'
last 20 years."'
The school district in which appellees reside, the Edgewood Independent School District, has been compared
throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights I ndependent School District. This comparison between tht~
least and most affluent districts in the San Antonio area
serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual system
of finance operates and to indicate the extent to which
substantial disparities exist despite the State's impressivE'
progress in recent years. Edgewood is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approxi~
mately 22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 elementary
and secondary schools. The district is situated in thP
core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighbor~
hood that has little commercial or industrial property
Tht' residents are predominantly of Mexican-American
descent: approximately 90'?{ of the student population
is Mexican-American and over 6;7( is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil is $5,960-the lowf'St in the metropolitan area-and the merl.ian family
~o I Governor's Committee Report, at 51- 5a
·n Texas Research League, supra, n. 20. at 2
2
~ In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupti
expenditure for all cmrent operating expem:iel:i mcreased from $206
to $493 In that same period C'apital expenditures increa;,;ed from
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Committee flpport, at 53-54.
>MJ III Governor'~; Committee Heport, at 113-146; Berk<:>, Carol'··
vale, Morgan & Whtte, The Trxas School Fmance Case: A Wrong
\n Srarch of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Ednc. 659, ll8H182 (1972)
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.i nconw ($4,686) is also the lowest.·' 0 At an equalized
tax ratt> of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-the
highest in the metropolitan area-the district contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 19671!168 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248.~ Federal funds added another $108 for a
total of $356 per pupil :'"
Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San
Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000
students, are situated in a residential community quitE>
u ulike the Edgewood District. The school population is
predominantly Anglo, having only 187< Mexican-Americans and less than 1 7c Negroes. The assessed property
value per pupil exceeds $49,000 "" and the median family
1

The family income figun·s are ba~rtl on HHiO cen~us statistic::,.
ThE> AvailablE> School Fund, techmcally, provides a second
source of ~tate money. That Fund hm; continued as m year~:; paHt
(:sec• text accompanying nn. W-19, supta) to du;tnbute uniform
per pupil grant;; to every di~trict. in the Stat('. In 1968 thiH Fund
tlllottrd $98 per pupil. How('ver, b('C'itu~:>P the Available 8f'hool
Fund contributiOn is always subtractrd from a district's entitlPment under the FoundatiOn Program, it play;; no i>Ignifirant rolr
ln educational finance today.
"~ While federal a;;;.m;tanee ha:; au amelwrat ing effect on the difference in :school budget:; between wealthy and poor du;t rict~, tbP
District Court reJrcted an argnmrnt mad<' by th(' 8tate in that
court that it should con1>ider the rfTec1 of the frderal gmn1 111
a::;:;es~:>illg the di:scrimination clrum. 3:~7 F Supp., at 284 The Staw
ha;; not renewed that content1on here.
d:l A map of Bexar County mcluded w the record ~>hows that
Edgewood and Alamo Hrights ar(' among the :;malle~>t distnct~:; m
the county and are of approximately equal SJZ<' . Yet, as the figureK
above indicate, Edgewood's studrnt populat 1011 I::i morP than four
times that of Alamo Height;,;. TillS factor obvwuHiy account,; for
a 1>igmficant percentage of the diffc·n'IlCC'::; brtwPPn thr two districtK
in per pupil property values and expenditurr::. . If Alamo H('Ight:s
had a,-; man.v Htndent~ to Pducate a~ Edgrwood doP~:> ll2,000) I1Sp('t'
30

~1
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income is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85
per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and
above its contribution to the Foundation Program.
Coupled with the $225 provided from that Program, the
district was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources.
Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil.
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide
the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid/' more recent partial statistics indicate that
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year. the FoulJdation School Program allotment for Edgewood was
$356 per pupil. a 62o/r increase over the 1967-1968 school
year
Indeed, state aid alone in 1970---1971 equaled
Edgewood's entire 1967-1968 school budget from local.
state. and federal sources. Alamo Heights enjoyed a
similar increase under the Foundation Program, netting
$491 per pupil in 1970---197V"' These recent figures
pupil asse:;sed propPrty value would be flpproximately $11,100 rather
than $49,000, and its per pupil C'Xpenditures would therefore have
been considerably lower.
a4 The figures quoted abovE' vary slightly from thosr lltihzrd in
the District Court opimon 337 F. Supp., at :Zi\2. Thr,;e tnvwl
differrnces are apparently a product of that court's reliancr on
slightly different statistical data than we have r<'lied upon.
a6 Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greater
contributionH to both school districts over the last several years, 1t
1s apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants
i::; due to the Pmphasis 111 the State's allocation formula on the
guaranteed minimum ~ala ries for teacher~. Higher salar.ies are
guaranteed to teachrrs having morr years of expenenee and pos ~
sessmg more advanced de!!:rees. Therefore, Alamo Heights , which
ha.s a greater percentage of experienced personnel w1th advanced
degrees, rece1vrs more State support. In this regard the Texas
Program IH not unlike that presently m existC'nce .in a number of
f}ther ShltPS C Coono~ , W C'lunr, S Sn~J;arman, supra, n. 1:{, at

'
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also reveal the exteu t to which these two tlistrictsJ
allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. Alamo
Heights, because of its relative property wealth, was
required to contribute out of its local property tax collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 209{ of
its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand,
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its
grant. 3 n It does appear then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential
of each. 37
Despite these recent Increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevaif in San Antonio and in varying
degrees throughout the State"" still exist. And it was
63-125 . Because more cfollars have been given to districts that
already spend more per pupil, t>uch Foundation formulas have been
described as "anti-equalizing." Ibid. The formula, however, is
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms. The percentage
disparity between the two Texas districts is diminished substantially
by State aid. Alamo Heights derivrd in 1967-1968 almost 13 times
as much money to ,;pend per pupil from 1ts cornbim•d State and local
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approximately two to onl.', i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice
us much money to spend JWr pupil from 1ts combird State and local
resource;;.
BG Texas RC8earch League, supra, n. ~0. at 13.
B7 The Economic Index, which deterrnmes each county's share of
tlw total Local Fund Assignmrnt, IS based on a complex formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was in;;tituted.
See text, <lt pp. 5-6 S'Upm. It lws fre(]uently been suggested by
Texas researchers that the formula br altrred in srveral respects
to provide a more .a ccurate reflection of local taxpaymg ability,
rspecially of urban school d1stncts. V Govrrnor's Commit tre Report , at 4~; Texas H.esca reb Lragu<> , Texas Public School Finane<>.
A Majonty of Excrptwm; 31-32 (2d Interim Rrport 1972) ; Berkr,
Carnevale, Morgan t\: White , s'Upra, n . 29, at 680-(i/-:1.
aB Thr District Court rel1ed on the findingH presented 111 an
affidav11 submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His sampling

71- 1032-0PINJON

SAN

ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

11

these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'
dual system of public school finance violated the Equa.l
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the
Texas system discrimmates on the basis of wealth .in
the manner in which education is provided for its people.
337 F . Supp., at 282.
Finding that wealth is a
"suspect" classificatiOn and that education is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held that the
Texas system could be sustained only if the State
could show that it was premised upon some compelling
of 110 Texas :>chool di"tricts demon"trateu a direct correlation
between the amount of a dit>trict 's taxable property and Its level of
per pupil exprnditurr. But hit> study found only a partial corrrlation
between a distnct's median family income and per pupil expenditure~ . The "tudy abo show~. in the relatively few distnct;; at the
extremes, a11 mvrr~e correlation betwePn percPnta~r of rninoritiP:<
and expc>nditurPK

I

Categorized by Equalized Property Values,
MPdian Family Income, and State-Local Revenue

Ma1'ket Vahie
of TaxablP
Property
Per Pu71il
Above $100,000
( 10 Districts)
$100 ,00( J-$50 ,000
(26 Districts)
$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
( 40 Districts)
Below $10,000
( 4 District s)

Medwu
Family
Income
From 196U
$5,900

Per Cent
Mmo1'ity
Pupils

X%

State Lt'.
Local
Revenues
Per Pup!l
$815
$544

$4.-125
$4,900

23%

$48;~

$5,050

:H o/,

$462

$3.3:L5

79o/,

$il05

Although the correlations w1th respect to family income and race
uppear only to ex1st at the ext remes, and although the affiant's
methodology ha s been que~tioned (see Goldstein, Interdistrict
lnequaliti!:'" m School Financmg: A Critical Analy~is of Serrano v,
Priest and 1t ~ ProgPny . 120 TT Pa. L. Rev . 504. 5~2-525 nn. 67
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.' 1
!d., at 284.
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
' dual system of financing education could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter~
fere with fundamental constitutional rights :l!J or that
involve suspect classifications.+() If, as previous decisions
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity,
that the State rather than the complainants must carry
a "heavy burden o{ justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precisionN and is "tailored" narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives and that it has selected the "least
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,• 1 the Texas
financing system and its counterpart in virtually every
other State will not pass muster. The State candidly
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." '12
Apart from its concession that educational finance in
& 71 ( 1972)), m~ofar a;; any of t hr;;e correla tiou~ i;; rPlrvant
to the constitutional thesis presented in this cnse we mny accrpt
it~; ba:sic thru~t .
But see pp. 21-23 infra. For a drfem;e of the
rehab1lity of thr affidnv1t, ~ee Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White,
supra, n. 29 .
39 E . g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S,
92 (1972) ; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
'Fhompson, 394 U. S. 61~ {1969) .
10 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) ; Loving v.
Vtrginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); ' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184
(1964) .
41
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 (] . S. 330, 343 ( 1972) , and th<'
cases collected therem.
·12 Appellant;;' Br\ef, at ll,

f
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Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes
the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis"
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage o(
some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. If so,
the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed .
If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to
determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protectiou Clause of the Fourteenth Amenrlment.

Jl
The District Court's opinion does not refiect the novelty
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance.
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and'
appellate processes, 45 and on cases disapproving wealth
restrictions on the right to vote."' Those cases, the
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classification. Finding that the local property
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea13

lbtd

11

Tr of Oral Arg. , al

.~.

Appellant;;' Hc>ply Bnef, ai 2

E. (] ., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U S. 12 (1956) ; Douglas v. CoLt·
fornia, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) .
•u HarrJer v. Bd. of Electwns , ;3~a U. 1:3 . 66:3 (1966) ; McDonald' ·
Bd. of Electiou Comm'rs, 394 {! . S. K02 ( 1969) ; B·ullock v. ('art!' F ••
4D5 U. S 1;34 (1972); Ooosb11 ,.. Osser , -- { 1 S - - 1197:3)
15
"
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soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the
undeniable importance of education,' 7 that there is a
fundamental right to education and that, absent some
compelling state justification, the Texas system: could
not stand.
We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis
persuasive.

A
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have
recently struck down school financing laws in other
States, IH IS quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather
than focusing on the umque features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through
a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the traditional systems of financillg public schools, some poorer
people receive less expensive educations than other more
affluent people, these systems discriminate ou the basis
of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms,
" S<'E' ra;;p~;; citrd in trxt, at 2(i- 27 , mfra.
Serrano "· Priest, 9ti Cal Rptr. 601 , 487 P 2d 1241, 5 Cal.
:3d 584 (1971) ; Van Dusartz v. lfatjield , ;3:)4 F . Supp. R70 (Minn .
1971) ; Robw.son v. C'ahul , 118 N J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187
(1972) , Milliken v. Green. No 54,809 (Mich. S. C ., .Jan - , 1973).
48
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~nd

whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence.
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court
below .
The case comes to us with no defimtive descnption of
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which
the discrimination claimed here might be described.
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as
discriminating ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 4 u or
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others. 5 "
or (3) against all those who, Irrespective of their personal incomes. happen to reside in relatively poorer
)

~v In their complaint, app~>llees purported to represeut a cia::;::;
rompo;;ed of person;, who are "poor" and who reside m ;;chool di;;tricts having a "low value of .
property ." Tlmd AmendPd Complaint, App., at 15. Yl·t appellees have not dPfined the term ''poor"
with reference to any absolute Of functional levrl of Impecumty. 8~
text, at. lH-1!:!, infra See abo Appellee.·:;' Bmf. at 1. :3 ; Tr. of Oral
Arg, <t.t. 2(}-~ I.
~<• Appellee::;' proof at trial focn::;cd on comparativP differences in
family mcomes between re;;Idt>nts of WPalthy and poor distnct;; . They
endeavorPd, apparently, to ;;how that there exi;;t1:1 a direct correlation
between JWr1:1onal family income and educational PxpendJturrs . See
text , at 20-22, m/m. The District Court may havP bPen rPiymg on
this notion of relativo d!scnmination ba1:1ed on fam1ly wealth . Citin~
a.ppeJlpp::; ' stat1~tieal proof, thP court Pmpha~nwd that "those dis-·
net~ mo::;t nch in proprrty al::;o havP the highest mPdian family lll ·
eomE:'
while thP poor propPrt~ · d1~tnrtt< arC' poor m Inrom<· ..•• "
;):~7 F. ~llflp , nt '2H~ .

;:
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school districts."' Our task must be to ascertain whether')
in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the
.
resulting classification may be regarded as suspect.
"( ~
The precedents of this Court provide the proper startiug point. The individuals or groups of individuals
who constituted the class discrimi11ated against in our
prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit. and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to eujoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12 ( 1956), and its progeny, ~ the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal
defendant frow acquiring a transcript, or au adequate
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation
would have been shown if the State had provided some

.

5

At oral argument and m their bnef, appellef'~ ~ugge~>t that
descnption of the personal status of the residents m districts that
spend less on education IS not critiCal to their case. In their view,
the Texas system is Jmpermiss1bly d1scnminatory even If relatively
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Bnef, at 43-44 ;
Tr. of Oral Arg ., at 20--21. Then' are mdicatwm; m the D1stnet
Court opmion that 1t adopted thi:,; throry of district discrimination .
The opimon repeatrdly emphmnzes the comparative financ1al ~:;tatu~:;
of districb and early m the opimon It describes appellees' class as
being composed of "all .
rhildren throughout Texa:s who live 111
school di:strict:; w1th low prOJWrty valuation~." :3:37 F. Supp., at 2~J .
5 " Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U S. 189 (1971); Willwms v.
51

Oklahoma City, 395 U. S, 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393
U. S. 367 (1969) ; Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S . 40 (1967); Long v
Distrrct Court of Iowa, 385 U S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washmgton,
372 U. S. 487 (1963); ErskinP v Washington Pnson Board, 357
U. S 214. {195H) .
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substitute" for a full stenographic transcript,
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. 8. 226, 228 (1 971) :
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963) ; Erskine v. Washing~
ton Prison Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958).
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. 8. 353
(1963). a decision establishing an indigent defendant's
right to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay
for counsel from their own resources and who had no
pther way of gaining representation. Douglas provides
110 relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not
insurmountable, Nor does it deal with relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less
wealthy.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. 8. 235 (1970), and Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal·
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be~ause of their inability to pay a fine.
Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those
.cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money or).
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The
Court has not held that fines must be structured to
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and
pften do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but iu
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts
found in the previous eases were present there. The size
of the fee. often running into thE' thousands of dollars

71-13:~:2- (>PiNrON
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and, In at least one case, as high as $8,900, effectively
barred all potential candidates who were unable to pay
thP required fee . As the system provided "no reason . .
ablE> alteruative rneans of access to the ballot" (ld., at
149). inability to pay occasioned an absolute denial of'
a position on the primary ballot.
Only appellees' first possible basis for describmg the
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance systemdiscrimination against a class of definably "poor" per•
sons- might arguably meet the criteria established in
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however,
,demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing char~
acteristics of wealth classifications can be found here.
First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no
P-ffort to demonstrate that 1t operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major
factual assumption of Serrano- that the educational
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in Connecticut." ,,;j Defining "poor" families as
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," "1
·the Conuecticut study found , not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial
areas- those same areas that provide the most attractive
sources of property tax income for school districts. 5 ~
n Note, A Sta tt::;ttcal Analy::;ts of tlw School Finance Dectt:nom; : On
Winmng Battle;; and Lo::;ing Wa rs, 8 1 Yal e L .1 1:303, 1328- 1321~·
,(1972)
'

1

~"

/d ., at ] ;~ 2 4 nud n 102
frl HI I:32i'.
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Whether a similar pattern would be discovered in Texas
is not known, but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases,
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here
is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of
education may be determined by the amount of money
expended for it,•n a sufficient answer to appellees' argu<tnent is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages.''' Nor, indeed, in view of the
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can
any system assure equal quality of educatiou except
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate"
.education for all children iu the State. By providing
12 years of free public school education , aud by assuring teachers. books. transportation and operatiug funds,
Each of appellee,;' poHtnble theorw::; of wealth dt,;crnnmatwn 1 ~
founded on the a,;sumption that the quality of education vnrieH
directly with the amount of funds expend0d on it and that , therefore, the difference Ill quahty between two schools can b0 determined simplistically by looking at the diffc·rellce in per puptl C'xpendt-·
tllrC's . Tht::; is a matter of com;idernble disputP nmong edue;ttor~ nnrl
c·ommentators . Sc'e nn . H6 and 101 , mjra .
57
E . g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S 1:34, 1:37, 149 (1!:172) ; Mayer v.
Ctty of C'hicago, 404 U. S. 189, 194 (1971) ; Draper v. Washmgtou ,
56

372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (196:3) , Douolas v. California, :372 U S.

as3,

:~57

(I9tt~).

•

f
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee,
for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu~
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.' " 5 s The State repeatedly
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education.'' su No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion.
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged
class is not susceptiblP to ident.ificat.ion in traditionaJ
~erms . ""

' As suggested above, appellees and the District Court
may have embraced a second or third approach, the
5
Indeed, eve11
" G1lmer-A1ken Comnnttr•e, supra. n. 15 , at 1:3 .
though · local funding ha::; long been a ::;ignificant al:lpect of educa-.
tiona[ funding, the State ha~ always viewed prov1ding an acceptable·
education a::; one of ib primary function~. Sre TPxas State Bd. of"
Educ., supra, n. 11 , at 1, 7.
5e Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at l.
;;o An Pducational finance system might be hypothesized, howPver, in which the analogy to the wealth di::;crimination ca~es would
be considerably clol:lf'f If elementary and ::;econdary Pducation were
madfl available by the State only to thoHe able to pay a tuitiOn
;tsses~ed aga\n::;t each pupll , there would br a clearly defined clal:l::;
of " poor '' peoplp--definablr 111 terms of the1r inabilit)' to pay
the prescribed sum- who would be absolutely precluded from reeeiving 1111 education. That ca::;e would prc~ent a far more compelling i:iet of circum~tances for judicial a~sistance than the case
b0fore us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide an education to tho~e who can afford 1t.
lt has provided what it con::;iders to be an adequate base educai ion
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to amdJOratfr
by stat(' funding and by thr local asses;;ment program the disparit1e~ :
in local tax re~oureP~ .
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~econd of which might be characterized as a theory of
relative or comparative discrimination based on family
.income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla~
tion exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That
is. along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower
the dollar amount of education received by the family's
children.
The prinCipal evidence adduced in support of this
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer~ity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and
apparently accepting thE' substance of appellees' theory.
noted, first. a positive correlation between the wealth of 1
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures.
Second. the court found a similar correlation between dis- '
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.
:::lupp., at 282. n. 3.
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustamed, then
it might be argued that expenditures 011 educationequated by appellees to the quality of education-aredependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
.questions, including whether a bare positive correlation or (
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro •.
vide a basis for co11cluding that the financing system is de-

"'· Al:so, 1t ::;hould lw reeoglllzed that rnedJ<UJ income ::;ta u::;tic::;
may not define with any prccJSJOn the ;status of individual familie::;
within a11y given di::;tnet. A morf' dPpmdable ::;bowing of compara t IVP wealth di::;cnmina1IOII would a!Ho Pxamme factor~ ~ueh a:,; the
average mromP, thf' mode , and thf' conrPntrntion of poor famJ!ies m
.< Ill\' rlistrH't,
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the
comparatively poor,u" and whether a class of this size
and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classes. These questions need not
be addressed in this case, however. since appellees' proof
fails to support their allegations or the District Court's
conclusions
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 1076 of the school districts in Texas. His
findings, set out in the margin, 6 '1 show only that the
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest
family incomes and devote the least amount of money
to education. Fot the remainder of the districts-96
districts comprising almost 90% of the sample-the correlation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next
to the most moner on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes while
the districts spending the least have the highest median
fli cr. Jejfet80YI v. flackney, 40!) U. :::3. 535, 547-54!:1 (197:2); Ely ,
Lrg;n;lative and Admm1strative Mot1vat JOn m Con~t itutionai Law,
7!:1 Yair L. J. 1205, 1258-1259 (1970); Snnon, The School Finance
"Decision~: Collrct1vr Barg;aming; and Future Finance Systemi'i, H2·
Yair L . .J. 409, 4:39-440 (197:3) .
uR Market Value of
M ediau J!'am!ly
Sta.tP & Local
1'axablP Property
fncoml'
Expend1.tures
. Per Pup!l
111 1960
Per Pupil
Ahov(• $100,000
$5,900
$815
(10 districts)

$100,000-$50,000
(26 district,;)
$50,000-$30,000
(:30 di:;;tricts)
$30,000-$10,000
(40 diH.tnrt&)
Below $10,000
(4 d!Htnct~)

$4.125

$544

~-I)JOO

. 1).050

$4o2

I
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family incomes. It IS evident that, even if the con..
'ceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees,
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of
comparative wealth discrimination. 64
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined~district wealth
'discriminatiou. Since the only correlation indicated by
the evidence 1s between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might
be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be
viewed as encompassing every child in every district
'except the diStrict that has the most assessable wealth
and spends the most on education."'' Alternatively, as
4
{' Studws in oth<·r 8tate::; havP abo quest10nrd the exi;;tence ol
any dependable correlation between a di~trict'::; wealth mrasured
in terms· of assessable property and the collect iw wealth of families
re;nding m the district mrasured in trrms of median family
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. P1'iest: Wealth and
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) (''It can be
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation:
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per
pupil, and districts with high m;::;es::;ed valtic per pupil haw• low
income per pupil"), Davit>, Taxpnymg Ability: A Study of thP He. lationship Betwren Wealth and Incomr 111 California Countieti, nr
The Challenge of Changr in School Finance, lOth Nat'l Educationaf
A:ssn. Conf on School Firwnce 199 (1967). Notr, ill Yale L. .J .
supra, n. 53. ::lre abo Gold~tem , supra, n. :~1'. at 522-527 .
" 5 lndred, this Is precise!~· how the plaintiff~ Ill Serrano v. l-"1ie~l
defined the cla~::; tht•y purportrd to repre~ent. "PiamtiiT children·
, clann to reprr;;rnt n clati~ con~i,.;t ing of all public ;;chool pupil;; Jll
Califorma, 'rxcrpt children m that ~chool di;;tnct
wlllCh .•.
affords the grratest educational opportunity of all school di::;tnct;.c
w1thm Cahfonna .' '' 96 Cal. Hptr ., at H04, 4H7 P. 2d, at 1244 .
5 Cal. :~d. HI 51\9,. SeP aJ;;o Van D·usartz v Hatfirld , :3;34 F' Supfl ,,

,~t .

x7:t..

71-l:3WJ-O.P1N't0N
24

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v RODRIGUEZ

suggested in MR. Jusnc~<.: MARSHALL's d1ssenting opinion, (
post, at - . the class might be defined more restrictively
to include children in districts with assessable property
which falls below the statewide average, or median, or'
below some other artificially defined level.
. However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks
this Court to extend 1ts most exacting scrutiny to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
d1verse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts.<"' The system
of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have
noue of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-·
rnand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class.
But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never )
heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides
an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees
have not relied solely on this contention."' They also
assert that the State's system impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior decisions of this Court require the
Appellee;;, however, havr avmded de;;cnbmg the Texa,; s~·;;tcm
as one resultmg merely m discrimination between distnct;; per se
~ince this Court has never que;;tioncd the State',; power to draw
r0asonable distinct10n:> between political subdivisions within its
borders. Grij]in Y. eounty SchooL Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U. S. 218, 2.'~0-231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U S
420, 427 ( 1961) , i'\alsburg v !II aryland, ;34,() U. S. 545, 552 (1954)
r; 7 E . g., Harper v. Vtrgww Bd . of Electwn.s. :38:3 U.S. 6();3 (1966) :
Urnted State~ v Kras. l1 S. - - (1972). i-lPP Mit. .JliH'I' ICI!}
l'vfARHHALL'H diHiil'lltU\g opimon, fJOSt. [l]l , "6
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application of the strict standard of judicial review,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1971);
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 ( 1969). It
is this question-whether education is a fundamental
right, in the sense that it is among the rights and liberties
protected by the Constitution-which has so consumed
the attention of courts and commentators in recent years_n~

B
ln Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.'' Id., a.t 493. What was said there in the
context of racial discrimination has lost nolle of its
vitality with the passage of time :
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performJ
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ•;, Srr Serrano v. Pnest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,487 P. 2d 1241.5 Cal. 3d
(1971); Van D"Usartz v. Hatfield, :344 F. Supp. (Minn. 1971) .
.Robmson v. Cahill, 118 N ,) Suprr. 22::3, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972), .f.
Coons, W. Clunr, ami S. Sugarman, sup·ra, n. 13, at 8:39-394; Go!d::;tein. supra, n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational ExJlenditurcs: Some Minority Viewti on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo . L.
Rrv. 617, 618-624 (1972): Comment, Educational Financmg, Equal
ProtectiOn of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICh. L. Rev .
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financmg Ca~es :
lnterdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Di~cnmma1wn, 14 Anz. L .
R(•v . 88. l 20- 124 ( L972) .
5~4
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ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. :::luch an
opportunity, where , thB state has undertaken to provide it, 1s a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.'' Ibid
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society, may be found m
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing'
both before and after Brown was decided . Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237,
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) ( 1972); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. ::-5. 203, 230 (1963) (MR. JusTICE
BHENNAN); McCollum v. Bd . of Education, 333 U. S
203.212 (1948) (Mr . Justice Frankfurter); Pierce v
Society of Sisters, · z68 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 F . S. 390 ( 1923); Interstate Consolidated
8treet Ry. v. Massachuset?s, 207 lT. S. 79 ( 1907) .
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts
from our historic dedication to public education. We
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the·
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance
of education both to the individual and to our society".
cannot be doubted.'w But the importance of a service·
performed by the titate does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice·
Harlan , dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate·
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute
a,ffects important rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson , 394
lJ . S. 618, 655, 661 .(1969) . In his view , if the degrcp·
qf :judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de~
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pending on a majority's view of the importance of the
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward
Ibid.
We
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'"
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and
<;me for which the Court lacks both authority and competence. But MR. JusTICE STEWART's response in
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale em~
ployed in the Court's equal protection decisions :
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular
human activities, characterize them as "fundamental," and give them added protection . .. .' To
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it
must, an established constitutional right, and gives
to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S .. at 642. (Emphasis from original .)
MR. JusTICE STEWART's statement serves to underline
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear.
In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational
t·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving
AFDC benefits, the Court explained .
"in moving from State to State . . . appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." l d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.)
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized
as a right of constitutional significance, 7 0 and the Court ' ~
7
" E. g .. United ::Jtates 1' . G·uest, :38;{ U. 8. 745 , 757- 759 (l9fio) :
Oregon v. Mitrh ell. 400 U . S. 112, 229, 2:37- 2:38 (1970) (opmion of

,Tl ' H'I' TCEI-i BHlC N NAN , WHITE .

and

:V1ARtHl ALJ, J ,
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decision therefore did not require an ad hoc detenninatio1i
as to the social or economic importance of that right. 71
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that casej
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law,
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality."
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are particularly important to the poor,'' such as the "'need for
decent shelter' " and the " 'right to retain peaceful possession of one's home' " Ibid. MR. JusTICE WHITE's
analysis. in his opinion for the Court, is instructive:
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee of access
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease, without the payment of rent . . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
71
After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970), there could
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for
the Court's holding in Shapir-o. In Dandridge the Court applied
the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family
grant provision under its AFDC program. A frderal di~trict court
held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter standard
of review. In tlw c:<ourse of rever~iug the lower court, the Court
distinguished , Shapiro properly on the ground that in that rase
"the Court found state interference with the con~titutionally protected freedom of interstate travel." Id., at 484 n. 16.

I
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housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-'
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
ld., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)
~imilarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human bei11gs." id., at 485.'~ provided no basis for departing from the settled mode of constitutional analysis of
legislative classifications involving questions of economic
and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central
importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an
adequate foundation for requiring the State to justify its
law by showing some compelling state interest. See also
Jefferson v. Hackney! 406 U. S. 535 ( 1972); Richardson
v. Belcher, 404 0. S. 78 ( 1971)
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question
now before the Court is plain. It is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental'' is not to be found in comparisons of the relatiw
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence
c'r housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather.
the answer lies in assessing whether there 1s a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con~titution
Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972): ''
n The Court reftt8rd to apply the stri<'t scrutiny tcl:lt desptte it:>
eontemporaneou:s recognition m Goldberg v K elly, 897 U. S. 254,
:Ui4 (1970), that "welfare provtdr:,; thr m ran.~ to obtain rH::;entmf
food, clothing, housing, and rnrdical carP.''
7 " In Eisenstadt , the Court Htrurk down a Ma:s::;aelntHt'tl :-; ~tatut<•
that prohtbtt rd thr di ~ tributwn of contrareptiv<• devicr::;, findmg that
rhe law fatled "to satisfy rven the more lenirnt equal protect10n
;;tandarrl '' ld . at 447 n 7.. NrV<'rthrlr~~. in dictum, thr Court

...
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972);" Police De.:.
partment of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92
(1972); · ~ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)."'
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor (
do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.
r<>cit(•d the correct form of Pqual protretton analy~1~: "tf wr wer1~
to concludr that the Ma;,;;,;achu;;ptt::; statute Impinge;,; upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold v. ConiU'Ctirut, :381 u. S. 479
(19(i5)], thP ~tntutory chts::;Ificntlon would have to b!' not mrrei~ ·
rationally related to a valid public purpo::;e but necessary to the
<tchiPvement of a r·ompPiling ~tatE' intPrr~r.·· Ibid. (rmphasi:-< from
original)
71 Dunn fully canvassPs thi;; Court '~ votmg nghts ca:;p,; and ('X·
plain~ that ''tht;; Court has madP clear that a ctt1zen ha::; a co 'lt~
stitutionaily protPcted right to parttctpatP 111 elections on an Pqual
bmas wJth otlwr cltizPns in the jurisdictiOn." !d ., at :3:3() (emphal-II~
supplied). The eonstltutwnal underpmmng~ of thr right to rqual
treatment in the voting proce~~ can no longer be doubtrd c•ven
though, a~ thr Court noted 1n Ilarper '. Virgmw Bd. of Electwns,
383 U. S. 663, 665 (196()), "thr right to vo1(• Ill state elrctwns I:>
now her!' expre~sly mentwned." SPC' Oregou \'. iYhtchell, 400 U. S.
112, 1:35, 1:38-144 (l\lR .. lutmcg DouGLAti), 229 241-242 (Optnton
of BngNNAN, WH!'m, aud :VlAHtiHALL) (1970); Bullock v. Carter.
405 U.S. l:H , 140-144 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District.
395 U.S. f\21, 625-(1:30 (19(i9); Williams Y. Rhodes, 393 U.S. :2:3, :29. (
30-:31 ( 1961-;) ; Reynolds v. Sims, :377 lJ. S. 5:{;), 554-5()2 ( 1964);
Gray v. Sanders , :372 U.S. :368 , :379-:381 (19(1:3).
7
thr Court ~truck Jown a Chtcago ;uttlptckPttng
" In Moslf'.IJ.
ordinancr that rxPmptPd labor picketing from it:; prohibition~ . Tho
ordinancl' was hPld mvalid under the Equal Protection Clauti('
aftrr subjecting it Lo careful scrutiny and finding that thr ordinancE'
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of rrviPw was appropnatrly applied :;inc(' the ordinanC(' wa;; onr "affrct ing Fir~t Amrndment intert'Ht:;." Jd., at 101 ,
7
" Skinner appli('cj tlw staudard of clo::;P ~crutmy to <t statr law
permitting forced ~tPrillzation of "habitual criminals." lmplictt m
the Court's opiniou is the n'cognition that the right of procrration
l::; among the rig\11:; of per;,;onal privacy protected nndN the Cou~tt
tutiou . Rr<-' Roe v. Wade, ·lJ S ( 197:{)

r
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As we have said, the undisputed importance of education
will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation. lt is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist
that education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not
been taught to read, assimilate. and utilize available
knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect
to the right to vote. 78 Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is
tp conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an inSee, e. g., Red Lion Broadcastmg Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367,
:3159-390 (1969) ; ::itanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969) ;
Lamont v. Postmaster Ge11R1'al, :{81 lJ. S. :301, 30f:\-:307 (1965) .
78
Since the right to vote, per se, i;; not a constitutional!~· protected right, we assume that nppellrrs' rcferencr:; to that right arc
~Imply shorthand reference:; to the protrcted right, implicit 111 our
constitutioual sy;;tem, to participate in ::;tate elert10ns on an equal
has1::; with other qualified voters whrnrver the State ha::; adopted
an elective proce::;::; for determining who will reprrsent any segment
of t.he State's populatiOn . ~('<' n. 74. supro
77

I

71-1332-0PfN'iON
32

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DlSTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelli~
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes
have been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The
Court has long afforded zealous protection against U t ijustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or
the most informed electoral choice. That these may be
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and
of a representative form of government is not to be
doubted."' These are indeed goals to be pursued by a
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be
lmplemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequi~
site to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expendi~
ture in Texas provide an education that falls short.
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a
7
u The State~ haY<' often pursued their entirely lcgitimatr intere~t
in m;suring "intelligent rxrrci~e of the franchise," Katzenbach v.
Morgan, :3S4 U. S. 041, fi5.5 ( 196!1), through ~urh dev1rr:-; as literac:v tests and age restrictions on t hr right to vote. SPe tbid.,
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (]970). And, whrre those restrictions have brrn found to promote intPiligent nsc of tlw ballot without,
discriminating againHt thosP racial and Pthnic minoritie::; previonsly
deprived of an equal Pducational opportunity, this Court has upheld
their u~P. Com parr Lass ita v. N ortharnpton County Bd. of Elec -·
tions, :360 U.S. 45 (1959), with Oreoon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 1:3:~
(Mr . .Tusticr Black), 1:35, l.t4--147 (:Vln .. Ju::mc~~ Dou<;LAK), 15:2.
'2 16-217 (Mr . .lu~tice Harlan) , 229, 231-2:~6 (Opinion of .TutmCE:>
BHENNAN, WHrm, and :'viAWHIALL). 281, 282-2S4 (Mn .. Ju::;Tice
STEWAin), and Ga~ion Cou.nt!l v. United States, 395 0 . S. 2S5 (19()9),
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State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial o£
educational opportunities to any of its children, that
argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in
~pending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the right~ of speech and of full participation in
the political proc~ss.
Furthermore, th logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficul to perceive. How, for instance, is
education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill·clothed, and ill-housed are among
the most ineffective participants in the political process
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendmrmt.H" If so appellees'
thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of Dandridg e v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v. Normet, supra.
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found
those arguments unpersuasive. In on e further respect
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has
applied strict scrutiny to state or fed eral legislation
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of

I

s-o See Schoettle, The Eqval Protection Clause in Pubhc Education. 71 Col. L. Hev . 1355, 1389- 1390 (1971) ; Viem1 , supra, 11. fiH ,
at 622-623 ; Comment , Trnant Interest RcprE\Sentation : Proposal for
a National Tenant s' A:ssociation, 47 T rx. L. Rrv. 1160, 1172- 1173
n. 61 (1969) .
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pur prior cases involved legislation which "deprived ,' ~
·' 'infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of
some such fundamental personal right or liberty . 8ee
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 536; Shapiro v. Thompso·n,
supra, at 634; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 338-343.
A critical distinction between those cases and the onf'
now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with
respect to education. MR. JusTICE BHENNAN, writing
for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 P B. f:i41
( 1966), expresses well the salient point · ''
"This is not a complaint that Congress . .. has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to
vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others
similarly situatedl . . . .
"[The federal law in question] does not restnct or
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by
state law. , . . We need decide only whether the
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-·
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . is
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform
~~ Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a chaJienge by regJ~:;tcred voter:;
in New York City to a provisiOn of thr Voting Ri!!;hts Act of 1965
that prohibited enforcement of a state law railing for Engli:;h
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least :;ix year:; of education at an "American-flag" school in that country evm though
the language of instruction was other than English. Thi::; Court
upheld the que:;tionrd provi~ion of the 19G5 Act over thl' claim that
Jt discnmmatrd agaiu~:;t tho::;e with a :;Ixth grade Pducation obtauwd
in non-English-;;peakml!: ~cbool ~:; ot bc>r than t hl' onr~< dPl:>ill;natrd by t llf'
f(•drral lrgiHia t ton .
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measure aimed at eliminating an existing barriet
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar
principles that a 'statute is not iuvalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther tha11
it did.' . . . that a legislature need not 'strike at all
Pvils at the same time,' and that 'reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind
: '' !d ., at 656-657. (Emphasis from
original.)
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the
federallegislatiou involved in Katzenbach in this regard .
Every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and
continuously expanding state aiel-was implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its
quality.R 2 Of course, every reform that benefits some
more than others may be criticized for what it fails
to accomplish. But we think it plaiu that, in substance,
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's
efforts and to the rights reserVf•d to the ~tates under thP"
e ~onsti tu tion .-~

It should be clear. for the reasons stated above all(l
in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that
2
H Cf Meye1· '
Nebraska, 2(i2 U 8. :mo (1923) , Pierce, .. Soaety
of Sisters. :26,1, 0 S. 510 (1925) ; llaryrove v K~1·k. ;~];{ F t-lupp
\;144 (MD Fla 1970) , vacatf'd, 401 U S. 47fi (1971)
3
M 8rf' Schilb v
Kuebel, 404 lJ S :~57 (1971); McDouald ""
Hrl. of Rlel'hrm ('umm'rs, :{94 l l, 8 ..-m ( 1~)()9).
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this is not a case in which the challenged stat<• action
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny n·~
served for laws that create suspect classifications or
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.
We ueed not rest our decision, however, solely on the
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of
the traditional standanl of review. which requires only
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This cas<'
represents far more than a challenge to ·the manner iri
which Texas provides for the education of its children.
We have here nothing less thau a direct attack · on the
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse ··
state and local tax revenues. We are askf'd to condemn
the State's j udgmeut in conferring on political sub.:
divisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. Iu so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.'' ' This Court has
often admonished against such interferences with the
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause :
"The broad discretion as to classification possessed
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
been recognized. . . . ITlhe passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other ficlcls. legislatures
possess the greatest freedom in classification. :.;;ince
"S(•e , 1'. g., B ell's Gap R Co v. Pmtrli.lJlvania, 1:34 U.S . 232 (1i'90) :
C'annichae/ v. South em ('val ,t· Cok P Co .. :~01 ll. S. -HJ5 . 501'-50~
(l9:37) . Allin / 8tore~ of Ohio . Inc . \'. Rowrrs , :l.'i,-: 11 H. 52:.! (IH59) .
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the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a
familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressivP discrimination against particular persons and
classes . . . . " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 tT. S. 83 1
87-88 ( 1940) .
pee also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,U. B. ( 1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co ., 311
U. S. 435, 445 ( 1940) .
Thus we stand on familiar ground when we coutwue to
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both th€'
~xpertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to th€'
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are
urged to ctirect the States either to alter drastically thr
prese11t system or to throw out the property tax altogether
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a.
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
.subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.'r.
85 Tho~e who urge that the pre::;ent ;;y~tem be mvahdatrd offer
httle guidance a:; to what type of school finanei11g ~hould replace
it. The mo;,;t likely result of rejection of thr rxtstiug sy~trm wou ld
be 8tatewid(• financi11g of all public rdueation with funds drrived from
taxation of proprrty or from the adoption or rxpansion of ~ale~:> and
income taxe:; . SP<' Simon. supra. n. (i:2 . Thr author~ of Privatr
Wealth and Publk Educatton, supm. n. n. at :201-242 , suggest aq
aJternatlV<' :<elwml', known a:-; "dt~tnrt power equalizmg " ln ~tmpl<>~1
trrms, the State would guarantee that at any part1rular rate ul
)lropertl' taxatiOn the rh~tnr1 would n 'rrtvf' H Htated numher of

I
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy, another area in which this Court's
lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed j udgments made at the state and local levels. Education.
perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a
myriad of "intractable economic, social. and even philosophical problems.'' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S..
at 487. The very complexity of the problems of financing·
and managing a statewide public school system suggest
that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them," and that. within the
limits of rationality. "the legislature's efforts to tackle
the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 40~ U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even
the most basic questiqns in this area the scholars
t:tnd educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of"
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
P.ollars regardle~s of the du;tnrt's tax ba~e. To finance the ~llbHicllcs
to "poorer" districts, funds would be takrn away from the .. wealthier"
districts that, bccauHe of their higher property Hilue~. co llect moro
than the ~tated <tmotmt at any gJVcn ratP. Thit; i~ not the place to
weigh the arguments for and ag;tin~t "dbtrict power equalizing," b('yond noting that commentator~ arc 111 dbagreement a~ to whcthev
it is feasible, how it would work, and inclerd whether it would violatP
the equal protection theory undet•lying appellee~,;' caHc. President '~
Comm'n on School Fluancc, Schoob. Peoplr & Moury :3:2-:33 (197:2);
Bateman & Brown. Somp RefiPction~ on 8errano v. Prirst. 49 .I
Urban L. 701, 70G-708 (1972); Brc·~t. Book HeviPw. 23 Stan. L. Hev.
591 , 594-596 (197 i) ; Goldstein, supra, n. :31\, at 542-54:3; Wi~r,
School Finance Equalization Lawsuit~: A Model LPgi~lativC' He~ponsr, 2 Yale Rev . of L. & Soc. Ac1ion 12:3, 125 (1971); Silnrd
& White, Intra~tate Inequalities 111 Public Education: ThC' Cmw
for Judicial Relief Under thr Equal Protrrtim1 Clau::;c , 1970 Wi::;.
L. RPv. 7, 29-30.
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tJducational expenditures and the quality of education "''an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal
conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case,
Relaterl to the questioned relationship between cost and
quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the
proper goals of a system of public education.' 7 And
the question regarding the most effective relationship
heween state boards of education and local school boards .
.in terms of their respective responsibilities and degrees
of control, is now undergoing searching re-exammation. The ultimate wisdom as to these and related
problems of education is not likely to be devined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debatE'
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States mflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe·
or handicap the continued research and experimentation
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keepin~ abreast of Pver changing
ponditions.
It must be remembered also that every claim arisi11g
under the Equal Protection Clause bas unplications for
~"The qualJt y-coHt cont rovt:>r~y has rec(•ived con~1derable att(•Jllion . Among the notable authontJes on both ~Ide;; are the followiHg . l' .Jencks, Inequality (1972) ; C Silberman. Cris1;; m tlw
('Jassroom (1970) ; Office of Education, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (196(1) (The Coleman He port); On Equaltty of Educatwnal Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & 1\fo::;teller rds.); .f. Guthm,
C . Klrindorf('r, II. Levin , & R. Stout. School~ and lnequahtr
(1969) ; Pre;;idrnt ';; Comm'n on School Finance, supra , 11 H5: Swan-.
~on , Tlw Co::;t-Quality RrlatJon~>hip, 111 Thr Challrnge of Change in
School Finance, 10th Nat'! Edncational A,;~n C'onf. on Sebool Finanr<•

151 (19(ii)

' ' Ser the n•:sult,; of the Tl•xa" Govemor '~ Commit tee ';; c>tatl•WH1l•
on thr goal« of Pducatwn m that State. I Governor'~
('ommn tee Report, at 59- (il- Sl·P also Gold;;trm , supra, n. 3g,
:.t( .5Hl- li22 : Rehorttle. supra. 11. XO , authont1es rJt<'d Ill n. Hfi. su.pm ,.
~ttrvpy
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Lhe relationship between national and state power under
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigor"
ous judicial scrutiny. While "[tjhe maintenance of
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration
.in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under
which this Court examines state action.''"' it would be'
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential
,impact on our federal system than the one now before
us. in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually
every State.
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict .i udicial scrutiny. Thesf"
same considerations are rclevan t to the determination
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections,
nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next
turn our attention .
lii
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will
now describe in more detail that system and how it
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparablf"
"'ALlied Sto res uf Ohiu, Inc " Bowers, a5H ll . 8 . 5:Z2, 5;30 , 5;{2
( 1!:159) (MR . •Jut>T IGE BHEN N AN, concurring) ; Katzenbach v . Morgrrn ,
~~1-14 P S, fi41 . 659 . f)61 (1966) ( l\lr .Justirr Harl an. dissrntlllg)
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·a mount of funds is uerived from each source.'w The
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teachercompenstated at the state-supported minimum salaryfor every 25 students. 00 Each school district's other
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for
every 30 teachers; '" one "special service" teacherlibrarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 2
superintendents, vocational instructors. counselors, and
educators for exceptional children are also provided.""
Additional funds an' earmarked for current operating·
expenses, for student transportation."' and for freP
textbooks."''
The program is adrmnistered by the t::ltate Board of
Education and by the Central Education Agency, which
also have responsibility for school accreditation 9 r. and
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-·
11rds. 97 As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted
to the Edgewood School District over the last threfJ
,Years,r1' the State's financial contribution to education 1s
:Steadily increasinp;. None of Texas' school districts, how1)

hw In 1!:170 Texa::; expended approxnnately 2.1 b1llion dollars for
pducatwn and a little over onr billion came from thP Minimum
Foundation Program Texas Research L<•agur . suwa. n 20, at :2.
"" Tf'X Edur ('o(k ~ If) 1:~ (I 97:2).
1
" !d., § 1() li-o.
''" I d.. § Hi.l5
'"'!d ., §§ Hi.W . W,17, W.HJ
!H !d ., §§ Hi.45 , 16 .5 1 - W .It~.
"~ ld ' §§ 1:2.01- 1:2.0-t.
''" 7d .. § IJ.:W ( 5 l
'•7 ld .. § Hi.:301 et Sl'lf,
'"SP(' aute af 9-lll,
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ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the
Foundation Program.
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to
assure that each district would have some ability to
provide a more enriched educational program. 0 u Every
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner.
In some districts the local property tax contribution is
~nsubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation
grant. In part. local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which
the market value for any category of property varies from
its assessed value. 100 The greatest interdistrict disparities,
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have a greater capability for supplementing state
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues
are devoted to paying higher salaries to more teachers.
Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools
in property-affluent districts are lower pupil-teacher ratios
and higher salary schedules.""
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15.
There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texa~ .
.Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's
Committee Heport, at 25-26; Berh, Carnevale. Morgan & Wh1tr,
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16.
"" Texa~ Hesearch League. supra. n. 20, at 18. Texas, in thiH
regard, i~ not unlike most other States. One commentator has observed that "di:sparitirs in cxprnditure~ appear to br largely ex·
99

100

I
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The
District Court found that the State had failed even "to
establish a reasonable basis'' for a system that results
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284. We disagree.
plained by

variatiOn~

in tearhN salaner;."

Stmon. supra, n. o2. at

41:~.

A~ prevwwsly not('d, text acrompanymg n. !:lf:i. 8Upra, the extent to
which t lw quality of education varie~ wtth expenditure per pupil 1s
debated inconclu~\vely by th(' most thoughtful studrnt;; of pubhc educatwn. While all would flgr('r that therE' is a corrrlatwn up to tlw
·p omt of JH'OVIdmg the rPeognized E'H~ential:s in far1htiE'~ and arnclrmtc
opportunities, the issues of greatest disagrrempnt mrlude thP dl'l'ct on
thr quality of education of pupil-tmclwr rattos and of higher tPachE'r
~alary ,;chedulrs. E. g., Oflicr of Ecluratwn, supra. n. R6, at :no-al9
The statE' funding 111 Texas is dPSJgned to assure, on the avrrage, uno
teacher for every '25 ::;tuclent:s , which ~ ~ considrred to be a favorable
ratio by most standard::;. Whrther thr minimum sa lary of $6,000 per
year IS :sufficient in Texas to aH ract qualified teacher::; may be mort'~
debatable, dependmg Ill maJor Jlart upon the locatwn of lhr school
distnct. But there appears to br littlE' empincal data that support~:
the advantagE' of any partiCular pup1l-teaclH'r rat1o or that document~
the ex1stencr of a depPndable correlation bctwern the levPl of pub he
~chool teachers' salaries and the quality of their cla~sroom instruction. An intractable problrm m dealmg wtth teachers' salan(':,: is the
absence, up to this time, of satisfactory technique:; for judging
their ability or performance. l1elat1vely frw ~rhool :systPm:s have
ment. plan::; of any kmd, w1th the rr::mlt that teachers' salaries arc•
usually mcrra::;ed acros:s the board in a way wh1rh trnds to rrward tho
lea::;t dPServmg on the sa me ba::n:s aR thr most desc•rvmg. Salane:s are
usually raised automatically on the ba:s1s of length of service and
according to prrdrtE'l'mmerl "Rtep::;," ('Xtrncling ovPr 10-to-12 year
penocl" •

..•
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Iu its reliance on state as well as local resources, the
frexas system is comparable to the systems employed
in virtually every other State.' 0 " The power to tax local
property for educational purposes has been recognized
ln Texas at least since 1883.'"" When the growth of
commercial and industrial centers anu accompanying
shifts in population began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas
t;)ducators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product
of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig. 104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational
program without sacrificing the vital element of local
Pre~Ident':; Comm'n on School Fmance, supra, 11 85, at 9. Until
recently, Hawaii was the only Stat<' that maintamrd a pur0ly ~tatC'
funded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amrnded
its educational finance statut0 to permit countirs to collect additwnal fund:; locally and ::;pend tho:;e amount:; on it::; school::;. Thr
rationale for that recent legi::;lative choice is im;tructlvP on thr
question before thr Court today
''Undrr exi:;ting law, countws are prrduded from domg anythmg
ln this area, ev0n to spPnd thrir own fund::; if they so desire. Th1s
corrective lrgi::;lat10n is urgently needed in order to allow counties
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educatwnal facilities a::; good as the prople of the countir::; want and
are willing to pay for . Allowing local communitie:; to go above
and beyond rstablished mmimums prov1ded for their people pncourages the brst fratures of democratic government." Haw. SC'::;::L Laws,
Art. 38, § 1 (1968).
w~ See text accompanying n. 7, supra.
'"' U. Strayer & R. Ha\g , Tlw Fimmcmg of Education m thr StatP
of NPw York (192;3). For a thorough analytii::; of the contribution
of these rrformrrs and of the prior and subsequent hi::;tory of educatwnal finan ce, SP<' J Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n . 1a,
'" 2

~tt

a9-95.
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participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an
accommodation between these two competing forces. As
~rticulated by Professor Coleman ·
"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces:
the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each
family to provide the best education it can afford for
its own children.··""'
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to
these two forces. While assuring a basic education for
every child in the 8tate, it permits and encourages a large
measure of participation in and control of each district's
schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of
government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of the C'ity of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451 (1972). MH. JusTICE STEWART stated there that
" [ d] irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our
society." ld., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as
well.'' !d., at 478.
The persistence of attachment to government at
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part.
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's
children. Equally important. however. is the opportunity
" J . CoonH, W Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by
.• lames S. Coleman , at v1i.
10
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offers for participation in the decision-making proc"'
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Plur~lism als9 affords some opportunity
for experimentation, mnovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems
uniquely appropriate. Mr. .Justice Brandeis identified
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government eaph State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ...
and try novel social and economic experiments." lOG No
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches
than does public education.
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas'
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary,
they attack the school finance system precisely because,
in their view, it does not provide the same level of locaf
control' and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees
suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted· under other financing- systems that resulted' in
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others,""
New State Ice Co. v. Leibrnann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932).
MR. Jm:;'l'ICE WHITE ~uggests in his dissent that the Texas
l:!ystem violates the Equal Protection Clause becau~e the means it ha~
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee
complete freedom of choice to every district. He . places special
empha~is on the ~tatutory provision that establi~hes a maximum rate
of $1.50 per $100 valwttion at whi ch a local school district may tax
for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d) ( 1972). The
maintenance rate in Edgewoo.d when this ca~e was litigated in the
District Court was $.S5 per .UOO, barely one-third of the a!Jowable
r:!)t(' (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100. see p. 7, s·upr-a, i~ the equalized
106

107

't_'

.....
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the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying
the State's interests, while occasioning "less drastic"
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only
where state action impinges on the exercise of funda~
mental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 ( 1972); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is also well to
remember that even those districts that have reduced
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much
they spend on education still retain under the present system a large measure of authority as to how available
funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power
to make numerous other decisions with respect to the
operation of the schools.'"' The people of Texas may be
ratP for maintenance and for thP retirempnt of bonds.) Appellees do
not cla1m that the ceiling presently bar;; desired tax increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality
of th~:~,t statutory provision is not before us and must await litigation
in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk,
313 F. Supp. 944 (MD Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
111 8 MR. JusTICE MARSHALL statE'S in hi;; dis;;enting opinion that
the State's a~serted interest in local control is a "mere sham," post,
p. 60, and that it has bePn oft'pred not as a legitimate justification
but "as an excusE' ... for interdi;;trict inE-quality." !d. , at 56. In
additwn to a~serting that local control would be pre;;erved and po~
sibly brtter served under other systems-a consideration that we
find irre!Pvant for purpose of deciding whPther the system may be
said to bP supported by a legitimate and reasonablE' basis-the dis<Pent suggests th<tt Texas' lack of good faith may be demon~trated

•.

'

''

.
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_justified in believing that other systems of school finance;
which place more of the financial responsibility in the
hands of the State, Wlill result in a comparable lessening
of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe
that along with increased control of the purse strings
mamtain~ eonrontrol. The State, we arr told, rrgulatr::; "the mo:-;1 mtnutt•
details of local public rducation," ibid .. including textbook ~rlrrt ion,
tracher 4uallfication~. and thr lrngth of the ~chou! clay. Thi~ as~Pr
tion, that genumr local control does not exi~t lll Trxa:;, ~imply
cannot. br ~upportecl. It 1:; abundantly rrfutrd by thr elaboratP
:;tatutory divi:;ion of re:;ponsibJiitJe::; :;et out 111 the Texa:; Education
Code . Although policy decbion-making and :;upNvi~ion in eertam
~Lrea:; art> re:srrvecl to the Statr, the clay-to-day authority over thr
··management and control" of all public Plementary and :;eronclar~·
,;chool:; tl:i squarely placrd ou the local school board:;. Tex. Educ
Codr §§ 17.01, 2:3.26 (1972)
Among the mnumrrable SJ)('Ctfic power~
of the local school authoritie:; are the followmg: thr power of rminrnt
domain to acquirr land for thr con;;truction of school facilitirs, id ..
§§ 17 .26, 23.26; the powrr to hirr and terminate trachrrs and otlwr
per~:>onnel, id., §§ 1:3.101-1:3.103; the powrr to drsignatr condit tons of
teachrr rmploymrnt and to establi~h certmn ;;tandard:; of educational
policy, id., § 13.901; the pow<'f to maintain order and disCipline,
id., § 21.:305, includmg thr prerogattve to :;m;pend ~tudrnt;; for dt~
ciplinary rea;;ons, id., § 21.:~01; the power to dPcidr whether to offer
a kindergarten program, id., §§ 21.l:H-21.1:~5. or a vocational traming program, ul., § 21.111, or a program of ~pecial rducation for
the hand1eapped, id., § ll.Hi ; thl' powrr to control thr a~~Ignment
and tran~:>frr of ~tudent;;, id., §§ 21.074--21.0~0; and tlw power to
operate and mamtam a ~:>chool bu~ program, ul., § Hi.52. See also
Perms v. LaMarque Ind. 8chuo/ Dist., ;~2R F. Supp. 6:3H (Tex.
1971); NichoLs v. Aldine lnd. SchooL Dist., :356 S . W. 2d 1~2 (Tex .
Civ. App. 1962). Local :;chool board~ also determme attt•ndance
zone~:>, location of new school,;, clo~ing of old onr~, ;;cbool a ttenda ncr
hour~:> (within limit~:>), gradmg and promotiOn policte::; subject to grnPral guideline~. n'creational and athletic pohcie:;, and a mynad of
other matter:; m the rout 111(' of ::;chool administration. It cannot lw
~eriously doubted that Ill Texa:;, ('duration remams largPI~· a local
funct1011, and that the prrpond<'fatmg bulk of all decisio11~:> affectlll!-!'
the schoob are madr and executed at the locullPvel. guaranteeing tlw
_greatest participation by tho~P mo~t din•ctly c•oncernPd

hy exarmmng thr extent to which the Stat(• aln•ady
~iderable
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at the state level will go increased control over local
policies.100
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance."
They see no j usti:fication for a system that allows, as
tpey contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of
l9cal taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units-requires the establishment of
10 " This themr-that greater ~tate control over funding will lead
to greater state power with respect to local educational program~
a.I)d policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public
ec(ucat1on. Professor Simon, in his thoughtful analysis of the political ramifications of this case, states that on<> of the most likely
consequences of the District Court's decision would be an increase
in the centralization of school finance and an increase in the <·x'tent of collect1ve bargaming by teacher unions at the Htate
level. He suggests that the wbjects for bargaining may include
many ''non-salary" item,;, such a~ teaching loads, clnss size, curricula,r
;1nd program choices, questions of student di~cipline, and selection
of administrative personnel-matters traditionally decided heretoforr
at the local level. Simon, supra, n. n2, at 434-436. See, e. q.,
Coleman, Th<> Struggle for Control of Education, in Education
and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64, 77-78 (BowE>rs
ed. 1970); ,}. Conant, The Child, The Parent, ::wd The StHte 27
(1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school board, ba~
some control over the pursE', there can br little real feE>Iing 1t1
the community that schools arc in fact local schools.
.'') ; HowE',
Anatomy of a Revolution, in Sat. Rev. 84, H8 (Nov. 20, 1971)
("It is au axiom of American politics that control and powE'r follow
money . , . . "); Hutchinson, StatE>-AdministE>red Locally-Sharf'd Taxe;;
21 (1931) ('' I S]tate administratiOn of taxation i~ the fi~t ~tcp to ~
ward ,.;tatE' control of the functions supportf'd by thE'SE' taxe~. . .").
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospE>cts as dE'trimcntal ,
or whether he agrres that the con::;NJncncf' i8 inevitable, it. certainly
cannot be doubtf'd that there is a rational basi<> for this concrm on
the part of parrnt~ , educators, <lild IE>gislator~ .
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jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary,
It is 'equally inevitable that some localities are going·
to be blessed with more taxable assets than others."" Nor
is local wealth ·'a stadc. quantity. Changes in the level
of taxable wealth within any district may result from
any number of events, some of which locai residents
can and do influence. For instance, . commercial and
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within
a district by various actions-public and private.
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an
unconstitutional method of providing for education then
it may be equally impermissible to provide other nee- \
essary services customarily financed largely from local
property taxes, including local police and fire protection,
public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of
various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a
severe denegration of local property taxation and control {
as would follow from appellees' contentions, It has simply never 'been within the constitutional prerogative of
this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the l;lUrdens or benefits thereof
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subd.ivisions in which citizens live.
ln sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school
finance results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say
that such disparities are the product of a system that
ts so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.
Texas has acknowledged tts · shortcomings and has per~
'"'This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in tho
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of " territorial uniformity ."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 427 (1961) . See also Griffin
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County , 377 U. S. 218,
. 230--231 (1964) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954) . Cf.
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahorna, 409 F . 2d 6fi5 , (i68
,(CAIO 1969) .

. .,
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sistently endeavored-not without some success-t<J
ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditures withbut sacrificing the benefits of local participation. The
Texas plan is not the result of hurried, ill-conceived
legislation . It certainly is not the product of pur~
poseful discrimination against any group or class. On
the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic
Gas Co ., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to
remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions.
Metropolis Theatre Co . v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S.
69- 70 ( 1913). One also must remember that the system
here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other
~tate .
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for
financing public education reflects what many educators
for a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 49 States, especially where the
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and nowhere yet tested. The constitutional standard under the
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U. S. · -. (1973)
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this
stanclarcl .
IV
ln light of the considerable attention that has focused
on the District Court opmiOll in this case and on its
California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr.

1
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601, 487 P. 2d 1241, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971), a cautionary
postscript seems appropriate. It cannot be questioned
that the constitutional judgment reached by the District
Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented
upheaval in public education. Some commentators have
concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative
financing programs that might be devised and approved.
the result could not avoid being a beneficial one. But,
Just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional
fssues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or
certain about predicting the consequences of massive
change in the financing and control of public education,
Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention
to the practical ramifications of these cases have found
uo clear or dependable answers and their scholarship
reflects ~ ..\ucn unqualified confidence in the desirability
of completely uprooting the existing system.
The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by
the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be
said with any assurance that the poor, the racial minori~
ties, or th-e children in overburdened ·core::city school districts would .. be benefitted by abrogation of traditional
modes of financing education. Unless there is to be a
substantial increase in state expenditures on education
across the board-an event the likelihood of which IS
!')pen to considerable question 111 -these groups stand to
Any alternative that calls for ~ignificant increa:se~ in expendi tures for edueation, whether financed through increa~es in property
taxation or through other ~ource:s of tax do.llars such as income and
"ales taxe:s, b certgin to encounter political barrier::>. At a time
when nearly ever~· State and loc1tlity is suffenng from fiscal undernounshment, and with demands for service~ of all kinds burgeolling·
and with weary taxpayer::> already resisting tax increases, there i~
considerable reason to question whet her a decisiOn of thi::; Court
nullifying present state taxing ~y~tl'ms would result i11 a marked
'incrra~(· in thC' financial commitment to education . See Senatr Selrct
111
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realize gains in terms of increased per pupil expenditures
only if they reside in districts that presently spend at
relatively low levels, i. e., in those districts that would
benefit from tre redistribution of existing resources.
Yet recent studies have indicated that the poorest fam-'
ilies are not invariably clustered in the most impecunious
school districts.m Nor does it now appear that there is
any more than a random chance that racial minorities are
concentrated in property-poor districts."" Additionally.
several research projects have concluded tha.t any financ- .
ing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of
Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Toward Equal Educational Opportunity 339-345 (Comm. Print
l!:i72); Berh & C:.dlahal!, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or MillstonP.
for School Finance, ?l .J. Pub. L. 23, 25-26 ( 1972); Simon, supra,
n . 62, at 420-421. lri Texas It has been calculated that $2.4 billion
of additional school funds would be required to bring all ::;chools
in that State up to the pr<:>sent level of expenditure of all but the.
wealthiest district::;-an amount more than double that currently bc~
mg spent on education. Texas Rr::;earch League, supm, n. 20, at
1,6-18 . An amicus c·uriae brief filed on behalf of almost 30 States,
focusing on these practical consequence::;, claims with some justificaqon that '·each of the understgned states . .. would suffer severe··
financial stringency ." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Ap-·
pellants, at 2 (filed by Att.y. Gen. of Md. et al.) .
u 2 See Note, supra, n . 53. S<>e also authorities cited n. 114, infm .
11 1
: S<:><:> Goldstem, s·u pra, n. 38, at 526 ; C . .Jeuch, wpra, n. 116.
<l.t 27 ; U. S. Cornm'n on Civil Rights, Inequality in School Finane-·
ing : The Role of th<:> Law 37 ( 197Z). J. Coons, W. ClunE' & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 1:3 , at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in Callfornia, for ·
example, "59% of minority students livE' in districts above tlw median
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the
largest district- t,hc San Antonio Independent School District-is above the local average in both the amount of taxabln
wealth prr pupil anql jri mej}ian family income. Yet 72% of its
students are M<>xican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only
a very few dollars less j'ier pupil than the North East and North
Side Independent School DistrictH, which have only 7% and 18%
JV!exiean-Americnn enrollment respectively. BNk<', CHrnPvnlr,
Morgan & White, supm, n. 29, at 67iL

'

..

71-1332-0PINION

54

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DIST81CT v. HODRICUEi

~xpenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower
educational expenditures in the major urban centers,"" a
result that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing conditions in those areas.
These practical considerations, of course, play no role
in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented
here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of thE'
traditional limitations on this Court's function. The
consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with
respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States.
and we do no violence to the values of federalism and
separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly
need add that this Court's action today is not to b(-'
viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status
quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems
which may well have relied too loug and too heavily
on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new
thinking as to public education, its methods and its fund]ng, is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality
and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters
merit the continued attention of the scholars who already
have contributed much by their challenges. But the
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them .

Reversed.

11 1
'

See Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity ,
I~sues in School Finanre 129 (Corrun. Print 1972)
(monograph entlt Jed "Inequities m School Finance" preparf'd by
Proff'ssors BC'rke and Callahan); ll. S. Office of Education, Finance:::
of Large-City School Sy:,;tems: A Comparative Analysis (1972)
(HEW publication); U. 8. Comm'n on Civil Rip:ht~. supra., n. Wl,.
ai. :33-:36 ; Simon , s'Upra , n . 62, at 410-411 , 418 .

92d Gong., 2rl Ses:>.,
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1-._:r:. Justice Douglas
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v.
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al.

Texas.

rFebruary -, 19731
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The Court today decides, in effect, that a State may
constitutionally vary the quality of education which it
offers its children in accordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in the district within which they
reside. The majority's decision represents an abrupt
departure from the mainstream of recent state and
federal court decisions conceruing the unconstitutionality
of state educational financing schemes dependent upon
taxable local wealth. 1 More unfortunately, though, the
majority's holding can only be seen as a retreat from our
historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system
which deprives children in their earliest years of the
chance to reach their full potential as citizens. The
Court does this despite the absence of any substantial
justification for a scheme which arbitrarily channels edu1
Sec Van Dusartz v. Ilatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (l\Jinn. 1971);
Milliken v. Green , - Mich.-,-- 1 . W. 2d- (1972); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rp1.r. 601 (1971);
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. Y. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972);
Hollins v. Sofstall, Civil No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cy.,
Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972) _ See al::;o Sweetwater County PLanning Cornm .
for the Organization of School Districts v. Hinlcte, 491 P. 2d 1234
(Wyo. 1971), 493 P. 2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972).
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cational resources in accordance with the fortuity of
the amount of taxable wealth within each district.
Jn my judgment, the right of every American to an
equal start in life, so far as the provision of a state service as important as education is concerned, is far too
vital to permit state discrimination on grounds as tenuous
as tho~e presented by this record. Nor can I accept the
notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees to the
vagaries of the political process which, contrary to the
majority's suggestion, has proven singularly unsuited to
the task of providing a remedy for this discrimination. 2
I, for one, am unsatisfied with the hope of an ultimate
"political" solution sometime in the indefinite future
while, in the meantime, countless children unjustifiably
receive inferior educations which "may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954). I must
therefore respectfully dissent.
I

The Court acknowledges that "substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures exist in Texas,"
ante, at - , and that these disparities are "largely attributable to differences in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation," ante, at - .
But instead of closely ·examining the seriousness of these
"The Distriet Court in this ca8e posl]1oned decisions for some
two year:-; in the hope that the Texas Legi~lat urc would remedy
the gro~s disparitirs in treatment inherent. in the TexaH finnncing
scheme. It W<li> onJ~· nftrr thr lrgi~l:ttmr failrcl to art in it~ 1971
H.egulnr Sesl"ion that thr District Court, nppnrcntl~· recogni~ing the
lack of hopr for ~rlf-initialrd lrgi~lati,·e rdorm, rrndered it:-; drei~ion.
Sec Texas Rc"carch Lrngur, Public School Finance Problems in
Trx:1s 13 (Intrrirn Rrporl 1972). The sl rong vested intcrrstR of
proprrty rich di~trict,: in the existing propcrt~· tnx >:rhcmc pose a
sub~tantial baricr to self-initiatrd legislative reform i11 cclucation:ll
financing. Sec N. Y. Time", Drr. 19, 1973, nt 1, col. 1.

.....,
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disparities and the invidiousness of the Texas financing
scheme, the Court undertakes an elaborate exploration
of the efforts Texas has purportedly made to close the
gaps between its districts in terms of levels of district
wealth and resulting educational funding. Yet, however praiseworthy Texas' equalizing efforts, the issue in
this case is not whether Texas is doing its best to ameliorate the worst features of a discriminatory scheme, but
rather whether the scheme itself is in fact unconstitutionally discriminatory in the face of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
When the Texas financing scheme is taken as a whole, I
do not think it can be doubted that it produces a discriminatory impact on substantial numbers of the schoolage children of the State of Texas.
A

Funds to support public education in Texas are derived from three sources: local ad valorem property taxes;
the Federal Government; and the state government. 3
It is enlightening to consider these in order.
Under Texas law the only mechanism provided the
local school district for raising new, unencumbered revenues is the power to tax property located within its
:• Texas provides its school districts with cxtensiw bonding authority to obtain capital both for the acqui;:ition of school siteR and
''the construction and equipmrnt of school building,," Trx. Educ.
Code Ann. § 20.01 (1972), and for the acquisition, construction, and
maintrnancc of "gymnasia, Stadia, and other recreational facilities,"
id., §§ 20.21-20.22. While such printt r capital pro1·idcs a fourth
somcc of rcvrnuc, it is, of coursr, only temporar~' in nature since
the principal and interest of all bonds must ultimately be paid
out. of thr receipts of the local ad valorem property tax, sec id.,
§§ 22.01, 22.04, except to the extent that outside revenues derived
from the operation of certain facilities, such as gymnasium, are
employed to repay the bonds i8sucd thereon, sec id., §§ 22.22, 22.25.
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boundaries.~

At the same tirne, the Texas financing
schom.e effectively restricts the use of monies raised by
local property taxation to the support of public -education within the boundaries of the district in which they
are raised, since any such taxes must be approved by a
majority of the property-taxpaying voters of the district. 5
The significance of the local property tax element of
tho Texas financing scheme is apparent from the fact that
it provides the funds to meet some 40% of the cost of
public education for Texas as a whole.n Yet tho amount
of revenue that any particular Texas district can raise
is dependent on two factors-its tax rate and its amount
of taxable property. The first factor is determined by
the property-taxpaying voters of the disttict. 7 But regardless of tho enthusiasm of the local voters for public
education, the second factor-the taxable property wealth
of the district-necessarily restricts the district's ability
to raise funds to support public education. 8 Thus, even
'Sec Texat-~ Const., Art. 7, §§ :3, 3n; Tcxa:; Ednc. CodC' Ann.
§ 20.010.02. AR a part of the proprrt~· tax scheme, bonding authority
is confc·rrcd upon the locnl srhool dist riets, "cr 11. :3. supra.
3
SPc Texas Educ. Code. 1\ nn § 20.04.
n For the 1970-Hl71 school year, the prrci~e figure wn~ -H.1%.
Sec Tcxa~ Hc~E'arch Lcn~uc, supm, n. 2. at 9.
7
Sec Texa~ Ednr. Codt• Ann. § 20.04.
Theoretically, Tcxns law limit:; the tux rnte for public ~t·hcJOl
m:tintcnancc, sec 'id., § 20.02 (1971) , to 81..50 per :);100 ,·aluation,
sec irl. § 20.04 (d). HO\n'vcr, it docs not appear that nn~· Texas
district. prcsrntl~· taxc:> it~rlf at the highest rate allowable, although
Home poor distric-ts arc npproaching it. SE'C App., at 174.
8
Under Texas law local dit-itrict::; nrc allowed to cmplo~· difTrring
ha~cs of aR~c~"mcltt-a fact tlwt introduce:,; a third varinblc iilto the
lor:1l funding. Sec Texas Educ. Code Ann. § 22.03. But Jtcit her
party has suggested that this factor is rcsponc~iblr for the di::~p:1riiic~
in n·,-cmw~ available to the nriom,; di:-;trirt~. Con:<<'qucntJ_,., T belie' c we mu;•t deal with the ca~e on the a~~tunpt ion thnt ditl'crencc~
in lorn! met hod;; of n"R<'~"mcnt do not mc:min!!;fully afl'cct the rp,·cnuc

. ,.

71-1~:32-DISSENT

(A)

SAK ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

5

though the voters of two Texas districts may be willing
to make the same tax effort, the results for the districts
will be substantially different if 011e is property rich while
the other is property poor. The necessary effect of the
Texas local property tax is, in short, to favor property
rich districts and to disfavor property poor ones.
The seriously disparate consequences of the Texas
local property tax, when that tax is considered alone,
arc amply illustrated by data presented to the District
Court by appellees. This data included a detailed study
of a sample of 110 Texas school districts" for the 19671968 school year conducted by Professor Joel S. Berke of
Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. Among other things, this study revealed that the
10 richest districts examined, each of which had more
than $100,000 in taxable property per pupil, raised
through local effort an average of $610 per pupil, whereas
the four poorest districts studied, each of which had less
than $10,000 in taxable property per pupil, were able
to raise only an average of $63 per pupil."' And, as the
Court, in effect recognir.es, ante, at - , this correlation
between the amount of taxable property per pupil and
the amount of local revenues per pupil holds true for the
96 districts in between the richest and poorest districts. 11
mi~ing

powrr of lorn] districts rebti1·c to one another. The Court
nclmits ns much. Src ante, at - . It should be noted,
morrovrr, that the main set of data introdnrccl brforr thr District
Court. to establi::;h the cli::=:paritirs at issur here was ba~rd upon
"cf1ualizrcl taxablr property" values which had bern adjustrd to
correct for clifferin~r method~ of assessment. See App. C to Affidavit
of Profr~sor Joel S. Berke.
'1 Texas lws approximatrly 1,200 srhool district::;.
"'Sec App. I, infm.
11
Sre id. Indeed, appellants acknowlrdge that i he rrle1·n nt data
from Profe88or Berke's affidnYit showR "a very positive correlation,
0.9n, bct"·ern market value of taxable property per pnpil and

appnrcntl~·
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It is clear, moreover, that the disparity of per pupil
revenues cannot be dismissed as the result of lack of local
effort-that is, lower tax rates-by property poor districts. To the contrary, the data presented below indicates that the poorest districts tend to have the highest
tax rates and the richest districts tend to have the lowest
tax rates. 12 Yet, despite the apparent extra effort being
made by the poorest districts, they are unable even to
begin to match the richest districts in terms of the production of local revenues. For example, the 10 richest
districts studied by Professor Berke were able to produce $585 per pupil with an equalized tax rate of 31¢
on $100 of equalized valuation, but the four poorest districts studied, with an equalized rate of 70¢ on $100 of
equalized valuation, were able to produce only $60 per
pupiPa Without more, this state imposed system of
educational funding presents a serious picture of widely
varying treatment of Texas school districts, and thereby
~tate and local revenurH per pupil." Reply Brirf for Appellants 6,
n. 9.
While the Court takes issue with much of Professor Bcrkc'o; data
;mel conclusions, ante, at - , nn. 38 nnd - , I do not und r r~land
its criticisms to run to the basic finding of a correlation between
taxable district property per pupil and local revenues per pupil.
The critique of Professor Berke's methodology upon which the Court
rdies, sec Gold stein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Finance: A
Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest, and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 504, 523-525, nn. 67 and 71 (1972), is directed only at the
suggested correlations between family income and taxable district
wealth and between race and taxable district wealth. Obviously,
the appellants do not question the relationship in Texas bet ween
taxable district wealth and per pupil expenditure; nnd there is no
basis for the Court to do so, whatever the criticisms which mny be
leveled at other aspects of Professor Berke's study, buL see infra,
n. 55.
12
See App. II, infra.
1 :J Sec Ibid.
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of Texas school children, in terms of the amount of funds
available for public education.
Nor are these funding variations corrected by the other
aspects of the Texas financing scheme. The Federal Government provides funds sufficient to cover only some lO<;'o
of the total cost of public education in Texas. 14 Furthermore, while these . federal funds are not distributed in
Texas solely on a per pupil basis, appellants do not here
contend that they are used in such a way as to ameliorate
significantly the widely varying consequences for Texas
school districts and school children of the local property
tax element of the state financing scheme.u;
State funds provide the remaining some 50<fo of the
monies spent on public education in Texas. 10 Technically, they are distributed under two programs. The
first is the Available School Fund, for which provision
is made in the Texas Constitution. 17 The Available
School Fund is comprised of revenues obtained from a
number of sources, including receipts from the state ad
valorem property tax, one-fourth of all monies collected
by the occupation taxes, annual contributions by the
legislature from general revenues, and the revenues deFor the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 10.9% ..
Sec Texas Research League, supra, n. 2, at 9.
15 Appellants made such a contention before the District Court but
apparently have abandoned it in this Comt. Indeed, data introduced in the District Court simply belies the argument that fcdE'ral
funds have a signiftcant equalizing effect. Sec App. I, infra. And,
as the District Court observed, it does not follow that remedial
action by the Federal Government would excuse any unconstitutional
discrimination cfiected by the state financing scheme. 337 F. Supp.,
at 284.
In For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 48%.
Sec
Texas Research League, supra, n. 2, at 9.
17 See Texas Canst., Art. 7, § 3.
See also Texas Educ. Code Alln.
§ 15.01 (b) .
14

.

71-1:~:~2-DISSENT

8

(A)

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

rived from the Permanent School Fund.'; For the 19701971 school year the Available School Fund contained
$296,000,000. The Texas Constitution requires that this
money be distributed annually on a per capita basis 1 ') to
the local school districts. Obviously such a fiat grant
could not alone eradicate the funding differentials attributable to the local property tax. Moreover, today
the Available School Fund is in reality simply one facet
of the second state financing program, the Minimum
Foundation School Program,~ since each district's annual share of the Fund is deducted from the sum to
which the district is entitled under the Foundation
Program. 21
The Minimum Foundation School Program provides
funds for three specific purposes: professional salaries,
current operating expenses and transportatio11 expenses. 2 "
The State pays, on an overall basis, for approximately
80o/o of the cost of the Program; the remaining 20o/o is
distributed among the local school districts under the
Local Fund Assignment."" Each district's share of the
Local Fund Assignment is determined by a complex
0

Ls Sec Texas Edur. Code Ann. § 15.01 (b).
The Permanent School .Fund is iu c~~cnrc a public tru~t iniiinlly
endowed with va~t quantities of publie land, the sale of whic-h
hati provided an cnormou · ropu~ that in turn produces ~ub~tnntia[
:mnual revenues which arc dc,·oted exclu:,;ivd.l' to public cdur·ation.
Set' Texas Const., Art. 7, § 5 (Supp. 1972). SPc also V Report of
the Governor's Committee on J'ublic Education in Trxa~-Financing
the Sy~tcm 11 ( 1968) (hrrcinaftcr Trxas Go1unor's Committee
Report).
•n Thi~ i~ dcterminrd from the a1·cragr daily attrndanrr within
rneh district for the Jlrcrcuing yr:tr. Tcxa~ Edm. Codr Ann.
§ 15.01 (c).
0
" Sec Tcx::tR Eclur. Codr Ann. §§ 16.01-16.975.
1
"
Sec id .. §§ 16.71 (2), 16.79.
22 See id., §§ 16.:301-16.:316, 16.45, 16.51-16.68.
"' Src id., §§ 16.72-16.73, ]6.76-16.77.
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"economic index'' which is designed to allocate a larger
share of the costs to property rich districts than to property poor districts."" Each district pays its share with
revenues derived from local property taxation.
The stated purpose of the Minimum Foundation School
Program is to provide certain basic funding for each
local Texas school district."" At the same time the Program was apparently intended to improve, to some degree, the financial position of property poor districts
relative to property rich districts, since-through the use
of the economic index-an effort is made to charge a
disproportionate share of the costs of the Program to
rich districts.~" It bears noting, however, that substantial criticism has been leveled at the practical effectiveness of the economic index system of local cost allocation.27 In theory, the index is designed to ascertain the
relative ability of each district to contribute to the Local
Fund Assignment from local property taxes. Yet the
index is not developed simply on the basis of each district's taxable wealth. It also takes into account the
district's relative income from manufacturing, mining,
agriculture, its payrolls, and its scholastic population. 28
It is difficult to discern precisely how these latter factors
are predictive of a district's relative ability to raise
"'See id., § 16.74. The formula for raleulating each district's
described in V Texas Governor's Committee Report 44-48.
2
;; See Texa~ Edur. Code Ann. § 16.01.
2
~; See V Texas GoYernor's Committee Report 40-41.
"'See id .. at 45-67; IV Texas Research League, Texas Public
School~ Under the Minimum Foundation Progr:un: An Eniliwtion
123-124 (1956) .
"~Technically, the cronomir index involve-< a two ~tep enlrulalion.
Fir~t. on the ba~i~ of lhe factors mentioned above, each Texas
<·ount~ · ·~ ~hare of the Lo('al Fund Asi:iignmPnt is dcterminPd . Then
each count~·'::; ;,hare i;,; divided arnong it~ school dir>!rirts on the
ha,:i~ of their rrlative shares of the count~··~ asse~sable wealth. See
V Texas Gowrnor'~ Committee Report. 43-44.
~hare i~
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revenues through local property taxes. Thus, in 1966,
one of the consultants who originally participated in the
development of the Texas economic index adopted in
1949 told the Governor's Committee on Public Education: 29 "The Economic Index approach to evaluating
local ability offers little better measure than sheer chance
but not much."
Moreover, even putting aside these criticisms of the
economic index as a device for achieving meaningful
district wealth equalization through cost allocation, poor
districts still do not necessarily receive more state aid
than property rich districts. For the standards which
currently determine the amount received from the Foundation Program by any particular district 30 favor property rich districts. 31 Thus, focusing on the same EdgeI d., at 48, quoting statement of Dr. Edgar Morphet.
The extraordinmllycomplcx standards are summarized in V Texas
Governor's Committee Report 41-43.
:n The key element of the Minimum Foundation School Program
is the provision of funds for professional salaries-more particularly,
for teacher salaries. The Program provide.· each district with funds
to pay its professional payroll as determined by certain state slandnrds. Sec Texas Educ. Code Ann. §§ 16.301-16.316. If ihe district
fails to pay its teachers at the levels determined by the state standards it rereives nothing from the Program. See id., § 16.301 (c).
At the same time, districts arc free to pay their teachers salaries in
excess of the level set by the state standards, uRing local revenuesthat is, property tax revenue-to make up the differeuce, ~rc id.,
§ 16.301 (a).
The state salary standards focus upon t wo factor·: the educat ional
level and the experience of t he district's teachers. Ser id., §§ 16.30116.316. The higher these two factors arc, the more fund~ the district will receive from the Foundation Program for profeHsional
salaries.
It should be apparent that t he net effect of 1hio scheme is to
provide more aR~istance to rich districts than to poor ones. For
rich districts arc able to pay their teachers, out of local fundH, ~n lary
increments above the state minimum levels. Thus, the rich clist ricts
arc able to attract the teachers with the best education and the most
20

30
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wood Independent and Alamo Heights School Districts
which the majority uses for purposes of illustration, we
find that in 1967-1968 property rich Alamo Heights 32
which raised $333 per pupil on a tax rate of 85¢ per
$100 valuation received $225 per pupil from the Foundation Program, while property poor Edgewood 33 which
raised only $26 per pupil with a tax rate of $1.05 per
$100 valuation received only $222 per pupil from the
Foundation Program.a 4 And, more recent data, which
indicates that for the 1970-1971 school year Alamo
Heights received $491 per pupil from the Program while
Edgewood received only $356 per pupil, hardly suggests
that the wealth gap between the districts is being narrowed by the state program. To the contrary, whereas
in 1967-1968 Alamo Heights received only $3 per pupil,
experience. To complete the circle, this then means, given the state
standards, that the rich districts receive more from the Foundation
Program for professional salaries than do poor districts. A portion
of Professor Berke's study vividly illustrates the impact of the
State's standards on districts of varying wealth. See App. III, infra.
Jt In 1968-1969, Alamo Heights School District had $49,478 in
taxable propert y per pupil. See Berke Affidavit, Table VII, App.,.
at 216.
33 In 1968-1969, Edgewood Independent School District had $5,960
in taxable property per pupil. Ibid.
34
I fail to understand the relevance for this case of the Court's
suggestion that if Alamo Heights School District, which is approximately the same physical size as Edgewood School District but
which has only one-fourth as many student,;, had the same number
of students as Edgewood, the former's per pupil expenditure would
be considerably closer to the latter's. Ante, at - , n. 33. Obviously, this is true, but it docs not alter the simple fact that Edgewood does lmve four times as many students but not four time~:; as
much taxable property wealth. From the perspective of Edgewood's school children then-the perspective that ultimately counts
here-Edgewood is clearly a much poorer district than Alamo
Heights. The question here is not whether districts have equal taxable J)ropcrty wealth in absolute terms, but whether districts have
diiTcring taxable wealth giYen their respective school-age populations.
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or about 1<fo, more than Edgewood in state aid, by 10701971 the gap had widened to a difference of $135 per pupil,
or about 38%.'1" It was data of this character that
prompted the District Court to observe that "the current [state aid] system tends to subsidir.e the rich at
the expense of the poor rather than the other way
around." :w 337 F. Supp. 280, 282. And even the appellants go no further here than to suggest that the
Minimum Foundation School Program has "a mildly
equalizing effect." 'l7
Despite these facts, the majority continually emphasizes how much state aid has, in recent years, been given
to property poor Texas school districts. What the Court
fails to emphasize is the cruel irony of how much more
state aid is being given to property rich Texas school
'1"

In the face of t hesc gross dit'paritics in treatment which experience with the Texn~ financin!!; schrme has rcvcalrd , I cannot arrept
thr Comt's suggeRtion thnt we nrr draling herr with n rrmrclinl
~chrmc to whirh 11·r ~boule! accord Rnb~tantinl defrrrnre berau~e of
its accompli~hmrnt;; rather than criticize it for its fnilurrs. Ante,
at - . J\Jorronr, Trxas' financing scheme is hard!~· rPmrdinl lrgislation of the 1y]1e for which we have proviou~l~· shown ~ub.,tantinl
toleranre. Such lrgi~lation ma~· in fact c•xtrnd thr ,·otl' to '·prr~ons
\\·ho othrrwi~c would be denied iL by stntc law," Katzenbach v .
Moraan, :3R4 U.S. 641, 6!)() (1966), or it mn~· rliminnte thr r1· il~ of
tho private bail bondsmnn, Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971).
But t ho~c nrc in~t11 nrc~ in \\·hich a lrgi~lnt i1·c bod~· ha~ oought to
remrd.1· problem~ for which it cannot br snid to ha1·c brrn dirrrtly
rrspom;iblo. B~· rontrnst, public education is the function of the
Statr in Texas, and the re~pon~ibility for an~ · drfert in the ~('IH'mc
for financing public education mu~t ultimate!~· rc"t with the Stntc.
It is thr Stair's own schrmr which has rau~rd thr funding ]1roblem,
<llld thus Yiewed, that schrmr can hardly be deemed remedial.
"" Comparr App. I, inj1'a. Indeed, rvcn npart from thr diffcrrntial treatment inherent in 1hr local propC'I't.V tnx, thr rnormous
intrrdi~trirt disparitirs in ~tate aid reccivrd undrr tho Minimum
Foundation School Program would seem to rni~r ~ub~tantinl crpwl
prot rrtion que~tionH.
a7 Brief for Appcllnnts 3.
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districts on top of their substantial local property tax
revenues."R Under any view, it is apparent that thP
state aid provided by the Foundation School fails to
compensate for the funding variations attributable to
the local property tax clement of the Texas financing
scheme. It is these stark differences in the treatment
of Texas school districts and school children inherent in
the Texas financing scheme, not the absolute amount of
state aid provided to any particular school district, that
arc the crux of this case. There is, then, no escaping the
conclusion that the local property tax which is dependent upon taxable district property wealth is an essential feature of the Texas scheme for financing public
eel ucation. 'H'
B
The appellants do not deny the disparities in educational funding caused by variations in taxable district
property wealth. They do contend, however, that whatever the differences in per pupil spending among Texas
districts, there are no discriminatory consequences for the
children of the disadvantaged districts. They recogni:1.e
that what is at stake in this case is the quality of the
public education provided Texas children in the districts
in which they live. But appellants reject the suggestion
that the quality of education in any particular district
~8

ThuR, in 1967-1968, Edgewood had a total of $248 per pupil in
and local funds compared with a total of $558 per pupil for
Alamo Heights. Sec Berke Affid:wit, Tnblc X, App. , at 219. For
1970-1971, the respective totnls were S418 and 891:3. Rc<' Tf'xns
Rcscnrch Lr•ague, supra, n. 2, at 14.
:w Not Olll~r docs the local property tax provid<' npproximatcly
-W% of the fund~ <'xpcndcd on public education, but it is the only
~ourc·c of funds for such c~~ential a~pects of cclucat ionnl financing as
the payment of school bonds, ~:<cc n. 3, supra, nncl the pa~·mcnt of
the cliRtrict ';; share of the Local Fund Assignment, ns well ns for
ncnrlr all expenditures above the minimums e~tabli~hecl by thB
}'onndntion Program.
~tate
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is determined by money-beyond some minimal level of
funding which they believe is assured every Texas district by the Minimum Foundation School Program.40
In their view, there is simply no denial of equal educational opportunity to any Texas school children as a result of the widely varying per pupil spending power provided districts under the current financing scheme.
In my view, though , even an unadorned restatement
of this contention is sufficient to reveal its absurdity.
Authorities no doubt disagree as to the significance of
variations in per pupil spending.·n Indeed, conflicting
expert testimony was presented to the District Court in
this case concerning the effect of spending variations on
educational achievement: ~ We sit, however, not to resolve disputes over educational theory but to enforce our
Constitution. It is an inescapable fact that if one district has more funds available per pupil than another
district, the former will have greater choice in educational planning than will the latter. In this regard, I
believe the question of discrimination in educational
Sec R eply Brief for Appcll ants 5, 15- 17.
Compare, e. g., Coleman, Equality of Educat ional Opportunity
(1966) , Jencks, The Coleman R eport and the Conventional Wisdom,
in On Equality of Educational Opportunity 69, 91- 104 (F. Mosteller &
D . Moynihan, ed. 1972), with e. g., J. Gutherie, G. Kleindorf, H .
Levin, & R. Stout, Schools and Inequality 79-90 (1971) ; Ki e~ling ,
Measuring a Local Government Service: A Study of School Di~
trictR in New York State, 49 Rev. E con. & Statistics 356 ( 1967).
42
Compare Berke Deposit ion, at 10 (" [Dlollar expenditures arc
probably the best way of measuring the quality of education afforded
students . . .." ), with Graham Deposition , at 3 (" [I]t i ~ not just
ncce.:;sarily the money, no. It is how wisely you spend it. "). It
should be noted that even appellants' witness, Mr. Graham, qualified the importance of money only by the requirement of wise
expenditure. Quite obviously, a district which is property poor is
powerless to mat ch the education provided by a property rich district assuming each district allocates its fund with equal wisdom .
40

'
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quality must be deemed to be an objective one that looks
~what the State provides its children, not to what the
children are able to do with what they receive. That a
child forced to attend an underfunded school, with poorer
physical facilities, poorer teachers, larger classes, and
fewer courses than a school with substantially more
funds may nevertheless excel is to the credit of the child,
not the State, cf. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U. S. 337, 349 (1938). And who can ever measure for
such a child the opportunities lost and the talents wasted
for want of a broader, more enriched education. Discrimination in the opportunity to learn that is afforded
a child must be our standard.
Hence, even before this Court recognized its duty to
tear down the barriers of state enforced racial segregation in public education, it acknowledged that inequality
in the educational facilities provided to students may
make for discriminatory state action as contemplated by
the Equal Protection Clause. As a basis for striking
down state enforced segregation of a law school, the
Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,633-634 (1950),
stated:
"[W] e cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law
students by the State. In terms of number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of student body, scope of the library,
availability of law review and similar activities, the
[white only] Law School is superior. . . . It is
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice
between these law schools would consider the question close."
See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Likewise it is difficult
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to believe that if the children of Texas had a free choice,
they would choose to be educated in districts with fewer
resources, and hence with more antiquated plants, less
experienced teachers, and a less diversified curriculum.
Indeed, if financing variations are so insignificant to educational quality, it is difficult to understand 'vhy a number of our country's wealthiest school districts, who have
no legal obligation to argue in support of the constitutionality of the Texas legislation, have nevertheless
zealously pursued its cause before this Court."'
The consequences, in terms of objective educational
inputs, of the variations in district funding caused by the
Texas financing scheme are apparent from the data introduced before the District Court. For example, in
1968-1969, 1001f'o of the teachers in the property rich
Alamo Heights School District had college degrees. 44
By contrast, during the same school year only 80.021f'o of
the teachers had college degrees in the property poor
Edgewood Independent School District:'" Also, in 19681969. approximately 47% of the teachers in the Edgewood District were on emergency teaching permits,
whereas only 11% of the teachers in Alamo Heights were
on such permits.'"' This is undoubtedly a reflectiou of the
fact that Edgewood's teacher salary scale was approximately 807o of Alamo Heights'.'" And, not surprisingly,
.,, See Brief of, inter alia, San Marino Unified School Di~t rirt;
ne,·crl.'· HillR Unifird School Di~trict a~ amicvs curiae; Brirf of, i11ter
alia, Bloomfield Hill~, Michigan, School Di~trict: Drnrborn Cit~·,
Michigan, School Di;;triet: Gro~::;c l'ointc, Michigan, Public- School
S.1·~tcm a~

amicus curiae .

to l'laintirl"~ Intcrrogatoric~, App., at 115.
l\Ioreo1·er, dming ihc same prriod, :37.17% of ilw irarhcrs
in Alamo Heights had advanrrd drgrec~, while onl~· 14.98% of l':dgcll·ood's faculty had Hnrh degrrcs. See id., at 116.
1
' " Answer~ to VlnintilT's Intrrrogntorirs, App., at 117.
"'Id., at 118.
.,J

AnHwcr~

·'"Ibid.
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the teacher-student ratio varies significantly between the
two districts.•R In other words, as might be expected,
a difference in the funds available to districts results in
a difference in educational inputs available for a child's
public education in Texas. For constitutional purposes,
1 believe this situation. which is directly attributable to
the Texas financing scheme, raises a grave question of
state created discrimination in the provision of public
education. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395
U. S. 285, 293-294 (1969).
At the very least, in view of the substantial interdistrict disparities in funding and in resulting educational
inputs shown by appellees to exist under the Texas
financing scheme, the burden of proving that these disparities do not in fact affect the quality of children's
education must fall upon the appellants. Cf. Hobson
v. Hanson, 327 F. Supp. 844, 860- 861 (DC 1971) . Yet
appellants made no effort in the District Court to demonstrate that educational quality is not affected by variations in funding and in resulting inputs. And, in this
Court, they have argued no more than that the relationship is ambiguous. This is hardly sufficient to overcome
appellees' prima facie showing of state created discrimination between the school children of Texas with respect
to objective educational opportunity.
Nevertheless, the Court now seems to suggest that the
Minimum Foundation School Program effectively eradicates any discriminatory effects otherwise resulting fron1
the local property tax clement of the Texas financing
scheme. Ante, at - -. The Court does not contendas it certainly cannot ·11!-that the Program ensures interIn the 1967-1968 school year, Edp;ewood had 22,R62 ~tucknt~ nnd
teachers, n ratio of 26.5 to 1. See id., at 110, 114. In .\lamo
Hcip;ht;;, for thr Hmne school year, there wrre 5,432 ~tudrnt~ nnd 265t cnrher~ for a rn t io of 20.5 to 1.
Sec ibid.
"n See supra, p. - .
40

~64
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district equality in educational funding. Instead, the
Court tells us that "the Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute or complete equality," and then seemingly accepts the suggestion that the Foundation Program "assures 'every child in every school district an
adequate education' " as sufficient to dispose of any
claim of unconstitutional discrimination. Ante, at - .
I must admit that the precise thrust of the Court's
remarks are not altogether clear to me. It may be that
the Court is suggesting that the state aid received via
the Foundation Program sufficiently improves the position of property poor districts vis-a-vis property rich districts-in terms of educational funds-to eliminate any
claim of interdistrict discrimination in available educational resources which might otherwise exist if educational funding were dependent solely upon local property
taxation. Certainly the Court has recognized that to
demand precise equality of treatment is normally unrealistic, and thus minor differences inherent in any
practical context will usually not make out a substantial
equal protection claim. See, e. g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 194-195 (1971); Draper v Washington, 372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Bain Peanut Co.
v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). But as has already
been seen, we are hardly presented here with son::e de
miniwJ,§ claim of discrimination resulting from the "play"
necessary in any functioning system; in fact, it is clear
that the Foundation Program utterly fails to ameliorate
the seriously discriminatory effects of the local property
tax.
Alternatively, the Court may believe that the Equal
Protection Clause cannot be offended by substantially
unequal state treatment of persons who are similarly
situated so long as the State provides everyone with some
unspecified amount of education which evidently is
"enough." The basis for such a novel view is far from

1
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clear to me. It is, of course, true that the Constitution
does not require precise equality in the treatment of all
persons. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:
"The equality at which the 'equal protection' clauseaims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth
Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the
laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. . . .
The Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310
u. s. 141, 147 (1940).
See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
But this Court has never suggested that because some·
"adequate" level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is therefore constitutionally excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not
addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the
unjustifiable inequalities of state action. It mandates
nothing less than that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
Even if the Equal Protection Clause encompassed the
Court's apparent theory of constitutional adequacy, discrimination in the provision of educational opportunity
would certainly seem to be a poor candidate for its application. The Court never informs us how judicially
manageable standards are to be derived for determining
how much education is "enough" to excuse constitutional discrimination. One would think that the ma- {
jority would heed its own fervent affirmation of judicial
self-restraint before undertaking the complex task of 1
determining at large what level of education is constitutionally sufficient. Indeed, the majority's reliance upon ·
the purported adequacy of the educational opportunity
assured by the Texas Minimum Foundation School Pro-

i
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gram would seem fundamentally inconsistent with its own
recognition that educational authorities are unable to
agree upon what makes for educational quality, see ante,
at - , - n. 86 and - n. 101. If, as the Court stresses,
such authorities are uncertain as to the impact of various
levels of funding on educational quality, I fail to see
where the Court finds the e~ertise to devine that the
particular levels of funding provided by the Program assure an adequate educational opportunity- much Jess an
education substantially equivalent in quality to that
which a higher level of funding might provide. It is
true that appellants have repeatedly asserted before this
Court the adequacy of the education guaranteed by the
Minimum Foundation School Program. But given the
uncertainty of the educational authorities, such mere
assertions hardly provide a basis for this Court to rely
upon the adequacy of that education-particularly since
the appellees offered substantial uncontroverted evidence
before the District Court impugning the now much
touted "adequacy" of the education guaranteed by the
Foundation Program. 50
In my view, then, it is inequality- not some notion of
gross inadequacy- of educational opportunity that raises
a question of denial of equal protection of the laws. I
find any other approach to the issue unintelligible and
without directing principle. Here appellees have made
a substantial showing of wide variations in educational
funding and the resulting educational opportunity afforded to the school children of Texas. This discrimination is, in large measure, attributable to significant
disparities in the taxable wealth of local Texas school
"" Sec An~wc r:; to lntcnogntorie;; b~· Dr . .Jod S. Brrke, Ans. 17,
p. 9: An ~ . 48-51, pp. 22-2-l; Ans. 88-89, pp . 41- 42 ; Dcpo~ition of
Dr. Daniel C. l\'Iorgnn, .Jr., 52-55 ; AffidaYil of Dr. Daniel C. l\1or~wn, Jr., App., a t 242-243.
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districts. This is a sufficient showing to raise a substantial question of discriminatory state action in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause."'
'' 'It i~ true that in two preYious caf.'e~ thi~ Court hn~ ~ummarily
aflirmecl cli~t riel court di~mis:;ab of eonst itut ion a! attnd~H upon other
Htate edurntional finaneing :;cheme~. Sec l.fcfnnis v. Shapiro, 293.
·F. Supp. :327 (ND Ill. 1967), aff'd mem. sub ?Wm. Mcfnnis v.
Ooilvie, 394 U. S. 322 (1969); Burress v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Su]1p.
572 (WD V;t. 1969), aff'd mem. , 397 U. R. 44 (1970). But those
derisions cannot be consiclerrd clisposili\·e of this action for a numbrr
of reasons.
In the firHt place, the thruHt of tho~r suits differrd matcriall~· from
that of this case. In lllclnnis, the plaintiffs a~~rrted that "only a
financing ~~·Htem which apportions public funds ncrording to the
<'clnrntional nerds of the students satisfies the Fomteenth Amendmrnt." 323 F. Supp., at 331. The Dist rirt Comt ronrlucled that
'· (1) the Fourtrenth Amendmrnt docs not rcquirr public school
expenditure~ to be made onl~' on the bn~is of pupils' edurntionnl
needs, nnd (2) thr lnrk of .iuclicinlly mnnagrablr stnndurds makes this
contro\·er,.;y non.iusticiable." !d., at 329. The Burress District,
Comt dismis~ed that suit. c~scntially in reliance on M clnnis which
it. found to be 'scarcely dist ingnishablc." 310 F. Supp., at 574.
This Ruit involves no effort to obtain an allocation of ~chool fund:;
that considers only educational nred. The District Court ruled only
that the State must equalize local district wealth which has heretofore JWCwnted many di~t rict s from trul~· exrrrising local fiscal control. Fmthcrmore, the limited holding of the District Court presrntcd none of the problems of judicial management which wonld
rxist if thr federal courts wrrc to attempt to ensure thr distribntion
of rducational funds soldy on the ba~is of cduc:ttional need, Rce
infra, pp. - - - , or, for that matter, on the baRis of some
stnndard of cdnrntional "adequac~·" now snggc::;ted bv the ma.iority.
Aside from the ~igniftcnnt legal difference~ between this case and
Mcinnis and Burress. thr prececlcntial \·alur of the lattrr casrs must
be temperrcl by the fact that the~' were disposed of by summary
ord0r. While, in eontrnst to petitions for ccrtiomri, appenls technicnll~· are always diRposcd of on the merits, the burdens of onr subHtantial dockrt often compel us to denl with appeals on the basis of
man)' of the same discretiomu~ · considerations which inOuenre the
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Despite the evident discriminatory effect of the Texas
financing scheme, both the appellants and the majority
suggest that there is no true disadvantaged class for
purposes of equal protection analysis. The District Court
concluded that the Texas financing scheme draws "distinctiors between groups of citizens depending upon the
wealth of the district in which they live" and thus created a disadvantaged class composed of persons living
in property poor districts. See 337 F. Supp., at 282. In
light of the data introduced before the District Court,
the conclusion that the' ~chool children of property poor
districts'' constitute a sufficient class for our purposes
seems indisputable to me.
Appellants contend, however, that in constitutional
terms this case involves nothing more than discrimination against locaJ school districts, not against individuals,
since on its face the state scheme is concerned only with
exercise of our certiorari power. Cf. Frankfurter & Landi~, The
Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv.
L. ReY. 1, 12-14 (1930). This id true of appeals from federal, as
well as from state courts, despite technical differences in our mode
of dispo~it ion, sec R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice
233 (4th ed. 1969). At times summary disposition of an appeal
may indeed reflect the settled state of the relevant law. nut at
other times, summa ry affirmance may be the product of the uncertain and developing nature of a particular field of law into which the
Court either i~ not yet prepared to step or else sees no need to
step. Compare Drueding v. D evlin, :380 U. S. 125 ( 1965) , aff'g per
curiam, 234 F. Supp. 721 , 724-725 (Md. 1964), with Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 337 (1972). Hence, we ~ho uld not be
quick to give too great precedential effect to our summary affirmance
of an appeal. Certainly, the precedential value of the summary
affirmance of M clnnis and Burress for this case is small since the
unrefined and unclear character of the parties' legal theories in those
dcri Hion~ rendered them poor candidates for anything other than
summary di::;position.
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the provision of funds to local districts. The result
of the Texas financing scheme, appellants suggest, is
simply that some local districts have more available
revenues for education; others have less. And, in that
respect, the States have broad discretion in drawing reasonable distinction between their subdivisions. See Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U. S. 218, 231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S.
545, 550--554 ( 1952).
But this Court has consistently recognized that where
there is in fact discrimination against individual interests,
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is not inapplicable simply because the discrimination
is based upon some group characteristic such as geographic
location. See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U. S. 1, 4 (1971);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565~566 (1964); Gray
v. Sanders 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). Texas has chosen
to provide free public education for all its citizens, and
has embodied that decision in its constitution. 5 2 Yet,
having established public education for its citizens, some
Texas school children, as a direct consequence of the
varia£lohs in local property wealth endemic to Tex~s'
financing scheme, have been provided with substantially
less resources for their education than have others.
Thus, while on its face the Texas scheme may merely
discriminate between local districts, the impact of that
discrimination falls directly upon the children whose
educational opportunity is dependent upon where they
happen to live. Consequently, the District Court correctly concluded that the Texas financing scheme discriminates from a constitutional perspective between
school age children on the basis of the amount of taxable
property located within their local districts.
""Texas Const., Art. 7, § 1.

71-1:3:3::!-DISSENT (A)
24

SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTHTC'T v. RODRIGUEZ

In the majority's view, however, such a description
of the discrimination inherent in this case is apparently
not sufficient. For it fails to define the "discrete, identifiable class" which the Court now evidently perceives
to be "necessary for equal protection analysis." Ante,
at - . If by this the Court means that an essential
predicate to equal protection analysis is the precise
identification of the particular individuals who comprise
the disadvantaged class, I fail to find the source from
which the Court derives such a requirement. Certainly,
such precision is not analytically necessary. So long as
the basis of the discrimination is clearly identified, it is
possible to test it against the State's purpose for Fuch
discrimination-whatever the standard of equal protection analysis employed."" This is clear from our decision
only last Term in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972),
where the Court, in striking down Texas' primary filing
fees as violative of equal protection, found no impediment to equal protection analysis in the fact that the
members of the disadvantaged class could not be readily
identified. The Court recognized that the filing fee
system tended "to deny some voters the opportunity to
vote for the candidate of their choosing; at the same
time it gives the affluent power to place on the ballot
their own names or the Hames of persons they favor."
!d., at 144. The Court also recognized that "rtJhis
""Problems of remedy ma~· be another matter. If ]JrOI · i~ion of
the relief sou~rht in a partirul!tr rn~c rP(Juirrd identifiention of carh
member of the affected cla~~. a~ in the ca~e of monctar~· rrlirf, the
need for clarity in defining the da~>< i~ :tppnrrnt. But thi~ involves the procedmal problem~ inhrrcnt in ria~~ action litigation, not
the character of the clemrnt~ e~~cnt ial to equal prot crt ion :1nnl~·~is.
lYe arc ronr<·rned here on!~· with the !at tcr. Morcowr, it i~ e1·i<knt
that in r.1~c~ ~urh :ts this provi~ion of appropriate relief. whirh tnkcs
the in,innrt iw· form, i~ not a Rrrious problem ~inee it i~ enough i o
direct the nrtion of nppro]Jrintc offirinb.

71-1:332-DISSENT (A)
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ

25

disparity in voting po"·er based on wealth cannot be
described by reference to discrete and precisely defined
segments of the community as is typical of inequities
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause . . . . "
Ibid. Nevertheless, it concluded that "we would ignore
reality were we not to recog11ize that this system falls
with unequal weight on voters . . . according to their
economic status." Ibid. The nature of the classification in Bullock was clear, although the precise membership of the disadvantaged class was not. This was
enough in Bullock for purposes of equal protection analysis. It is enough here.
It may be, though, that the Court is not in fact de- \
manding precise identification of the membership of the
disadvantaged class for purposes of equal protection 1
analysis, but is merely unable to discern with sufficient
clarity the nature of the discrimination charged in this
case. Indeed, this may be the explanation for the Court's
elaborate exploration of the various theories of discrim.ination which have been put forth at various stages of
this case. See ante, at - . It is, of course, essential
to equal protection analysis to have a firm grasp upon
the nature of the discrimination at issue. The absence
of such a clear, articulatable understa.nding of the nature
of alleged discrimination in a particular instance may
well suggest the absence of any real discrimination.
But such is hardly the case here.
A number of theories of discrimination have, to be·
sure, been considered in the course of this litigation.
Thus, the District Court found that in Texas the poor
and minority group members tend to live in property
poor districts, suggesting discrimination on the basis of
both personal ·wealth and race. The Court goes to great
lengths to discredit the data upon which the District
Court relied and thereby its conclusion that poor people
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live in poor districts. 54 Although I have serious doubts
as to the correctness of the Court's analysis in rC'jecting
the data submitted below," 5 I have no need to join issue
on these factual disputes.
"'I assume the Court would launch the ~ame critici;.;m againRt the
validity of the finding of a correlati on bet ween poor district~ and
racial minorities.
r.r. The Court rejects the District Court's finding of a correlation
brtween poor people and poor di,;tricts with lhr a~~ert ion thn.t
"thPrc is • rea::;on to believr that t he poorr~l familieH arc not ll Cces~nrily clubtered in the poorest districts" in Texa.-. Ante, at - .
In support of its conclusion the Court offers absolutrl~' no datawhich it cannot on th is record-concerning the distribution of pnor
proplr in Texas to refute the dn.ta introducrd below by appPilecs;
it relics in~tead on a recent law revirw note concerned solely with
the State of Connecticut, ::\l'ote, A Statistical Analysis of the School
Finance Decisions: On Winning HattleH and Losing War~, 81 Yale
L .•T. 1303 (1972). Common scnf3e suggests that the basis for drawing a demographic conclusion with respect to a geographically large,
urban-rural, industrial-agricultural Stale such as Texas from a
geographically small, drnscly populated, highly induRtrializrd State
such as Connecticut is doubtful at best.
Furthrrmore, thr artirlr upon which thP Court rrlirs to dil:icrrdit
t hr stat isticnl procedures employed by Professor Brrke to establish
the corrrlation between poor pPople and poor districts, sec n. 11,
supra, based its criticism primarily on the fact that only four of the
110 di~tricts studied were in the lowpst of the five categories, which
were determined by rclativr taxnblc property per j)Upil, and most
districts clustered in the middlr thrrc groups. See Goldstein, InterdiHtrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Annl~'sis of
Serrano v. Pl'iest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 524 n. 67
(1972). But the Court fails to note that tho four poorest districts
in the Rample had over 50,000 students which constitutrd 10% of
the students in the entire sample. It apprars, moreover, that even
when the richest and the poorest categories are enlarged to include
in e~ch category 20% of the students in the sample, the correlation
between district and individual wealth hold::; true. See Brief for the
Governors of Minnesota, Maine, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and
Michigan as amicus curiae 17 n. 21.
Finall y, it cannot be ignored that tho data. introduced by apprlleoH
went unchallenged in the District Court. The majorit~··~ willingness
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1 believe it is sufficient that the 'tv8n ea:elo!i~~ form
.~.-~

/

of discrimination in this case is between the school district of Texas on the basis of the taxable property wealth
of the district in which they happen to live. To understand the precise nature of this discrimination-and even
the precise parameters of the disadvantaged class-it is
sufficient to consider the constitutional principle which
appellees contend is controlling in the context of educational financing. In their complaint appellees asserted
that the Constitution does not permit local district
wealth to be determinative of educational opportunity."n
This is simply another way of saying, as the District
Court concluded, that consistent with the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws, "the quality of public e.du- (
cation may not be a function of wealth, other than the
wealth of the state as a whole." 337 F . Supp., at 284.
Under such a principle, the children of a district are
excessively advantaged if tiliitchstrict has more taxable
property per pupii' "than the average amount of taxabie
property per pupil coi1sidering the tate as a whole. By
contrast, the ~en_of a district are disadvantaged if
that district has less taxable proper y per pupil than
tlie state average. I do not believe that the C'ourt could
asklor, much less need, a clearer definition of either the
disadvantaged class of Texas school children or the
allegedly unconstitutional discrimination suffered by the
members of that class under the present Texas financing
scheme." 7 Whether this discrimination, against the
to permit appellants to litigate the rorrectne~s of thnt data for 1he
first time before thi~:~ tribunal-where diective response by appellees
i · irnpo~;,;ible-i~ both unfair and judicially llll~01md.
" 6 Third Amended Complaint, App., at 24.
7
" Thus, I simply fail to under,;tnnd the CourL'o; suggestion that
)
the disadnmiagcd cla~s as I would define it, would be "ambiguous."
Ante, at - . And, certainly there is nothing "artificial" nbout the
line which determine~ whether the children of a particular district
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school children of property poor districts, inherent in the
Texas financillg scheme is violative of the Equal Protection Clause is the question to which we must novv turn.
II
In striking down the Texas financing scheme because
of the interdistrict variations in taxable property wealth,
the District
Court determined that it was insufficient
---------....
for appellants to show merely that the State's scheme
was rationally related to some legitimate state purpose;
rather, the discrimination inherent iu the scheme had to
be supported by a "compelling state interest" in order
to withstand constitutwmi1 scrutiny. The basis for this
determination was two-fold: first, the financing scheme
divides citizens on a wealth basis, a classification which.
the pistrict Court vie~ved as highly suspect; and second,
the discriminatory scheme directly affects what it considered to be a "fundamental interest," namely, education.
This Court has repeatedly held that state discrimination which either adversely affects a "fundamental interest," sec, e. g., Dunn v. Blumsteh1, 405 F S. 330, 336337 (Hl72); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 629631 (1969), or is based on a distinction of a suspect character. see, e. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365. 372
(1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 191-192
(1969), must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the
scheme is necessary to promote a substantial, legitimate
state interest. Sec, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S.,
at 342-343; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 634.
The majority today concludes, however, that the Texas
scheme is not subject to such a strict standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause, Instead in its view,
the Texas scheme must be tested by nothing more than
are mlvantagcd or cli~aclYanta~rd. Ibid. ThnL i~ thr line rlrarl~·
clir1 a ted h~· the prinripl r of intcrdi~trict oqunlit~· in taxable proprrl y
wcal1h for whieh apprllccs ha\·o argued.
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that lenient standard of rationality which we have traditionally applied to discriminatory state action in the
context of economic and commercial matters. See, e. g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961);
Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457, 465-466 ( 1957); F. S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (HJ20);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 7879 (1911). By so doing tho Court avoids tho telling
task of searching for a substantlal state interest which
tl1eTcxas :financii1g scheme, with its variations in taxable
district property "·ealth. is necessary to further. I cannot accept such an emasculation of the Equal Protection
Clause in tho context of this case.
A

To begin, I must once more voice my disagreement
with tho Court's rio·idified approach to equal protection
analysis. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519521[1969) (dissenting opinion); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78. 90 (1971) (dissenting opinion). Tho Court
apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection
cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate
the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or
mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field
of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A
principled reading of what this Court has done reveals
that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly viOlative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degreeofeare with wh:lch the Court will
scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe,
or1the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely aft'ected and the recognized invidiousness
of tho basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn. In short, I find that many of the Court's recent
decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to
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equal protection analysis for which I previo~sly ~ed
that is, an approach in which "concentration [is l placed
upon the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to the individuals iu the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits they do
not receive, and the asserted state interests in support
of the classification." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.,
at 520-521 (dissenting opinion).
I therefore cannot accept the majority's labored efforts
to demonStraTe that fundamental interests, which call
for strict scrutiny of the challenged classification, encompass only established rights which we are bound to .reco~
nize from the text of the Constitution itself. To be sure,
some interests w uch the Court has deemed to be fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis are
themselves constitutionally protected rights. Thus, discrimination against the guaranteed right of freedom of
speech has called for strict judicial scrutiny. s;;JI;iOsei'y
Y.' Police Department of the City of Chicago, 408 U. S.
92 ( 1972). Every citizen's right to travel interstate,
although nowhere expressly mentioned iii'the Constitution, has long been recognized as implicit in the premises
underlying the Document: the right "was conceived from
the beginning to be a concomitant of the stronger Union
the Constitution created." United States v. Guest, 383
U. S. 745, 758 (1966). See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6
Wall. 35, 48 (1867). Consequently, the Court has required that a state classification affecting the constitutionally protected right to travel must be "shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969).
But it will not do to suggest that the Constitution itself
alwaySdefines what interests are fundamental for purposesof equal protection analysis."8

-

'8

Indeed, the Court's theory would render the Equal Prolcction
Clause largely superfluous, except for cases of discrimination on the
"
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I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942), or the right to
vote in state elections, e. g., Reynolds v. SimS, 3'7 U. S.
533 (1964), or the right to an appeal from a criminal
conviction, e. g.-,-Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956).
These are instances in which, due to the importance of
the interests at stake, the Court has displayed a strong
concern with the existence of discriminatory state treatment. But the Court has never said or indicated that
these are interests which independently enjoy full-blown
constitutional protection.
Thus, in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the Court
refused to recognize a substantive constitutional guarantee of the right to procreate. Nevertheless, in Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S., at 541, the
Court, without impugning the continuing validity of Buck
v. Bell, held that "strict scrutiny" of state discrimination affecting procreation "is essential," for " [m] arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race." Today the importance of
procreation may indeed be explained on the basis of its
intimate relationship with the constitutional right of
privacy which we have recognized. See Roe v. Wade,
U. S. - , - - (1973). Yet the limited stature accorded any "right" to procreate is evident from the fact
that at the same time the Court has reaffirmed its initial
U. S.,
decision in Buck v. Bell. See Roe v. Wade, at-.
basi:; of su ·pect criteria such as race, e. g., McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U. S. 184, 191-192 (1964), or alienage, e. g., Graham v. Rirhardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). For the substantive con;,;titutiona l
right it;;elf requires that this Court o;trictly scrutinize any :u;;,;crted
stale intereo;t for restricting or denyiug the right to its citizens. Sec,
e. g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1961:l); Cox v.
Loui8iana, 379 U. S. 536, 545-551 (1965).
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Similarly, the right to vote in state elections has been \
recognized as a ~ental political right," because I
the Court concluded very early that it is "preservative {
of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370
( 1886); see, e. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561562 (1964). For this reason, "this Court has m.ade clear
that a citi~:en has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdict·ion." Dunn v. Blumstein., 405 U. S.
330, 336 (1972) (emphasis added). The source of such
protection from inequality in the provision of the state
franchise is, of course, the Equal Protection Clause. Yet
it is clear that whatever degree of importance has been
attached to the state electoral process, the right to vote
in state elections has never been accorded the stature of
an independent constitutional guarantee. See Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Finally, it is likewise "true that a State is not required
by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts
or a right to appellate review at all." Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S., at 18. Nevertheless, discrimination adversely
affecting access to an appellate process which a State
has chosen to provide has been considered to require
close judicial scrutiny. See, e. g., Griffin v. Illinois,
supra; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). 00
The majority, is, of course, correct when it suggests
that the job of determini11g which interests are funda"" It is trur that Griffin 11nd Douglas abo inYolYrcl di~c riminn
tion ag;ain~t incligmt~, that i~, wrnlth cliscrimin<ltion. But, ;~ .., thr
majorit.1· 11oint~ out, aute. at n. 67, tho Court ha~ nr1 er deemed
wealth di~criminat ion alonr to be ~nfficient to requirr Rtrict jud ieial
Hcrutin~·; rather, such review of wralth classification~ ha~ brrn npplil:'d on!~· whrrr thr diHcrimination nffrcts an important indi,•idnal
interr~t, srr, e. g .. Ilwper , .. V£rginia Board of Elections, 3~3 li. S.
66:3 (1966). Tim~, I believe Griffin and Douglas cnn only be undrr~tood as prrmi~C'd on n recognition of thr fundnmental importnncr of
the criminal appollnte process.
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mental is a difficult one. But I do not think the problem
is insurmountable, and I do not accept the view that it
need necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective "picking-and-choosing" between various interests. Although not all fundamental interests arc constitutionally guaranteed, the determination of which
interests are fundamental should be finnly rooted in the
text of the Constitution. The task in every case should
be to determine the extent to ,vhich constitutionally guaranteed rights arc dependent on interests not mentioned
in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific
cons 1tutio11al guarantee and the nonconstitutional inter- 1
est draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes
more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory
basis must grow accordingly. Thus, it cannot be denied •
that interests such as procreation, the exercise of the state
franchise, and access to criminal appellate processes arc
not fully guaranteed to the citizen by our Constitution.
But these interests have nonetheless been afforded special judicial consideration in the face of discrimination
because they are, to son1e extent, interrelated with constitutional guarantees. Procreation is deemed important
because of its interaction with the established constitutional right of privacy. The exercise of the state franchise is closely tied to basic civil and political rights
inherent in the First Amendment. And access to criminal appellate proc<'sses enhances the integrity of the
range of rights Go implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process of law. Only if we closely
protect the related interests from state discrimination
do "·e ultimately ensure the integrity of the constitutional

I

(Y

'"' Sc<', e. g .. Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 U. R. 14!5 (19f\8) (right io
jury trial); TVashington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1907) (right to
compulsor~· proecs~); Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965) (right
to confrout onc'8 nrru~cr::;).

<"'
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guarantee itself. This is the real lesson that must be
taken from our previous decisions involving interests
deemed to be fundamental.
The effect of the interaction of individual interests
with established constitutional guarantees upon the degree of care exercised by this Court in reviewing state
discrimination affecting such interests is amply illustrated
by our decision last Term in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U. S. 438 (1972). In Baird, the Court struck down as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause a state statute
which denied unmarried persons access to contraceptive
devices on the same basis as married persons. The Court
purported to test the statute under its traditional stamlard whether there is some rational basis for the discrimination effected. !d., at 447. In the context of commercial regulation, the Court has indicated that the
Equal Protection Clause "is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. See, e. g., McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961); Kotch v. Board
of R1"ver Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, 557
(1947). And this lenient standard is further weighted in
the State's favor by the fact that "[a] statutory classifiuation will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived [by the Court 1 to justify it."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 426. But in Baird
the Court clearly did not adhere to these highly tolerant
st~ndards of review. For although there were conceivable state interests intended to be advanced by the
statute-e. g., deterrence of premarital sexual activity;
regulation of the dissemination of potentially dangerous
articles-the Court was not prepared to accept these interests on their face, but instead proceeded to test their
substantiality by independent analysis. See 405 U. S.,
at 449-454. Such close scrutiny of the State's interests
was hardly characteristic of the deference shown state
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classifications in the context of economic interests. See,
e. g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Kotch v.
Boar,d of River Port Pilot Commissioners, supra. Y ct
I think the Court's action was entirely appropriate for
access to and usc of contraceptives bears a close relationship to the individual's constitutional right of privacy.
See 405 U. S., at 453-454; id., at 463-464 (WHITE, J.,
concurring). See also Roe v. Wade, U. S., at - .
A similar process of analysis with respect to the invidiousness of the basis on which a particular classification is drawn has also influenced the Court as to the
appropriate degree of scrutiny to be accorded any particular case. The highly suspect character of classifications based on race,u 1 nationality,u" or alienage "" is
well established. The reasons why such classifications
call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain
racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recognized as "discrete and insular minorities" who arc relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political
process. See Grah.a m v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372
(1971); cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 ( 1938). Moreover, race, nationality,
or alienage is " 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to any
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100." McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 192. Instead, lines drawn on
such bases arc frequently the reflection of historic prejudices rather than legislative rationality. It may be
that all of these considerations, which make for particular judicial solicitude in the face of discrimi11ation
on the basis of race, nationality, or alienage, do not
01

Sec, e. g., Jl!cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 191- 192; Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
""Sec Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 63:3, 644-646 (1948);
Kurematsu v. United States. 32:3 U. S. 214, 216 ( 1944).
na Sec Graham v. Richard8un, 403 U. S. 365, 37:2 (1971) .
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coalesce-or at least not to the same degree- in other
forms of discrimination. Nevertheless, these considerations have undoubtedly influeucecl the care with " ·hich
the Court has scrutillized other forms of discrimination.
In James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 (1972), the Court
held unconstitutional a state statute which provided for
recoupment from indigent convicts of legal defense fees
paid by the State. The Court found that the statute
impermissibly differentiated between
criminals
in debt to the state and civil judgment debtors, since
criminal debtors were denied various protective exemptions afforded civil judgment debtors. The Court suggested that in reviewing the statute under the Equal
Protection Clause, it was merely applying the traditional
requirement that there be "some rationality in the line
drawn between the different types of debtors." I d., at
140. Yet it then proceeded to scrutinize the statute with
less than traditional deference and restraint. Thus the
Court recognized "that state recoupment statutes may
be token legitimate state interests" in recovering expemes
and discouraging fraud. Nevertheless. MH. Jn=vrrc1~
PowELL, speaking for the Court, concluded that
"these interests are not thwarted by requiring more
even treatment of indigent criminal defendants
with other classes of debtors to whom the statute
itself repeatedly makes reference. State recoupment
laws, notwithstanding the state interests they may
serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion
the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and selfrespect." !d. , at 141-142.
The Court, in short, clearly did not consider the problems of fraud and collection that the state legislature
might have concluded were peculiar to ~ criminal
defendants either to be sufficiently real or Important to
justify denial of the protective exemptions afforded to
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all civil judgment debtors, to a class composed exclusively of indigent criminal debtors.
Similarly, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), the
Court, in striking do\\~1 a state statute "·hich gave me n
preference over women when persons of equal entitlement
apply for assignment as an administrator of a particular
estate, resorted to a more stringent standard of equal protection review than that employed in cases involving
commercial matters. The Court indicated that it was
testing the claim of sex discrimination by nothing more
than whether the line drawn bore "a rational relationship
to the state objective," \Yhich it recognized as a legitimate
effort to reduce the work of probate courts in choosing
between competing applications for letters of administration. !d., at 76. Accepting such a purpose, the Idaho
Supreme Court had thought tho classification to be sustainable on the basis that the legislature might have
reasonably concluded that, as a rule, men have more
experience than \\·omen in business matters relevant to
the administration of estate. 03 Idaho 511, 514; 465 P.
2cl 635. 638 (1970). This Court, hO\Yever, concluded
that " [ t] o giYe a mandatory preference to members of
either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive
values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice
in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on
the basis of sex," id., at 76-77. This Court, in other
words, was umYilling to consider a theoretical and unsubstantiated basis for distinction-however reasonable
it might appear-sufficient to sustain a statute discriminating on the basis of sex.
James and Reed can only be understood as instances in
"·hich the particularly invidious character of the classi-
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fication caused the Court to pause and scrutinize with
more than traditional care the rationality of state discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of past criminality and on the basis of sex posed for the Court the
spectre of forms of discrimination which it implicitly
recognized to have deep social and legal roots without
necessarily having any basis in actual differences. Still,
the Court's sensitivity to the invidiousness of the basis
for discrimination is perhaps most apparent in its decisions protecting the interests of children born out of wedlock from discriminatory state action. See Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968).
In Weber, the Court struck down a portion of a state
workmen's compensation statute that relegated unacknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased to a
lesser status with respect to benefits than that occupied
by legitimate children of the deceased. The Court acknowledged the true nature of its inquiry in cases such
as these: "What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?" !d., at 173. Embarking upon a determination of the relative substantiality of the State's justifications for the classification, the
Court rejected the contention that the classifications reflected what might be presumed to have been the deceased's preference of beneficiaries as "not compelling ...
where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to
anyone's recovery . . . . " !d., at 174. Likewise, it
deemed the relationship between the State's interest in
encouraging legitimate family relationships and the burden placed on the illegitimates too tenuous to permit the
classification to stand. I d., at 173. A clear insight
into the basis of the Court's action is provided by its
conclusion:
"[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that

,.
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legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously no
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an
unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered
by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection
Clause does enable us to strike clown discriminatory
laws relating to status of birth." 406 U. S., at 175176 (footnote omitted).
Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something
which the individual cannot control, and should generally
be irrelevant in legislative considerations. Yet illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence,
discrimination on the basis of birth-particularly when
it affects innocent children-warrants special judicial
consideration.
In summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this
Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it
willreview state discrimination in light of the constitutional significance• of the interests affected and the invi?iousness of the particular classification. In the context of economic interests, we find that discriminatory
state action is almost always sustained for such interests
.... are generally far removed from constitutional guarantees. Moreover, "[t]he extremes to which the Court
has gone in dreaming up rational bases for state regulation
in that area may in many instances be ascribed to a
healthy revulsion from the Court's earlier excesses in using
the Constitution to protect interests that have more than
enough power to protect themselves in the legislative
halls." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 520 (dissenting opinon). But the situation differs markedly when
discrimination against important individual interests )
with constitutional implications and against particularly
disadvalltagecl or powerless classes is involved. The
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majority suggests, however, that a variable standard of
reviev,· would give this Court tho appearance of a "su11erlegislature." Ante, at - . I cannot agree. Such an
approach seems to me a part of the guarantees of our
Constitution and of the historic experiences with oppression of and discrimination against discrete, powerless
minorities "·hich underlie that Document. In truth,
the Court itself
be open to the criticism raised by
tho majority so long as it continues on its present course
of effectively selecting in private which cases will be
afforded special consideration without acknowledging the
true basis of its action.G' Opinions such as those in
Reed and James seem dra>vn more as efforts to shield
rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's deCISIOns. Such obfuscated action may be appropriate to
a political body suCh as a legiSlature, but it is not appropriate to this Court. Open debate of the bases for
the Court's action is essential to the rationality and
consistency of our decisio1lnaking process. Only in this
way can we avoid the label of legislature and ensure the
integrity of tho judicial process.
Ne\·ertheless, the majority today attempts to force this
case into the same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as decisions involving discrimination
affecting commercial interests. By so doing, the majority
singles this case out for analytic treatment at odds with
what seems to me to be the clear trend of recent decisions
in this Court, and thereby ignores tho constitutional importance of the interest at stake and the invidiomness of
the particular classification, factors that call for far more
than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing schon1e
which the majority pursues. Yet if the discrimination
inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with the care

'"ill

Src grncrall~· Ciunthrr, Thr Supreme Court , 1971 Term: Forr\rord, In Sc:trrh of EYoh·ing Doctrine on 3 Clwnging Com1 : A
l\1odrl for 3 l\C'wcr Equal Prolcrtion, R6 HarT. L. TIP\". 1 (1972) .
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demanded by the interest and classification present m
this case, the unconl'titutionality of that scheme IS
unmistakcab lc.
B
Since the Court now suggests that only interests guaranteedby the Constitution arc fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis and since it rejects
the contention that public education is fundamental,
it follows that the Court implicitly concludes that public~ eaucation is not constitutionally guaranteed. It is
true that this Court has never deemed the provision of
free public education to be required by the Constitution. Indeed, it has on occasion suggested that state
supported education is a privilege bestowed by a State
on its citizens. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.,
305 U. S. 337, 349 (Hl38). Nevertheless. the fundamental importance of education is amply indicated by
the prior decisions of this Court. by the unique status
accorded public education by our society, and by the
close relationship between education and some of our
mo t basic constitutional values.
The special concern of this Court with the educational
process of our country is a matter of common knowledge.
Undoubtedly, this Court's most famous statement on
the subject is that contained in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954):
"Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for eel ucation both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
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in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping to adjust normally to his environment .... "
Only last Term the Court recognized that "r p] roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the functions
of a State." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213
(1972). This is clearly borne out by the fact that in 48
of our 50 States the provision of public education is
mandated by the state constitution.(;" No other state
function is so uniformly recognized nn as an essential
element of our society's well-being. In large measure,
the explanation for the special importance attached to
education must rest, as the Court recognized in Yoder,
id., at 221, on the facts that "some degree of education
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
in our open political system ... ," and that "education
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
participants in society." Both facets of this observation
are suggestive of the substantial relationship which education bears to guarantees of our Constitution.
Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First Amendment interests both as a source and
as a reeciver of information and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in life. This Court's decision in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957),
speaks of the right of students "to inquire, to study, and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understand05
Sec Brief amicus curiae on behalf of the National Education
Association et al., App. A. All 48 of the 50 States which mnndntc
publir education also have compulsory attendance laws which require school attendance for eight years or more. !d., at 20-21.
cr. Prior to this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
847 U. S. 483 (1954), ever~' State had a constitutional provision
directing the establishment of a system of publir schools. But a ftcr
Brown, South Carolina repealed its constitutional provision, and
Mi~sis~ippi made its constitutional provision discretionary with the
HU1to legislature.
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ing . . . . " Thus, we have not casually described the
classroom as the "marketplace of ideas." Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The opportunity for formal education may not necessarily be the
essential determinant of an individual's ability to enjoy
throughout his life the rights of free speech and association guaranteed to him by the First Amendment. But
such an opportunity may enhance the individual's enjoyment of those rights, not only during but also following school attendance. Thus, in the final analysis, "the
pivotal position of education to success in American society and its essential role in opening up to the individual
the cultural experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is undeniable." 67
Of particular importance is the relationship between
education and the political process. "Americans regard
the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of the democratic system of Government."
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Education serves
the essential function of instilling in our young an understanding of and appreciation for the principles and operation of our governmental processes. 68 Education may
instill the interest and provide the tools necessary for
67
Devrlopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1065, 1129 ( 1969)
68 The President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People, nnd Money: the Need for Educational Reform 11 (1972), concluded that "[l]iterally we cannot survive as a mature nation or as
individualR without. [education]." It further observed that
" in a democratic society, public understanding of public is;:;ues is
necessary for public support. Schools generally include in their
coursrs of in.,truction a wide variety of subject;;; related to the history,
Rt ruct urc and principles of Americnn government at all levels. In so
doiug, schools proYide students with a background of knowledge
which is deemed an absolute nrcesHity for responsible eitizen~hip."
Id., at 1:3-14.
0
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political discourse and debate. Indeed, it has frequently
been suggested that education is the dominant factor
affecting political consciousness and participation.nr• A
system of "[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental
policies is at the core of our electoral process and of First
Amendment freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 303 U. S.
23. 32 (1968). But of most immediate and direct concern must be the demonstrated effect of education on the
exercise of the franchise by the electorate. The right to
vote in federal eJections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, and
the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution, and
access to the state franchise has been afforded special
protection because it is "preservative of other basic civil
and political rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
561-562 (1964). Data from the Presidential Rlection
of 1968 clearly demonstrates a direct relationship between
participation in the electoral process and Jevel of educational attainment, 70 and, as this Court recognized in
"" Srr J. Guthrie•, G. Klrindorfer, II. Le,·in, & H. Stout. Srhool~
nnd Inequalit~· 103-105 (1971): H. He~~ & .1. Tome~·, The Drvclopmrnt of Political Attitudes in Children 217-21~ (HHii); Ca!ll]Jhrll,
The Pa~~iw Citizen, \'I Arta Soriologien, :'fo~. 1-2. 9, 20-21 (10()2) .
That rduration i~ the dominant factor in influrncing pol it ir:tl p:trtiripation al!Cl nwnrpnr~~ i" RtliTirieni. I brlirw, to cli~po~r of thr
Court!~ suggr~tion that, in all rvrnt~. thrre is no inclir-nlion that
Trx:tR i~ not pro,·iding nll of it·H children with :1 ~llffif'irnl rdu<':tlion
to rn.io~· thr right of frer ~prrrh and to ]Jnrtiripntr full~· in the
political procr~s. Ant<', at - . Tlwrc is, in ~hort. no limi t on thr
:tmmmt of frrr ~prrrh or polit irnl part if'ipnl ion t hn t t hr Com:titution gunrnntee~. :\forro,·cr, il ~hotild hr ob\'iou~ thai thr polilirnl
prorr~~ . like mo~l ol hrr nRpret;;; of Borin! i ntrrrou r."r. i~ to ~ornr
dr~!:rer rompetiti,·r. II i~ thu~ of little brnrfit to an indi,·idu:d from
:1 proprrty ]Joor rli,;lrirl to hrt,-c "rnough" rdurntion if tho~r :trotmd
him haw morr than "enough.'' Cf. 81c1'att , .. Paiutrr. ::;:)!) lT. S. 029,
();~:i-034

( 1950).

Srr Unilrd Stair~ Department of Commcrcr, Bnrr:tll of tlw
Crn~n~, Voting and Brgi~tration in tbr Elretion of ~owmbrr 190R,
Currrnl Population Rcporl,, Rrrirs P-20, No. Hl2, Tahir 4, Jl. 17
70
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Gaston v. United States, 395 U. S. 285, 296 (1969), the
quality of education offered may influence a child's
decision to "enter or remain in school." It is, in sum,
this very sort of intimate relationship between a particular personal interest and specific constitutional guarantees that has heretofore caused the Court to attach
special significance, for purposes of equal protection analysis. to individual interests such as procreation and the
C'xercise of the state franchise. 7 '
While ultimately disputing little of this, the majority
seeks refuge in the fact that the Court has "never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to
guarantee the citizenry the most effective speech or
(10fiR). Srr ;d~o Lr,·in, thr Co~tR to thr X:ttion of Inadrquntr Eduention, CommittPP Print of thP SC'n:ltC' SPlret CommittPr on Equal
Fdurat ion:d Opportunit _,., 92d Cong., 2d SP~~ .• j). -~7 (1972).
71
I brlirvr that thr dosr llC'XIIS betwPPIJ education aml our rstabli~hrd cou~titution:d valur~ with rr~prrt to freedom of spcf'rh and
Jlartieip:lti on in thP political prorrss makPs this a difTcrcnt cnsc
t h:m our prior dPri~ion~ rmwcrning di~rriminn tion nffprt ing public
wp]fnrr. srr, 1' . g., Dandridge'"· Williams. 394 U.S. -t71 (1970). or
hou~ing. ~rc, c. g .. Lindsey "· N O?'met. 405 U. S. M (1972). Thrrr
c:tn be no que~tion thnt, n~ thr majority ~nggrsts, eon~titntional
rights mn:'· br Jp~~ mraningful for Romcone without enough to cat or
without decent hou ~ ing . Ante. at - . But t hr rrueial diffrrcncP
lir>< in tlw rloRenc"·' of tlw rrlntionship. Whatewr thf' >'rvcrit~· of
t IH' impact of insufficient food or inndcquatr hou~ing ou :1 prrson';-;
lifr , they ha,·r ncvrr been ron~iderecl to brar the snmr direr( nml
immcdin tc rel nt ions hip to ronst it ntionnl conrrrns for frcr ~wrrh
nne! for our pol it ira! processr:; ns Pduca t ion has long hrcn rrcognizcd
to bear. Pc rhnp~. thr best evidence of thif' fnct i~ the uniqur ,:: tatu~
\Yhirh ha" bren ncrordrd puhlir rduration n~ the single public srrvicc
nrnrl.v unanirnou;;;ly ~unrantcecl in 1!lC' con~titut ions of om Stairs, src
n. G5, suwa. Edurntion, in trnns of ronstitution:li vnlnrs, i>' much
more nnnlogon~ in m~ · jud~mrnt , to the right to vote in ~tntr clcrt ion ~ thnn to public welfare or public hou::;i110:. IndPrcl. it i~ not
without signifir:lll('r that wr hn,·r long rceognizrd education n~ nn
csscnt in! step in providing the disad nllltng<'ci with i he tool s ncces~: n·~· to nchir,·p Pronomic srlf-~uffirirncy.
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the most infor·m.ed electoral choice." Ante, at-. This
serves only to blur w·hat is in fact at stake. \Yith clue
respect. the issue is ueither provision of the most effective speech nor of the most informed vote. Appellees
do not now seek the best education Texas might provide.
They do seek, however, an end to state imposed discrimination in the distribution of taxable district property wealth that directly impairs the ability of some
districts to provide the same educational opportunity
that other districts can provide with the same or even
substantially less tax effort. The issue is, in other words,
one of discrimination that affects the quality of the education which Texas has chosen to provide its children;
and, the precise question here is what importance should
attach to education for purposes of equal protection analysis of that discrimination. As this Court held in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S., at 493: The
opportunity of education, "where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." The factors just considered,
including the relationship between education and the
social and political interests enshrined within the Constitution, compel us to recognize the fundamentality of
education and to scrutinize with appropriate care the
bases for state discrimination affecting equality of educational opportunity in Texas' school districts 72-a con72
The majority's reliance on this Court's traditional deference to
legislative bodies in matters of taxation falls wide of the mark in
the context of this particular case. See ante, at - . The derisions on which the Court relies were simply taxpa~·cr suits challenging the constitutimmlity of a tax burden in the fare of exempSee Allird Sto1'rs
tions or differential taxation afforded to other::;.
of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowel's, 358 U. S. 522 (1959); Ca1'michacl v. Southem Coal & CokP Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Bell's Gap B. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890). There is no question that
from the perspective of the taxpayer, the Equal Protection Clause
'·imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and va-
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elusion which is only strengthened when we consider
the character of the classification in this case.

c
The District Court found that in discriminating between Texas school children on the basis of the amount of
taxable property wealth located in the district in which
they live, the Texas financing scheme created a form of
wealth discrimination. This Court has frequently recognized that discrimination on the basis of wealth may create a classification of a suspectcharacter and there& call
forexact.!!?:_g~ciaiscrutiTIY. See-:e. g., Griffin - v. Illinois, 351 U. S~ I2-cTir5T); Douglas v. California, 372
U. S. 353 (1963); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm·issioners of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802, 807 (1969). The
majority, however, considers any wealth classification in
this case to lack certain essential characteristics which
it contends are common to the instances of wealth discrimination that this Court has heretofore recognized.
We are told that in every prior case involving a wealth
ricty that arc appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation.
The Statr may impose different specific taxe:; upon different trades
and profcssionR and may vary the rate of an excise upon various
products." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S., at 526527. But in this case we are presented with a claim of discrimination of an e11tircly different nature-a claim that the revenue produring mechanism directly discriminates against the interests of some
of thr intrnded beneficiaries; and in contrast to the tnxpayer suits,
the interest adversely affected is of substantial constitutional and
societal importance. l-Ienee, a different standard of equal protection review than has been employed in the taxpayer suits is appropriate here. It is true that affirmance of the District Court deciRion
would to some extent intrude upon the State'~ taxing power insofar
as it would be 11ecessar~' for the State to at lca:;t equalize taxable
district wealth. But contray to the suggcHtions of the majority,
nflirmnnrc would not impose a straitjacket upon the revenue raising
powers of the SLate, and would certainly not spell the end of the
local property tax. Sec infra, pp. - - -
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classification, the members of the disadvantaged class
"have shared two distinguishing characteristics: (1) because of their impecunity they were completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and (2) as a. consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Ante, at - . I
cannot agree. The Court's distinctions may be sufficient
to explain the decisions in ·williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S.
235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971); and
even Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972). But they
arc not in fact consistent with the decisions in Harper v.
Virginia Board o Elections-;-3-s3 . K't>63 (1965), or
Griffin v. Illinois, supra, or Douglas v. California, supra.
In H m·per, the Court struck down as violative of the
Equal Vrotection Clause an annual Virginia poll tax of
$1.50, pa.ymeut of '"hich by persons over the age of 21
was a prerequisite to voting in Virginia elections. In
part, the Court relied on the fact that the p~ll tax intef:
fered with a fundamental interest-the exercise of the
state ranchise. In addition, though, the Court emphasized that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property ... are traditionally disfavored." I d., at 668.
Under the first part of the theory armounced by the
majority the disadvantaged class in Harper, in trrms of
a wealth analysis. should have consisted only of those too
poor to afford the $1.50 necessary to vote. But the
Harper Court did not see it that way. In its view, the
Equal Protection Clause "bars a system which excludes
[from the franchise] those unable to pay or who fail to
pay." Ib·id. (Emphasis added.) So far as the Court
\vas concerned, the "degree of discrimination .[was] irrelevant." Ibid. Thus. the Court struck clown the poll
tax in toto; it did not order merely that those too poor
to pay the tax be exempted; complete impecunity clearly
\Yas not determinative of the limits of the disadvantaged

-
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class, nor "·as it essential to make an equal protection
claim.
Similarly, Griffin and Douglas refute the majority's
contention that we have in the past required an absolute
deprivation before subjecting wealth classifications to
strict scrutiny. The Court characterizes Griffin as a case
concerned simply with the denial of a transcript or an
adequate substitute therefor, and Douglas as involving
the denial of counsel. But in both cases the question
was in fact whether "a State that rgrants] appellate
review can do so in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 18 (emphasis added). In
that regard, the Court concluded that inability to purchase a transcript denies "the poor an adequate appellate
review accorded to all who have mollCY enough to pa.y
the costs in advance," id., at 18 (emphasis added), and
that "the type of an appeal a person is afforded . . .
!_hinges] upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel," Douglas v. California, 372 U. S., at
355-356 (emphasis added). The right of appeal i~lf
was not absolute] denied to those too )OOr
lli!Y; but
because of the cost of a transcript and of counsel. the
appeal was a substantially less meaningful right for the
poor than for the rich. ~ It was on these terms that the
Court found a denial of equal protection, and those terms
7

This clor~ not mean that thr Court has drm:mdrd prrei~r <'quulity
in thr trratmrnt of the indigent and thr prrRon of mrnnR in the
criminnl pro<·r~s. \Yr haYr nr,·rr Ru~~rf'trd, for in~t:1nrr, that t hr
Equal Protection Cbu~e rrquirr,; tlw hrst law~·rr monrv ran bu~· for
thE> indip;rnt. Wr arr hardly rquipped with thr ohjrrti,·r :-:tandarcls
which i'llrh a. judp;mrnt would rrquirr. But \\·r ha,·c pur~urd the
p;oal of Rnbstantial cqualit~· of trratmrnt in thr farr of rlr:tr diRparitir~ in tlw naturr of the apprllatc procr~R affordrd rich Yrr,:m:
poor. Rrr, r. (1., Dra]Jer , .. Tl'ashi1l(fton, :~72 U. 8. 4R7, 4\)fi-49(3.
70

(196~).
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clearly encompassed degrees of discrimination on the
basis of wealth which do not amount to outright denial
of the affected right or interest. 74
This is not to say that the form of "·ealth classification in this case does not differ significantly fr~ those
recoo-uized in tileprevTous dedsion~--;;f this Court. Our
prior cases have dea t essential y wiTiiCT!SciW1ination on
the basis of personal wealth. 7 " Here. by contrast. the

----------------

Even putting aside its misrrading of Griffin and Douolas. the
Court fails to offer nn~· rra.·onccl conRtitutional basis for rrstrirting
cnsrH involving wraith diHcrimination to instances in "·hich thrrr is
:m abRolutc deprivation of the interest affected. As I havr alreacl~·
diHeussccl, sec supra, p. - . the Equal Protection Clause guarantees
rquality of treatmrnt of those persons who arr similnrly situntecl;
it dors not mere!~· bar Rome form of excessive discriminntion bet wren such persons. Out~icle the context of wealth di~crimiuation,
the Court's renpportionmcnt decision;;: clear!~, indicate thai, rrlntivc
di~crimination is within thr purview of the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, in Reynolds '"· Sims, 872 U. S. 533, 562-563 (1964), the
Court rceognized:
"It would appear extraordinar~· to suggest that a State could be
constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of
the State's voters could Yote two, five, or 10 times for thrir legislative
representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only
once. . . . Of course, the effect of state legislative districting schemes
which give the same number of ropresentativrs to unequal numbers
of constituents is identical. Overweighting and overvaluation of the
votes of those living here haR the certain effect of dilution and undcrYaluation of the votes to those living there. . . . Their right 1o
vote is simply not the same right to vote as that of those living
in n favored part of the State. . . . One must be rwr awarr that
the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simplr-miudcd
modes of discrimination.' "
See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 380-381 (1963). The
Court gives no explanation why a case involving wealth ckTrimination should be treated an~' differently.
7
" But cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 144 (1972), whrre n
candidate's inabilit~· to pay a primary filing fee was seen as discrimination against both the impecunious candidate and thr "los~ affluent
segment of tho community" who support such a candidate but arc
al~o too poor as a group to contribute enough for the filing fee.
7-1
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children of the disadvantaged Texas school districts are
being discriminated against not necessarily because of
their p;;.sonal wealtll or the wealth of their families, but
because of the taxable property ~ealtl1 of theresidmits
of the d1Strici in Which the l1ap..12_en to live. The appropriate question, th~ is whether- the ~~me degree of
judicial solicitude and scrutiny that has previously been
afforded wealth classifications is warranted here.
As the Court points out, ante, at - , no previous
decision has deemed the presence of just a wealtl;:-classificatio~to be sufficientbasis to call f~rth "rigorous judici~ scrutiny" of allegedly discrimin~tory stateactim1.
Compare, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elect?:ons,.
supra, with, e. g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
That wealth classifications alone have not necessarily
been considered to bear the same high degree of suspectness as have classifications based on, for instance,
race or alienage may be explainable on a number of
grounds. The "poor" may not be seen as politically
powerless as certain discrete and insular minority
groups. 76 Personal poverty may entail much the same
social stigma as historically attached to certain racial or
ethnic groups. 77 But personal poverty is not a permanent disability; its shackles may be escaped. Perhaps,
most importantly, though, personal wealth may not
necessarily share the general irrelevance as basis for
legislative action which race or nationality is recognized
to have. While the "poor" have frequently been a
legally disadvantaged group/ 8 it cannot be ignored that
social legislation must frequently take cognizance of
76
But rf. l\1. Harrington, The Other America 13-17 (Pcn~uin cd.
1963).
77
Sec E. Banfield, The Unhe:wcnly City 63, 75-76 (1970);
R Lynd & H. Lynd, Middle1own in Tran:sition 450 (1937) .
7
' Cf. City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 142 (1837) .
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the economic status of our citizens. Thus, we have generally gauged the invidiousness of wealth classifications
with an awareness of the importance of the interests
being affected and the relevance of personal wealth to
those interests. See Harper v. Virginia. Board of Elections, supra..
When evaluated with these considerations in mind. it
seems to me that discrimination on the basis of group
wealth in this case likc\\·ise cans 10r"bareful judicial
scrutiny~ • First, it mustbe recognized that '"hile local
district wealth may serve other interests. 7 " it bears no
relationship whatsoever to the interest of Texas school
children in the educational opportunity afforded them
by the State of Texas. Given the importance of that
interest, we must be particularly sensitive to the invidious
characteristics of any form of discrimination that is not
clearly intended to serve it, as opposed to some other
distinct state interest. Discrimination on the Lasis of
group wealth may not. to be sure, reflect the social stigma
frequently attached to personal poverty. Nevertheless,
insofar as group wealth discrimination involves wealth
ov~1~~anta~~c~all~s no ~gnificant
control/ 0 it represents in fact a more serious basis of
cli~crimination than does personal wealth. For such discrii"nination. . . is no reflect1on- oftl1e - individual's characteristics or his abilities. And thus-particularly in the
context of a disadvantaged class compo~ed of children1

" Throrrti <'tt ll~·. at lrn~t. it 111:1~· proYidr n mrrhani~m for implrlllPPi ing Trx:1~' n~~Prtrd iut rrr~t in loe:d rclurationnl eont rol, ~l'r
infra. pp. - - - .
~o Trnr, a fa mil~· mn~· mo1·r to c~rapr n proprrt~ · poor ~c·hool
di~trirt, a~~uming it ha~ t hP means to do c:o. But surh n ,·irw would
it~rlf rni~r n srriou~ ronstitutionnl qur;:tion rmwcrning an imprrmiRsiblr burdening of t hr right to tr:wrl, or, morr prrri"rl~ · . i hr ronromitant right to rrmain \\'herr 011(' i~. cr. Sha]Jii'O \". 'I'hOIII]JS011.
7

~94

F. 8. Gl.S, G29-G31 (19G9).
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we have previously treated discrimination on a basis
·\\'hich the individual cannot control as constitutionally
disfavored. Cf. TV eber v. Aetna CasualLy & Surety Co.,
406 U. S. 164 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68
( 1968).
The disability of the disadvantaged class in this case
extends as well into the political processes upon '"hich
we ordinarily rely as adequate for the protection and
promotion of a.Il interests. Here legislative reallocation
of the State's property wealth must be sought in the face
of inevitable opposition from significantly advantaged
districts that have a strong vested interest in the preservation of the sta.tus quo. a problem not completely dissimilar to that faced by underrepresented districts prior
to the Court's intervention in the proress of reapportionment.' ' see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191-192 (1962).
Nor can we ignore the extent to which, in contrast to
our prim decisions. the State is responsible for the 'vealth
discrimination in this instance. Griffin, Douglas, Williams, Tate, and our other prior cases have dealt with
discrimination on the basis of indigency which \vas attributable to the operation of the private sector. But
we have no such simple de facto wealth discrimination
here. The means for financing public education in Texas
arc selected and specified by the State. It is the Sta.te
that has created local school districts, and tied educational funding to the local property tax and thereby to
local district wealth. At the same time, governmentally
imposed land usc controls have encouraged and rigidified
natural trends in the allocation of particular areas for
'' Inc!C'C'cl, thC' politirn l cl .iillru l liC'~ that HC'riouRh· di~acln1nl:t .g:c•d
farC' in :;C'rurin!); IC'gi~b I i1·r rrdrC'SR nrc au~mcntrd by the
f:trl tlwt little support i~ likC'I~· to be SC'rurcd from on l.1· milcH~·
di-<acl 1·:mta!);Nl di~t rirt~. Cf. Grau v. Sanders, 372 U. R. :3G~ (196~).
Src al'o n. 2, supm.

di~trirtH
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residential or commercial use,R2 and thus determined
each district's amount of taxable property wealth. In
short, this case in contrast to the Court's previous wealth
discrimination decisions, can only be seen as "unusual
in the extent to " ·hich govemmental action is the cause
of the wealth classification." 'a
In the final analysis, then. the invidious characteristics
of the group wealth classification present in this case only
serves to emphasize tfi:e need Tor careful judicial scrutiny
of the State's justifications for theresu1~distnct
discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded to
the school children of Texas.
D

The nature of our inquiry into the justifications for
state dis(;rillllnation Is essentially e same in air equal
protection cases: we must consider' the substantiality
of the state interests sought to be served, and we must
scrutinize the reasonableness of the means by which the
State has sought to advance its interests. See Police
Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U. S. 92,
95 ( 1972). Differences in the application of these tests
are, in my view, a function of the constitutional importance of the interests at stake and the invidiousness
of the particular classification. Thus, for instance, the
Court has required "a compelling governmental interest"
to justify discrimination affecting the constitutional right
to travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634
(1969). This is, I believe, essentia.lly an expression of

----

2
b SC'C' Texas Cities, Towns, & Villages Code Ann. §§ JOlla-lOllj.
See also, e. g., Skinner v. Reed, 265 S. W. 2d 850 (Tex:ls Civ. App.
1954); City of Corpus Christi v. Jou es, 144 8. W. 2d 388 (Texas
Civ. App. 1940).
f>a Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, - , 487 P. 2d 1241, - . 96
Cal. Hptr. 601, 614 (1971). See also Van Dusartz v. Ilatficld, 334
F. Sllpp. 870, 875-876 (Minn. 1971) .
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the Court's concern for the legitimacy of the asserted
state interests. When interests of constitutional importance are at stake, the Court does not stand ready to
credit the State's classification with any conceivable
legitimate purpose,R" but demands a clear showing that
there are in fact sub~antial, legitimate state interests
which the classification serve-s. BeyondtheState's purpose f~;-the classificatwl1,'the Court traditionally has become increasingly sensitive to the means by which- a
St~s to act as- its action affects more dir~ctly
interests0re011Stitutional significan~e.&8;e. g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1968). Thus, by now, "le~s
n~strictive alternatives" analysis is firmly established in
equal prote~tionjurisprudence. See Dunn V.Blumstein,
---.....;;--......_
.._
-~
405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621, 627 (1969). It seems to
me that the range of choice we are willing to accord the
State in selecting the means by which it will act and the
care with which we scrutinize the effectiveness of the
means which the State select:(~ust reflect the constitutional importance of the interest affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification. Here both
the nature of the interest and the classification dictate
1
close judicial scrutiny~£ thepurposes which Texas seeks
to serve with its present educational financing scheme
and of the means it has selected to serve that purpose.
The only justification offered by appellants to sustain
the discrTrllinahon in educational opportunity calJ§ed by
the exas financing scheme i~nal control. - Presented with this justification, the District Court concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to demon-

- .

'

l

Sec, e. g., Two Guys frorn Ilarrison-Allentown, Inc . v. McGinley,
:366 U.S. 5S2 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Gocsaert Y. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
1
' '
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strate compelling state interests for their classification
based on wealth, they fail even to establish a reasonable
basis for these classificatious." 337 F. Supp., at - .
I must agree with this conclusion.
- At the outs~ I do 110t question that local control of
public education. as an abstract matter, constitutes a
very snbstantial state interest. We observed only last
Term that " [ d] irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a. need strongly felt
in our society." Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporium, 407 U. S. 451 ( 1972). See also id., at 469
(BuRGER, C. J., dissenting). The State's interest in local
educational control-which certainly includes questions
of educational funding-has deep roots in the inherent
benefits of community support for public education.
Consequently, true state dedication to local control would
present, I think, a substantial justification to weigh
against simply interdistrict variations in the treatment
of a State's school children. But I need not now decide
how I might ultimately strike the balance ,,;ere \\'e confronted with a situation \Vhere the State's sincere concern for local control inevitably produced educational
inequality. For on this record, it is apparent that the )
State's puq1orted concern \Yith local control is offered
primarily as an excuse rather than as a justification for
interclistrict inequa.lfty.
~·ide laws regula.t e in fact the most
n~ detSt~a~blic ~· For example,
the State prescribes rcquifCCI courses. 8 " All textbooks
must be submitted for state a.pproval,~n and only approved textbooks may be used. 87 The State has estab~ r. Tc•xas Edur. Codr Ann. §§ 21.101-21.117. Criminal p<'n~dl i<':<
:11'<' pro,·idrd for f:!ilmr to trarh rrrlain n•quirrd rom:<r:<. !d.,
§§ 4.1.')-4.16.
M: /d., §§ 12.11-12.35.
1
'
I d., § 12.62.

~

¥-

~~~-e-v ~-~~

~~~

~~01~

~E-.,c..h-..._ ~ c'J....u~
£~~~

~~6-vv-~~

71-l:n2-DlSRENT (A)
SAN .\NTONTO SCHOOL DISTHICT v. RODRIGUEZ

57

lished the qualifications necessary for teaching in Texas
public schools and the procedures for obtaining certification." The State has even legislated on the length of
the school day.''' Texas' own courts have said:
"As a result of the acts of the Legislature our
school system is not of mere local concern but is
statewide. While a school district is local in territorial limits. it is an integral part of the vast
school system "·hich is coextensive with the confines of the State of Texas." Treadway v. Whitney
Independent School District, 205 8. W. 2d 97, 99
(Tex. Civil App. 1949).
See also El Dorado Independent School District v. Tisdale, 3 S. W. 2d 420, 422 (Tex. Comm. Civ. App. 1928).
Moreover, even if we accept Texas' general dedication
to local control in education matters, it is difficult to find
any evidence of such dedication with respect to fiscal
matters. It ignores reality to suggest-as the Court
docs, ante, at --that the local property tax • element of the Texas financing scheme reflects a conscious
legislative effort to provide school districts with local
fiscal control. If Texas had ~y~ truly d~d~ted
to local fiscal controTOiie would expect the quality of
- educational
--·------·~
-- -to
the
opportumty provided in each district
vary "'ith thedeciswn7tlwvoters in thatdistrict a;
to the
sacrifice they-w!sn to mai{e for public
educatiOn. tl1_.!act~ti1e1.'cxas scl1CJTI.e produces precisely the opposite result. Local school districts cannot
choose tohavethe oest education in the State by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the )
educational opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined by the amount of taxable

--

m

R8 fd.,

§~

13.ml-13.046.

""ld,§ ~

~~~~
~7

-

~
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property located in the district-a factor over \Yhich local
voters can exercise no control.
The study introduced in the District Court sho\Yecl a
direct inverse relationship behveen equalized taxable
district property "·ealth and district tax effort with the
result that the property poor districts making the highest
tax effort obtained the lowest per pupil yield.no The
implications of this situation for local choice is illustrated by again comparing the Edgewood and Alamo
Heights School Districts. In 1967-1968, Edgewood, after
contributing its share to the Local Fund Afl-signment,
raised only $26 per pupil through its local property tax,
whereas Alamo Heights was able to raise $333 per pupil.
Since the funds received through the Minimum Foundation School Program are to be used only for minimum
professional salaries, transportation costs, and operating
expenses, it is not hard to see the lack of local choice
with respect to higher teacher salaries to attract more
and better teachers, physical facilities, library books, and
facilities, special courses, or participation in special state
and federal matching funds programs under \-vhich a
property poor district such as Edgewood is forced to
labor.n In fact, because of the differences in taxable
local property wealth, Edgewood would have to tax
itself almost nine times as heavily to obtain the same
yield as Alamo Heights.n 2 At present, then, local control
is a myth for many of the local school districts in Texas.
As one district court has observed, "rather than reposing
in each school district the economic power to fix its own
level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so arranged
the structure as to guarantee that some districts will spend

·----

00

See App. II, infra.
See Affid:wit of Dr . .Jose CardenaR, Superiutenclcnt of Sc-hools,
Edgewood Independent School District, App., at 234-238.
v~ See App. IV, infra.
!Jt

'

.
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low [with high taxes] while others will spend high [with
low taxes]." Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870,
876 (Minn. 1971).
In my judgment, any substantial scrutiny of the operation of the Texas financing scheme reveals that the
State has selected means wholly inappropriate to secure
its purported interest in assuring its school districts local
fiscal control. At the same time, appellees have pointed
out a variety of alternative financing schemes ·which may
serve the State's purported interest in local control as
well, if not better, than the present scheme without the
current impairment of the educational opportunity of
vast numbers of Texas school children. 93 I see no need,
however, to explore the practical or constitutional merits
of those suggested alternatives at this time, for whatever
their positive or negative features, experience with the
present financing schem.e impugns any suggestion that
it constitutes a serious effort to provide local fiscal control. If, for the sake of local educational control, this
Court is to sustain interdistrict discrimination in the
educational opportunity afforded Texas school children,
it should require that the State present something more
than the mere sham now before us.

-------

III
In conclusion it is essential to recognize that an end to
the wide variations in taxable district property wealth
inherent in the Texas financing scheme would entail
none of the untoward consequences suggested by the
Court or by the appellants.
First, affirmance of the District Court's decisions would
hardly sound the death knell for local control of education. It would mean neither centralized decisionmaking
nor federal court intervention in the operation of public
""See n. 94, supra.
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schools. Clearly, this suit has nothing to do with local
decisionmaking with respect to educational policy or even
educational spending. It involves only a narrow aspect
of local control-namely, local control over educational
funding. In fact, in striking down interdistrict disparities in taxable local wealth, the District Court took
the course which is most likely to make true local control over educational decisionmaking a reality for all
Texas school districts.
Nor does the District Court's decision even necessarily
eliminate local control of educational funding. The District Comt struck down nothing more than the continued
interclistrict wealth discrimination inherent in the present
property tax. Both centralized and decentralized plans
for educational funding not involving such interdistrict
discrimination have been put forward. n·• The choice
'"' Crntrnlizrd rdurational financin!!: iH, lo hr ~urr, onr :iltrrnntiYr.
On :m n l~·;: i,.;, though. it i::; rlrnr that Pl·rn c<>ntralir.rd finnnrinl-': would
not drprin:• lorn! ~rhool di " trict~ of whnt hn ~ bern ron~idrrrd to hr
thr r;:,;rncr of !oral rducnt ional control. Scr Jl'rioht "· Cowu:il of

thr City of Em]Joriwn. 407 U. S. 451, 469 (1972)

(B u nc:~:n.

C . .T. ,

di""rn ting). C'rntral finnncing would lrnw in local hand ~ thr <·ntirr
gamut of lora! rducational polirYmnking-trnrhN", c·tnTirulum, "rhnol
.
I
.
fld~At~t•
I
.
I
. I
;: ttr~. t 1r rnt 1rr prorr~~ o A_l'l'fiomrr;: among a tcrnn t n·e ec urn t wna
oh,irrt i1·rs.
A ~rrond JlO "" ihilit~ · is thr much disru""rd thror~· of di;:trict poll'rr
t•qualir.ation put forth by Profrs"or Coons, Cl un e. nnd Snu:nrm:lll
in t hrir srminal work , Pri1·nt r Wrnlt h and Puhlie Erlnr:t t ion 201-242
(1!)70). Su ch n sc hrmc would trul~· rrfirct :1 dedieation to local fi scnl
eon trol. Under smh a ~~·strm, r:l('h school d i~t rirt wou ld rrrri 1·r a
fixrd amount of rrwnnr prr pupil for an~· part iculn r lr1·rl of t:n
r!Tort rrgnrcllrR,.: of thr lrl'r! of local proprrt~· tax hnsr. A11prllants
critirizr this srhrmr on thr rathrr rxtr:wrdinnr~· ground th;lt it would
c•nc·ouragr poorrr di~triet~ to o1·rrtax thrmsrll'r~ in ordrr to oht:tin
suhst nntinl rrYcmtr,.; for rdurat ion. Bnt undrr t hr ptwrnt di~rrimi
nator~ · srhrmr, it i ~ thr poor dist riet s who nrr clrnrl~· t:txing thrmsrh ·e,, :tt t hr highrst rate~. yet :trr recri 1·ing t hr lowr"t rrt urns.
Distrirt wrnlt h rrapportionmt>nt is yrt nnot hrr nlt Nn:rt i1·r which
would accompl i ~ h clirrrtl~· r~~rn tially what dist riet powrr equ:tl izn-
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among these or other alternatives remains with the State,
not with the federal courts. In thil regard, it should be
evident that the degree of federal intervention in matters
of local concern would be substantially less in this context than in previous decisions in which we have been
asked effectively to impose a particular scheme upon the
States under the guise of the Equal Protection Clause.
SeE', e. g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970);
cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
Still, we are told that this case requires us "to condemn
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests." Ante, at --. Yet no one in
the course of this entire litigation has ever questioned the
constitutionality of the local property tax as a device
for raising educational funds. The District Court's decision, at most, restricts the power of the State to make
educational funaing dependent exclusively upon local
~ty taxa.tio_g so long as thC're exists interdistrict
disparities in taxable property wealth. But it hardly
eliminates tne locilproperty tax
a source of educa-

as

1io11 "·oulcl srck to do artificially. Apprllant" rhim th:1t tlw enlrulat ions concerning ~t atr property rcqnirrd by such :1 sr·hrme would
br im]1o~:,;ible as a prarticfll mflttrr. Yet Trxa:,; is alrrad~· mt1king
far more romplrx annual calculntiom;-invol\'ing not only local
proprrt~· Yalues but also lorn] income nnd other economic fact or~
in conjunction with the Lorn! Fund A8signmrnt portion of thr Minimum Founclat ion School Program. Srr V Texas Go,·ernor's Committrr Report 43-44.
A fourth possibility would br to remoYe commrrrinl, inclust rinl,
and mineral proper!~' from local tnx rolls, to tax this property on a
stat r-wiclr bnsi~, and to rrturn the resulting reYrnues to thr local
di~t rirts in a fashion that \Yould compen~ate for remnining n11"int ions in the locnl tax bases.
Konc of these pnrtirnlar alternntive~ are nrrr~~~ril~· ron~titu
tionflll~· romprllrd: rnther, they indicate thr breadth of rhoice which
rrmnins to the State if the pre.-ent wraith discrimination wrrc('] iminatrd.
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tional funding or a means of providing local fiscal
controP 5
The Court seeks solace for its action today in the possibility of legislative reform. The Court's suggestions
of legislative redress and experimentation will doubtless
be of great comfort to the school children of Texas' disadvantage<IdistrictS;-but considering the vested interests
of wealthy school districts in the preservation of the
status quo, they are worth little more. The possibility
of legislative action is, in all events, no answer to this
Court's duty under the Constitution to eliminate unjustified state discrimination. In this case we have been
presented with an instance of such discrimination, in a
particularly invidious form, against an individual interest of large constitutional and practical importance. To
support the demonstrated discrimination in the provision
of educational opportunity the State has offered a justification which, on analysis, takes on at best an ephemeral
character. Thus, I believe that the wide disparities in
taxable district property wealth inherent in the local
property tax element of the Texas financing scheme render
that scheme violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 9 a
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District
Court.

See n. 94, supra.
Of course, nothing in the Court's decision today should inhibit
further review of state educational funding schemes under state conMich. - , stitutional provisions. See Milliken v. Green, N. W. 2d - -(1972); cf. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cnl. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
!Jc.
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OF MARSHALL, J., DISSEXTIXG

XAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS
PERTY VALUES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS·*

$856
610

Total Revenues
Per Pupil
(State-LocalFederal, Column;:;
1, 2 and 4)

66
529

$ 41

544
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546

Federal
Revenues
Per Pupil
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484
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135

State and Local
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1 and 2)

5
305

5

venue,;
upil

3

arch Corporation, Syracuse, "N. Y.
exas School Districts from data for the 1967-1968 school year.
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APPENDIX II TO OPINIO~ OF MARSHALL, J.,
DISSENTING
TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY
EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES, EQUALIZED TAX RATES, AND YIELD OF RATES*
CATEGORIERl
i\Tnrkrt VnlttP of
Taxnble Property
Prr Pupil

Above $100,000
( 10 Districts)
$100,000-$50,000
( 26 Districts)
$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
(40 Districts)
Below $10,000
(4 Districts)

EQUALIZED
TAX
HATES
ON 8100

YIELD PElt PUPIL
(Eqttalizrd Rate
Applied to District
Market V~tluc)

$ .31

$585

.38

262

.55

213

.72

162

.70

60

·>:·Sonrce: Policy Institute, Syrnrusc UniYcrsity Rcscnrrh Corporation, 8~-rn-rusc, N. Y.
t Prrpared on the b::tf'is of n, ~arnplr of 110 selected TPxns School
Districts from data for thr 1967-196S school yrn,r. Ba.<cd on Table
H to a.ffidn-\·it of .Toe! S. Berkr, App., at 205.
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47

ll<jo
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\Yith Emergency Permits 5
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1,516
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3,098
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4.00
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APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J.,
DISSENTING
BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS
RANKED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUE
AND TAX RATE REQUIRED TO GENERATE
HIGHEST YIELD IN ALL DISTRICTS*
Di~trirts

Ranked from
High to Low l\larket
Valuation Per PupiH

ALAMO HEIGHTS
JUDSON
EAST CENTRAL
NORTH EAST
SOMERSET
SAN ANTONIO
NORTH SIDE
SOUTH WEST
SOUTH SIDE
HARLAND ALE
SOUTH SAN ANTONIO
EDGEWOOD

Tax Rate Per $100
Nrcclrcl to Equal
Highr~t Yield

$ .68
1.04
1.17
1.21
1.32
1.56
1.65
2.10
3.03
3.20
5.77
5.76

-r.·Policy Institute, Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syracuse, New York.
t Prepared on the basis of the 12 school districts located in Bexar
County, Texas, from data from the 1967-1968 school ymr.
Based on Table IX to Affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App., at 218.
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REPORT OF THE SUB- CO M MITTEE TO
THE SCHOOL DIVISION CRITERI A STUDY COMMISSION

Thi s re port i s submitte d by the School Division Crite ria Study Commi ssion,
established by the 1972 Gen e ral Assembly, in complianc e with the Genera l
Ass e mbly's r e quest "to study and dete rmine reasonabl e conditions and criteria
which should b e set by the General Assembly for use by the Boa rd of Education
in dividing the State into school divisions, to the end that the size and composition of such school divisions will, in compliance with the Constitution,
promote the reali z ation of quality education for th e school children of the
Commonwealth." It is not yet possible to evaluate the imp a ct of the Se rrano
vs. Pri e st and Rodriquez vs. San Antonio class action suits and of the Richmond
consolidation case on the organizational patterns of public education, nor is
it yet possible to evaluate progress toward achievement of the "Standards of
Quality and Objectives for Public Schools in Virginia, 1972-7 4" because these
new requirements became effective July 1, 197 2, and implementation is just
beginning.

Therefore, this report deals with four factors considered by educa-

tors to be important considerations in determining the minimum size at which a
local school administrative unit is capable of providing a quality educational
program.

Implications for Virginia conclude this report.

The strengthening of Virginia's public education program through the consolidation of small schools was begun in 1918 as one of s e veral reform measures
of State Supe rintend e nt of Public Instruction, Harris H. Hart.

During World

War II and the postwar years, school consolidation was accelerated because of

•

>

-2 -

ma t e ri a l a nd manpower shortage s.

By 19 57, the nu mb er of Vi rgini a hi g h schools

wit h fe we r tha n s e v e n t eache rs ha d b een re duc e d from 340 i n 1940 a nd 173 in 1950
to 39. 1
The tre nd toward fewer schools and larg e r enrollme nt pe r s c hool has been
accomp a nied by a national movement toward the consolidation or re organization
of loc a l school administrative units for the purpose of forming units which can
provide comprehe nsive educational programs, efficient administration, and
adequate supervision.

In 1947-48, there were 94,926 local school divisions

2

and during the period of 1966 to 1970, the national total of local school administrative units was reduced from 23,464 to 17,995 (23%).

In 1970, the number

of divisions per state ranged from 1 (Hawaii) to 1, 665 (Nebraska).
strong evidence to indicate that the number of individual
units in the United States are continuing to decrease.

3

There is

admi~i.strative

school

Some educators indicate

that the number will drop to 10,000 and a few go so far as to predict a figure
as low as 5,000.
As a result of the large number of consolidations, an extensive background
of literature concerning guidelines for establishing optimally-sized local school
administrative units has been created.
opinions in four critical areas:

The following sections discuss consensus

(1) the desired educational program and its

1 EDUCATION IN THE STATES: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND OUTLOOK, National
EducationAssociation, 1969, p. 1296.
2 Local school administrative units are referred to generally as divisions in Virginia
whereas generally throughout the country the word district is used.
3 STATISTICS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, National Center for Educational Statistics,
U.S. Office of Education, 1971, pp. 12-13.

'·
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relationship to the numbe r of pupils in a school district, (2) ava.ilabl e financial
resources, (3) the geography of the area und e r consideration in relation to transportation and population d e nsity, and (4) a subjective decision regarding the
feasibility of reorganization in terms of the climate of opinion and general
attitudes of the people involved.

(l) Educational Program
The literature shows that a small school division is unable to provide a comprehensive articulated educational program, K-12, with adequate opportunities
for special, vocational, and continuing education.

4

There is no uniform agree-

ment among even so-called experts concerning the accepted optimum size of a
school or school division. However, there are general ranges within which most

4

Charles F. Faber summarizes individual reports in his article, "The Size of a
School District" (PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 1966, pp. 33-35), including the following
items. The Forty-Fourth Year Book (Part II, "Structural Reorganization," 1945,
p. 304) of the National Society for the Study of Education states that "The significance of the inadequate local school unit as a retarding factor in limiting
educational progress has probably never been fully appreciated." The Committee
for the White House Conference on Education (1956, pp. 14-22) reported that the
shortage of well-qualified teachers is most keenly felt by small districts where
teaching loads tend to be heavier and equipment is less satisfactory than in
larger, better-organized districts. A study reported by the National Conference
of Professors of Educational Administration (Problems and Issues in School Finance,
Columbia University, 1952, p. 73) revealed that very small districts frequently
lack adequate lay and professional leadership and that an inverse relationship
exists between enrollment and cost per pupil. C. F. Faber ("Measuring School
District Quality," American School Board Journal, October 1964, pp. 12-13)
assessed 35 school districts on the basis of 15 measures of quality and found
a high relationship between quality and enrollment.
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educ ators tend to agree.

A summary of the present thinking is given in

Public Sc hool Administration by Griede,r, Pierce and Jordan .

Thirty or forty ye ars ago a total enrollment of two thou sand
pupils in Grades 1-12 was quite acceptable; tens of thousands
of districts did not have that many. Since , 19 3 4, however ,
when Howard Dawson published his pioneer study, Satisfactory
Local School Units, the acceptable minimum has risen continuously. In 1950, five thousand was wide ly used as a
standard; by 1960 the figures had changed to 10,000 to
15,000; in the mid-1960's the Illinois Task Force cited
earlier recommended 25,000 to 30, 000; and Benson suggested
6 0 0 0 0 to 7 0 0 0 0
1

I

o

In the judgment of the authors, when school district enrollment
passes the 50,000 mark, administrative and instructional problems become unwieldy and their complexity increases faster
than enrollment. 5
·
In determining the size of the local school division, it is important to look at
,-

the distribution of the pupil population in determining the size of individual schools.
For example, at the elementary school level, the minimum figure that most educators
agree on is 150 to 175 pupils in grades one through six with about 25 to 30 pupils
per grade.

Most educators would prefer to have at least two sections of each grade

and three or four would be considered better.

Maximum enrollment of some 600 to

700 pupils is considered ideal for an elementary school. Applying this formula at
the primary level, grades one through 4, the enrollment would be approximately 400
pupils. At the junior high and middle school level, the suggested range extends

5

Calvin Grieder, Truman M. Pierce and K. Forbis Jordan, Public School Administration,
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1969), pp. 19-22.

-5from 500 to a maximum of l, 200, and for the senior high schools the suggested
range is from about 600 to 2, 000.
While even the smallest of high schools provides instruction in English,
mathematics, science, and social studies, the program is quite limited in many
schools.

The programs in most small schools are not substantially expanded

beyond the minimum requirements established by the State Board of Education
for graduation.

Courses in art, music, industrial arts, vocational education,

etc. , are seldom offered in schools which enroll fewer than 500 pupils.

The

offerings in many areas do not increase significantly until enrollment reaches
1,000.

6

Conant has suggested that a minimum of no fewer than 100 students in the
graduating class is needed in order to offer an adequate program, implying an
administrative unit of from 1, 500 to 2, 000 pupils. 7 Faber states that "although
an enrollment of about 2, 000 might be sufficient for the offering of a good
instructional program, most authorities regard it as being much too small to
8
enable a district to provide the full range of needed educational services. " A

6 The Division of Education Research and Statistics, Virginia Department of
Education, surveyed school size and the relationship between size and course
offerings in Virginia and the South in 1967-68.
7

James B. Conant, THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL TODAY, 1959, p. 77.

8 Faber (1966), op cit.
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study of administrative and supervisory services and cost per pupil l ed Dawson
to suggest an optimum size of 9, 800 to 12,000 pupils and 280 t eaching units.

9

Although Cook said that 46 teachers is an absolute minimum, she implied that
this would be an inefficient, undesirable arrangement, preferring a district of
10,000 to 12,000 pupils, which would enable more efficient us e of supervisory
personnel, librarians, nurses, et cetera. 10
The literature does not deal as extensively with a maximum size desirable
for school divisions.

Swanson finds a strong positive relationship between

population and quality up to 20,000, a leveling off and a gradual decline in
quality as population went above SO, 000. ll Because very large school administrative units--those containing a total pupil population in excess of 100,000-are often beset by lack of public support, Mort and Reusser suggest that natural
communities be identified within the large city and that these areas be established as independent districts in order to decentralize the system and increase
citizen interest, participation, and control.

12

Bell and Green describe

9Howard A. Dawson, SATISFACTORY LOCAL SCHOOL UNITS, Field Study No. 7,
George Peabody College for Teachers, 1934.
10Katherine M. Cook (ed.), REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL UNITS, U.S. Office
of Education, Bulletin No. 15, 1936.
llArthur D. Swanson, "Relations Between Community Size and School Quality,"
Institute of Administrative Research, RESEARCH BULLETIN, October, 1961, pp. 1-3.
12 Paul R. Mort and Walter C. Reusser, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, Second Edition,
1951, pp. 92-93.
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the division of Chicago into 16 sub-districts, eac h serving about 20, 000 pupils,
in an effort to bring the democratic and personal advantages of the smaller
school system to the teache rs and pupils of a large city. 13
has reduced the sizable literature concerning

enrollm~nt

Michael E. Hickey

recommendations to a

table presented as Exhibit 1 in the addendum at the end of this report.

(2)

Financial Resources

-

It is difficult to establish a minimum expenditure necessary to provide the
d~sired

quality educational program.

---

The outcome of class action suits presently

under appeal (Serrano vs. Priest, Rodriquez vs. San Antonio) may require extensive
changes in the funding patterns for public education. Any functional discussion of
this aspect of school district organization should be based on the results of these
important cases. We will have more to say on the subject of finances under the
Implications for Virginia.
different states.
for schools.

(3)

Exhibit 2 shows the pattern of state support among the

Exhibit 3 gives some indications of the wide range of state support

Both of these exhibits can be found in the addendum of this report.

Geography
The transportation of students for long distances in rural areas or for long

periods of time through metropolitan areas or mountainous terrain is an important
limitation in the reorganization of school divisions. Travel for supervisory 1 administrative, and maintenance personnel should also be considered.

l3 John W. Bell and ArthurS. Green, "Why Not Vertical Administration?"
AMERICAN SCHOOL BOARD JOURNAL, December, 1957 1 pp. 25-26.

1
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School faciliti es should be centrally lo ca ted with respect to u nit popul ation.
Pre s e nt re commenda tions of the Virgini a De partm e nt of Educ a tion's Divi s ion of
Pupil Tra nsporta tion i ndic a t e that 29 mil e s per one way pupil trip is a max imum
dista nce feasibl e . At a sta nda rd rate of 3 minute s per mile , a trip of 29 mil e s
is roughly one and one-half hours long.

In areas where popul a tion is quite scattere d,

or wh e re a natural geographical barrier makes centralization difficult, some states
are using interme diate administrative units within adivision which permit economies
while limiting long or dangerous travel.
The generally accepted standards related to pupil transportation suggest that the
maximum walking distance for elementary school childre n is generally s e t at

l/ 2

to 3/4 of a mile one way; for junior high school students, 1 1/2 miles; and for
senior high school students, 2 miles.

These figures, of course, could be greatly

affected by road and traffic conditions in terms of safety and feasibility.

Where

transportation is furnished, the maximum time for travel for elementary pupils one
way is generally considered to be 45 minutes and for secondary pupils one hour.
Local conditions have to be given consideration in applying these criteria.

(4) Feasibility
A subjective judgment concerning the feasibility of the consolidation or reorganization plan must be made by administrative and planning personne l in order
to ensure effective implementation.

There is often a considerable amount of

opposition to change in administrative units.

There are a number of reasons for

opposition, including the following listed by M. E. Hickey:
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l. General antipathy toward change.
2. Misunderstanding, or lack of understanding of
the purpose of the reogranization.
3. Fear that reorganization will result in centralization
of government control.
4. Feelings that the organization of school districts is
a matter of local concern--despite the fact that a
large portion of funds are provided by the State. 14
In surveying Wisconsin superintendents regarding redistricting, T. J. Jensen
found the major problems to be (a) educating the general public, (b) transporting
students, (c) fear of losing local representation, (d) changing taxes, and (e)
concerns over new building needs. 15

IMPLICATIONS FOR VIRGINIA
Available data pertaining to the foregoing discussion of factors influencing the
determination of school division size are presented summarily in the following
sections.

(l) Educational Program
Virginia is in the initial stages of implementing the

11

Standards of Quality and

Objectives for Public Schools, 1972-74," passed into law by the 1972 General
Assembly.

These standards and objectives are expected to have great influence

in shaping the development of Virginia's educational program.

The scope of the

proposed programs would seem to suggest that some reorganization should be
considered.

14 Hickey, op cit~~ pp. 12-13.
15 T. J. Jensen, "Public Opinion Factors in School District Reorganization,
unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1952.

11

...
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Table 1, located in the Addendum, shows the ranking of school divisions in
Virginia by size.

It will be noted that only one school system extends an enroll-

ment beyond the usual SO, 000 to 7 S, 000 pupil range that is suggested by most
authorities.

This school division is Fairfax County with over 140,000 pupils.

Some educators would agree that a school system with this many pupils would
need to be divided into sub-administrative units, which Fairfax County has done.
Other school divisions that exceed SO, 000 pupils, depending to some extent on
geography, might wish to consider the advantages of a sub-district plan.
The major problem that still exists in Virginia is the number of ve1y small
divisions (54) with a pupil population of less than 3, 000, and another 57 school
divisions in the range of 3, 001 to 10,000 pupils.

These figures suggest the

magnitude of the consolidation problem that faces Virginia if ea..Gh school division ·in the State is to have enough pupils to provide a reasonably effective and
comprehensive program at a reasonable cost. If the most generally accepted
figure of 10,000 pupils were accepted as a desirable goal, this would mean that
111 local school divisions would be affected.

And even if we accept a figure of

3, 000 as an intermediate goal, the magnitude of the problem is still very great.
Exhibit 4 in the Addendum shows the number of public secondary, elementary,
and combined schools in 1970-71 according to average daily membership (ADM)
and number of teaching positions.
Table 2 shows the number of school divisions with respect to student enrollment
and number of teaching positions referred to in the first section of this report.
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(2) Financial Resources ·
A total of $7 47 1473 1338 was spent for the operation of public schools in
Virginia during the 1970-71 school year.

The sources of these funds were as

follows:
Local

$40619891400

(54%)

State

25212511071

(34%)

88,232,867

(12%)

Federal

$74714731338
The average cost per pupil in average daily attendance (ADA) for the State
during 1970-71 was $784 1 compared with a national average of $868.

In 1970

Virginia ranked 29th among the states in the average cost per pupil in ADA.
Exhibit 5 shows a ranking of states by cost per pupil.
Exhibit 6 shows shows the comparable figures for the individual school divisions
in Virginia.

Careful consideration should be given to this exhibit for it dramatically

emphasizes one of the problems facing Virginia in providing anywhere near equal
educational opportunities for all of its pupils.

For example 1 the total cost per

pupil in average daily attendance for 1970-71 ranges from a low of $516 to a
high of $1318.

Just as dramatic is the range of local expenditures per pupil in

average daily attendance which ranges from a low of $153 to a high of $1001.

(3) Geography
Geography 1 population density 1 and natural barriers are an important con-
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sideration in determining boundary lines for specific school divisions.

It is

difficult to suggest specific distances that are acceptable and which would
apply with equal validity throughout the State.

For example, extraordinary

conditions exist in Highland and Bath counties where the combined total
school enrollment in 1970-71 was I, 777 and the total land area was 1, 743
square miles.
Exhibit 6 shows pupil transportation figures for Virginia by division for 1970'll.

Exhibit 7 gives the ranking of Virginia among the states by percent of
expenditure spent for transportation and the average cost of transportation per
pupil.
Improved road conditions have removed one of the barriers to effective
consolidation.

(4) Feasibility
The real job of the Committee will be to review the criteria dealing with
division size as it relates to the number of pupils, the financial resources,
and geography with proper consideration to population density 1 distances 1
and natural barriers.

The factors that were reviewed under this heading

earlier in this report need to be applied specifically to each area that is
proposed as an independent administrative unit. Virginia has not had the
great proliferation of administrative units that reached into the thousands
as was true of some states.

However 1 as the figures indicate 1 we have a

serious problem of local division size that must be approached with both

-13boldness and discretion.
The sub-commiteee of the School Division Criteria Study Commission
has reviewed the literature and practices that relate to our assignment.

On

the basis of these findings 1 the sub-committee has identified four broad areas
generally recognized as being worthy of consideration out of which specific
criteria will have to be developed.

These four broad areas include:

1.

Educational Program which has a direct relationship to
the number of pupils in a given school division

2.

Financial Resources

3.

Geography

4.

Feasibility

Attention is called to additional supporting data that appears in the
Addendum to this report.
Respectfully submitted 1
Hillary H. Jones 1 Jr.
Ray E. Reid
(Mrs.) Katherine L. Goolsby
Staff Attorney
H. I. Willett
Chairman

October 3
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Michael E. Hickey, "Optimum School District Size," ERIC Clearinghouse
on Educational Administration, University of Oregon, December, 1969, p. 30.
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Exhibit 3
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF EDUCATION
Percentage of School Support from Local ,and County, State,
and Federal Sources, 1929-30 to 1967-68

Year

Local and County

State

Federal

1929=1930

82.7

16.9

0.4

1937-1938

69.3

29.5

1.2

1945-1946

63.8

34.8

1.·4

1953-1954

56.0

41.4

2.6

1961-1962

56.7

38.9

4.4

52.0

40.0

8.0

1967-1968

(est.)

Source: Various statistical reports published by the U.S. Office of Education.
The NEA Research publishes useful "Estimates of School Statistics" annually.

Copied in full from Public School Administration by Grieder, Pierce and Jordan
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Table 1
Ranking of School Divisions by Size Within Four Cate gories
With Numbe r of High Schools and Graduates
1970-71
Categories:

Small Systems

1

Small (1-3 0 0 0 students)
Medium (3 1001-10 1000 students)
Optimum (1 0 1 001-25 1 000 students)
Large (25 1 001 or more students)
1

Enrollment

No. of High Schools

No. of Graduates

Abingdon

11025

NA

NA

Amelia

11884

1

73

Appomatox

21313

1

109

Bath

11213

1

62

Bland

11123

2

74

Buckingham

21770

1

Buena Vista

1,554

1

90

393

NA

NA

Charles City

1,916

1

83

Clarke

11892

1

87

Clifton Forge

1,244

1

75

584

NA

NA

2,291

1

111

800

1

40

Cumberland

1,621

1

57

Essex

1,883

1

90

Cape Charles

Co10nial Beach
Covington
Craig

,

-

132
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Small Systems continued

Small Systems

Enrollment

No. of High Schools

No. of Graduates

Floyd

2,183

1

135

Fluvanna

2,056

1

87

Falls Church

2,090

1

148

Franklin City

2,271

1

118

Fredericksburg

2,795

1

171

570

1

55

Galax

1,591

1

126

Goochland

2,573

1

98

Grayson

2,603

3

159

Greene

1,324

1

55

Harrisonburg

2,713

1

140

564

1

42

King George

2,188

1

99

King and Queen

1,108

1

51

King William

1,367

2

118

Lancaster

2,103

1

111

Lexington

1,200

1

136

Lunenburg

2,846

1

147

Madison

2,103

1

87

Mathews

1,394

1

69

Fries

Highland
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Small Sys t em s continu ed

Sma ll Sy ste ms

]::nrollme nt

No. of High Sc hools

No. of Gra duates

Middl esex

1,410

l

80

Nelson

2,961

l

14 4

New Ke nt

1,402

l

77

Northumberland

21117

l

133

Norton

1,334

l

78

Poquoson

1,489

NA

Powhata n

1,573

l

65

Princ e Edward

1,888

l

77

Radford

2,250

l

130

Rappahannock

1,234

l

40

Richmond County

1,613

l

82

NA

,-

931

NA

NA

South Boston

1,638

NA

NA

Suffolk

2,126

l

139

Surry

1,325

l

53

Westmoreland

2,586

2

153

West Point

754

NA

NA

Winchester

2,903

1

197

Saltville

Total small districts: 54
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Medium Systems

Medium Systems

Enrollment

No. of High Schools

No. of Graduates

Accomack

6,462

6

353

Albemarle

8,833

1

435

Alleghany

3,269

1

176

Amherst

5,375

1

248

Bedford

8,282

2

457

Botetourt

4,610

2

241

Bristol

3,523

1

200

Brunswick

3,666

1

192

Buchanan

9,891

5

343

Caroline

3,689

2

175

Carroll

5,334

1

270

Charlotte

3,045

1

167

Charlottesville

7,475

1

349

Colonial Heights

3,902

1

245

Culpeper

4,657

1

201

Dickinson

4, 684

3

226

Dinwiddie

5,731

1

243

Fauquier

7,076

1

292

Franklin

6,951

1

352

Frederick

7,609

1

365

-21-

Medium Systems continued

Medium Systems

Enrollment

No. of High Schools

No. of Graduates

Giles

4,063

2

266

Gloucester

3,233

1

149

Greensville

3,807

1

199

Halifax

7,790

1

495

Hanover

9,676

2

483

Hopewell

5,726

1

281

Isle of Wight

4,817

2

213

Lee

5,224

6

248

Louisa

3,858

1

154

Martinsville

4,715

1

Mecklenburg

7,017

2

374

Montgomery

8,600

4

473

Nansemond

9,591

3

520

Northampton

3,296

2

207

Nottoway

3,242

1

154

Orange

3,582

1

153

Page

3,807

2

149

Petersburg

8,857

1

423

Patrick

3,537

1

176

Prince George

6,367

1

261

Pulaski

7,271

2

389

~

-

270

-22-

Me diu m Sys; t e ms continued

M e dium Sys t em s .

Enrollm e nt

No. o f High Schools

No. of Gra dua tes

Rockbridge

4,142

2

170

Russ e ll

6,72 4

4

297

Scott

5,739

3

328

She nandoah

5,260

3

290

Smyth

6,532

4

390

Southampton

4,524

1

173

Spotsylvania

4,663

1

192

Stafford

6,589

1

296

Sussex

3,143

1

134

Staunton

4,721

l

287

Warren

3,680

l

213

Washington

9,354

4

530

Waynesboro

4,289

1

225

Williamsburg

4,716

1

242

Wythe

5,284

3

308

York

8,953

2

537

Tota l me dium districts: 57

...

.
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Optimally-Sized Systems

Optimally-Sized
Systems

Enrollment

Al exandria

18,892

Augusta

i

No. of High Schools

No. of Graduates

3

873

10,773

5

595

Campbell

10,8 40

4

566

Danvill e

10,280

1

477

Henry

13,354

4

638

Loudoun

10,409

3

491

Lynchburg

12,040

1

576

Pittsylvania

15,597

4

801

Roanoke City

20,046

4

1,237

Roanoke County

22,625

5

1,130

Rockingham

11, 12 4

4

544

Tazewell

11, 247

4

644

9,870

6

481

Wis e

Total optimally-sized districts:

13
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Large Syste ms

Large Systems

Enrollm e nt

No. of High Schools

No. of Graduates

Arlington

26,444

3

1,664

Chesapeake

26,492

6

1,463

Chesterfield

25,493

6

1,242

141,270

19

8,560

Hampton

34,306

4

1,667

Henrico

35,654

6

2,114

Newport News

33,900

6

1,713

Norfolk

58,610

5

2,415

Portsmouth

27,847

4

1,249

Prince William

33,019

5

Richmond City

50,339

7

2,027

Virginia Beach

48,779

6

2,252

Fairfax

,-

1,229

Total Large Districts: 12

Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent, Virginia Department of Education,
1970-71, pp. 63-86,294-299.
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Exhibit 4

TABLE 57A-NU!\IBER OF IIIGFI SCIIOOLS ACCORDING TO
AVERAGE DAILY ME!\1BEllSHIP AND NUMBER OF
TEACHING POSITIO:-..'S-1\170-1971
.An:tuoz
D.mT
M EIIBE!\3111P

1-99.......
100-190 ....•.
.....
30()-539......
60()-809......
G00-1199 . .. . .
120()-1409 . . .. .
15oo-17oo .....
ISOG-2090... . .
2100-2399.. ...
2-100 or more.. .
200-2~J.

! Oil or

1-9
10- 19 20-29 31}-39 40-19 51}-59 60 -GO
Tchrs. Tchro. Tchrn. Tchrn. Tchr3. Tcbrn . Tcl.n

2
1 ... .. ..
1 . . . . . . . . .. . . • .
.•... ...• .... .... ...•. .... . ...•... •. ···• • ·
.......
G
2 . . . • . • . . . •• . • • . •• • •• .
.......
9
4G
17
3 . •. . . . .
. . . • . . . . . . •. . .
1
35
29
10
. . .. . . . . .. .. .• . . . .• .• . ... . ..
10
24
. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . • . . . • . . • . . • •
3
. • . .. . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . .
. • • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . • . . . . . . • . . . •• . . . • . . • . .
. . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • . . .

71}-70
Tcbrs.

81}-Sg 90- 99 ~!ore
Tchrn. Tc!l.r.1. Tchr•.

....... ....... ....... ... ....
.. .•. .•..•••. •. ...• •... . •. . .
. • . • • •• . • . . • . . , •• •• • . . • . • • . .
. • . • . . . . . . . . . . . •• . . • . • • . • . • .
. . ••. . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . • . . . •. . .
4
1
1 .•.....
12
s
1l
4
1
2
11
7
. . . . . •• . . . . . . .
1
6
. •. . . •• . . . • . •. . . . . . . • . . . . . . .

. . . • . . • . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . •• . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .

2

Tot.nl ••••.

54

1G

42

37

17

11

24

17

Totll

.. . . .. .
4
. ... •.. . ·•...•.•
. . ••. . .
8
. . . •. •.
75
. . ..•..
76
1
41
. . . . •. .
33
s
2a
10
17
11
11
4

4

31

300

TABLE 57B-NUMBER OF COMBINED SCHOOLS ACCORDING
TO AVERAGE DAILY MEMBERSHIP AND NUW3ER OF
TEACHING POSITIONS-1970-1971

-

AVI!R.\OE D.\tLT .
ME~B ERSH IP

1~9 .•••••••••••
60-99 .••••..••••.
100-149 .•• ••• .••••

150-199 ••..•••..•.

200-299••....•.•••
300 -399 .. .••• • ••.•
•oo-599 .•••.••••••
£0()-799 •••••••...•

One
Tchr.

50 or

'l'hree Four
5-9
IG-19 2()-29 3()-39 41}-49 More Tot:~!__ ,
Tchrs. Tchrs. Tchrs. Tchrn. Tclu s. Tchrn. Tcb..-s. 'l'c~. Tchrs.

Two

1

2

. 3 ..... i.

::::::: ::::::: ::::::: :::::::
4
.... T ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: .... T .... T ::::::: ::::::: :: ::: :: :: ::::: ...... 3
. ..•..• . ..•... ··· · · ·· ... ....
3
· ·•···· ·· ······· ··.······ ···· · ···• ··
. . . • . . . . . • . • • . . . . • . . . . .• . . . . . .. • . . .

3 .............. · ···· · · ···•···
7
8
1 .•............
1

18

. • • . • . • . • • • • •• . . • • . .• . •. • • .• . • • • . • • . • • .• • .
2
800-999 . ••.•....•. . • . • . • • . • . • . •• . . . . • . . . . • • • • . • • • . . . . . •• • . . • . • • • • . •

13
13

2
8

1

13

1000-1999 .• • ••.••.• . . . . . . • . . • . . • • . • . . • • • . . . . . •• . • • • . • . . . • . • . • . . • • • . . . . • . . • .
3
1200 or more . •• •.••• .• ••.•• ••••••• . .. .... .•.•••• . •••••• ••. • •• • .•••••• .••• .• • . • •••••

Total .•...•.•..

1 .•....... •. .. .

8

28

13

33

6

Uf
34

2
12
25

28
31

3G

36

75

ISS

23

.

TABLE 570-NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY SCIIOOLS ACCORDING
TO AVERAGE DAILY ME<VII3ERSHIP AND NUMBER
OF TEACHING POSITIONS-1970-1971
An:RAOE D~ILT
Mt>IDEMUIP

One
Tcbr.

50 or
Two Three Four
6-9
10- 19 2()-29 30- 39 40--19 More To:al
Tchr3. Tcbr3. Tchrs. Tchrs. Tcbr.J. Tchrs. Tchn. Tchrs. Tchrs.

..... f

1-24 .••• ··•·••·•

I

1 . ....

25-19 .•••.••. • •••
3 .... i9" .. .. ii;"
5()-99 ..•••••..••.
2
1t
100-149 .••.••••••• . . . • • • • • • . . . . •
)5()-19~ •.••••••••• ••••··• .•.••••.••.•.• ·••••••

20()-299 .•••••••.•• . • • • . • . . . . •. .• . • . • . . • . . • • . . .
. •••••• . •. . • . • . •. •. •. . • . . . . •

300-399 ..•••.•••••
400-599 ••••••••.••
fi00-i9V .••••••••••
800-99~ . .•••.•••.•

Source:

11

:lo

-!. • •• •••• ••• ••••• • • • ••• • • •• •••

59
57
1

12 .••••.•.•••.••.••••.•.••.•••
123
3 ...•.•..•..•...••...•
IS3
8 .•.••...•.••.• . ..•..•

. . . • . • • . • . • • • . . . • . •• • . • . • . . • . • • . • • •

. •. . . . •
. • • • . ••
100(H199 .; ••••• .-•• . . • • • . •
)2()()-1399 .• •••••••• .••.•.•
. 1400 or more •••• • ••• .......

Tol>l.. •••.•

............... .............. ..... . .
3

12 ·· ···;· ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: :::::::

... ...•
. • • • • ••
. ••. •. •
. •.•...

. . . •• . .
. •• • . . •
. . . ••. •
....•••

. • . • • •.
. . . . . ••
. •. •. ••
....••.

. . . . •. .
. • . • •. •
. • ••• . •
.•••••.

....... ··· ··:• .... ..........
7

22

31

16S

127

227

7 .•..•.• . • . ••..

. •. . . . •
193
53 ...•..•.•••...
. •• • • • .
9
7G
4
I
. •. •. . • . •. . . . •
12
12
1
.•••••. .•...•• .......
•
3
2
······· ···· ··· .... ...... ....
455

Annual Report of the Supe rintendent,
Education, 1970-71, p. 306.

410

11

l -IS

20

7

3
7
52
55
71

ISS

192
3G1

246
90
25

7
2
1300

Virginia Department of

.· .

-26Table 2

Summary of Virginia School Districts with Respect to
Student Enrollment and Teacher Positions
Total
Districts not having 11 600 enrollment
Districts employing less than 46 teachers

18

Districts enrolling between 1 600-3 1 000
Districts employing between 47-100 teachers

36
37

Districts enrolling between 1 1 600-9 799
Districts employing between 47-200 teachers

84
64

Districts enrolling between 9 1 800-12 1 000
Districts employing 201-300 teachers

10
20

Districts enrolling more than 12 000
Districts employing more than 300 teachers

18
46

6

1

1

1

Source:

"Facing Up:

19 70-71

1 "

Virginia Department of Education

1

197 2

1

pp. 31-35.
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121 - AVEilAGJ.:: COST OF
l'ORT:\TION PER PUPIL
PORH: D, 1%9-70
~

·.·

'

i
'

'

,.

l.
'" 2.

l\lontana
Alaslv1
3.
North Dakota
4.
Nebra ska
5.
Rhode Island
South Dakota
6.
7.
Wyoming
8. ·.Hawaii
9. Kansas
10.
Wisconsin
IL Iowa
12.
New Jersey
New MexiCo
New York
Colorado
Dr.! aware
Vermont
Washington
] 9.
;\ laryland
lllinois
20T 1\la~; sachusctts

l3l

15[

..'
•I

,.

-r;:

Oklahoma
23.[ Maine
Nevada
_,
25"[ Louisiana
West Virginia
27"[ Indiana
New llamp, ltirc
_29. [ Idaho
l\lir;ncsota
31. Pcnosylvania
32.
Missouri

1

UNITED STATES

!

..

33.
34.

Oregon
Connecticut
35.
Michigan
36.
Utah
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
40.
l\1ississi ppi
1-L
Arkansas
42.[ Ohio
T{'llllt'SSCe
44.
Texas
45.
Alabama
'16.
Vir[.,>inia
-1-7.
South Carolina
11l.
North Carolina
-1-9.
California
50.
Arizona

~7l

sl•1-7

'9'--"'-'
, 0'----SCI! 00 LS, 1 %.:.:

132
129
117
lU•l
102
101
90
87
83
80
75
70
70
66
66
66
66
64
61
61
61
60
60
59
59
56
56

6.'1.
6.3

lBl
22.

'"[

5.9
~.7

5.6
5.4

4.9
4.8
4.7
4.6

·t6
4-.5
·1 .4
4.3

Dela\\~lre

.u

Kansas
Iowa

4.2
4.1

,\l,.,b

4.1

Indiana
:\laryl1nd
1\'a;;!tington
Vermo nt
Arkansas
Georgia
Oklahoma
1\'yorning

,t_1
4.1

.t_o
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.4

Ala Lama
27.
28'[ :\lassachu:;clts
Penn sylvat~;l

Minnesota
30T Nebraska
Tennessee
33'[ i'\cvacla
Oregon
35.
Nrw Jersey

3A
3A
3.2
3.2
3.1

I

UNITED STATES
Colorado
Virginia
Conncl'licut
38T New York
Ohio
South Carolina
- ~1.
Illinois
42.
43'[ i'\orth Carolina
Utah

·15.
tJ6.

I

I

I
I

I
I

I

'H.
48.
·1·9.

;,o.

2.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
1.9
1.8

:\lichi~an

llawaii
Florida
Texas
Ari zona
C:difornia

1.4

-·-- --- ----·-1\t. r\ ' f.'.- tim u tcs nf
II) ~'(). 71.

3.0
2.9
2.3
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.5

36.
37.

3·t
:32

·=<· Hcducc 30'/e to makt· purch :t ~ ing powcr
l:otllpa~ahlc , to fi;;m1' S for otlwr an·a, of
tit.: lhuted ::itatt'.' .

U.2

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

17.

52

Sclwol /Ius Flct•t, December 1971/January 1 !.172, p. •W.

l.

IS'[

55

25
2:3
22
17

----

North Dakota
Wt·sl Virginia
Rhode h:land
Louisiana
'\Iaine
:\lontana
Wi; consin
New llarnp ~hirc
Idaho
9.
:\lissouri
10.
11. [ New 1\lcxico
South Dakota
;\ li~:; is~i ppi
13.
11.
Kenturky

55
53
!i2

51
-19
45
42
41
41
-1-1
40
38
37
37
35

120-- I'UI'IL TlL\NSI'OitTATION EXPE;-.;DlTLIRE AS PEH.CENT OF CUR·
!tENT EXPENDITURES FOlt PUill.IC
ELt::'\IE:'ITARY AND St::COND,\I{Y

0.3
0.7
Sclu.~ol

Statistic.<,

I' · :\(•.

Sc/1u" / Hu .,· Fi r.(' /,
an J ;)': :! . P- l U.

D c r~mhcr

J 971/.J aril:-

Source: National Educati o n As sociation ~ "Ra nkings o f trw Sta te s, 19 72," pp . 65- 66 .

0.

0

0.

•••••

0

••••••••

••••••

0

0.

(50)

Source: Virginia Department of Education, "Facing Up 6: Stat

"A.D. A. for purpose of determining per pupil costs.
iTotal operation including Regular Day School, Summer Schools and Adult Education.

•

••••••

$23,781
58
40,146
12
23,123
65
40
28,129
74
20,892
47
26,183
___84,597 - 1 4_s26,3.87
30,071
32
41
26,887
19,157
88
29,602
33
42
26,794
21,003
71
28,948
36
21,494
68
26,214
46
19,481
85
18,536
89
23,125
64
,59
- 23,702
I 3
49,020
20,052
82
37,566
16
26,539
44
24
31,372
19,191
87

133,793,000
315,106,000
68,537,000
45,428,000
100,469,000
54,906,000
1,886,770,000
259,177,000
33,108,000
199,447,000
19,425,000
121,960,000
87,267,000
185,312,000
69,910,000
212,405,000
85,170,000
94,969,000
32,252,000
64,588,000
542,258,000
82,942,000
14,538,000
154,057,000
37,473,000
132,639,000
96,645,000
$

5,626
7,849
2,964
1,615
4,809
2,097
22,843
9,822
1,101
7,418
1,014
4,120
3,257
8,823
2,415
9,882
3,249
4,875
1,740
2,793
22,878
1,692
725
4,101
1,412
4,228
5,036
Accomack ........
Albemarle
Alleghany
Amelia .......... .
Amherst . . ... . ....
Appomattox .......
Arlington .........
AugUsta ... . ......
Bath ......... . ...
Bedford
Bland ..... . ......
Botetourt .........
Brunswick ........
Buchanan ........
Buckingham .......
Campbell .........
Caroline ......... .
Carroll ...........
Charles City ......
Charlotte .........
Ch~ .......
arke ...........
Craig ............
Culpeper
Cumberland .......
Dickenson
Dinwiddie .... . ...
0

A.D.A.*
1970-71

COUNTIES

•••••

Wealth per Child
B<~sed on
V<~lues of Re<~l
Estate & Public
Service Corps.
Col. 3 -7- Col. 2
Rank

True Values of
loc<~lly Taxed
Property ( 1968)
Real Estate and
Public Service
Corporations

0

4

3

2

1

0

TABLE

BASIC INFORMATION CONCER
(Based on 1968 True Values Real Estate and Public Ser

~

0

•••

•

•

, , .. .•..

••

0

••

. . ..... ...

•••

0

•••

••

0.

•••

••

•

0

•

•

0

•

••

••

0

•

••

0

••

•

••••

•

0

••••••

F-knry ............
Highland
rslc of Wight ......
James City .. ......
King George
King & Queen ......
King William ......
Lancaster .........
Lee .... .. ........
Loudoun
Louisa
Lunenburg ........
Madison ..........
Mathews ....... ..
lvfccklcnburg ......
J'v1iddlcscx

l-1~

••

(lrn:nc ...........
G rcensvillc ........
Halifax
Hanover ..... ....

(;r:lySOII

••••••

Essex ... . ...... ..
Fairfax .. . .... ....
Fauquier . . ...... .
Floyd ........ ... .
Fluvanna . . .. .... .
Franklin ... .. .....
Frederick .........
Giles
Gloucester ... .....
Goochland ..... ...
1,668
124,309
6,132
1,996
1,834
6,193
6,865
3,673
2,854
2,286
$

RO

19,925

52
22
29
11
94
9
51
69
56
20
72
15

25,355
32,311
30,593
40,936
16,015
43,048
25,418
21,215
24,929
33,653
20,976
38,525

(51)

10
21

41,455
33,607

~
,

26.175

77
53
84
48

20,7.00

20,370
25,221

28
30
2
70
4
83
78
17
18
7

A.D.A.*
1970-71

COUNTIES

$30,912
30,335
50,539
21,166
46,527
20,033
20,336
34,313
33,725
43,877

Wealth per Child
Based on
Values of P.enl
Estate & Public
Service Corps.
Col. 3 7 Col. 2
R;mk

True Values of
locally Taxed
Property ( 1968)
Real Estate ancl
Public Service
Corporations

51,562,000
3,768,219,000
309,903,000
42,247,000
85,331,000
124,066,000
139,610,000
126,032,000
96,250,000
100,303,000
~.X(•~
~7.H I :1,000
24,302,000
1, 193
3,341
84,262,000
6.933
138,143,00
8,640
226,156,000
31,982
999,134,000
12,115
245,487,000
528
21,888,000
4,277
143,737,000
Sec Williamsburg City
1,942
49,240,000
976
31,536,000
1,235
37,782,000
1,869
76,510,000
4,530
72,548,000
9,199
395,996,000
3,266
83,016,000
2,506
53,166,000
1,936
48,263,000
1,271
42,773,000
6,340
132,988,000
1,297
49,967,000

4

3

2

1

(

$

TABLE 8-Conti

•

0

•••

0

0

•

0

.

•••

0

•••

•

••••••

•

••••••

•

$

189,133,000
154,744,000
63,026,000
38;774,000
70,270,000
58,270,000
66,869,000
124,684,000
97,502,000
75,131,000
292,101,000
45,488,000
67,133,000
102,355,000
667,257,000
133,525,000
50,416,000
38,997,000
445,988,000
99,776,000
257,114,000
190,721,000
91,339,000
150,784,000
101,676,000
116,835,000
118,902,000
119,596,000
54,029,000
77,843,000
163,700,000
143,220,000

$24,531
18,464
23,360
31,371
25,213
30,176
23,397
39,025
28,719
23,246
20,893
33,720
40,127
19,467
23,141
20,596
45,667
26,172
22,002
26,721
25,104
31,819
17,552
31,348
16,452
28,489
29,029
20,613
46,061
28,938
16,393
43,439

(52)

37
93
8

5

57
90
61
25
54
31
60
14
38
62
73
19
13
86
63
76
6
49
66
43
55
23
91
26
\92
1
39
35
75

7,710
8,381
2,698
1,236
2,787
1,931
2,858
3,195
3,395
3,232
13,981
1,349
1,673
5,258
28,834
6,483
1,104
1,490
20,270
3,734
10,242
5,994
5,204
4,810
6,180
4,101
4,096
5,802
1,173
2,690
9,986
3,297
0

Montgomery
Nansemond
Nelson ...........
New Kent . .. ... ...
Northampton ......
· Northumberland ....
Nottoway .........
Orange ........ ...
Page .............
Patrick ...........
Pittsylvania ...... .
Powhatan .........
Prince Edward .....
Prince George .....
Prince William .... .
Pulaski .. ... .. ....
Rappahannock .....
Richmond ........
Roanoke · .........
Rockbridge
Rockingham
Russell .. .........
Scott
Shenandoah ...... .
Smyth ....... ....
Southampton ... ...
Spotsylvania ..... ..
Stafford .. ..... ...
Surry ....... . . . . . 0 .
Sussex ... . .......
Tazewell ..........
\Varrcn ...........
••

A.D.A.*
1970-71

COUNTIES

•••

Wealth per Child
Based on
Values of Real
Estate & Public
Service Corps.
Col. 3 -;.. Col. 2
Rilnk

True Values of
locally Taxed
Property (1968)
Real Estate and
Public Service
Corporiltions

-

4

3

2

1

TABLE 8-Co

5,110
TOTAL TOWNS .. .

•

••••

•

•

0

•

•

•

0

•••

Alexandria . . . . . . . .
Bedford ... .... ...
Bristol
Buena Vista .. . . . . .
Charlottesville ... ..
Chesapeake
Clifton Forge . .. . ..
Colonial Heights ...
Covington .. .. .. ..
D:mville .... ......
Emporia .. ... . ....

~IE~ ·

0

••••

••••••

.------.....

••

136,009,000

$ 1,062,670,000

$

$

73,787,000
29,453,000
281,888,000
486,387,000
31,246,000
79,553,000
60,948 ,000
230,817,000
Sec Greensville County

3,047
1,406
6,542
23,056
1' 131
3,463
2,085
9,037

Sec Bedford County

15,752

25,714,000
6,511,000
16,585,000
3,872,000
28,968,000
28,094,000
26,265,000

•

925
345
484
509
1,302
846
699

•

Capl! Charks .. .. ..
Colonial Beach ... . .
Fries ........ ... ..
Poquoson . ... . ....
Saltville
West Point ... . . . . .

TOWNS

0

/\bingdon . . . . .....

•••

$18,105,834,000

••

631,372

••

TOTAL COUNTIES .

••

24,216
20,948
43,089
21,096
27,627
22,972
29,232
25,541

$67,463

$26,616

$27,799
18,872
34,267
7,607
22,249
33,208
37,575

$28,677

(53)

26
31
4
30
19
28
16
22

2

1

4
6
2
7
5
3

81
34
95
67
50

8,315
2,277
8,707
4,758
7,709

Washington ... . ..
Westmoreland . . . . .
Wise .. . .. . . ..... .
Wythe ........ .. .
York

$20,156
29,422
13,377
21,551
25,457

A.D.A.*
1970-71

COUNTIES

167,601,000
66,994,000
116,470,000
] 02,542,000
196,248,000

Wealth per Child
Based on
Values of Real
Estate & Public
Service Corps.
Col.3 7 ~
Rani<

True Values of
Locally Taxed
Property (1968)
Real Estate and
Public Service
Corporations

s

4

3

2

1

TABLE &--C

~ In clu d es

S28,784,2ll,OOO

1,006,230
J8mcs City County.

.

G RAND TOTAL . . .

.

•

$ 10,542,368,000

0

•••

0

•

0

••

369,748

3o,2os,ooo

--

302,728,000
137,757,000
757,195,000
1,325,084,000
19,431,000
175,682,000
409,878,000
51 ,657,000
1,572,180,000
521 ,652,000

TOTAL CITIES .. . .

•

. .....

•

195,519,000
127,977,000
37,311 ,000
99,187,000
40,09 4,000
577,751,000
99,258,000
128,666,000

36,886,000
132,060,000
69,792,000
896,693,000
125,871 ,000
179,311 ,000
149,791 ,000

•

$

...

•

0

•

0

0.

--

-

. .

$28,606

$28,512

24,974
31,036
37,282
21, 179
32,584
43,777
40,169

.

$35 ,280
69,780
17,810
39, 189
2R,OI 8
19,406
40, I20
25,273
33.557
28,240
33,004
26,131
26,880
16,481
23,512
16,802
25,497
34,691
30,346

(54)

3
5

1':3

25
14
8
49

34
27
35
23
.J__O)
15

®

9
1
33
7
18
32
6
24
II
17
12
21 ~

~

Wealth per Child
Based on
Values of Real
I Estate .& Public
)
Service Corps.
)
~ 7 Col.2
Rank "'

True Values of
locally Taxed
Property (1968)
Real Estate c;nd
Public Service
CorporaHons

.

4

3

1,477
4,255
1,872
42,338
3,863
4,096
3,729

•

5,542
1,834
2,095
2,531
1,431
29,772
2,474
5,091
I ,079
10,720
4,174
28,977
49,297
I, 179
7,472
24,395
2,026
45,320
17,190

1970-71

A.D.A.*

2

Fairfax . . .. . .. ... .
Falls Church ......
Franklin ..... . ....
Fredericksburg ... . .
Galax .... . .......
Hampton
Harri sonburg .. . ...
Hopewell . . ... .. . .
I .cxington .. ......
Lynchburg ...... ..
Martinsville . ......
Newport News ... ..
orfo1k
~ ···· · ···"'·
Norton .. . .. . . ....
Petersburg ........
Portsmouth
R adford ......... .
RichmonQ. .. ..... .
Roanoke . ........ .
Salem .... .. ......
Sou th Boston .. ... .
Stau nton .. .. ......
Suffolk .. . .. . . . ...
Virginia Beach . ....
Waynesboro .... . ..
Will iamsburg*
Winchester .. ......

C-t_~

~

1

TABLE 8-Cont

..

3
4

1,603

1,014
125
1,139

2,914

2,003

5,S37

l,G92

~. 703

2,005

906

fiOl
8
5C9

1,691

1,032

3,270

812

2,!:i51

1,136

1,393

359

503
2,435

2,788

3-!G

721
4,383

6,038

5,586

694

1,495

!i53

1,074

2,544

1, 706

Sccond:\ry

3,534

3, 0·!6

1,230

3,0!8

1,0-11

l,6C6

4,850

3,333

Elcmenbry

2,569

1,fi75
133
1, 703

4,605

3,125

9, 1!3

2,40-1

8,254

3,141

3,833

922

7,176

1,067

9,572

9.~32

1, 924

4,5~3

1,50!

2, 710

7,403

5,031J

Totnl

46

2
H

22

73

48

110

42

87

61

48

19

100

20

111

77

33

6~

Z5

31

117

77

Oper·
nied

nus~•

Tot>!
Nun:bcr
or

6

3g9,510

178,668
15,120
103,783

713,340

301,476

733,500

454,392

543,060

73G, 8i6

387,23!

122,670

984,114.

163,743

885,780

{55,3 65

2G2, 764

622,764

207,540

268,776

011,310

522,720

on
Regubr
Routo

Tr~nsportcd

Pupils

Milca

Tote!

REPORT OF THE

Avrn.\.or:: D.AtLT ATTX:-<D.\.NCt or
TlUNSPO!\T<D PUPILS

2

A~-T~·l'UAL

!SO

180
!SO
!SO

180

!SO

!SO

180

180

1SO

1SO

180

180

180

180

186

180

180

180

180

!SO

180

ber
or
Days
Duscs
Oper·
ated

Num·

7

M

F

Adult

N=~n OF

8

F

6

....
.... ....

20

....

....
....

....

....

9 ....

.... ....

16

10

4

7 ....

11

11

.... ....
\

I

Superintendent's

17

17 .... ....
...... .... ....

......

36

62

13

16

15

3

....
23 .... ....
20 58 ....
...... 1 ....
61 14 ....
...... .... ....
14
3 ....
0

28

9

35

....
...... .... ....

Source: Virginia Department of Education,

35

7

2

(,

6·~

12

32

19

67

40

31

19

25

19

33

Gi

21

35

10

31

62

M

1-r-

Studeot

Dnm:ns

-- - - - 29
48 .... ....

I I

TABLE 11-PUPIL

Coluruns 2, 3, 4, 6, 6, 7, 8, 13, B, 16, and 10 aro tot!l!a. ColUla!ls 9, 10, 11, and 12 aro averazu,

PubEc!y-oll'ned .••••

CnAnLO'I'r%

Conlrnct. .........
Tot•!. ..... .

}'u!Jlidy·OWUC!'tl,,.,.

Ca.utL<!I CITY

Pu~!icly-owncd .....

CAnHOLL

Pub!icly-owned .....

CJ.r.OLI:XZ:

Publicly-owned ..••.

8J.lli'DEL!.

'Publie!y·owned., ..•

13UCXI.~GU!II

Publidy-owned . . , ..

llucu.a.!U!f

I'ubt:ciy-owned .....

llutr~!WIC.C:

Pub!icly-o·,rc.cd ....•

llOT!:TO!JllT

Publicly-owned .....
Bw."n
l'uL:irly·O~'Ded ...••

B!DTOltD

Aucc •.,..,
Publ:cly--owoetl .. .•.
Dna
P"bEcly-owned .....

l'ubHcly.o~Tnr:U.,

An:..t:O:GTOX

Pubiicly-owned ..•..

Arl'OYA.TTOX

Pub: idy~'vncd .. ...

}.~:u:nsr

Publicly-owned, .••.

.A!.!.t:LU

l'uLl:cly-ow~cd . ....

ALUGBi!'IT

Pub:ic!y~owned .....

AtH'-£.U:C~

Accol!.!ct:
Pu!J!icly-Qw!lcd .••••

COUKTIES

112

3

451
1,"25

925
2,364

Publiely-ownrd .....

U30

2,022

785

I, 732

1,502

3,143

1,194

332

1,042

703

G

918,324

377,388

131,220

352,760

333,000

33S,5SO

252,072

470,304
17,820
483,12!

742,680

211,572

285,750

00~.870

5,871,072

302,022

71S,3ti0

403,740

270,612

339,552

114,408

124,740

1,282, 716

ISO

1SO

1SO

181

180

180

ISO

ISO
ISO
ISO

l~!l

180

180

ISO

18{

ISO

ISO

1SO

180

ISO

1SO

1SO

1SO

9, IQ, U, nqd 12 nre aver:tzes.

116

29

15

51

3G

37

38

52
1
53

88

27

34

81

6·17

27

~a

50

:!5

44

11

14

192

M

Adult

M

H

13

9

40

23

16

3

4

20

35

3

17

14

4

3•1

2

2

....

I

....

I

....
....
....

30

5

.. ..
.... ....
3

7 ....

.... ....
2 ....

12

2

2

5

...... .... ....

11

17

2

....

.. ..
······ .... ....
17 12 ....

63

63·1

17

U·l

1

I
34

23

2

... . ....
... . ....
20
8 ....
5 6 ....
..... . .... .. ..

3

175

~3

su

27

IS

2·1

78

8

IU

50

14

16

10

9

17

F

Student

or Dntvtno

F

No,..un

8

---- - -

I7 I

TADLE 11-PUPlL

NumTotnl
Tolal
Miles
bcr
Number
Popila
of
or
Tr•nsported D>YS
DW!es
on
lluse3
OpcrRe~tulnr
Opcrntcd
Route
atrd

5

Co!urt~II'!

7,273

3,21G

1,117

2, 774

2,20:i

2,518

1,324
2,080

731

2,103

1, 781

3,404

.... ..... ...

5,061
0,6S5
62
0,74.7

2,10~

2,038
4,532
62
4,044

3,U23

Co!ulllnJ 2, 3, 4, 5, G, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, nnd 16 oro totals.

Publicly-owned . , . .

r!J.!..!J'A%

Publiely-o1vned .....

Gn:u:~sv rLL&

Publicly-o~·nrd ..• •.

Gm~es£

Publicly-owned., .•.

~RJ.T&Ol'C

Pub:idy-owued ....

8oocaL4.SO

Publicly-owned, .•••

Gt.ot:Cl::5T£Jl

PuLiiely-owued .... ,
Contract. .........
Tot>!. .......
GILES
Publiely-~wned., •••

FaY.IH:nrc.:

1,811

1,220

FP.4S(LI~

591

1,944

74~

1, 19S

PLI!J:icly·owued, •. ••

l'ubl id y-owne<l ....
Jo'wru
FLUV..SS!
Publicly-owned ... ..

SI,5S7

1,558

S,GH

3~.·158

-ISO

4, U52

3, 789

1,376

3,550

I,S21

42,1~~

1,078

1,t.~J

1,064

2, 48ij

:S,3!i~

208

H2

650

1,439

W4

935

Total

19,903

I

G, 738

Seeon<bry

13,165

Element3ry

D11Lr AT'I'r.Ho•sc& or
TRASSPORUD PCI'ILS

Avzn.\o~

2

ANNUAL REPORT OF' THE

3,623

FAUQUtt:U

PuO!ic!y·O\tncd . .• , .

l•~.LiltFAX

l'uulicly-OifnoJ .•••.

!Ctui u

l,uLIIcly--owrlt'tl . .. ,,

l>IN \fi!IUIJC

CnzsunrltLD
Publie!y-ownrd .. •..
Cu.nu
Pulllicly-owned .....
Cit! tO
Publirly-o;vned .••• ,
CtrLrErtn
Publicly-ownrd .....
Ctntotnuso
Publicly-owned . .•••
Dtcnl<sos
Publicly-owned .....

COU:-IT!ES

114

\

'

C£onoc

3

7,133

2,7ii2
1,049

4,386
2,14B

21
GO

1,249
0,500

453
2,169
4,331

gs

19

1,209
5,Sl9

27

39

48

102

51
3
54

29
1
30

23

20

26

51

G·i

10

125
1
12C

211

EO

1,835

2,3!i0

3,195

G

418,752

1i2,134

848,880

151,3SO

224,028

·180

ISO

ISO

ISO

180

180

180

554,GGO
362,520

180

180
180
180

ISO
180
180

613,290

398,538
35.784
434,322

240,384
5,112
251,490

180

180

223,200
210,960

!SO

!SO

180

180

!SO
180
!SO

180

!SO

190,080

374,580

453, 72G

94,036

1,043,136
7,632
t,o:;o, 768

1,25'1,379

728,280

M

Auult

F

M

2

2

.. ..

20

43

1

....

.... ....

.... ....
...... .... ....
62 .... ....
...... 1 ....
51 .... ....
62

177

75

5G

1

40

4

18

26

15

13

3

4

20

35

15

8

13

19

7G

10

1

1

....
.... ....
.... ....

20

1

....
.... .. , .

.... ....

13

12

1

....
4
10 .... ....
24 .... ....
G
1 ...... .... ....
0
24 .... ....
50 ...... 1 ....
3 .. .... .... ....
G3 ...... 1 ....

5

11

13

g

a.!

63
1

32

8

1

F

Student

:\vYntrt or Dmvrna

8

-- - - - -

I I
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TABLE 11-PUPIL

To!:U
N"m·
Miles
Tot•l
bcr
Pupit..
:\umber
of
of
Tro""po:tcu Days
lluses
on
Duscs
OperOpcrRc~"!or
otcd
Route
•leu

5

706

2,302

ZC9

840
3,517

543
1,292

1,534

810

3,92il
2,452

so

1,4-17
27
1,47-1

3,8·16

1, 715

5S2

1,667

;.g

582

............
2,399
53

1,085
48
1,133

383

823

1,200

972

312
GOO

3, 062
1,785

1,327

2,635

3,938

6·10

1,266

2,672

50:1

10, 9D6
01
11,057

22,697

7, 953

Toto!

or

1,145

197

3,607

............

3,007

10,155

z,ssg

Secondary

308

7,380
61
7 .~[10

12,542

5,00·1

Elemcnbry

'l'luxsron'I'ED POPIL~

Av<n•o~ DAt~T ArrEND.l~Ct
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ANNUAL REPORT OF TilE

ColutnJU 2, 3, 4, 6, 0, 7, 8, 13, U, 15, ond !G are totsls. Cob!IIlls 0, 10,11, !Lild 12 nre avcncco.

I'ublicly-owned, ••• ,
MoncournT
Publicly-owned.,,.,

MIDDU:O':t

PuL!idy·olvn.O .•. ,.

~lr.cu~sncnu

l'culidy-<Jwncd ..••.
.Muntv••
l'ublicly-owncd .. , .•

M4Df50!f

Publicly-owned ...•.

LCNE!'\D'OUO

Public!y-owced .. , . .
Contr>cL ..•....••
'.lot~!. ......
LoCDO!J'i
l'ub!idy·owncd.,,,.
LoutoJ.
Publicly-owned., ...

Lr:

Pul!idy-o,.nct! .....
Cootr"ct ... ,, ... ,.
To~!ll. ......

LA.NCJ.!ITllt

Public!y·OI'.'ncd .....
Ktxo •~o Qor.r.'1
Pu bl:cly-owncd., . .
li:tso WtLLl.\1!
Publicly-owned ... ..

lC!~O

Puo!icly·owncd ..•..
In~ or 1\':cnT
Pub~idy-owncd .....
h>!r3 C:TT
Publicly-o;•nc<l .. ,.,

HIOD!.A.lnl

Pcblidy-owncd .. ...
Contract ..........
Tot>!. ......

:rr:mr

Pcb!idy-o-;vncd ... ,.

H!S!Ut;O

Public!y-owncd., ...

HA!\OYI~

COU:\TIES

116

0 ,,

1

ulJ!idy·O\fllCJ.,,, •

4

7

29

181
181
181
32-1,678
77,8-18
402,526

41
0
50
2,819
625

3,644

1,041

294
1,33!j

1,778

m
2,309

38

0

62

180
1,123, 780

2
138

!SO

14

35

7

20

12

8

H5

47

12

18,333

176,742

180

181

318,772
151' 740

185

180

180

!SO

!SO

ISO

ISO

1,454,618

776,520

258,480

172.620

1,81·1,706

4:15, !50

1U5,3G4

~:·

15

4

29

2

23

16

a,734

22

180

234,918

!UO

180

308,520

:11u, unu

180

180

180

ISO

301,140

243,360

507.780

738,900

F

M

F

---

Student

or Dnrvrns

8

12

.... ....

.... ....

7 ....

... . ....
······
12 .... ....

66

13

5-J

.... ....
.... 6
3 ....
.... ....
.... ....
.. .. ....
0 ....
3 . ...
.. .. ....

....
15 .... ....
...... 12 ....
50 10 ....
1G2
4 ....
2 13 ....
...... 4 . ...
02

3

10

~

19

34

7

20

22

62

-- -- - -

M

Adult

Nu~tn En

I I

11 ,5!l9

1,422

18

1,0~4

334
760

49-1

50

4,74S
1,635
3,113

928

173

so

24

23

~UI

5U

:11

20,428

5,231

1,474

1,318

13,106

3,0US

3,002

7,2oJ1

1,781

!i45

432

4,Hll5

!,OUO

1,uu;;

~.tiiU

13,167

3,-l:iO

92~

BS6

8,2-11

2,0UM

1,1J\J7

lltfl

34

2,253
880

1,373
I ,'1~~

38

1, 782
666

1,116

~-,

36

25

51

78

2,787

1.22n

2,687

a, 755

Tctnl

1,090

458

955

2,364

Secondary

1,697

771

1. 732

4,391

Elementary

6

TABLE 11-PUPIL

Total
NumMilos
bcr
Totnl
Pupil•
of
Number
Trnnspcrtetl Dnyo
of
Uuseo
Buse.
en
OpcrOperRrgui!U'
ntcd
ntctl
Route

5

REPORT OI•' THE

Avzuoz D.LtLT AnrsnA~cz or
TuA.NsronTcn l,OPILS

3

A.N~UAL

Colu rnn• 2. 3, 4, 5. G, 7, 8, 13, 14, !5, and 16 ~"' totols. Cc!utnno 9, 10, 11, otd 12 r.re averages.

Publicly-owned .....
Rocxu1uoot:
l'ublicly-owoetl . •••.
Contract ...........
Totnl. .......

Ro.\:{ox.~

PuL!icly-cwned .. , •.

RICU~fOS'O

l'uLliely-owoed . •• ,.
Powsu
Pub!idy-cwnetl .•••.
fiAPr>O.LN,.CCC
Pub!icly·cll'ued .• , ..

PnrNc• WttUAM

PniN~' &

l'ulllicly-cwncd ..••.
t;<onor.
l'ul>lidy·ownetl .•• ,.

l)nt~CE ED\fARD

}

!'OWUJ.T4N

l'uLiicly-ow netl ... ,.

Pt'I"rdtr.V.L~JA.

l'ublidy..cwncll .....

l'A.TtUt;l.

J'ut,lirly·OWIWtl ... ,.

l'J.tu:

J'ull:ll·l y•U\YIIt•tl,,

On.tti•Jte

Pub!ic!y-cwnetl .••••
NonrnownrnLAND
Publicly-owned .... .
NonowAT
Publicly-c;rnetl .....

NonTn .Uil'TO~

Publicly-owned ..•• •

NEW 1\:l!ST

Publiely-01voed .•• •.

Ntr,_,o}f

Publicly-owned .••••

N'.LNS!!YON!)

COUNTIES

118

\

I

2,713

4,537
323 , 440

Toll! Counti-..,.

520,300

7,250

4,030

5,970

2, 236

7, 913

2,819

8,704

2,478

1,125

5,314

4,014

3, 716

5,945

4,427

4, 712

5,520

9, 415

Totnl

on
Regular
Route

Duscs

6,170

92

42

07

40

78

25

79

30

18

51

51

74

42

1i3

G4

G5

111

ntcd

51, 226 , 422

731 ,830

301,848

500,153

351,030

093,008

174,222

556,140

401,9·10

182,088

411,588

L07,52S

6SC,502

325,810

422,460

012, 720

402,120

762,096

Trno;,~ort.cd

ot
Opcr•

Total
Miles
Pupils

Total
Number

6

F

F

.

4

8

13

17

1

....

8 .. ..

3,0SO 510

11

JG

3G

54

.... ....
...... ... . ....
.... .. 1 ....
23
2 ....
······ ... . .. ..
32

M

Student

Dnmms

....
10
20 .... ....
02
5 12 ....
g .... ....
10
73
5 .... ....
4
SG .... ....
G5
······ 2 ....
30
3 .... ....
87 ... . ....
5
- - -- - -3

6

2

12

42

28

62

65

70

M

01

-- -- -- -

Adult

Nol!Dtn

...... 2,511

182

1SO

181

180

180

180

!SO

1SO

180

180

ISO

180

180

180

180

180

1SO

Duscs
Opera ted

D:1rs

ot

bcr

Nurn-

7

I I

T ABLE 11-PUPIL

Co!u:nna 2, 3, 4, ~. 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, ~nd 16 are lola!:.. Co!umns 0, 10, 11, and 12 are averogca.

202 , 914

1,521

2,518

2,400

714

1,522
4,480

2, 730

OGO

1,8.')9
5,177

3, 138

851

335

1, 775

1,355

1,059

2,123

1,601

1, 784

1,903

3,474

Secondary

5,556

1,C27

790

3,530

2,650

2,657

3,822

2,826

2. 023

3,017

5,941

E!cr::1cont~ry

01

4

REP ORT OF T HE

D.iiLT ATTEXDAXCE

TIU..'-;S!'O:tTZD PO'PI:.S

AvrnAG~

AN~UAL

Pub!iel;r-o..-ncd.,,,.
Yom:
Pub:;cly·owncd., ...

Wrrn•

Puhlie!y-owned., , ..

WlU

Puh!idy-owned .. . ..
WreTuou:u.!fD
Pulllidy-owncd .....

W.<anrsoro:f

Publidy-o•vntd., . . .
'W.llllLI:(
PuLlicly-ow~ed., , ..

T.LtlW l LL

l'ublicly-owncd.,, . ,

SU!S!l:

PuLlicly-owncd .. . ,.

SoR.r

Pull!iely- o..-~ed .....

~~AtTOU.O

Pu!,!1cly-owned .. ...

SPOT8t !.YA.:-;" U.

Pul!iely-owoed .... .

SouTru.YPTON

Pulllidy-o·.rncd .... .

S~o~rra

P·Jtlidy-owned., ...

SntM"J.sno;.n

Publidy-owncd .. . ..

&on

PuL!!cly-owncd .•...

RU:!3io:L!..

Rocxnwn.uc
Publldy-owocd •.•..

COUNTI<:S

120

-r

1. 732

Tot>l Towr.s . ....

l,OSO

180

511

2,812

488

1,292

25

10

Opcr·
a ted

llus•·•

or

~:.nuber

Tot'!

I
I

I
7

I

T AI3 L E 11-PUPIL

143' 157

18,720

93,705

12 ,2·10

1 8,~32

180

... ...

4

....

-;-!~I~

1G

....

..... .. .... ....
2 ......

3

1"""1
=-s

182

ISO

!SO

--- -- -- - - - -

Total
Num-1 NtninEn or DniVEns
Mile!
bcr
Pupils
or
Transported Days I
Adult
I Student
on
lluscs
OpcrRc~ul:1r
1\outc
a ted
M
F
~1
F

OF Tim

Coh.:m:1s 2, 3, 4, 5, G, 7, 8, 13, !4, 15, a.nd lG ere totals. ColunuL, 9, 10, 11, and 12 :1re nvcr:~~cs.

303

7.)1

290

I

183
101

742

Toto!

252 I

I

or

Rl~P O llT

~30

Sccond>ry

T!l.\XS!tORTEO Pt:PH.S

Ele-mentary

-

ANNUAL

Avl~n . \C! DAlLT An·r:!\' DAXCE

P!.!Llicly-ownt'<! .....

\\' >S r Poi~.,.

Puulicly-ow~cd .....

!'OQOOSON

PuLJ:cly-ownl'd . .. ..
CoLosaL Br:Acu
Publ!clr-ownrd .....

Anrscoox

TOWXS

122

G47

I, 094

293

Publicly-owned ... ,.

3,GOO

I

1, 750

870

109

9,370

91

I

I

5,410

2,590

5~6

22 ,587

6,402

017

1,512

293

824

18 ,025

1,357

I

I

7

I I

G7 I

24

374 ,580

124, 73·1

10,854

180

ISO I

180

ISO

I IS!

I

2

I········ ....... .

148

3

4 I

2

G3

22

220

68

15

3 .......... .. ... ..
ISO 1...... 1

183 !

180 I

180

ISO

351,900 I 183

18 ,360

9G, 120

10.908

17,470

995,202

81,030

227 I I ,370,532

OS I

5

15

14S

11

I

Toto!
I Num- 1 Nu1tnn or Dmn:ns
Tobl
Miles
bcr
Number
Pupils
of
or
Tronsported Doys
Adult
Student
Duses
on
Duscs
OpcrItcgubr
Opcr· ~ ~ -~ntcd
Itouto
ntccl ~~ ~F- ~ ~

5

TABLE 11- P UPIL

I

I

390,300

G5,12S

24,000

237, 050

33 ,01;0

13,809

I

I

I

I

,_

,_

,_

,_

204
2 1, ,
•··31 I 813 I 2 •.. ••

7

027,350 I 7,0-17 I56 , 000,C53 I.... .. I2,G07 13,913 1512 1 17
I
I
1····-

1- -1

~73
1,770,180
IS!
1- -1
1•08,181
840 I 5,231,C74

37,809

~r•

totals. Columns 9, 10, 11, and 12 are

avera~cs.

.1. ,,.. ,,,., ,.I. .,, ,,, ,,, .I..,,,., .I. ,,.. , .., .1.,.,, .1. ,,,,.1., ,, .I. ,, .I., :.

I

I

I

Columns 2, 3, 4, 6, G, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, and 10

W~NT., ,, , ,. ,, .1. .. ,,,,,,,

lNcLODl~O R!rL.\CZ...

Total Stste ••• ,, .

Total Cities ......

I

.....,............ ,............ ,............ ,.... ~ ... ,............ ,...... ,...... ,...... ,.... ,.. ..
lublrcly·OW!!Cd .,,. .

Vt~~~!~~)~:~~d

J!OAXOU

Public!y-owncd .. .. . j

Rrcu.wosn

I, 720

427

l'ublicly-ownccl., , . .
Pon-:-~)J.OO T U

Puhticly-owocd., .. .
NonTOS'

0,371

418

298

520

Sceomhry

0,200

13,208

N<wronT N<w5

Publicly-owned ... . .

ll•\11-:-011

c""'"
J'ubl!cly-uwncJ .. , . .

I
Toto!

AnEXDAliCE or

11,819

1,3;i7

., ••• ,, •• , ••
1

'I

Contract., .. . ,.,..

Publicly-o"ned.,,.
Fm:or.mcs...sncno

Fn.sxt.nr

Publicly-owuccl ..... 1

F.. u.,.. Cmmcn

l'ublicly-owued .. . ,.
Coyrxoro:<
Pob!icly·owncd ..... 1

Cnt!J.P!:.u:c:

Publicly-owned., . . .

At.t:ti.SDRU..

DA.!LT

4

ANNUAL REPORT OF TilE

Tn!I'ISPORUD Pt!P!LS

AnnAos

--------! Elementary

CITIES

124:
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TABLE 12-TRANSPORTA.TION BY Pli"3 LIC CARRIER

COU~TIES

~ i.!:UO ~i
P L~pi !.:;
"f: ~n3p o ~t ~d

Franklin ........................................ .
Rockingham .................................... .

8
63

'5

71

)

14,971 75

538

:)

42,3~0

Total Coun tie3................•..........

Cost

900 co
13,£Sl 75

----------- 1·-----------

CITIES
Alexandria. ..................................•....
Buena Vista ..................................... .
Charlottes vi I! e.................................. .
Colonial Heights ...•...........................•.
Harrisonburg ..........................•.•.......
Hopewell ............•.......•... : .............. .
Lynchburg .............................•.........
1v1a.rtinsville .................................•...
Richmond ..•.•........•.........................
Roanoke .• ·...........•...............•...........
Staunton .........•......•....•..................
\Y nynesboro .................................... .
\Vinchester .••.........•..........•..............

·!-2
l,S:JG 4D

1S,!l05 50
1,6-!G 50
1,367 9.5
2S,76G GO
24,22.) 71
0,097 S8

93,1331 50

:?,6J7

137,~\l'~

04
3,203 10
4,500 co

93 58

Totcl Citie3 ••......•.........•..........

3,1~5

)

365,074 32

Total State .......•.••.................•.

3,2'26

:)

380,046 07

#

-
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OF PUBI,IC INST!tUCTION

TABLE 13- PAY.MENTS TO P,\nENTS IN LI EU OF PRO\'lDING BUS
TRANSPOltTATION SERVICE

COUNTIES

·'

,.

Accomack .... . ................................. .
Bedford ................................... , ...... .
Botetour t ..................................•.....
Buchn.nan ...•.•....•..•...•.....•............•••.
Cn.mpbcll. ................. . .............. : ..... .
Cn.roli r..e ........... ... .. ... ... .......... . ....... .
Carroll. ........................................ .
Crai~~ - ... .· .... . ..... .... ... . ...... . ............. .
D inwiddie ... . .... . . . ..... . . . ... . .. . ....... . .... .
Franklin ........................................ .
Giles ........................................... .
Grayson .................................•.......
Greene . ............. .... .. ... .................. .
Henrico .. ....................................... .
Henry ...... . ................................... .
Lee ... .. . ......... . ............................. .
Loudoun ......•................••....•...........
?-!::tdison .............. ..... ............. ... . .. .. .
i\Ieeklcnburg ..... . ............................•..
i\Iontgomery ..•...•..............................
N' ansernond ..................................... .
Northampton ......... ~ ......................... .
Pngc ... ........................................ .
Pul:tski. ........................................ .
Happabnnnoek . ..••........................•.....
Smyth ........•...............•........•...•...•.
\Yn.rrcn . .......•...•...•.......•.......•..•......
\Vi tie ...................................•...•..•..
Total Counties ...•.•.•............•......

Number
Pupils
Transported

Cos t

-3

31-1 64
7() 50
1,193 40
13,798 50
360 00
4:20 00
1,064 3-l
tiUO CO
518 94
644 50
87 00
135 00
l,OCO 00
11,203 49
812 8-1
1,410 00
439 02
180 00
42938
261 97
100 00
895 80
1,530 00
1,223 l(j
106 20
755 00
544 60
459 00

:)

40,566 28

s
s

375 00

2
3
102
6
2
2
3
8
1
2
2
7
21
6
1
4
2
2
8
6
7
3

7
17
7
2.11

TOWNS
Poquoson ...•...••..•.•.••...•..........•...•..•.
Total To"'"Ils ....•.....•.•.•.•........•...

375 00

CITIES

,.,"·

·'

·~ ·

.··,

::.':'

Charlottcsvillo ...............•..............•....
Chesapeake ...... . . . .... .. .................... .. .
:\orfolk ............·..........................•...
:-;_t :\ll!lt.on . ..•.. ... ........•.. •.... ........ ... ..•.
\ 1rgm1a Beach .................................. .

133

Total Cities ............•.........•..•....

142

Total St:J.te ...................•...•......

373

3

s

1

s
s

10,062
203
2J,122
3,754
375

50
35
00

co

00

34,516 85
75,458 13
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T ABLE H-PAYMENT OF MONEY TO OTITER SCTI OOL
DIVI SIO XS F OR TltA.NSPOllTATION
COUNTIES

Number
Pupils
T ranspor ted

.

•

Cost

Campbell t o Appomattox Coun ty ................ .
I sle of Wi gh t t o Che3s.penkc City...... . .. . . . .....

16
4

:)

Total Counties ...•..•.. ••..•.....•.•.••..

20

s

1,25!) 68

Cape Charles to North!unpton County .•..••..•• ..

...

s

658 50

Total Towns .............................

.. .

:5

653 50

Total State ..............................

20

s
s
s

3,766 00

Total Cities .••.••.••••••••.••....•.•..•.

...
...

6S3 GS

576 00

TOWNS

CITIES
Waynesboro to Augusta County. .............. . ...

3,766 00

5,68-:!: 18

TABLE 15-SPECIAL TRIPS
COUNTIES
Accomack •••••..•••••...•••••••.•.••....•••.•..•
Albemarle ............... ~ ............. . ........ .
Alleghany •••..•••••••••••.•.••..•••.•..••••.•.•.
Amelia .. . .••.•.••.••..........•...•.... •.•..••..
Appomattox .•••••••••••••.•..•••.....•••.....••.
Arlington .••.••••.• •.••••• • .•..••••.•.••.••••.••.
Augusta. •••.•.••••.••.•••.•••.•.•••••••..•.••....
Bath .••••••.•••••••••.••••.•••.•••••••••.••••.•.
Bedford ••••.••.•.••.•.•.••••..•••••.••.••.•.•.••
Bland .. •. •.••• • ...•..•.•..•••••.••.••••...•.•••. .
Botetourt . ••.••.••••••••••••..•••.••••••.••••....
Brunswick •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••..•.
Buchanan ................................ . ...... .
JBuckinghaDl .•••••••••••.•••..•••.••••..•..•••...
Ca.Dlpbell .••••••••••.•••.•••••..••.••.••••••...•.
Carroll .••••••••••.•.•.•.•.....•• ••••••. ••.•...•.
Charlotte ....................................... .
Chesterfield ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.
Clarke......................................... . .
C~;~lpeper........................................ .
D1ckenson ...................................... .
Dinwiddie ••••••••••.••.••••.•••••••••.••.•..•••.
Fairfa.~ ......................................... .
FauqWer. ...........•......•.....................
Floyd .......................................... ..
Fluvanna ....................................... .

FrAllklin .. ..••••..•.....•••...•..................

Number
.. of Miles

10,344
7,66-1
2U,02'l
12,359
63,060
61,711
8,156
89,523
11,873
28,016

11,301

52,721
5,009
31,526
15,988

15,380

60,552
3,693
29,625
9,679

10,445

239,519
13,2-16
8,198

4,700
29,422

Cost

s

4,385
3,192
12,404
19!
4,338
87,0-H

86
06
93
00
01
12

20,302 92
2,887 2'2

21,700 33
4,416 76
10,365 92
2,853 8S

20,503 47

1,459 52
11,175 46
4,202 57
5,4...'>9 14
25,008 61
733 60
9,417 79
4,341 80
3,209 82
104,334 4S
5,054 27
3,48-i 15
940 00
8,502 96

NCAEW
P. 0. BOX 233
MCLEAN, VA. 22101

21 March

1973

Associat e Justice Lewis Powell, Jr,
The Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Wa s hington, D.C. 20543

We wanted you t o have this complimentary copy
of our Rodrigue~ backgro under.

Siz·~
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

The laws in Texas governing the collection and
distribution of public funds for public schools result
in widespread inequalities.

All children living in

Texas do not have an equal opportunity to have a fiscally
comparable education through the public schools of the
state because of the immense differences in the funds
available to each school district.

That fact is the basis

for Rodriguez vs. San Antonio Independent School District.
What is true of the laws in Texas is true of the
laws in

all states except Hawaii.

And Hawaii is exempted

only because that state is one large school district.
(While it is possible, of course, for schools within one
district to have more resources than others, this type
of intra-district discrimination is not involved in
Rodriguez, which deals solely with different funding
levels among school districts within a specific state.)

-2-

On December 23, 1971, three Texas judges,
U. S. District Judge, a U.

s.

(the Chief

District Judge, and a U. S.

Circuit Judge} unanimously found "merit in plaintiff's
claim that the current method of State financing for
public elementary and secondary education deprives their

•
class of equal protection of the laws under the 14th
amendment to the

u. s.

Constitution."

And as further reason to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, the judges stated:

"Within [the] ad valorem

[property tax] system lies the defect which plaintiffs
challenge.

This system assumes that the value of property

within the various districts will be sufficiently equal
to sustain comparable expenditures from one district to
another.

It makes education a function of the local

property tax base •.•
"For poor school districts, educational financing
in Texas is, thus, a tax-more, spend-less system.

The

constitutional and statutory framework employed by the
state in providing education draws distinctions between
groups of citizens depending upon the wealth of the district in which they live."
In

its conclusion, the court charged, "Now it is

incumbent upon the defendants and the Texas Legislature
to determine what new forms of financing should be utilized
to support public education making it a function of wealth
other than the wealth of the State as a whole."

I
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The court ordered the defendants, the Commissioner
of Education and the members of the State Board of Education, to draft new laws for the legislature of Texas so
that the taxing and financing system would provide for
each child equally throughout the state.

A time limit of

two years was given with the court concluding:
"In the event the Legislature fails to act within the
time stated, the Court is authorized to and will take such
further steps as may be necP.ssary to implement both the
purpose and the spirit of this order."
The defendants immediately appealed the ruling and
on October 12, 1972, the oral arguments were heard by the

u.s.

Supreme Court.

A ruling is expected by this spring.

Should the Supreme Court rule in favor of Rodriguez,
the Texas Legislature would have to draft new laws in its
next session to be in compliance with the U.
Court order of December 23, 1971.

s.

District

s.

Regardless of the U.

Supreme Court decision, the Commissioner of Education in
Texas has stated his intent to improve the present system
of financing the public schools.
If Rodriguez is upheld, the implications for all the
other 48 states are enormous.
Some reporters have written that it is the property
tax which is being challenged.

This is not the case.

It

is the way the tax money is . being distributed which is at
issue.
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Texas may have a more complicated taxing system than
most of the other states, but the conditions which produce
the incompatible results are so similar, that reporters
in the other 48 states will find much background material
here which is applicable to their own localitites.

As in

most states, each school district in Texas (some cities
include several independent school districts) has to raise
its own public school monies -- mostly by taxing property
with only a minimal amount of additional help from the
state.
This use of the wealth of the property in a school
district as a main source of funds has resulted nationwide
in dramatically different abilities of a school system to
pay for building, maintaining an0 operating their schools.
A school district fortunate enough to have a few industries
which pay high property taxes and families with only a
few children, is able to keep the personal property tax
rate very low at the san1e time that it has a lot of money
to use picking and choosing among well-qualified teachers.
Such school districts can build and maintain modern school
plants, offer a wide variety of courses, provide special
counselling, and give extensive remedial help.
Such privileges usually cost a school system between
$1,500 and $2,000 per/pupil, per/year.
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Some school districts, without the good fortune to
have businesses and light industries helping to pay the
school bills, still are able to spend at the $1,500+
per/pupil level by attracting to the community only those
who can assist them attract "outside" funds to pay for
high-quality programs.

Such "outside" help comes from

Federal programs, foundation, and even from the state.
But there are many school districts where there are
no industries or businesses to help pay school bills,
where family incomes are low, where property value is also
low, where there is no one to help attract foundation or
Federal "outside" funds, and where the per/pupil, per/year
expenditure is considerably less than $1,000.
Many states have tinkered with such inequalities and
have tried to find some way for the state to compensate
those school districts which don't have enough resources
to do the job themselves.

But the effort to equalize

fiscal opportunity in the public schools has been fragmented
and stymied by the tangled web of state laws governing
property tax rates, property assessment, state funding
patterns, and qualifications for "outside" support.
There is no question that some school districts within
a state have more money than others to run the public
schools.

And there are few left in the United States who

do not know that some families pay a higher percent of
their incomes toward public schooling than do other families.
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Yet those who often have the biggest bite taken out
of their paychecks are those who live in school districts
which have the least to spend.
This is true in the Rodriguez case. The tax rate is
higher and produces less for the effort in the district
where the Rodriguezes live than in the neighboring San
Antonio Independent School District.
lives in Edgewood.

The Rodriguez family

And while Edgewood is totally within

the city of S.an Antonio, by law it is a separate and independent school district.

Edgewood is horne to most of the

Mexican-Americans living in San Antonio.

Ethnic break-

down is approximately 95% Chicano and 5% black.
In Edgewood there are no large businesses or industries
to help pay the taxes, there is almost no property of any
significant value, and only a few families with incomes

,,

above the poverty line.

Hence, according to the Texas

Research League, Edgewood raised only $418 per/pupil in
1970/71 after combining local funds with state funds.

In

the same school year, the San Antonio Independent School
District raised $599 per pupil from the same resources.
The difference between the two neighboring school
districts is $181, or more than 40% of Edgewood's total.
If that was the widest discrepancy in the

stat~

one might

have cause to wonder why the Rodriguez case has caused
so much turmoil in Texas and such interest nationally.
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But the same year that Edgewood had $418 per pupil
to spend, and Antonio I.S.D. had $599, Deer Park I.S.D.
had $1,277 and Lipscomb C.S.D. had an incredible $7,332.
Property market value statistics (from the year
1967/1968) show that Edgewood had $5,429 per/student, but
that Alamo Heights, another school district in the city
of San Antonio, had a market value per/student of $45,095.
This means that taxes as a percent of the property's
market value were high in Edgewood and low in Alamo Heights.
And yet, in spite of its high rate, Edgewood was able to
produce only _$21 per pupil from local ad valorem taxes.
Alamo Heights, on the other hand, with a lower rate, produced $307 per pupil.
In most states, the poorer school districts -- that
is, those school districts with the least to spend for
education-- includs not only families with low incomes,
a heavy percent of families on welfare, but also blacks
and other minorities.
A Texas study showed, for example, that the rich
districts, like Alamo Heights, had only 8% minority pupils,
while the poor districts were 79% minority.
Clearly, there is no argument as to whether some
children are discriminated against because they happen to
live in "poor" school districts. Yet no one really knows
how much should rightfully be spent per/pupil, per/year.
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There is no significant data available in Texas -or in any other state-- to tell legislators just how much
money it is necessary for an Edgewood or any school .
district to spend each year on each pupil to guarantee
an adequate education.
If such information were available then we would
know exactly how far below this "necessary•· or "adequate"
level each child was.

We could work out formulas for

local taxing efforts, compensate with state funds, and be
sure that this "adequate" amount was available to all
school districts equally throughout the state.
A few studies are being conducted which may provide
some significant and reliable data about what it costs to
provide certain types of schooling for specific types of
children.

At the

mo~ent,

however, no one really knows.

Unfortunately, since the property tax is so often
the base source of funds for local school districts,
some reporters have informed the public that what is
being challenged in Rodriguez and Serrano is the constitutionality of the property tax.

This is not the case.

The challenge is to the right of a state to consciously
write laws which result in unequal funding for public
school children based solely on the school district in
which they live.
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The issue is wealth discrimination.

The child

born within a wealthy school district (whether to a
poor or rich family), has an advantage over the child
born within a poor school district.

And that advantage

is tied directly to the amount of money the school
system has to spend for maintaining and operating the
public schools.
The school district which does not have enough money
to offer sound vocational/technical programs to its students, is making the children victims of wealth discrimination.

The school district which does not have enough

money to hire teachers qualified to prepare students for
four-year colleges, is suffering from wealth discrimination.

The school district which does not have good refer-

ence books in the library, up-to-date science equipment
in the physics

labs, ~ in-service

staff training programs,

remedial reading teachers, and adequate playing fields,
can't offer its children schooling which is equal to
that of a district which has well-stocked libraries,
modern equipment, expertly-trained teachers, and a topnotch sports program.
Should Rodriguez be upheld, what then?

Certainly,

the level of spending in Edgewood -- and other poor districts around the United States -- appears insufficient.
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While one may argue that the funds, even though small,
might be better spent, no one is going to argue that the
"ideal" or

"adequate" amount is what Edgewood now spends.

Conversely, almost everyone would argue that those
districts spending more than $1,500 per/pupil, per/year
are probably too rich; that is, they are overspending.
They are, for example, probably locked into a salary
schedule with insufficient quality control; they are
probably over-equipped; and undoubtedly they are carrying
an unnecessary administrative load.
Most school systems grew in the past 25 years a bit
like Topsy, and it has only been in the past five years
that any thought has been given to cost efficiency and
to differentiated staffing which lowers the teacher/pupil
ratio without raising the per/teacher costs.
It would, of course, cost almost no more money to
bring every school district in the state of Texas to the
average spending level.

That could be done by giving to

the poor districts the surplus from the rich districts.
For example, Alamo Heights !.S.D. would still tax at its
present level, but it would give the surplus back to the
state which would give as much to Edgewood as it needed
to reach the average.
This rather simplistic approach to a solution caused
one Texas wag to argue that Texas could become, were Rodriguez
upheld by the Supreme Court, just one large Sherwood Forest,
robbing the rich to give to the poor.
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Yet something of this nature must take place if
the Supreme Court does uphold Rodriguez and does state
that wealth discrimination is unconstitutional.

This

will mean that within a given state, all children must
have an equal share of the public school resources regardless of the school district in which they live.

And the

job of providing this equality, in Texas, is left up to
the Texas Legislature.
In the pages which follow, we present FYI several
documents or discussions pertaining to the school financing
question as it affects Texas and the Rodriguez case.
include:

(a)

These

an explanation of the present financing

system by Glen Ivy of the Texas Research League;

(b) a

historical review of Rodriguez v. San Antonio by Mark Yudof,
who assisted Arthur Gotchman, lawyer for the plaintiffs;
(c)

the position of

~he

State Board of Education by its

Deputy Commissioner, Marlin Brockette;

(d)

a discussion

by Dan Morgan, economist, regarding possible funding schemes
to eliminate wealth discrimination;
oral arguments made before the U.

s.

(e)

a summary of the

Supreme Court.

The NCAEW wishes to thank the following people who
have worked long and hard (and fast) to bring this booklet
to the working press and interested public: Janet Edson,
Dorothea Kahn Jaffee, Jane Lampmann, Cecily Lee,
Cynthia Parsons, and Linda Pyle.
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PART TWO
HISTORY OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM*

There is little disagreement that the public school
financing system in Texas is extremely complex.

The pro-

blem of equalization -- even at a defined minimum level
has plagued legislative policy makers in Texas for more
than two decades.

Some understanding of past equalization

problems may throw light on future prospects.
In 1949, a committee of the legislature presented a
study called "To Have What We Must."

The Gilmer-Aikin

Committee, as it was known, found some of the following
problems existing in its education system at that time:
(a)

Too many school districts were not levying any tax

to support education.

Others were contributing little

because of low assessed valuations or low tax rates.
(b)

Because of wide differences in local assessed rates,

amounts raised locally for education differed widely.

*

Dr. Glen Ivy, Executive Director of the Texas Research
League, presented this history of Texas public school
finance at the NCAEW Seminar on School Finance October 3,
1972, at the University of Texas at Austin.

..
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(c)

At that time, the only state aid (Rural Aid Program)

was so limited that many districts lacked means for good
schools.
(d)

Distributing aid on a per/pupil basis caused the

Gilmer-Aikin Committee to conclude that "such distribution
tends to unequalize rather than equalize educational
opportunities."
To remedy these conditions the committee proposed
the Minimum Foundation Program.

This new proposal's

main premise was that,
" • • • every school-age child should be given an
equal minimum educational opportunity, financed by
an equalized local tax effort supplemented by state
aid sufficient to compensate for variations in local
taxpaying ability."

The study had disclosed that in 1947 more than half
of the state's 5,000 school districts, did not even operate
a school.

The new committee proposal attempted to

eliminate such districts which served only as "tax havens,"
and recommended a modest 750 student minimum and while the
legislature agreed to eliminate districts that had no
school, it set a minimum of only 15 student (rather than
750) requisite for a district to participate in the Foundation Program.
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The new formulas for appropriating state aid and
district taxes had to be altered to include the very small
districts.

The expansion of these formulas added to the

system's complexities.

i

To reduce them, the new Minimum Foundation Program
proposed a scheme to determine the amount each district
contributes.

Theoretically, the plan seemed simple.

But

major complications resulted from the differing methods
among districts in assessing and collecting taxes.

The

variation was so great that it defied a legislative solution and the legislature did not require statewide equalization.
As a substitute for equalized property value estimates
the Committee designed an indirect measurement of local
ability.

Despite the relative simplicity of the program,

,,
the formulas covered such a range of factors and inputs
that in practice there soon was little relationship
between the taxpaying ability of a district and the money
it was alloted for education purposes.
Included in the Gilmer-Aikin package was a "credit"
system designed to reduce the local tax load on the smaller
districts.

In other words, those districts having such

items as national forests, armed service bases, state
prisons, university lands, and orphanages, had a certain
percent taken off their local share of the education
expenditures.
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However, there was one credit which proved
beneficial for the wealthy districts, called the "maximum
tax rate limitation."
In its origianl form, the clause apparently was
designed to require local school boards to keep their
values at least as high as those of the county in which
they were located,

(and use their maximum legal property

tax levy for maintenance purposes), before they would get
any extra help from the state.

When the clause was incor-

porated into the Foundation Program, its purpose apparently
was changed to protect "common" school districts which
used the county tax office and county tax roll for assessing and collecting local district taxes.

If the county

assessments were so low that they would not produce the
district's local fund assignment, the difference would
not be subtracted from the district's state aid.
Some years after the Foundation Program was adopted,
a few independent districts began claiming the maximum
tax rate credit to which they would have been entitled
if they had been common districts • • • . But by pretending that their taxable property resources were limited to
the level fixed by the county, 158 independent districts
were able to reduce their local fund assignments by a
total of more then $21 million in 1971-72 -- and to
increase their state aid by a like amount.

,.
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Another discrepancy in the financing system, in
addition to the "credit" plan, is the per/capita apportionment, a state constitutional law.

This Act guarantees

every child in the state a specific amount, without regard
to the Foundation Program's objective of an equalized
local effort.

This fund, along with the Program, often

results in a "budget-balance complication."

That is,

some districts receive more per/pupil than the total state
program specifies.

Any sum over that fixed amount is

poured back into the state budget.

The practice has no

rational relationship to the needs or ability of the
individual districts.
Despite its many complex idiosyncracies, the Minimum
Foundation Program, per se, was not challenged in the
Rodgriguez suit.*

Presumably it might meet the test of

a system based on the
,, wealth of the State as a whole.
However, the federal district court overturned the whole
public school finance system of Texas, including both the
Foundation Program and the local supplements, because only
about half of the total expenditures are equalized.
Within the Foundation Component Program itself, in
1970-71, there was a 100 percent spread of per/student
expenditures from high to low.

*

The suit states, "Any mild equalizing effeqts state
aid may have do not benefit the poorest districts."
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These variations can be attributed to the built-in
formula advantages for the smaller districts.

Even among

the larger districts however there were some discrepancies
between outlay of resources.
Because Edgewood and Alamo Heights figure prominently,
in the Rodriguez case, we might compare the Foundation Program costs for those two districts as an example.

The

cost per student was $491 in Alamo Heights and only $356
per pupil in Edgewood -- a difference of $135, or the
equivalent of nearly $2,755,000 in additional State aid
that Edgewood would have received at the Alamo Heights
level.
There are, according to Dr. Ivy, only two ways to
equalize districts like Alamo Heights and Edgewood -split the advantage which the affluent district enjoys,
or raise the poor district up to the level of the rich
system.

The Texas Research League has estimated the cost

of averaging up as follows:
Just to bring the below average districts to
the State average of $704 per student would
;

cost an additional $130 million a year.
To equalize up to reach the 99th percentile
($1,277 per student) would cost $1.4 billion.
In summary, Texas is facing a tough period if the state
has to devise a new system of financing education.

It's

going to require every effort to find new sources and new
ways of allocating.
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PART THREE
HISTORY OF THE RODRIGUEZ CASE*

To put the Rodriguez case into perspective we'll
start with the proposition that concern for unequal expenditures in public schools is not really a new concern.

It's

something that dates back at least to the 1890's and the
infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson.

In this decision the

United States Supreme Court declared that separate but
equal facilites were unconstitutional.
Since Plessy there has been a gradual erosion of
the separate but equal doctrine.

During the first half

of the 20th Century courts began finding inherent inequalities in it and started to use the inequalities they found
as a way to integrate segregated schools and universities.

*

Summary of remarks made at the NCAEW Seminar on School
Finance October 3, 1972, by~ Yudof, co-counsel for
the plaintiffs in the Rodri~uez case. Mr. Yudof
requests that nothing in th1s statement · be construed
or interpreted as indicating the plaintiff's position,
but should be regarded as his own views.

-19-

For example, by the middle of the 20th century the
•
University of Texas at Austin Law School was integrated
pursuant to a court order on the theory that a law school
which the state had given to the blacks was not equal to
Austin.

The court in that decision considered not only

the physical facilities but also the intangibles, such
as school prestige.

These were the only decisions during

the first half of the century up to the 1954 Supreme
Court case, Brown v. the Board of Education.

In this case,

the Supreme Court repudiated the "seperate but equal"
doctrine saying that schools separated by race are inherently unequal.

Even if you could count the last piece of

chalk in school buildings and they're equal in some physical sense, the court says no, that will not suffice:
You've got to integrate these schools.
This, I think, had a profound effect on civil rights
litigation for the next fifteen years.

Civil rights

lawyers and activists organizations like the NAACP essentially addressed themselves to the integration problem.
.,

By

the mid 1960's all this began to change.

to change for a variety of reasons.

And it began

One, quite under-

standably, was that there was a good deal of dissatisfaction with the progress of desegregation in the South.
The second was that even in those areas where integration had occurred the equalization problem was not
solved.

.. ...
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It seemed that what ultimately happened was that the
poor blacks went to school with poor whites in poor schools.
Both poor black and poor white children simply were not
getting their share of the pie.
Another factor I suppose is that some people eaw
better school financing as a politically feasible alternative to the controversial integration.

They hoped that

somehow one could achieve equality in education through
the manipulation of the financial structure rather than
through integration.
Contributing also to the demand for improved financing
was an increased emphasis on local control of the school
structure on the part of particular racial and ethnic groups.
So, with all these ideas in the air, we saw a change
in the mid '60's among civil rights groups from emphasis
on integration alone for removing inequalities to an emphasis on school financing.
It was at this point that Congress entered the scene
with Title I of the Elementary and Secondary School Act
of 1965.

It provided for special educational services

for indigent children.
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There was a ·twofold recognition:

(1)

that the poor

children might not be getting their fair share of local
and/or state resources and therefore federal resources
were required;

{2)

that poor

children might actually

require not simply equality of resources, but additional
resources -- resources that more affluent children did
no·t need because they came from homes in which food was
plentiful, and there were books, summer camp opportunities,
and the like.
The first challenge to school financing occurred in

..

the District of Columbia in the famous case of Hobson v •
Hansen in 1967.

In that case, Julius Hobson brought suit

against the District of Columbia Board of Education for
failing to distribute funds between black and white
schools equitably.
ally gargantuan.

Sometimes the disparities were actuSome white schools were spending two

and three times as much money per/pupil as some black
schools in the same district.
This resulted in a number of things.

One was that

the expensive teachers -- that is the teachers with
degrees and more pay -- generally taught in the white
schools.
A second factor was the age of the buildings and
the conditions of the physical facilities in the area.

'

.....

·~·

...

.~
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When it came to counting cafeterias, gymnasiums,
broken windows and so forth, the black students were
always on the adverse end of that count.

That was also

true of honors courses, library books and, in general,
congestion in the schools.
Justice Skelly Wright, in the Hobson v. Hansen
decision, ultimately ruled that he would permit only 5%
deviations between schools in the District of Columbia.
He said, "I realize there are some administrative hassels,
but you'd better work it out to within 5%."
There are several tltings to be noted about Hobson in
order to put this in perspective.
intradistrict case.

One is that it is an

What is being alleged is that there

are disparities between schools within the same district.
That is a very different case from one that involves disparities between districts and that's what we're talking
about in Rodriguez.
The second point which is absolutely crucial is that
Hobson involves a racial classification.

In Serrano and

Rodriguez we're talking about all the poor -- white, black,
and Chicano.
And the third thing which is important is that no one
paid any attention to Hobson.

Judge Wright was always

viewed as something of a deviant judge and his decisions
were simply not followed in other jurisdictions at that
time.
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So then we move on in this rapid history, and after
Hobson v. Hansen there comes down in 1967 the first interdistrict suit, Mcinnis v. Olgilvie in Illinois.

I think

it's fair to say that the suit was a calamity.

The plain-

tiffs petitioned the court to distribute the state's funds
according to the educational needs of the children.

This

was asking for a sort of child by child, district by district survey.

The court said that that was preposterous

and most people would agree.

The court rejected the suit,

saying it was nonjudiciable and was largely a political
and legislative question.
By this time school

financing was thought to be dead

as a lawyer's type of issue.
Sugarman came on the scene.

Then Coons, Clune, and
Coons was a law professor at

Berkeley who had been working diligently on these problems.
He and his colleagues wrote a brilliant article which has
largely formed the basis of all the attacks we see today
-- the Rodriguez suit, the Serrano suit, the suits in
Arizona, New York, New Jersey and others.
Their legal argument went somewhat

as follows:

The first thing to decide is whether education is of fundamental interest.

They put together all the documents they

could find to support the proposition that education was
important to the success of a student, to his socioeconomic mobility, to his job security, to the amount of
income he would get. They also argued that it was absolutely
crucial to participation in the democratic process.
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The second prong of their argument, and this is still
hotly disputed,

was

that poor people live in poor dis-

tricts and that therefore any system which treats poor
people distinctly as a class must be scrutinized by the
court.

This comes from a long line of cases which say

that when a certain group of people are politically powerless and legislation treats them differently from other
people in the state, the court will be peculiarly aware
of this and will scrutinize the classification with a.
great deal of care.
And the third prong is that g·iven these two things -discrimination on the one hand and the importance of education on the other -- the state must come up with a compelling reason for classification.
"Compelling reason" is the legal jargon.

What it

means is that there q,re ways to finance education without
discriminating against the poor.

Coonsi Clune, and

Sugarman argued that there certainly are alternatives.
The plan that they proposed, which ! 1 m tola had arisen
earlier, was something they called district power equalization.
What they were .saying in effect was, if you're really
worried about local control and you want each district to
determine its own tax rate and if each district. is to
choose between hospitals and highways and fire departments,
then the way to do that is to make each district equally
capable of raising funds for all these purposes.

.~·

·~

..

~.
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Poor districts do not choose to spend less for education.

It's like telling a man who makes $50 a week that

he has the same right as a millionaire to send his son to
Exeter.

It just isn't so.

He can't spend his $50 in any

fashion which will allow for the Exeter education.
They're saying in effect, let's equalize the ability
of the poor and rich districts to spend for education, and
once we've equalized the ability, then if the poor districts
turn out to not value education very much, well, that's
their choice and they have to live with it.

But let's

equalize their ability.
Essentially what we're talking about is subsidies
from the state to the local districts in order to do this.
At any level of taxation, at 1%, 2%, whatever, Edgewood,
the poor district in San Antonio, should be able to raise
as much money as

Ala~o

Heights, the rich.

If it cannot, the

state will make up the difference.
There are a couple of things to think about in
relation to the Coons' approach.

One thing is that

Coons' standard is much simpler than the educational
needs standard of Mcinnis.

The other is that it really

moves one away from the educational suit and takes on
the overtones of a taxation suit.
A third thing which is very important is that Coons'
proposal is a negative standard. Coons is telling you what
is unconstitutional, he isn't telling you what you have
to do.
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In the Coons' rational the court simply declares that
the present method of financing education is unconstitutional because it discriminates according to wealth.

It

is up to the legislature to figure out any other scheme
it wishes so long as it doesn't have this constitutional
imperfection in it.
So this is the standard which is employed in Serrano
v. Priest in California and in Rodriguez v. San Antonio

ISD.

It holds that the state may not allocate its resources
according to wealth of the individual or the school district but must allocate them according to the wealth of
the state as a whole.
Now, with something of the basic framework, let's go
into the specific history of Rodriguez.
in the spring of 1968.

The suit began

Bexar County commissioner Albert

Penia brought a number of parents of children attending
school in Edgewood, a San Antonio district, to speak with
Arthur Gochman, who has a private practice in San Antonio,
and has handled a number of civil rights lawsuits.
The parents were very unhappy with the Edgewood schools,
saying there was a shortage of classroom teachers, poor
facilities, vast overcrowding, lack of basic education
materials.

The conversation began with an effort to fix

blame for discrimination on persons, but ended with placing
the onus on the syst.em itself.

Mr Gochman became chief

counsel for the plaintiffs.

/"

... ·'
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In September 1969,the case came before the court.
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and
that was really the crucial decision.

..

The court thus was

saying to the plaintiffs, I agree with you as a matter of
law.

If you can prove the facts to us, we're going to

'

rule in your favor.

At that time the court was rather optimistic.

It

said to the legislature, we'll give you two years to do
something about this problem, to act on the govenor's
report.

The legislature convened in January 1971, and

adjourned in June but, quite predictably did nothing about
it.
After the legislative session, Mr. Gotchman began to
make preparations for the trial and it was at this point
that I began to assist him.

We began by outlining our

strategy. We felt that the inequities of the system were
so great that our job was to convince the court of the
magnitude of the discrimination against the poor and minority children.

We thought that if we could make our case

to the court that this is really the way the system is,
that it really is discriminatory, the court would rule in
our favor.
The state's case at this point was even simpler.

Its

tactics were, 1) to expose what it termed the "frivolous
nature" of the law suit (which ultimately was not too suecessful) and 2) to uncover what it alleged were unsavory
motives of the plaintiffs' lawyers and their expert witnesses.
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Prior to the trial, the testimony of the witnesses
was taken and the court made the decision on the written
record.
The trial, I think it is fair to say, followed the
prel~
brie~

skirmishes.

The defendants reported on their

,

which I think in a number of points supports our

factual if not our legal contention.
Concluding its oral argument, the state argued that
it was guided by a sense of honesty, that the plaintiffs
were seeking socialized education, and that if the case
ended with the invalidation of the Texas financing system,
it would lead to forty years of seeking another solution,
"like Moses wandering in the desert."
The plaintiffs relied, obviously, on the recent
Serrano decision, emphasizing the flexibility the legislature would have if in fact this decree were entered.

They

said they simply fought for the standard for which Professor
Coons had fought.

That is, that the legislature should

have wide discretion in choosing a financing scheme, but
it must pick one which doesn't discriminate systematically
against the poor and minority groups.
On December 23, 1971, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously upheld the charge that the present Texas school
financing scheme is unconstitutional, and directed the
state to remedy the situation within two years.
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You can see the restraint the court has exercised.
The directive allows the legislature two more years after
December 1971, for completion of the new program.

So,

we're really talking about a remedy which will not go
into effect until early 1974.

The suit started in 1968,

and six years can elapse before the state gets its house
in order, with two or three warnings along the way.

I

suppose that at the end of that time nothing will have
happened, and the court will have to implement its injunction if it is affirmed.
At the end of the opinion, the court disposed of the
defendant's argument that the plaintiffs were calling for
socialized education.

Education, like the postal service,

has been socialized and publicly financed and operated by
the government almost from its inception.

The court held

that the type of socialized education, not the question
of its existence, is the only matter currently in dispute.
And that, of course, was the point we had been trying to
make -- that education had been socialized since the 1850's.
If they had a bone to pick in that regard, they should
have taken it up with Horace Mann and certainly not with
the plaintiffs in this suit.
Rodriguez is now pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court.

The hearing took place October 12.

Professor

Charles Alan Wriqht argued for the state, Arthur Gotchman
for the plaintiffs.
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There appeared to be four main issues before the
court at the time of the

u.s.

Supreme Court hearing.

is whether or not this case is manageable.
when the court issues its decrees?
pay attention?

One

What happens

Is anyone going to

What shall the court do if no one responds?

A second issue is whether or not the court treats
poverty as a suspect classification, and whether or not
it affirms the finding of the lower court that by and
large poor people do live in poor districts.
The third element is whether in a constitutional
sense education is deemed to be of fundamental interest.
And the final thing, I think, is whether or not the
court believes that the case can be limited to its own
facts.

And I think that's crucially important.

The argu-

ment has been made that if tax income is equalized among
school districts today, why not hospitals tomorrow, and
roads and sewers and so forth.

I think the court is going

to have to be convinced that it can put stops on this
suit at some particular point.

That it's going to be able

to deal with the education issue in isolation, that by
committing itself to the Serrano and Rodriguez principle
it is not committing itself to an endless series of litigations involving every conceivable public service.
We're going to have to clear up exactly what we're
talking about in Rodriquez.
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One point that needs clarification is: Are we talking
about a taxpayers' suit?
financing system?

What offends us about the present

Is it the fact that some taxpayers must

bear a heavier burden than others to raise the same amount
or less for the same education for their youngsters?

Are

we really talking about an inequitable taxation scheme?
The second thing the court will have to decide is
whether or not this discrimination extends only to discrimination against the poor.

And that is really problematic.

Suppose the state comes in and says we've got a perfectly
rational financing scheme.

Lots of kids get more than

other kids, but when you round them up, the kids who get
less are not consistently poor or members
groups.

Some get more than others, and we think that's

a good idea.
tutional.

of minority

The question is whether or not that is consti-

If the suit does extend only to prohibiting dis-

crimination against the poor, there's no reason to think
that that would be unconstitutional.
And the third point which I think that the court will
ultimately take a position on, and which I would certainly
take, is simply the proposition that the state has got to
inject some rationality into this financing process.
have an essentially irrational scheme at this time.

We
We're

talking about discrimination based upon the accident of
whether or not a child lives in a district with a Dupont
plant, whether or not the school which he attends has oil
underneath it.
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We're talking about things which bear no relation to
children's education.

So I would hope that what we get

out of Rodriguez is a requirement of
It's pretty simple.

rationality.

When the state distributes it's

resources and gives some children more than others, it
has to give reasons, and those reasons simply have to be
rational.

If the state says we want to give handicapped

children more money, fine, and if the state says we want
to give gifted children more money, fine, and so on.

But

don't give one child more money than another child, simply
because of fortuity.
And I'm

hop~ng

Give reasons for your discrepancies.
that that's ultimately where the

Rodriguez case will take us, although I don't think that
in this round of litigation it will take us there.

This

~

means that even if Rodriguez is affirmed, I think we can
look forward to a number of years of litigating this issue.
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.

PART FOUR
THE POSITION OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION*

Two weeks after the Texas Supreme Court ordered state

.

education authorities to restructure the entire system of
financing the public school system, the State Board of
Education adopted a formal resolution on the matter.
First, the resolution requested the Attorney General
to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.
If the result of such action were a reversal of the Rodriguez
,,
decision, the State Board of Education could continue to
follow its present course.
Second, facing the possibility that the

u.s.

Supreme Court

might uphold the Texas Court's order, the resolution stated:
"The State Board of Education ••• assumes full
responsibility for developing a proposal to be submitted to the Govenor, the Legislature, and to the
gener.,.l public which will provide for financing public
school education in Texas in accordance with st~ndards
of high quality commensurate · ~'1ith the financial ability
of Texas."

*

A summary of remarks made by Dr. Marlin B~ockette,
deputy commissioner, Texas Education Agency (TEA),
at the NCAEW Seminar on School Finance, held October 3,
1971, at the University of Texas at Austin.

-34-

Several officially appointed study groups have been
working on the problem of Texas school finance for many
years.

So that the final proposal presented for legisla-

tive action would represent the "broadest participation by
citizens,"

the

State Board has invited these groups to

coordinate their findings with its own.
Each of these groups is working independently but
all are using the same data base.

This includes TEA's

estimates of future school needs and its study of market
value of taxed property in Texas school districts, as well
as a compendium of school statistics prepared by the Texas
Research League.
To help these study groups, the State Board has prepared a chart for procedure -- a visual guide.

This is

shown on the last page in this section.
To guide its own staff in planning, the State Board
drew up a statement of principles of school finance.

The

dominant note in this statement is support for local control of school financing.

This appears to move in a direc-

tion opposite to that implied in Rodriguez.
State Board affirmed that in drawing

u~

However, the

the guidelines it

was considering not only the general problem of improving
school financing but also the specific concerns of Rodriguez.
"Local taxes should continue to be used in the district
collected," is one principle laid down.

Added to this is

the caution that districts should not be restricted in their
efforts to add to their funds by their own efforts.
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Less controversial is the point that control of the
district's funds should be vested in the citizens residing
in the district.
"tax-havens"

An evident allusion to the existence of

districts gerrymandered to minimize or

avoid the taxation of wealthy property-owners -- is made
in this section.
It is observed that emphasis on local control will
require "responsible district organization and financial
structure."
Regarding state financing to equalize district income,
the principles are stated in very broad terms.
(a)

For example:

"The allocation of state funds shall give consideration

to the ability of the local school district to provide local
tax and other revenues; and (b)

"Guaranteed funding of

the state's share of basic educational opportunity for all
children must continue to be a key element."
This contrasts with the court order which called for
an entirely new plan by which public education is made a
function of the state as a whole and not of the district.
While recognizing the need for improving the state's

.

method of financing its schools, the Board of Education
holds that the demands of Rodriguez are impracticable.
The Board's position is made clear in papers by
Ben R. Howell, Board Chairman.

In these Mr. Howell dis-

cusses the Board's reasons for requesting appeal of the
case.

The gist of the argument is as follows.
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The State Board of Education agrees that Texas should
improve its method of financing education.

Mr. Howell

calls the disparity among districts in evaluation of property and return from tax effort "a horrible example of
inequity."

He deplores the existence of "tax havens with

a tiny number of children and a huge tax base."

The Board,

he says, has asked for authority to reorganize districts
and should be given it.
But, Mr. Howell contends, to accept the court's demand
that variations in wealth among governmentally chosen units
may not affect spending for the education of any child
presents problems seemingly unsoluble.
The Board's reasons for this stand are stated in the
brief filed by the Board's attorney, Charles Alan Wright,
in a request for a
holds in effect:
able;

(b)

u.s.

(a)

,,

Supreme Court hearing.

The brief

that the court's demands are unreason-

that to bring all districts up to the present

district average of spending per/student would more than
double the amount the state now spends upon education;

(c)

that it is very "unlikely" that the state could produce
that amount of money; and (d)

that such spending would

not be wise public policy. Other social needs are still
unmet in Texas because of underfunding, it notes.

Further,

it argues that it cannot be proved that greatly increased
spending for education would improve quality •

..
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A management task force of the Texas Education Agency
and consultants are now developing alternate plans for the
State Board of Education.

Regardless of the outcome of

Rodriguez, the Board states as its goal, "improv1ng the
below-average standard schools without pulling down the
best schools.•
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PROPOSED STEPS FOR DETERMINING A METHOD OF
FINANCING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Scope of Public School Education Determined:
A. Populations
What age groups will be financed
by the state?
B. Programs and Services
What kind will be financed to
meet the objectives of the goals
adopted?
C. Elements of Quality
What criteria will be used to
determine the quality of services
as far as money is concerned?

Organization - Structure of Governmental
Units Determined
What structure should be used to
better -q.se of resources?

l

Level of Funding Determined
How much money needed to carry out
these plans?

Method of Financing Determined
What approach for distribution of
funds?
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PART FIVE
ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF FINANCING PUBLIC SCHOOLS
OR
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE

SUPRE~ill

COURT UPHOLDS RODRIQUEZ?*

Introduction
The appropriate men to address my topic, "What
Happens if Rodriguez Is Upheld?" are the other men on our
program, Dr. Marlin Brockette, Deputy Commissioner of
Education, and Mark Yudof, of the UT Law faculty and counsel for the plaintiffs in the case and Dr. Glenn Ivy,
Director of the recent Governor's Committee on Public School
Reform.

What I shall do is discuss the possibilities, most

of which are not political probabilities.

At the end of

my presentation I shall go into what I consider to be

.

politically relevant forecasts.

*

Address by Daniel c. Morgan, Jr., to the National
Council for the Advancement of Education Writing,
J. Thompson Conference Center, University of Texas
at Austin, October 3, 1972.
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The Assumptions
First, I shall assume that the court rules that wealth
discrimination is what the Rodriguez case is about, and
that wealth discrimination between districts is out henceforth, i.e., that it must be eliminated very, very quickly.
Obviously the court need rule no such things, and my personal guess is that they will not.

But I want to operate

initially with strong case assumptions and leave to the
lawyers and the politicians the realistic compromise forecasts.

So I shall assume that the high court says, "No

more wealth discrimination among the school districts of
Texas."

Under such a ruling practically anything in the

way of system or solution is legal, the only prescription
being that the state of Texas is not to discriminate on
the basis of wealth among its many school districts.
keep things simple

I~shall

To

assume that the only alternative

systems open to the state are these&
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Full State Funding
Minimum Foundation Program approach--fixed unit
variety
Minimum Foundation Program approach-- variable
unit variety
Power or percentage equalizing of some sort: or
Some combination of these four.

To make the illustrations as simple as possible, I'll
manufacture a mythical state with •
1.
2.
3.

Four districts--A, B, C, D
Each district with 25 pupils
Wealth per pupil as follows:
District
Wealth/5upil
A
$10,0 0

B

c

D

20,000
30,000
40,000
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This

mythical state differs quite a bit from Texas

reality, with its 1149 districts (not 4); with fantastic
differences in wealth per pupil, (not just 4 to 1 ratio).
[In the latest study, published by the Texas Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the range of
market value per/pupil goes all the way from $5,147 per
pupil in Edgewood to $10.9 million per pupil in Provident
City, or over 2,000 to 1!]

And of course the actual range

of students among Texas districts is immense.
Let me assume a system somewhat like Texas where the
state provieds a foundation guaranteeing so much per/pupil,
say $400, with the state paying 80% of the cost of the State
program and the local districts collectively paying 20%
(with each district paying in accordance with its respective capacity; let's say that this is measured by its
,,
wealth per/pupil). But in addition to the State program
the local districts can provide whatever they wish -- or
"local enrichment" is completely up to the local district.
Let us assume that each district decides to make the same

.

tax effort -- highly unlikely •
Then we would have this situation to begin with,
pre-Rodriguez:
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SITUATION PRE-RODRIGUEZ

Dist.
A
B

c

D

State
Corcpulsory
Foundation local
Wealth Guarantee
taxes
$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000

$ 400

400
400
400
$1600

$ 32
64
96
128
$320
(20% of
$1600>

State
aid
(1)- (2)
$ 368
336
304
272
$1280
(80% of
$1600)

Local volTotal
untary taxes revenue:
at 2% local = (2) +
rate
(3) + (4)
$ 200
400
600
800
$2000

$ 600
800
1000
1200
$3600

So pre-Rodriguez we commence with immense disparities
in total revenue per pupil, as Column (5) shows, going
from $600 in A to $1200 in D.

The source of the differ-

ences is the local districts' wealth bases:

they range

from $10,000 per pupil to $40,000 per pupil, so that equal
tax rates of 2% (or 20 mills) give a range from $200 to
$800 per pupil in local districts revenues.

[This is

nothing like actual differences which ranged from $300
or so to thousands in the years pertinent to the Roqriguez
case.]
We wish to end the discrimination.

[Notice that the

total cost of the program, State + local, is $3600.

Notice

also that cost to the State government is only $1280.]
suppose that we wish to keep costs (State plus local,
combined) constant, at $3600.
at $900 per pupil.

We equalize to the middle

So
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Equalizing to the Middle Under
A State Flat Grant
Say that we take the route of 100% State Funding,
using State flat grants of $900 per pupil, ending all
local district taxation (compulsory as well as voluntary
local enrichment).

Now only the State bears the taxes.

So we get:

Wealth State Carpulsory
per
Eupil

flat
9:rant

local
taxes

State
aid

local
enrichrrent

revenue

$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000

$ 900
900
900
900

$0
0
0
0

$ 900
900
900
900

$0
0
0
0

$ 900
900
900
900

$100,000

$3600

$0

$3600

$0

$3600

Dist.
A

B

c

D

Total

Half the districts gain (A and B) but half the districts
lose (C and D) :
A= +$300; B

=

+$100; C

=

-$100; D = -$300.

Total cost (and average revenue per pupil) is the same.
But then notice how costs to the State government rise:
They were $1280 earlier; now they are $3600 -- nearly a

..

300% increase in costs!

Not too popular with state legis-

lators.
But even with this we see C and D's children hurt.
Some would say, surely we don't want to let them be hurt.
If we equalized everybody to the level of D's children
($1200), costs would go to $4800.

,.

~) .~.
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Now total costs (State and local) have risen
$3600 to $4800, or 33 1/3%.
ment have risen from $1280 to

~rom

But costs to the State govern$4800~

nearly fourfold.

Full State Funding
One alternative, then, is for the State government
to take over the entire funding of the education program,
thereby relieving the local school districts of all their
property tax obligations. The State could do this either
through centralization or by flat grant payments to the
school districts.

Probably implicit in centralization

and State operation of the schools is the idea that the
State government will make all of what we think of as the
big

education decisions, decisions such as the level of

program and such as the allocation of our education resources.
~

Centralization is not about to happen as the result of
Rodriguez, so for the sake of brevity I'll pass it by as
an alternative.

But the State government could make grants

to the districts and continue to make the decisions it
presently makes and have the local districts make most of
the decisions they presently make.

State flat grants could

be equal perjpupil or per/task unit (whatever the unit may
be) or it could be weighted, so that certain pupils or
units receive more than others.

(In Texas we presently

have much of the latter and there would be heavy pressure
to keep it so.)
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(So, saying "flat grants" does not necessarily imply
equal amount per/ p upil.

If we wish more money for needier

pupils, ttis is perfectly legitimate under Rodriguez, so
long as the differences are not invidious distinctions or
classifications.)
Seeing how this works out with an

over-simple myth-

ical state example, it should come as no surprise to us
then that actual empirical costs to the State in Texas
jump irnroensely unC.er 1.00% State funding.

Even if we keep

total costs of education constant in Texas and equalize
to the middle it would cost the State government abcut
$1 billion today.

And say that we equalized up to the

level of Texas City (just under $1000 per pupil in 1970-71
or the 95th percentile in Texas), it would cost nearly
$2 billion!

(This is so even though it would cost state +

local together only between $600 and $700 million.)
The State government is not apt to foot this entire
bill, npedless to say!

They will at the very least turn

to a Minimum Foundation Program approach (as we used to
call it; in Texas we now call it a Foundation School
Program) .

Under this approach even though the State

guarantees money or services it compels the local districts to put up some portion of the cost: the State does
not bear it all alone.
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Progr~rn

Foundation

Approaches

Under a Foundation Program the State lays down a
compulsory uniform rate tax on the local school districts.
It makes the portion it wishes the districts to put up
a~ything

the State wishes.

Texas has used 20%, roughly,

but it could be more than this.
district pays of this total

The portion that each

percent depends on its

relative capacity to pay taxes, the given district's
ability relative to the ability of the others.
be measured all kinds of ways:
Index to measure it.

This can

Texas uses an Economic

There is plenty

of pressure nowadays

to measure it in a.ccordance with full market value of
property.
One big question after Rodriguez, if the court rules
for the plaintiffs, is:

if we use a foundation program,

can there be any local enrichment atop this

even as

little as 5%, 10%, or 15% -- that continues to use the
fantastic differences in wealth vJi tbout. using power
ization

(which I'll talk about in a minute).

and logically the answer is NO!
give wealth discrimination:

l~ny

~qual

Certainly

amount continues to

districts with dozens of

times the wealth per/pupil hold the big advantage still;
you would simply be reducing the dollar amount of it if
you allow any local
progra~ ~ithout

enrich~ent

at.op the State foundation

power equalizing for the local portion.

-47-

So let

~e

assume for a moment that there is only a

State foundation system and no local enrichment atop it,
as we think of the term local enrichment today.
:

There are tv-10 basic types of foundat.ion programs:
1.
the fixed unit approach
2.
the variable unit approach
Some of each of these is found in Texas' Foundation
School Program

to~ay.

able unit approach.

But the dominant part is the variThis is very unusual among the· states.

It comes about because of how our Salary Schedule dominates
our foundation program

80% to 90% of its total costs.

But the fixed unit approach is easier to understand; so
I'll start with that and play as if the entire system is
fixed unit, for a moment.
Fixed Urli t Approach to Foundation Program
To go back to my original example, if we want equal
spending per / pupil but no increase in State + local district
costs, we provide $900 per/pupil again.

This makes the

situation:
Dist.
A
B

c
D

Wealth per pupil

Foundation
guarantee

$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000

$ 900
900
900
900

Total= $100,000

Total= $3600
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If we want to keep the State-local division at 80-20,
then local districts must pay $720 or 20% of $3600.

It

would be divided so that A would pay 10% of this because
it has 10% of the ability, ($10,000 is 10% of $100,000);
B would pay 20%; C would pay 30%; D would pay 40%.
Notice that the original cost being paid by the State
government pre-Rodriguez was $1280.
or $2880. More than double.

Now it is [$3600 -$720]

And the children of C and D

are receiving less money than pre-Rodriguez.

So, there

would almost surely be equalizing up; so the increase to
the State government would be greater than this.
It is easy to see that if the State goes to an all-out
Foundation program approach it will almost surely be
changing the State-local ratio; so the local districts
~ill

be paying more than 20% of the program's costs.
As we work on these things it comes clear pretty fast

that Rodriguez is not going to mean the end of property
taxes for schools if it means the end of

\'Tec3_l

th disc rim-

ination and any real help for the poorest districts!
Costs to State Government of Alternative
Splittlng Arrangements, 1970-71
Keep average costs/
pupil constant ($704)
Equalize up to Odessa
[86th%]: $804
Equalize to Texas City
[95th%]: $959
Equalize to Deer Park
[99.1%]: $1277
Equalize to Andrews
[99.9%]: $1708

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

'•

80-20

60-40

50-50

$ 691 mil.

$ 518 mil.

$ 432 mil.

1,006

"

745.3"

629

"

1,321

"

984

"

820

"

1,943

II

1,463

II

1,251

II

2,624

II

1,968

II

1,640

II
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Local districts will not be relieved of property
taxes.
We'd have to equalize everybody down to Edgewood's
level.

That would lower total

(State-local) spending

$700 willian, and the State government would just break
even!
But Andrews would lose about $3 million, i.e., over
$1,000/pupil; Alamo Heights would lose about $500/pupil;
Houston and Dallas would lose between $55 and $65 million
each, between $300 and $400/pupil.
(When people say money doesn't matter, just suggest
to them that we solve our equalization problem by cutting
everyone down to Edgewood's level!)
Variable Unit Approach to Foundation Program
Some foundation programs, though rare nowadays, are
not per/pupil based,

~r

per/classroom, or per;task unit.

They are not fixed unit approaches, they are variable unit
appioaches.

The common variable unit approach is the State

minimum salary schedule approach.

The State sets up a

minimum salary that each teacher of designated characteristics or qualifications must receive no matter what district she or he teaches in.

Usually the teachers with more

schooling and more experience are deemed to provide the
better teaching services and the districts with these
teachers receive the greater State aid.

This is the major

part of the Texas Foundation School Program.
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The Foundation Prograro has some other aspects that
are 100 % State funding, and some that are fixed unit
foundation approach, like the $660 per classroom teacher
unit for maintenance and operation.

But $660 for, say,

25 pupils per classroom unit, comes to about $26 per/pupil.
(It really goes a little higher than this, to abut $30
for the average CTU.)

But all this is peanuts compared

to the salary schedules.
The State Board of Ec.ucation and most people concerned
seem to want to retain this unusual salary schedule approach
as a basic for aid to the school districts.

As thinge

stand now, wi t.h local enrichment based on the immense
differences in wealth, not only do we have great differences in local enrichroent money per/pupil among the districts, v_re even often have the State Foundation's program
giving more rooney to the rich districts than to the poor,
contrary to what we would expect.

This is because the

richer districts are more able to hire the teachers with
the more degrees and experience, and to hire more aides,
etc., that the program pays them for having.
So one question that faces us if we retain any kind
of local enrichment at all and at the same time retain
the salary schedule as a major part of our foundation program is, is this not wealth discriminatory and unconstitutional?
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If the richest districts have the best chance of
attracting the teachers with the qualities that give the
biggest State money -- because a given tax effort by
:

richer districts gives them more money -- are we not wealth
discriminating?

In other words, is not the Salary Schedule

approach unconstitutional?

Almost certainly it would not

be if we have power equalization among the school districts,
so that each district has an artificial equal economic
potential per/student, thus an equal ability to attract
a given characteristic of teacher.
With all this talk about "power equalization," it is
time to talk about it!
The Power Equalization or Percentage
Equalization Approach
So far we have talked only about reforms that turn
the big education decisions over to the State government
-- at least decisions as to the level of outlay and how
that outlay is to be distributed among· the various school
districts.
But suppose we want the local school districts to
make practically all the big decisions?

In other words,

suppose we really favor the principle of local control,
practically all the way?
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If the plaintiffs win Rodriguez, clearly we can't just
say "Local enrichment all the way," leaving the wealth
disparities per/pupil remaining immense, as they are in
Texas today.

With our immense disparities, with equal

tax effort the revenues per/pupil differences would be
immense.

But does this mean that local control is out

completely?
deal with.

This is one of the decisions the court must
But my guess is that it will say no.

Local

control is perfectly okay, the Supreme Court will say, so
long as there is power equalization among the school districts.

Many people fail to understand this point because

they don't understand power equalization or equalization
of fiscal potential per/pupil.
Many people assume tha·t with Rodriguez (if affirmed}
we must choose between two alternatives, both of which they
consider bad:
1.

Local control (good) but with wealth discrimination (bad)

2.

State uniformity and/or no local control (bad) but
with no wealth discrimination (good).

But, theoretically at least, we can indeed have both
local control and diversity of levels of education among
the various school districts if we do it under conditions
of "fiscal neutrality" or equal resources per/pupil.
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The idea is for the end of wealth discrimination but
to continue to allow the local districts to decide the
le~els

of program they want

throug~

the tax rates they

are willing to pay, except not like toeay, where Edgewood
can tax itself out of existence and raise very little
~oney

while Andrews can make very little effort and raise

a barrelfull.

The State government plays a subsidizing

role in setting up a situation so that equal tax effort
gets districts the same revenue per/J?upil no matter their
real wealth per/pupil.

But higher effort gets you more

money and you, the district, make the decision about how
much effort
~his

yo~

wish to make.

is dcne with formulas but the basic idea cf one

kind of power equalization where the State keys on the
richest district can be displayed easily.

First assume,

unrealistically, that each district puts fort.h the same
true tax effort:

Actual
Cist.

EUEil

State
gUc-rran teec
~\'eal th Base

A
B

$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000

$40,000
40,000
40,000
40,000

~7ealth

l-:ler

c

D

Local
tax
rate

2%
2%
2%
2%

Total
revenue
r--er
EUEil

$800
800
800
800

Tax Paid
by local
district
(2% x act. wealth)

$200
400
600
800

State
aid

$600
400
200
0
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In this case every district pays an equal percentage
of its true wealth in tax, and with equal effort all districts receive equal total revenue per/pupil.
But of course districts will not all have the same
"appetite for education and taxes,
same effort.

Dist.
A

B

c

D

$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000

and will not make the

Suppose IA makes 1 % and D makes 1%, while B

makes 3% a.nd C makes 2 %.
P..ctual
Wealth
per
EUEil

II

Then we have the following:

Wealth Base

IDeal
tax
rate

Total
revenue
per
pupil

Tax paid
by
local
district

$40,000
40,000
40,000
40,000

1%
3%
2%
1%

$ 400
1,200
800
400

100
600
600
400
$1,700

State
guaranteed

Equal effort of A and D gives equal
(total): $400 per pupil.

$

State
aid
300
600
200
0
$1,100

$

revenue per pupil

Higher effort gives higher taxes

and higher revenue per/pupil.

The local districts make

the crucial decisions --"local control."

But, unlike to-

day, every district has an equal chance: equal effort
yields equal revenue per/pupil.
Of course if it wishes the State can say:

you must

make at least so much effort; or you can't make above so
much effort.
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Co~binations

of Approaches

Now the [previous examplel assvmes complete local
control -- no more foundation system.

But of course the

State can create a foundation system -- fixed unit approach
and/or variable unit approach -- and put some power equalization above it.
In other words, it can make up any combination of
the above approaches it likes.

For example:

the total

system might be: E[(l) + (2) + (3)]:
( 1) •
•

+ ( 2)

+ ( 3)

•

Some things -- full State funding
Foundation program:
more fixed amount per/pupil or per/classroom district than the present system has;
plus
contintuation of the present Salary Schedule
approach
Power equlaization (with some limits) above these
State programs. Clearly this ends wealth
discrimination and is constitutional. (So
long as the local is power equalized and not
just local enrichment based on the present
power bases.)
Forecasting What the State Will Do

What will the State do?

What will come from the

Texas Education Agency, Texas Research League, "Mauzy
Con!IT1ittee," Texas State Teachers Association, et al,
studies, plus politics?
I believe the lines are emerging and that Dr. Brockette
can answer the question for us.

I think that the Texas

Education Agency plan, or something related to it, is what
will emerge.

Let us not

worry for a moment about whether

the plan is wealth discriminatory.
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I am fully certain that what the Legislature passes
will continue to be a highly wealth discriminatory plan.
The plans that end it are either too expensive or hurt too
much those who've "got it" now, while those who are being
hurt don't have the power to assert their rights.
What will emerge will be a plan that improves the
Foundation School Program considerably; it will be phased
in over several years; it will continue local enrichment
(which is clearly wealth discriminatory); it will continue
capital outlay and dept service with districts, giving no
aid from the State,

(which is also wealth discriminatory);

it will put a lot of emphasis on creating new staff positions
[Out of the Govenor's Committee Report the main result was
increases in teachers salaries; now there are a couple of
teachers looking for work for every job opening, and TSTA
is anxious for more openings]; it will increase the State
program and money per/pupil which will help the poorest
districts.

In other words, the emphasis will be on making

the foundation program more adequate, more than today's,
and this will help the poorest districts.
But it will leave heavy wealth discrimination, and we
will be back in court

~mmediately

trying to show how wealth

discriminatory the plan remains and trying to get the
court to force a nondiscriminatory plan on the State.
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PART SIX
THE ORAL ARGUMENTS

On

October 12, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United

States heard the oral arguments in case number 71-1332 -San Antonio Independent School District, et al,
v.

Appellants,

Demetrio P. Rodriguez, et al., Appellees. Eight justices

were in attendance:
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice
William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice
Potter Stewart, Associate Justice
Byron R. White, Associate Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice
Charles A. Wright, of Austin, Texas, was the lawyer
for the Appellants.

Arthur Gochman, San Antonio, Texas,

was the lawyer for the Apellees.
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First, excerpts (and some summary) from arguments
put forth by Charles A. Wright:
"I would like to take as the text for my argument
this morning a sentence from an article that Professor
Coons and his collaborators, Sugarman and Clune, wrote
last year.
They said:

It is cited at page 44 of my initial brief.
' of all public functions, education in its

goals and methods is least understood and most in need
of local variety, experimentation, and independence.'
"That, I think, is wise counsel.
the argument for reversal in this case.

I believe that is
In our view, the

Texas system of school finance, imperfect as it is •..
does allow for local variety, experimentation and independence; not as much as I would like it to, but that is
its
, goal, that is its rationale, and for that reason there
is a rational basis to it, and I will undertake to develop
our view that the

·rational basis test is the.appropriate

test.
"The view adopted by the district court that there is
a rigid constitutional mandate that the quality of education may not be a function of wealth, except the wealth of
the state as a whole, in my submission, is based on educational assumptions about matters that are today not understood and about which educators are not ready to form firm
judgments, •••

...
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"[It] would seriously inhibit,

if it would not destroy

altogether, the possibilities for local variety, experimentation and independence, of which Messrs. Coons, et al.,
quite properly speak so warmly.

..

"Proposition One, the proposition adopted by the
district court in this case, would

i~pose

a constitutional

strait jacket on the public schools of 50 states.

It

would mean that hereafter and permanently, or at least
until a new book is written and the Constitution changes
again, that all measurements in terms of the public schools,
must be in terms of per/capita or per/pupil student expenditures, even though there may be many other things that
we ought to be worrying about in an effort to cure the
problems of public education."
Then followed a discussion of district ppwer equalization by Mr. Wright with question from the court.
Justice White asked Mr. Wright if it was not necessary
for the court to assure a minimum level of spending throughout the State of Texas, to which Mr. Wright responded in
part:

"I do not think you have to decide that.

I am pre-

pared for purposes of the present a.rgument, Justice

~Jhi te,

without foreclosing what I may say the next time I am up
before you on a different case, to concede that there is
a constitutional minimum that could be required.
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"I think that there were certainly overtones of that
in Yoder last term when the court talked about a basic
education and quoted what Thomas Jefferson had to say
about it and things of that sort, so that I can understand
what to me is a viable constitutional argument, that a
minimum education is required.

But I do not think there

is any issue between the parties in this case on whether
or not Texas is providing a minimum education.
"I certainly would not want to put words into the
mouths of my friends.

But their pleading is not drawn

on the theory that the foundation program does not give
Edgewood enough.

Their theory is that it does not give

Edgewood as much as Alamo Heights and that there is the
constitutional violation. And that is certainly the consti"'
tutional violation found by the district court. The
district court made no finding that we fall below whatever the

constitutional minimum may be ••• "

Then followed an exchange by Justice Rehnquist and
Mr. Wright.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST:

"Do you know of any case in this

court which has ever held that it would be unconstitutional for a state simply to get out of the business of
public education bag and baggage?"
MR. WRIGHT:

"I know of no such case, and I would say

there were certainly strong implications in the Prince
Edward county case that a state could do exactly that •.• "

c

-61-

JUSTICE REHNQUIST:

"Then why do you say that a

minimum education may be a constitutional requirement if
a state could get out of it entirely?"
MR. WRIGHT:

..

"I, of course, you recall, sir, made my

concession entirely in terms of this case.

I think I can

safely ooncede it here, but I do not have to take on that
argument in order to win this case; even if a minimum is
constitutionally required, Texas wins here.

I must say

I am attracted, Justice Rehnquist, as a scholar to the
argument that it might be, despite the intimations of your
previous cases, that today the failure of state to provide
an education altogether would inhibit the First Amendment
rights, that a state has an obligation to teach children
to read and to write.

I do not know that I would accept

that argument, but I can see the possibilities of sketching
out an argument of that kind."
JUSTICE REHNQUIST:

"In the past two or three years,

-

did not Mr. Justice Black in one opinion, whether part of
the holding or not, did he not say pretty flatly a state

..

could close all its schools if it wanted to?"
MR. WRIGHT:

"I think he said something of the sort in

Palmer v. Thompson, the swimming pool case--"
JUSTICE REHNQUIST:

"Is there a question, however,

that once the state undertakes to furnish education, then
it must furnish a certain minimal adequate education for
everybody?

Once they start to go down that row, they must

follow through."
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MR WRIGHT:
yes.

"We certainly must do it for everybody,

If we are going to do it for any, then we must do

it for every young person in the state."
Justice Brennan next asked a question about district
power equalizations.
"On district power equalizations, what about the
percentage of ratings?

Do they not differ in Texas?

They seem to everywhere else.

Some places assess at 30

percent and some at eighty and some at a hundred."
MR. WRIGHT:

"They differ very widely in Texas as

they do in most states, Justice Brennan, and I think
that if a state were to adopt district power equalizing,
it as a practical matter would have to adopt statewide
as~essing,

I do not see any other way in which the scheme

would be feasible.

Otherwise you simply use a favorable

rate, and you get more than you are entitled to.

And I

think that demonstrates the further incursion on local
government that the ideas presented here by the Appellees
[lawyers for Rodriguez]

represent, that very little is

to be left of local government if the decision below is
to be affirmed.
"We contend, of course, that if we are subject only to
the rational basis test, that this is not one of those
cases in which we must demonstrate a compelling state
interest in order to justify the results for which we
argue and justify the state plan.
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"And we think that there are quite a number of very
recent cases in this court, some of them ignored by the
lower court and some of them still more recent, that show
exactly that and show that this court is not going to

.

impose a constitutional strait jacket on the states in
difficult, intractable questions of social reform, welfare, economics, Dandridge, Lindsey, Jefferson v. Hackney,
cases of that kind, and we think this is clearly in the
area with which we are concerned.

The appellees undertake

to distinguish these and to suggest that in some way the
educational needs of the poor are fundamental, while their
needs for food, for housing, are not.

And, with respect,

this is a distinction that I think simply is not a tenable
one, that it is hard to say that a higher salaried school
teacher is more fundamental to a poor child than food or
a sound roof over head."
Mr. Wright then took up several

issues regarding the

relationship of money to quality and education.
I

He

challenged the district court's findings "that there is a
correlation between poor people and poor school districts,"
arguing that the information which the district court had
had was not truly representative.
Connecticut which tended to shav

He cited a study in

the opposite "that it is

the poor poeple who live in the area where the most is
being spent on education and the rich people live in the
areas where the least is being spent on education."
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This discussion was interrupted by Justice Douglas
who asked, "As I read this record, Mr. Wright, it seemed
to me that the testimony -- I am not sure about the
findings -- pretty clearly demonstrate there is unequal
treatment of these respondents who are Americans of
Spanish ancestry at educational levels.

Is that any part

of this litigation?"
MR. WRIGHT:

"The racial issue is in this litigation,

yes, Justice Douglas.
tiffs' complaint.
its opinion.
ineq~ality

It is a major portion of the plain-

The trial court did not rely on it in

It put its holding squarely

on the dollar

without regard to whether the particular plain-

tiffs were of Spanish ancestry of Anglo or what.

But the

issue is certainly there.
~

"We think that the issue is one that is fairly readily answered, that although it is of course quite true
that in the Edgewood School District . in Bexar County, Texas,
the great majority of the students are of Spanish origin
and not as much money is spent there as in other school
districts.

But we doubt that this would be found to be

true as a general matter.

But the poor school districts

are not that congruent with racial distributions, that it
is, in other words, a happenstance.

We have a case in

which we have particular plaintiffs who are MexicanAmerican and who live in a district with low taxable
resources.

-65-

"l.gain, on these factual statistical problems, we
think that the state of the literature simply does not
perroit the conclusions that are essePtial to the position
of my fri e nd; and that even if their conclusions were
sound, we still think that our legal argument would have
great merit.

But if their conclusions are not

de~onstrable

esse~tial

at the present time because they are the

premises

of the results for which they argue, we think that the
inability to demonstrate the accuracy of these assumptions
is fatal to tr:cir case."
Chief Justice Bruger interrupted:

.-

"I assume you use

the term 'state of the literature' in the broader sense
of state of the human knowledge on this?"
ME.

vJRIGHT:

"Yes, yes.

That is exactly the sense

in which I use it, Mr. Chief Justice.

I would like ...

to quote from the book by Messrs. Coons, Sugarman, and
Clune.

They say -- the quotation appears on page 24 of

our initial brief-- 'It is not surprising that even the
present litigation is understood by many of its close
supporters as a racial struggle.

The fact is otherwise.

There is no reason to suppose that the

system of district-

based school finance embodies racial bias ... No doubt there
are poor districts which are basically Negro, but it is
clear alMost Ly definition that the vast preponderance of
such districts is white.'
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"Professor Coons and his associates have supported
that statement, by figures showing thaL in California, for
example, 59% of minority students live in districts in
which the assessed values are above the nedian and therefore, if we would have strict equalization, they would
get less than even novl. ''
Mr. Wright concluded his testimony thus:
"I am not here to apologize for the Texas school
finance system, and I have said repeatedly that it seems
to me far from perfect.

I think that the Texas system

does assure, as evidence in the record shows, more than
merely a minimumi it insures a basic education to every
school child in the state, and it then lets districts,
if they have r,·,oney and vlant to spend money, go beyond
that.

As I uncerstand the argument of my friend, Mr.

Gochman, it would not matter if Texas were giving each
school district in the state $2,000 per student.

If Alamo

Heights were still free to tax, with its heavy resouces,
and spend more than Edgevmod was, he v10ul.d still find this
to be impermissible, although, for reasons that are not
persuasive to me, he regards the same result as quite
different if it stems from district power equalizing
than if it comes out of the mere facts as they are.

...
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"I have said several times in my brief -- and I want
to say here and say with the utmost sincerity -- how much
I admire the creative scholarship of Professor Coons and
his associates, my colleague Professor Udall, and others
who have written in the field, and I admire also the devotion and the ability with which Mr. Gochman has perservered in this case. These people have opened the eyes of
the whole country to a very serious problem.

I think

that every one in this courtroom would agree that what
we want is better education for all children and especially
for p9or children, that the real differences between us

..

are whether a new system should be adopted because this
court finds that the Constitution requires it or whether
we look to legislatures to provide remedies and the
difference about whether the proposals they make would
indeed lead to better education or only more expensive
education, whether they would relieve poor children or
only children who happen to live in poor school districts,
and indeed if district power equalizing is to be taken
seriously, whether the remedy that has been offered here
is not one that is of no benefit to children but only of
benefit to taxpayers."
Arthur Gochman presented the case for Rodgriguez,
et al, substantially as follows.
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"The court below held the Texas system unconstitutional because it distributes educational benefits on
the basis of district wealth.

The court said, as might

be expected, those districts most rich in property also
have the highest median family income and the lowest percentage of minority pupils, while the poorer districts are
poorer in income and predominantly minority in composition ...
"The court further found that there was no rational
or compelling reason that could be offered for this invidious discrimination.

This court is to decide whether or

not to reverse the lower court and approve District 12 as
a proper basis for distributing public school education.
corr~Ja-

"The defendants admit that there is a perfect

tion between the property tax base per/student and the
~

amount of dollars each child gets for his education.
Mr. Justice Brennan, tax rates do vary in Texas.

Yes,

But the

district taxing at the highest rates in Texas get the lowest dollars per/pupil, and the districts taxing at the
lowest rate get the highest dollars per/pupil;

and we

showed it in exhibits in Bexar County where my clients
live, a metropolitan area, and we showed it statewide."
Mr. Gochman was interrupted by two justices who challenged whether or not there weren't some school districts
where the per/capita income is low, but the schools
have a lot of money to spend.

'·

.
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While Mr. Gochman agreed this could and did happen,
he emphasized that this was not the case in Bexar County,
where Edgewood I. S. D and San Antonio

I. S. D are located.

Mr. Gochman was asked about other social services
such as police and fire protection and public health
facilities.

He replied, "I think what is important is

the constitutional importance of education.

And that is,

education affects matters guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
It is preservative of other rights, unlike some of these
othEr services.
we have.
[and to]

It is related to every important right

It is related to the right to vote,
jury service.

[to] speech,

You cannot serve on a federal

jury if you cannot read, write, understand, and speak the
English language.

It 'is education this co~rt has used as

the high water mark for measuring the importance of other
rights ..•
"Public health, food, lodging, these things are of
great economic importance.

But they are not matters that

are related to those things guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.

And in importance, education lies at the apex

up and down the ladder.

It is important to the free enter-

prise system, to the individual not to the poor.
important to fulfill individual potential.
sally relevant.

It is

It is univer-

And it is the only thing the state pro-

vides that it compels you to utilize for this period of
time.
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"But a child has to go to school for ten years.
is the importance that the state puts on it.

That

It molds the

character and the personality of the individual.

And it is

vital for the United States to compete in the world.
"But they seek to rationalize this and say it is all
right on the basis of local control, on the basis of
diversity, variety, independence.

[Local control is the]

one thing the Texas system does not have, because those
that tax at the highest rates, as I said a moment ago,
have the lowest expenditures per/pupil.

And those that

tax at the lowest rate have the highest expenditures per
pupil.

This is just the reverse of local control.

"In San Antonio, Edgewood taxes at a rate
~igher

than Alamo Heights.

odd dollars a pupil.
pupil.

20%

But they raise thirty some-

Alamo Heights raises over $400 a

It is the property tax base that determines how

much you have for a child's education.
base and who set that standard?

And who set that

The state.

And they

agree that this is a state system of public school education.

And these school districts were set up by the state

for the convenience of the state in affording public
school

education.

"They also agree that these district boundaries serve
no educational function, and they have no rational basis."
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Next Mr. Gochman was asked if he agreed with Mr. Wright
that the state foundation contribution is sufficient to
provide an adequate education.

He said he did not and

followed with a question of his own.
"What is a minimum?
asking you to get into?

viThat kind of morass is Mr. Wright
What is a minimum? .•• Are we going

to have two classes of citizens, minimum opportunity
citizens and first-class citizens?

I think in Sweatt we

took care of that, and I think in McLaurin we took care
of that."
Mr. Gochman then got into the issue of power equalization when he was asked the following question:

"In

power equalization, if after providing a minimum education,
if a district decided that they wanted to spend more money
on education, they could decide to spend it; is that right?"
Mr. Gochman agreed.
Another justice asked if there was any system which
would satisfy Mr. Gochman's objections to the present
Texas. system.

To which Mr. Gochman replied in substance:

"One thing they are looking at in Texas for example
is, you take all the nonresidential wealth and you tax
it statewide and you tax the residential wealth on a
county-wide basis.

In taxing the residential wealth on

a county-wide basis each district, by improving its own
tax rate, will get itself reore money.
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"But there is a basis, because pretty well, on a
county-wide basis throughout the state, the residential
tax basis will be equal or the variance will relate to
the higher cost of living."
A justice then summarized, "As I get your position,
it is not that just unequal inputs per se violate the
equal protection clause.

So far it sounds like you are

syaing that the fact that there are some districts that
are locked in is what violates the equal protection clause.
There is nothing they can do about having a better educa-

-.

tion either from the state foundation program or from
taxing at higher rates."
Again Mr. Gochman agreed.
A long discussion on power equalization followed.
Then

~1r.

Gochman concluded his oral arguments by stating:

"One thing [the Appellants] are asking you to do in
this case is to declare constitutional a system that is
based on money making a difference and giving incentive
matching grants to those schools that have the most money
and put up the most money for education, and ask you to
declare that system to be constitutional on the ground
that money makes no difference.

Actually at the trial of

this case thay all agreed that money made some difference.
Now they say that a minimum program is enough, which is
admission that money must make a difference, that there
must be a maximum program.

;.

\

(.
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"But again I want to go into the fact that Sweatt,
J think,

did away with minimuros.

And I want to point

the court to McLaurin, because this is what the state
•

did.

And it is not what will happen as a result that

counts.

In McLaurin the State of Oklahoma s&id this

child shall sit in the back of the room.
dent shall sit in the back of the room,

This law stu'Well, nobody

else would have sat with him anyway; so, the statute
ought to be upheld because it wouldn't be any different
if we didn't have it.'

And the court said,

'Khat the

state did is what is important.'
"I want to say, in concluding, that the San Antonio
Independent School District, the central city district,
is a main defendant in this case.

And they fought us

hard at the trial level, got out on a motion to dismiss;
but on appeal of this case, after seeing the decision of
the trial court, and the equity involved and the vast
discrimination, filed a brief in support of the decision
of the trial court."
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